That’s not an argument, it’s a question. The obvious answer was, we don’t know — we won’t knw until we fly it to find out. No one knew that unmanned spy satellites would be useful until the government had built and tested a few satellites. So, I guess you think those satellites should never have been built?

> Or, if the military needs a Dyna Soar type manned shuttle, it clearly cannot be launched by existing
> boosters such as Titan which are too small, too expensive and cannot be turned around quickly enough

You assume Dyna Soar would have been the last manned spacecraft the aircraft built, rather than the first, and that no one would ever develop a new booster.

Do you think it was a mistake for the Army to buy a Wright flyer, since it was too small to be useful?

> remember: the Shuttle was supposed to be launched 40-60 times a year…

Marcus, Marcus. You never change, do you? Because the Space Shuttle failed, every spacecraft must fail?

The first jet airliner built by the British suffered catastrophic failure of the pressure hull. Does that mean all airliners will suffer similar failures?

> But it is difficult to see why MOL or Dyna-Soar would be any more useful than the Shuttle, Hermes,
> HL-20, NASA’s recently aborted “AeroSpace Plane” mini-shuttle plans or similar systems.

You never could see any value in experimental systems.

If the British had built an experimental airplane to study large pressurized airframes, prior to building the Comet, would you consider that a waste of money?

Impossible? No, but both projects would most likely have been useless to the military since they had very few opeational capabilities to begin with. The Space Shuttle seemed more useful as an operational system, since it could carry large military payloads into orbit on a regular basis. Or that was the idea, anyway…
—
Of course, MOL and Dyna-Soar would have been cheaper but they were nonetheless essentially experimental programs without any operational capabilities to speak of. The argument in 1969 was, why spend $2 billion on a manned can in orbit when unmanned spy satellites can do the same job? Or, if the military needs a Dyna Soar type manned shuttle, it clearly cannot be launched by existing boosters such as Titan which are too small, too expensive and cannot be turned around quickly enough (remember: the Shuttle was supposed to be launched 40-60 times a year…)
—
I do think a fairly strong argument could be made for gradually upgrading the X-15 and XB-70 into a small rapid-response access-to-space system … maybe we would have something resembling cheap(er) access to orbit in that case. But it is difficult to see why MOL or Dyna-Soar would be any more useful than the Shuttle, Hermes, HL-20, NASA’s recently aborted “AeroSpace Plane” mini-shuttle plans or similar systems.

MARCU$

ASATs are a poor choice of weapon for that purpose. Like bombing an Air France office because we didn’t like something they did, it’s unlikely to be politically supportable. This really falls under the heading of space control. A technician with a pair of wirecutters can disable a satellite without destroying it permanently. That’s one reason why the left is so opposed to the US military developing any manned space capabilities.

Hitchins didn’t “observe” anything. She is of the opinion that space weapons will not defend systems. This has never been observed. And your dismissal of Dolman’s arguments as theoretical rather than practical is entirely based on one’s point of view. At least “theoretical” means logical thought applied in a rigorous system of hypotheses and theories. “Practical” is far lazier because you get to start with an opinion (space weapons are bad) and work your way down. Space weapons won’t work. If they do work, they’re too expensive. If they aren’t too expensive, they’re destabilizing. If they aren’t destabilizing, they’re immoral. Ad infinitum. You yourself even proved that “practical” means lazy adherence to a foregone proposition. Its simply too expensive to protect the global commons? You can’t know that because its never been tried! Many can agree that it would not be cheap, but value judgements are not a monopoly granted only to you.

Also, space weapons are not meant solely to protect our space assets. Orbital bombardment would be used for rapid attack, not as a deterrent against assault on GPS. ASATS are space superiority weapons, perhaps to threaten hostile nations or commercial operators to stop selling sat imagery or comm bandwidth to Al Quaeda, North Korea, etc.. Only space based BMD could really be used to protect our systems. Yet this is again a favorite tactic of those opposed to space weapons. The naysayers focus only on one proposition they think they can beat and paint a broad stroke. Sorry, Hitchens, strategic thinking is somewhat more rigorous than that.

Mr. Bush is correct–I should have written 200%, not 300%. Alternatively, if I had simply said that it is now expected to cost “three times” as much, that would have been correct. I will ask Dr. Foust to correct my mistake.

However, this is probably one of those cases where I could be more accurate by being more vague, because precise information is contradictory and confusing. Finding out the original cost estimate for SBIRS-High is not easy. A recent Aviation Week article stated that the original estimate was for $4 billion and that it was now expected to exceed $11 billion. However, a November 18, 1996 Aviation Week article (“New Sensors Drive Winning SBIRS Bid,” p. 23) indicates that the initial contract for five geostationary satellites (one as spare) and sensors for two other satellites in Molniya orbits was “valued at around $2 billion.” That would mean that the current cost is now estimated at six times the original cost. However, I don’t find that $2 billion estimate to be believable for a brand new, highly sophisticated satellite system. It would have meant per-satellite costs at under $400 million apiece, which doesn’t happen in the DoD space world.

On another note, National Public Radio picked up on the space weaponization story on their program “Talk of the Nation.” You can listen to that segment here:

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4666532

One of the guests is the NY Times reporter, Tim Weiner, who first broke this story–and botched it in the process. Weiner is actually a business reporter for the Times. (I assume that the Times has a dedicated military/Pentagon reporter. I don’t know why the story was not assigned to him. Probably because Weiner got the initial tip about plans to update the DoD space policy.)

It is clear that Weiner actually read my piece, because he mentions previous unrealistic Air Force space proposals like military bases on the moon and the Orion rocket, and then makes a clear distinction between the rhetoric of the Air Force space program and actual funded programs. Let’s hope that he can turn his attention to current problems, like SBIRS-High’s travails, and that the next time he decides to write about space weaponization he does a little more research first.

Overall, the discussion on the program was pretty good (helped by the fact that Weiner started by noting the gap between rhetoric and reality which was missing in his original article). Theresa Hitchens, of the Center for Defense Information, made an excellent observation that developing space weapons does nothing to protect American space assets. To be fair, many US military leaders have made the same point numerous times. They ephasize that because the United States has so much to lose in space, it is more important to develop defensive and redundant systems than it is to develop weapons. Hitchens is probably the most well-read person on the “anti-space weaponization” side. As I noted in my article, the “peace and justice” groups (I use the quotes on purpose) have long demonstrated a poor grasp of facts on this subject. Hitchens is a major improvement on that side of the debate.

[An aside: in the 1970s and 1980s, the United States chose to develop the F-15 ASAT weapon precisely to serve as a deterrent to the Soviets. In other words, that was a case where a US space weapon was intended to defend American space assets. However, that situation is changed. It is unlikely that something like an ASAT could deter North Korea from attacking American satellites. It would require some other form of deterrent to do that.]

The program also featured Everett Dolman, professor at the Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama. Dolman argued more on the theoretical side than the practical one, about the United States “preserving the commons” of space for the rest of the world. The problem is that this theory does not extend to practical solutions very well. It is simply too expensive to field a global constellation of space weapons to preserve this commons.

Either Dolman or a phone-in questioner chided Hitchens and her side for an apparent flaw in their argument, saying that they cannot simultaneously argue that space weapons are impractical and expensive, and yet also claim that if the United States builds them it will cause others to follow suit. Although this is somewhat true, it also demonstrates the limits of viewing this subject in terms of left/right and pro/con debating tactics. The reality is that the United States _could_ waste a lot of money on an impractical weapons system that ultimately does not work, and yet still prompt other countries to develop their own weapons that ultimately work to our disadvantage. For instance, if the USAF chose to develop an orbital bombardment weapon (the so-called “Rods from God” proposal), it could prompt other countries to develop anti-satellite weapons that they might otherwise not develop. The end result could be that the US abandons its initial program, but now finds that one or several other countries have developed ASATs that risk our space assets.

The program is about 25 minutes long and worth listening to if you want to educate yourself on the subject.

“There have been several unclassified reports on what went wrong with SBIRS that have led to what now appear to be 300% cost overruns. (The exact overrun is unclear, but it appears that the original program was supposed to cost $4 billion and will now cost $12 billion.)”

A 100% cost overrun would drive $4 billion up to $8 billion. 100% increase, in other words, means it costs twice as much.
Therefore 4 to 12 is a 200% overrun, not 300%. 200% increase = 3x as much. That’s still unacceptably high, of course.

I tend to be on the side of those who want to build things they know are possible within the laws of physics, but are beset by critics who only know it cant be done because they personally cant figure out how to do it, or because it hasn’t been done before.

I’ve worked systems, where we did build things that worked, and constantly had to fight with the opponents saying it couldn’t be done, because their company/program hadn’t been able to do it.

Which is quite frustrating when you have the proof in hand and the naysayer continues to deny the reality of it.

No, you are not the only American who thinks it’s impossible to do anything that changes the status quo.

The fact that two or more people agree does not prove you are right.

You very much resemble the reporter who thought Nixon couldn’t have won the election because no one she knew voted for Nixon.

Many people have patiently explained to you why things you think “impossible” are, in fact, quite possible — to no avail. Economics, engineering, even basic physics seem to roll off you like water off a duck’s back.

I know I have spent too much time putting out the fires caused by management, or sales types claiming that the impossible can be done. And by impossible I mean, not hasn’t been done before, but violates the known laws of physics. Those fires have to be put out right away because they are program killers.