You’re projecting. Even before the VSE was announced, O’Keefe was on record on the importance of returning the shuttle to flight.

Who dat?

We’re looking at lift in general. This is why the process of defining the requirements is so important. We have to do the trade studies between an EELV—what does it take from a business case to human-rate that, and the costs of in-space assembly—to the full scope of a shuttle-derived alternative—what does it mean to maintain the infrastructure that we currently have in place—and any kind of hybrids in between.

Almost everything in your 6 points is just conjecture, or just an option. In 18 months they never even drew a likely picture of the crucial CEV. That is indeed technically blank.

And technically ignorant too, to refer to both an LEO vehicle to service the space station and vehicles to travel to the moon and Mars as “the CEV”. That’s like referring to a river ferry, a coastal yacht, and a trans-Atlantic cruiser as “the boat”. It makes no sense to say “the” for three completely different things.

1. Use the EELVs, and possibly Ariane.

2. Build the CEV to fly on any EELV-sized launch vehicle for maximum flexibility and to avoid ever again being dependent on a single rocket. This was the cheif lesson learned from Columbia, which we appear already to have forgotton.

3. Complete the Station using the Shuttle. (My guess is that this was added over O’Keefe’s head and is unrealistic now, but it probably did not appear so then.)

4. Use the CEV to support the Station once the Shuttle is retired.

5. Launch a version of the CEV on upper stages launched by separate, uprated EELV(s) to the moon.

6. Launch a future version of the CEV on an HLV to be developed in the future to go to Mars.

So, what, specifically, is “technically unrealistic” or “blank” about this plan?

I didn’t like O’Keefe at first for many of the reasons that you don’t now, but I think that’s a great plan and it is what turned my thinking about him around. It’s what you get when you take a fresh look at something from a perspective outside of the usual suspects.

Then NASA got hold of the plan and turned it into a launch vehicle development plan, and that, most likely, was the end of the VSE.

— Donald

On the other hand, some other people at NASA did start to fill in the technical void with their own assertions. That was when the plan started to look either impossible, or self-contradictory, or a sham (depending on interpretation). Gerstenmaier said 28 more shuttle flights. Steidle said that NASA did not need heavy lift for many years. If you have 28 more shuttle flights, and you’re not developing heavy lift, how exactly is that going to the moon? O’Keefe never explained that one. Instead, he quit.

I really don’t see the value of a “politically realistic” proposal which is technically blank. If it were home renovation, it would almost be a comedy routine:

Client: “We have a great vision for our kitchen. We want marble surfaces, more room, artistic designs, and a completely new layout.”

Contractor: “Ordinarily that would cost you $20,000.”

Client: “I’m sorry but that’s not politically realistic. We can only spare $5,000.”

Contractor: “Okay, then it will cost $5,000.”

So the contractor makes a contract and some blueprints, then draws a month of pay and quits. His replacement raises the cost estimate to $10,000 and that annoys the clients.

At least in my case, the answer to this is easy. Mr. O’Keefe presented a plan that, unlike any prior plan NASA has proposed, was politically realistic first, and technically realistic second. Your critique of it on technical grounds, while remarkably lacking and specifics and featuring rather too many personal attacks, may well have merit. However, I believe that my criticism of Dr. Griffin’s plans on political grounds have equal merit.

Mr. O’Keefe started out from first principles. What can we afford? Answer: NASA’s current budget. Is there a way we can go forward using NASA’s current human spaceflight budget or close to it? Answer: Maybe, by phasing out the current program as quickly as politically expedient, using existing launch vehicles, making the payloads (CEV, etc.) fit within that envelope and use as much current technology as possible, and defer new launchers and new technology until after the program starts. This strikes me, and others, as an eminently realistic approach, indeed the only approach that has even a chance to succeed.

Dr. Griffin’s approach is essentially the traditional NASA approach. What do we need to get back to the moon? Not what can we afford, but what do we need?

I would argue that Mr. O’Keefe’s approach is far closer to how you would renovate your house. You don’t ask, what do I need to make the perfect, efficient roof designed to last forever and with no chance of anyone getting hurt building it? You ask, what roof can I afford, or borrow enough money to invest in, and give your contractor their marching orders. You don’t tell your contractor to build a roof, full-stop. You ask them, what kind of roof can you build me for X dollars, and then make your decision based on the answers. You don’t necessarily start with the expert — the carpenter — you start with your banker (Mr. O’Keefe), then you go talk to your carpenter (or his boss).

O’Keefe’s plans may well have been technically impractical, though I have heard almost no one(including you) say that. But I, and apparently many others, believe they were a better approach than Dr. Griffin’s pay-whatever-it-takes approach.

I suspect that Mr. O’Keefe wanted to shut down the Shuttle and Station projects right away, and was vetoed by the President (for reasons that I don’t clearly understand since this President isn’t known for caring what other countries think and he probably had the political capital after Columbia). Given the political requirement to fly out the Shuttle and Space Station programs, Mr. O’Keefe and Dr. Griffin have both done the best they can to get started quickly. The decision, right or wrong, was undoubtedly made above their pay scales.

— Donald

Freeways, on the other hand, were immediately realistic when Eisenhower endorsed interstates. You don’t have to have the whole vast interstate network to see benefits. Instead, you can build the first several and expand from there if the plan is working.

Certainly not every presidential plan should be completed within eight years. That’s overstating the point. I do argue that you should either deeply trust the president, or demand some hard deliverables within eight years. Not necessarily the whole home renovation, but at least a very good kitchen. Do you deeply trust Bush on this? If not, how do you know that he’s not leading you down the garden path?

Not precisely, but I would probably expect the ballpark to be of a similar size. I would also expect the new crew to use as much as possible of the old crew’s work. If they declined, I might find someone else in the old crew to manage the project and continue the original design. I would not throw up my hands, say the project is impossible, and give up my house, which seems to be your solution.

but Bush will be gone before we see any deliverables of that vision.

So what? That is an inevitable consequence of taking on a large project. Are you saying that every project humanity (or the United States) undertakes must be accomplished in eight years? Or are you saying that all human projects that took or will take longer (nuclear fusion, the freeway network, developing practical jet transports, any great city) should never be attempted?

In and of itself, the fact that Mr. Bush will not be around when the VSE shows a usable result is meaningless.

— Donald

But what does it say about the cost projections if their author, Sean O’Keefe, chose not to be answerable for them? Say that the contractor who wrote the cost sheet for your home renovation quit before any work started. Would you still demand that the new crew stick to the old cost estimates?

This is going to play out even larger in 2010. As Roland emphasized, it’s the Bush vision, but Bush will be gone before we see any deliverables of that vision.