Mr Day has a good deal of decent material above, but I would like to add some more that generally tend to be less bureaucratic and more supportive of a USSF.

Everett Dolman’s Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age lays a great theoretical foundation for an independent space power theory.

http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/bibs/sepsp/sepsp.htm

The web site above is from the USAF Officer Training School and is a compilation of some of the articles and papers written regarding a separate space force. Of particular interestst is Col Story’s paper and Col Whittington’s. However, all are good sources.

Sorry, I missed that. Since there were no quotes, I assumed the words were your commentary.

> So, you conclude that nothing can be fast, easy, cheap, and simple?

Perhaps I misunderstand whom you mean by “you,” but I didn’t write anything following the URL. The author or perhaps the Air Force Magazine staff did.

I posted the URL and lead-in because I thought it is an interesting and useful article that addresses an identifiable and real problem the US has in the miilitary use of space.

> Making space launch faster, easier, and cheaper sounds simple. It’s not.

Developing ELVs isn’t fast, easy, or cheap? I am shocked.

And RASCAL didn’t work? Trying to fly to 200,000 feet with turbojets — you’re surprised that didn’t work.

So, you conclude that nothing can be fast, easy, cheap, and simple?

What about SpaceShip One? The article doesn’t say that was impossible and failed.

RASCAL wasn’t fast, easy, or cheap because it wasn’t simple. It failed because it dictated a complicated approach, not because what it was trying to do was impossible.

SpaceShip One easily exceeded the RASCAL altitude goals, because it was using a simple rocket engine rather than a bleeding-edge airbreather.

Just because one thing fails does not mean everything will fail.

Likewise, the article also states, “Satellites typically take months to ‘check out.'” Does that mean it’s impossible to ship complex electronics without months of checkout? Companies like Dell and Apple do it every day.

It’s easy to think up reasons why things are “impossible.”
It takes slightly more work to make them happen.

As Roosevelt said, “It is not the critic who counts.”

http://www.afa.org/magazine/March2006/0306space.asp

Making space launch faster, easier, and cheaper sounds simple. It’s not.

Responsive Space
By Jeremy Singer

As I sit here I am tempted to think that orbital combat will evolve into something akin to submarine warfare where stealth will be the best defense. A high value asset can be hidden from radar fairly easily given the lack of aerodynamic demands on a satellite. Communication with the SV could be done either though a proxy in higher orbit (radiating away from earth so the SV does not reveal its position) or even better, with lasers that may direct communication onto a very precise target.

There are also the more mundane methods of denying service by jamming or spoofing, perhaps even eclipsing a SV with an umbrella like interceptor, who knows. The point is, our assets are not as secure as they once were, as we make space cheaper, it becomes cheaper for the badguys too.

Hard kill, soft kill, stealth, electronic spoofing, decoys, hidden silent replacements, temporary proxies on quick-reaction vehicles…

> What likely threats wouldn’t they protect against?

They wouldn’t protect against paper cuts, pitbulls, or shark attacks.

That argument is a red herring, No weapon, whether ground-, sea-, air-, or space-based, can protect against every possible type of attack. No one expects them to. That’s why we build more than one type of weapon.

> Note that the US depends far more on space for warfighting than other
> countries — what might hurt us a lot might be more of a nuisance for
> China.

Even if true, that’s not an argument for disarmament. If the Chinese can “hurt us lot,” there’s no guarantee they’ll refrain merely because we avoid developing weapons that are a “nuisance for China.”

> Conventional, precision-guided ballistic missiles in particular should be
> examined as an alternative to orbital bombardment.

Do you really think no one has every examined them?

A “conventional precision-guided ballistic missile” costs millions of dollars. A reusable spaceplane could accomplish the same mission for a small fraction of the cost (and other missions that ballistic missiles can’t).

> I think that the US currently should be worrying more about increasing
> the survivability of its space-based capabilities through traditional
> means such as redundancy, dispersal, rapid replacibility, some hardening,
> alternate means, etc.

It’s hard to have much redundancy or rapid replacement when a single satellite launch costs many millions of dollars and requires an expendable launcher that must be ordered many months, or even years, before it is used.

It’s difficult to harden satellites when every ounce of excess weight must be avoided because launch costs are so high.

It’s impossible to disperse ELVs that can only operate from one or two national ranges.

> Of course, if everybody could just get along we wouldn’t have to worry about any of this.

Are you willing to grow a beard, burn your cassette tapes, and worship Allah in the Al Queda-approved manner? All of those are prerequisites for “getting along.”

I’d rather invest in the weapons needed to secure our freedoms.

I suggest starting with several papers from Aerospace Power Journal:

Lt Col Peter Hays and Dr. Karl Mueller, “Going Boldly–Where? Aerospace Integration, the Space Commission, and the Air Force’s Vision for Space,” Spring 2001.

Lt Col Cynthia McKinley, “The Guardians of Space: Organizing America’s Space Assets for the Twenty-First Century,” Spring 2000.

Maj Gen John Barry and Col Darrell Herriges, “Aerospace Integration, Not Separation,” Summer 2000.

Lt Gen Bruce Carlson, “Protecting Global Utilities: Safeguarding the Next Millennium’s Space-Based Public Services,” Summer 2000.

A few additional articles:

Brigadier General Simon Peter Worden, “The Air Force and Future Space Directions: Are We Good Stewards?” Aerospace Power Journal, Spring 2001.

Ralph Milsap, and D. B. Posey, “Organizational Options for the Future Aerospace Force,” Aerospace Power Journal, Summer 2000.

Add to that several chapters in books:

Peter L. Hays, James M. Smith, Alan R. Van Tassel, and Guy M. Walsh, “Spacepower for a New Millennium: Examining Current U.S. Capabilities and Policies, in Peter L. Hays et al., eds., Spacepower for a New Millennium: Space and U.S. National Security,New York: McGraw Hill, 2000.

Brigadier General Earl S. Van Inwegen, “The Air Force Develops an Operational Organization for Space,” in Cargill Hall and Jacob Neufeld, eds., The U.S. Air Force in Space: 1945 to the 21st Century, Washington, D.C.: USAF History and Museums Program, 1995.

Brigadier General Simon Peter Worden, “Space Control for the 21st Century: A Space ‘Navy’ Protecting the Commercial Basis of America’s Wealth,” in Peter L. Hays et al., eds., Spacepower for a New Millennium: Space and U.S. National Security, New York: McGraw Hill, 2000.

And a few books:

Major Stephen M. Rothstein, Dead on Arrival? The Development of the Aerospace Concept, 1944–58, Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air University Press, November 2000.

Steven Lambakis, On the Edge of Earth: The Future of American Space Power, Lexington, Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press, 2001.

For a more basic discussion of the development of an organization within the Air Force to conduct space acquisition and operations, I would suggest starting with the management and organizational chapter in David Spire’s book Orbital Futures (it is in Volume 1; my contributions were largely limited to providing a number of documents used in Volume 2).

You can add to that Spire’s history of the Air Force space program, Beyond Horizons. I think it is a little dated, because it was written in the mid-1990s and could not benefit from some later document declassifications (thankfully rectified with the Orbital Futures volumes).

The predominant theme running through much of this literature is the question of whether the Air Force is effective at providing the user community what it needs from space assets, AND whether an alternative organizational structure would be better at providing those services.

That is,

– Just how and to what extent would escort/ defensive satellites protect high-value US satellites? What likely threats wouldn’t they protect against? How do you protect against a direct-ascent ASAT or other object closing at km/s speeds with little warning?

– What enemy satellites do we want to destroy/ degrade with ASATs and other offensive sats? What leverage would that provide against the enemy’s ability to wage war? Note that the US depends far more on space for warfighting than other countries — what might hurt us a lot might be more of a nuisance for China.

As for space-to-ground/air/sea weapons, those might well be worth thinking about. (I kind of like the idea of a few orbital lasers for non-time-critical or surprise attacks against softish targets.) But again, some careful thinking about what the mission is and what other means might be used is in order. Conventional, precision-guided ballistic missiles in particular should be examined as an alternative to orbital bombardment.

At the end of the day, I think that the US currently should be worrying more about increasing the survivability of its space-based capabilities through traditional means such as redundancy, dispersal, rapid replacibility, some hardening, alternate means, etc. Space weaponization might contribute in a modest way to survivability and have other niche applications, but it’s not the most important thing for the foreseeable future. IMO, of course.

Of course, if everybody could just get along we wouldn’t have to worry about any of this.

I’m sure if you ask nicely he will send you any of the papers he’s written and published.