Comments on: This will impact the space weaponization debate

By: Rand Simberg

Rand Simberg — Fri, 19 Jan 2007 13:33:05 +0000

A colleague suggests that the launch may have been directly opposite to the velocity vector of the target, meaning a very high closing speed.

Why would they bother to expend all the delta-v necessary to do that (it would be equivalent to an orbital launch, retrograde)? A collision at orbital velocity is adequate to assure destruction. The cheapest and easiest means of doing this is just to toss it up vertically with an apogee at the satellite’s orbital altitude, and let the satellite kill itself when it runs into it.

By: Ardbeg

Ardbeg — Fri, 19 Jan 2007 04:00:16 +0000

It is interesting to me that there are some in government who use their power to influence space policy such as CA-D Roberta Sanchez. I’ve read that she opposes any U.S. weapon systems in space even though they would be designed to protect U.S. interests. I don’t understand where she is coming from. Does she not understand the consequences of not protecting our space assets or our troops on the ground that our being imaged by Chinese satellites? I think its a no brainer, we have to defend our interests in space just like we protect our interests on the high seas.

By: richardb

richardb — Fri, 19 Jan 2007 03:43:18 +0000

Bar or Punish this bad behavoir eh? The victors always write the history. If we depend upon the UN to sanction China or other offenders, then we’ve just doped up on ammnesia over the last few years with the Iran & North Korea show. One other big problem with the bar and punish implementation. What about BMD? Take your garden variety anti-ICBM ground based missile, such as those presently in Alaska, and it can reach useful heights in space. The laser equiped YAL-1 could do the same, do we outlaw BMD too? Remember the F-15 based system the US tested to shoot down a satellite? That’s a missile not much larger than an an Amraam. In short, I don’t see how any Ban & Punish could be verified nor would the punishment mean anything because the winner would dictate who made the violations.

By: Dwayne Day

Dwayne Day — Fri, 19 Jan 2007 03:38:31 +0000

“This test changes many calculations about China, especially if this hit was their first try.”

I seriously doubt it was their first try. If you look at the history of the US F-15 ASAT program, the US conducted several tests before it went to a full test.

Supposedly a DoD official has told CNN that this was China’s “fourth test” and that earlier ones were “failures.” I suspect that instead of failures, the earlier tests were actually partial tests. I could see an initial test of the booster, minus guidance or warhead. This would then be followed by a test of the booster plus guidance system to put the kill vehicle in the vicinity of the target (actually, a specific point in space). Then the next test would include the kill vehicle and would be a full up test against a point in sky. Then a test against an active satellite.

So what were they using for the actual terminal intercept? A kill vehicle? Or an explosive warhead? A colleague suggests that the launch may have been directly opposite to the velocity vector of the target, meaning a very high closing speed.

By: Dwayne Day

Dwayne Day — Fri, 19 Jan 2007 03:32:48 +0000

Actually, the Chinese actions regarding PAROS and their ASAT test remind me of a story that NASA’s former RTG expert told me about the relationship between the US and Soviet Union in the UN Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) regarding space nuclear power sources. I cannot remember the particulars, but for a long time the Soviets had space nuclear reactors and the United States did not. The two sides were supposed to be engaged in negotiations on establishing standards on the operation of space nuclear power. However, what this person said was that the US position was essentially a propaganda position–the US was not _really_ interested in establishing standards. It was more interested in using the issue to bash the Soviets in the UN. The person who told me this, Gary Bennett, was actually a technical advisor to the US negotiating team, so he should know.

However, he said that eventually the Soviets (or maybe they were Russians by this time–I forget) wizened up to this fact and instead of fighting the US position, they suddenly agreed to it. From a diplomatic standpoint, this was a disaster for the US, because the US had been pushing a stance that it did not actually want, and now found itself in a position of having to back away from what it had proposed.

It was a very minor incident in the history of space law and diplomacy, but it illustrates the fact that countries can take positions in UN forums solely for the intention of beating on the other side. That may have been what China was doing in PAROS all along.

By: Kevin Parkin

Kevin Parkin — Fri, 19 Jan 2007 02:58:06 +0000

So much for China’s protests for a ban on space weapons:

“According to China’s public position, outer space should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. China is officially opposed to any militarization of space, including (and perhaps especially) space-based missile defense systems. China has also made strong statements against any type of arms race, including arms races in space. In both the 1998 and 2000 white papers on national defense, China called for the creation of a multilateral mechanism to prevent an arms race in outer space.” – http://www.nti.org/db/china/spacepos.htm

Treaties can be used as weapons – this is not new; it hasn’t been new for thousands of years.

This test changes many calculations about China, especially if this hit was their first try. Conversely, how America responds will change many calculations about how others will challenge us. Should there be a response? How well can the US respond?

By: th

th — Fri, 19 Jan 2007 02:17:15 +0000

I agree that verifying an ASAT ban would be insanely difficult, and therefore I’ve never promoted that. That said, you could easily — as witnessed by this Chinese test — verify the creation of space debris or the testing/use of a destuctive weapon in space. Seems to me, that kind of approach to bar or at least punish this sort of bad behavior would make sense.

By: richardb

richardb — Fri, 19 Jan 2007 00:57:22 +0000

Exactly how do we verify a treaty outlawing Asats?
Lasers like the YAL-1 could easily point up and track a satellite. China would have no problem concealing a laser program either. Would the US or China have the trust to truely believe that should there be a conflict between the US and China, that neither had the ability to destroy vital space assets? This isn’t has easy as counting missile silo’s, strategic bombers or nuke subs. Asat’s are small and getting smaller.

By: th

th — Fri, 19 Jan 2007 00:49:18 +0000

Actually, I was not poopoohing Chinese interest in ASATs — I’ve always believed, and said, that Beijing obviously had/has interest in that capability. What I have said is that Pentagon pronouncements on the issue of capability have been over-wrought, which they have been (a la Soviet Power back in the day). The U.S. demonstrated hit-to-kill ASAT capability in 1985, so the Chinese have now caught up. That is of concern, of course, but it doesn’t live up to earlier hype. That said, this test is deplorable, as no responsible space faring nation would deliberately create persistent debris in a heavily used orbit during peacetime. The Chinese have commited a high crime against space. But whatever your political perspective, the question is now clear: how does the U.S. deal with this? I will only respectfully submit that up to now, policies that rely on refusal to engage — North Korea, Iran and now China on space — seem only to have backfired. Perhaps we need to reconsider the dangers of saber rattling without diplomacy, on both sides of the Pacific fence.

By: ASAThuh?

ASAThuh? — Fri, 19 Jan 2007 00:29:23 +0000

Weren’t critics like Teresa Hitchens complaining about the dangers of US space policy and pooh-poohing Pentagon warnings that the Chinese would test ASATs?