This was no accident. This was not the fault of Griffin or O’Keefe. This was the official policy of this government. And if you asked Bush and Cheney about it, they would look into the camera and deny it up and down.

An astonishing indictment of America, Americans, and the administration they chose to represent them. Now you are starting to get it. I’m only mildly surprised it took you so long to figure it out, though.

There may be a way to salvage a little something from this, but it would involve a movie star and future nobel prize winner running again for the highest office in the land, and a bunch of SSMEs, ELVs, space shuttles and space stations in the hands of some creative Americans. Are there any creative Americans left out there after six full years of oppression by a fascist government?

Don’t worry, the next big American disaster is right around the corner.

This is the fundamental problem. NASA (Griffin, Cooke, and others) are still using an Apollo model for Constellation, with its massive budget run-up and unsustainable infrastructure, in a world where there is no longer a driving rationale like the Cold War and the Soviets for such huge and wasteful expenditures. NASA has to change its culture and adapt its programs and infrastucture to the world today as there’s little chance that it will have the resources necessary to undertake another Apollo-style human space exploration effort in the foreseeable future.

“How many disasters like Iraq and Katrina do you need to see before you realize that Bush and his minions really don’t think things through very well?”

Again, I agree with you regarding the Bush Administration’s failings in Iraq or after Katrina. No debate there.

But I would argue that the Bush White House did think through VSE pretty well. They deserve kudos for establishing original guidelines for a sustainable, post-Apollo, post-Cold War human space exploration program — something that no one else has done in the three-and-a-half decades prior.

However, unlike Iraq and Katrina, there is little evidence that the Bush White House has been deeply involved in decisions about NASA’s human space flight programs since rolling out the VSE. Maybe we can accuse the Bush White House of neglecting NASA, but we can’t accuse them of poor decisionmaking on the human spaceflight program because they havn’t been making those decisions — Griffin has. So, as much as the Bush White House is culpable on other issues, I have a hard time blaming the White House for ESAS and the decisions Griffin has made since ESAS.

“The Earth sciences budget at NASA has dropped 30 percent. I believe that way part of the plan. Bush came in and said no carbon caps, but we’ll study the problem vigorous and follow wherever the science leads us. He didn’t mean a word of it. Classic bait and switch.”

You’re onto something there. The Bush White House has stiff-armed reductions in carbon emission to combat global warming with one hand while promising to do more science to ensure that carbon emission reductions are necessary with the other hand. But the funding for that science has not materialized at the White House. Whether that was the direct result of a conspiratorial plan as you indicate — or whether it’s just a reflection of the low priority that the Bush White House assigns global warming and/or the right hand not coordinating with the left hand — it’s hard to say without more evidence.

What we may be seeing is the result of that. How many disasters like Iraq and Katrina do you need to see before you realize that Bush and his minions really don’t think things through very well? He has this idea that he can do anything but isn’t required to think through the contradictions in his own planning.

The Earth sciences budget at NASA has dropped 30 percent. I believe that way part of the plan. Bush came in and said no carbon caps, but we’ll study the problem vigorous and follow wherever the science leads us. He didn’t mean a word of it. Classic bait and switch. He put an oil industry figure in the bureaucracy to rewrite reports on global warming. He’s apparently had his minions intimidating scientists. And he’s used this lunar mission as an excuse to gut the very research that would tell us what’s going on and probably force him to actually do something.

This was no accident. This was not the fault of Griffin or O’Keefe. This was the official policy of this government. And if you asked Bush and Cheney about it, they would look into the camera and deny it up and down.

I agree with almost everything you said, and could not have said it better. (My first reaction was to right something similar, then I read your response.) I am struggling to find something I disagree with.

I would only summarize what you said as follows:

On national security/DoD/Iraq/Afghanistan/terrorism, Bush has repeatedly made it very clear that he is the “Decider”.

On NASA/civil space policy, Bush would NEVER make the same statement.

Since Bush made the VSE policy decisions, as anounced in early 2004, and the subsequent decision to put Griffin in charge of NASA, Bush has decided very little at NASA, excepting (perhaps) the top-level budget for NASA.

Griffin is clearly the “decider” on how NASA will implement the VSE.

Sure, you can blame the WH for not providing more adult supervision of NASA, but even this is hard to get worked up about, since the Bushies have (and should have) much higher priorities in a time of war.

– Al

My apologies. I did assume that the song was intended as a flame. Thank you for the creative energy expended.

“That being said, the problem with your analysis of responsibility is that if you take that argument to its illogical extreme, Bush should either have an approval rating of 100 percent or zero percent…”

I agree. The argument can’t be taken to either extreme. The President can’t be fully responsible for every decision his appointees make but neither can the President be absent of all culpability in everything that goes wrong. Specific issues and situations are going to fall at different points along this spectrum.

“… How long were we stuck with Rummy? How long did we stick with a losing Iraq strategy?”

Absolutely, I’m with you on Iraq. The Bush II White House let things go wrong for far too long in Iraq, partly out of misplaced adherence to their own ideologies but also out of misplaced loyalty to underperforming appointees. I still find the awards that Bush gave to Bremer and Tenet to be mind-boggling displays of craven hypocrisy in the face of overwhelming evidence of underwhelming performance.

But the President (and the Vice-President and Condi and the rest of the White House) led on Iraq. It was his White House that pressured the intelligence community to agree to dubious proof of WMDs, it was his White House that decided to go to war, it was his White House that failed to develop an adequate reconstruction and anti-insurgency plan, it was his White House that ignored the advice of experts and kept the post-invasion force small, and it was his White House that variously ignored and spun worsening conditions in Iraq. From what I see, there is little doubt that slavish adherence by the White House to Republican (or at least neocon) ideology, instead of realpolitik, resulted in what is probably the worst foreign policy debacle in U.S. history since the Bay of Pigs.

But the Iraq situation is very, very different from what’s happened at NASA. After Bush’s speech to roll out the VSE, the White House has not led on the decisions made with regards to NASA’s human space flight program. It was Griffin (not the White House) that set up the dubious requirements and lack of sensitivity analysis in the ESAS study; it was Griffin who accepted the recommendations to build a new LEO launch vehicle that would consume the available budget and defer actual exploration hardware until the next White House; it was Griffin who appointed Horowitz to oversee the development of that vehicle even though Horowitz had such a personal stake in it that the vehicle was nicknamed for him; it was Griffin who agreed to changes in the design that reduced the Shuttle heritage in the vehicle and turned it into a tougher, clean-sheet design with even more dubious performance and safety claims; it was Griffin who cut science and aeronautics to keep the vehicle on schedule even as mass issues were beginning to emerge on the vehicle; and it will be Griffin who decides to stay the course and stretch out the development of the vehicle out even further after Congress cut his request by $500 million.

Sure, you could argue that the White House should be more involved with NASA and maybe they should. At a minimum, I would agree that the White House should have kept the budget promises it made on the VSE, which they did not in 2005 and 2006. But the reality is that the White House does not own ESAS and everything that has flowed from it — Griffin does. So when I critique the sustainability of the ESAS plan and how it’s not proving to be sustainable in the face of modest budget pressures and how it will likely crumble when those pressures intensify with the next White House, I put the blame on Griffin and his political naivete, not Bush. And I certainly don’t blame political ideology for what are very involved NASA technical decisions and budget policy.

You and I may just have to agree to disagree on this one, but hopefully this finally makes my logic (or lack thereof) clear, even if you don’t agree with it.

The song was a joke. I was really hoping you’d find it amusing. But, apparently not. I didn’t mean any dispect, I actually enjoy debating with you. Your comments are intelligent and well thought out. I mean that; I’m not being sarcastic in any way.

That being said, the problem with your analysis of responsibility is that if you take that argument to its illogical extreme, Bush should either have an approval rating of 100 percent or zero percent. Because the government is so large, he wouldn’t actually be held responsible for how anything got done, good or bad. Hence, he’d either be universally popular or so insignificant that we could replace him with a turnip without anyone noticing.

Bush, Rove and company want it both ways. Bush certainly will show up on aircraft carriers and the floor of the Stock Exchange to take credit for anything that goes right, however significant or insignificant his role is in it. He’ll make the same speech about the war in front of one military or law enforcement group after another. But, when anything goes wrong, it’s, “Hey, I dunno. Go talk to Rummy. Go talk to Griffin. What the heck do I know about this? I can’t be held responsible for this.”

The CEO model of government of delegating things only works if you have a competent CEO. He’s got to pay attention, make sure things are going in the right direction, and hold people when they screw up. Bush doesn’t do this. How long were we stuck with Rummy? How long did we stick with a losing Iraq strategy?

I’d argue that the original $8 billion budget was a realistic estimate for the space station as originally intended. But, as you stated, NASA took what could have been a relatively simple, straightforward, and quick project and turned it into a complex, convoluted, and lengthy program that — even if NASA had not gone into redesign paralysis — could never hope to be built for $8 billion.

“Ronny didn’t stop them. Twenty years later, Reagan Redux (a.k.a. Bush the Second) does the same thing.”

The problem I have with this argument is that it passes the buck from the NASA Administrator to the White House and tries to create a partisan political attack on the White House when the NASA Administrator — first and foremost — should be the one held accountable for these decisions.

Don’t get me wrong — the White House and Congress in power at the time always hold some level of responsibility. I just don’t think one can take every bad decision by every secretary, adminstrator, and general in the federal government, pass the buck all the way back to the White House (or Congress), and claim that it’s some pattern of mismanagement by the Republicans (or Democrats) in power at the time. While such an argument may score points among the partisan faithful, it doesn’t inform the NASA debate or put that debate at the level of NASA’s leadership, where it can do the most good.

NASA now appears to be on a path where a White House (likely the next one, but maybe even the current Bush II Administration) will scale back the human exploration elements of the VSE because Griffin made the LEO elements unnecessarily difficult, expensive, and lengthy. So I think you’ll get your wish and the White House, as it has done before, will eventually exercise oversight and control over NASA and its Administrator by cancelling or making major alterations to NASA’s human space flight programs. But I think the vast majority of the responsiblity for the decisions that put NASA in this position lie with NASA Administrator Griffin and other NASA leaders. Whether the NASA Administrator decides to build a clean sheet launcher, leverage EELVs, or do something else to replace Shuttle’s LEO capabilities is a technical and policy decision. There is no political ideology at stake, and partisan politics should not enter into the picture.

“I went through a blog with a man with no name
it felt like sort of a strange game
On the blogosphere he can’t remember his name
but his arguments will cause you no pain”

I’m sorry, but my day job requires me to conceal my identity.

Sounds like you have sour grapes over recent budget events at NASA. Although I understand your displeasure, venting it at me, anonymous as I am and opposed to the decisions that led NASA to its current situation, won’t do any good. Better to voice your opinion at those responsible for those decisions than engage in useless partisan sniping.

My 2 cents… FWIW…

Fact is, what happened with space station was a two-fold problem: Ronny and the boys underestimated cost and complexity and NASA’s ability to do the job. AND NASA came up with a deisgn that went beyond what was originallly proposed. Look at some of the plans for that dual keel, ultimate research facility, way station to stars with contributions from all our Cold War allies monstrosity that sold to Congress. Ronny didn’t stop them. Twenty years later, Reagan Redux (a.k.a. Bush the Second) does the same thing.

I really think too much is being put on Griffin. At some point, Bush (or whoever he delegate to keep an eye on NASA, if anyone) has to provide some adult supervision (something clearly lacking in this administration). You can’t put the whole thing on Griffin as if he’s some independent contractor working in Newt Gingrich’s Third Wave (don’t ask, you don’t want to know).

Oh, BTW, I I wrote you a little song here, Mr. Anonymous. Goes to the tune of that America song, Horse with No Name. I really hope you enjoy it.

I went through a blog with a man with no name
it felt like sort of a strange game
On the blogosphere he can’t remember his name
but his arguments will cause you no pain

Nah nah nah nah nah nah nah nah nah nah….
(Guitar solo)

I agree with “anonymous”.

I also agree that Griffin’s ego will get in the way, and that this plan probably does not have a chance of happening until January 2009.

– Al

Although there are parallels between what happened to Space Station under Reagan and what’s happening to the VSE under Bush II, I don’t think that the Bush II Administration “grossly underestimated” the “cost and complexity” of what they set out to do. The VSE budget estimates for what eventually became Constellation, as rolled out by O’Keefe, were pretty consistent with Apollo costs. In fact, if anything, they were more conservative because they gave themselves a longer timeframe than Apollo to complete a task (land humans on the Moon) that had been done before.

The problem is really the ESAS recommendations that Griffin bought into (and Horowitz pushed for years before he came back to NASA). They turned what was a fairly straightforward lunar return plan under O’Keefe and Steidle into something considerably more complex, costly, and (worst of all) lengthy in time. Instead of building a small CEV and leveraging existing EELVs so that a heavy lift vehicle and lunar lander could get underway as soon as possible, Griffin chose to build a large Orion CEV and a clean-sheet Ares I launch vehicle that would consume all of Constellation’s dollars and time during his tenure, leaving no exploration hardware underway by the time a new White House comes into office in January 2009.

One might argue this was a worthwhile tradeoff as ESAS showed that Ares I and Orion had better crew safety than less costly and more quickly developed options. However, ESAS assumptions about safety factors related to several suppossed “Shuttle-derived” elements of Ares are questionable, and ESAS requirements like crew size were set in stone, not allowing examination of potentially safer options like a smaller Orion that would have eliminated blackout periods when launched on EELVs. Moreover, the difference in safety between Ares I/Orion and other options was marginal (about 1-in-2000 versus 1-in-1600 chance of loss of crew per flight, IIRC), especially given the small number of flights the system would make during its operational life (probably several tens of flights). The difference was probably within the margin of error we’ve seen on Shuttle flight safety estimates (an operational and much better understood system), where the calculations show a 1-in-200 or so chance of loss of crew per flight, while the demonstrated rate is more like 1-in-50.