– Al

If and when success is achieved, especially of a Falcon-9, the markets may cough up additional funds — but he has to get there. Any guesses of the odds of that happening?

Based on these funding sources, my guess is that his chances are relatively low, and getting lower with every Falcon-1 delay. But I would give him the best chance of any of the five other COTS contendors that survived the first down-select.

— Donald

The problem with Pegasus is that it was too small to address the vast majority of the commercial satellite business. The Pegasus market consists of small NASA research satellites and some small communications and remote sensing satellites also built by Orbital. I think the same will hold true for Falcon 1 and the other DARPA vehicles currently under development. The sweet spot(s) for the commercial satellite launch business are much heavier than what these small launchers can deliver.

The converse of this is that first non-military U.S. launch vehicle that is big enough to address these markets (potentially Kistler K-1, Falcon 9, etc.) has an opportunity to steal lots of business that’s currently going overseas, if priced attractively. That would fundamentally restructure the market and provide an ongoing line of business upon which other markets, eventually even commercial orbital human space flight, could be explored/built.

“Likewise, the Taurus-XL was conceived as an Operational Responsive Launch Vehicle (and I think it was even successfully demonstrated as such), so why are we trying again now?”

From a military perspective, having an operationally responsive launch vehicle is not enough to actually field operationally responsive space systems. The military has to fundamentally rethink and restructure how it procures, builds, and qualifies satellites. That’s a much bigger challenge than the launch vehicle, and I’m not sure it’s going to happen anytime soon. I’d also note that when the military talks about operationally responsive satellites, they’re also on the small side and not consistent with the size of larger commercial satellites. (And again, that’s why Falcon 1 and the other DARPA vehicles currently under development are unlikely to garner a significant number of commercial payloads, even if they’re successfully fielded.)

But from a near-term commercial space perspective, operational responsiveness is beside the point. We don’t have to have an operationally responsive vehicle to address the sweet spot(s) in the commercial satellite launch business. The only reason operational responsiveness enters into the commercial discussion is if it’s synonymous with the low cost and (maybe) reusability necessary to achieve certain future commercial space markets. I’m agnostic on the connectivity between operational responsiveness, reusability, and low cost and will leave that discussion to the true believers and atheists out there.

“On second thought and the other hand, Orbital Sciences does demonstrate that a successful business can be created out of less than complete success.”

Yes, and I think this is what will happen with Kistler and/or Space-X. Pegasus failed to address the commercial market, but did prove useful for NASA science payloads and internal payloads. Similarly, I think an underfunded COTS program will fail to address most, or all, ISS needs, but the K-1 and Falcon 9 launch vehicles will still prove useful for the commercial satellite market and unmanned NASA and military payloads.

“a partially successful COTS effort would leave us with a new domestic competitor in the launch industry and maybe a somewhat cheaper or better product. That is far from perfect, but it’s worth trying for.”

My hope is that a commercial proof-of-concept would finally kick off the first true cycle of private sector launch vehicle development and innovation, something that is sorely missing and much needed in the overall space sector.

Agreed. It’s going to come down to the cost-benefit analysis in the specific case. I’m just saying that depending on where we’re at along the technology innovation S-curve or in the technology adoption cycle, the analysis often tells you to ditch your old platforms in favor of new capabilities.

“During STS’ second decade, a lot of people pointed out that its computer systems were N years behind off-the-shelf PC capabilities — as if an upgrade were a matter of swapping out a motherboard and using faster RAM, and NASA was just too damn dumb to keep up with Intel and Gateway.”

Absolutely. The difficulty and cost of upgrading space systems, especially the way we do human space flight systems, is so high that we usually forgo the effort and expense altogether and wind up with wildly obsolesent systems. Or we end up wasting mountains of dollars just trying to keep the system’s shrinking supply chain intact, rather than doing the intelligent thing, throw it away, and start anew. I don’t know what the exact number is, but if you added up all the billions that NASA has spent on Shuttle “upgrades” over the years (really just preserving or replacing elements of the Shuttle supply chain that had withered as the state of technology and non-NASA customers had moved on), we probably could have built Ares 1/Orion or a couple EELV/small capsule systems by now.

Of course, the Shuttle, as a patently unsafe system, is a special case. Cost-benefit doesn’t really apply here — it should have been retired after the Challenger accident.

“I’ve long argued that it would have taken many design and testing iterations to get from the 1970 state of the art to what STS was supposed to achieve in one. It would be great to live in a world where NASA could have treated reusability as an X-goal and started work on STS 2.0 in 1981, STS 3.0 in 1984, etc.”

While I think Shuttle was too ungainly and inherently too unsafe to warrant further iteration, I agree with your sentiment here. Build it small, operate it until lessons are learned and some degree of utility achieved, then build a new capability that’s responsive to how your mission needs have changed and that can incorporate a new generation of technological advances, and discard the old.

I think Griffin’s recent Aviation Week blog essay is rather extreme and a little insane in this respect. To borrow from the Washington Post letter to the editor, it’s the height of aerospace engineering hubris to assume that you can design a couple launch vehicles today that will be responsive to changes in human space exploration goals, needs, budgets, and technology base for the next 50 years. I understand his arguments with respect to aircraft examples like DC-9 or B-52, but those were exceptions to the norm. Out of hundreds, maybe thousands, of aircraft developments, only a couple handfuls have that kind of longevity. To assume that NASA (or anyone) can hit a similar home run with only one or two at-bats is pretty ludicrous.

Every other rocket engineer wants to be the next Werner von Braun who lays out the grand space exploration plan for generations to come, and it’s fine to dream. But folks in positions of power like Griffin have got to let go of that way of doing business and adapt much more realistic, flexible, and sustainable planning strategies.

— Donald

While I do not disagree with most of your COTS analysis, I would argue that Orbital Science’s Pegassus does not encourage one to hope for any “dramatically reshape[d]” market. (Yes, I know, Pegassus received significant military DARPA money, but it was conceived as a radical departure toward low-cost launch.) Likewise, the Taurus-XL was conceived as an Operational Responsive Launch Vehicle (and I think it was even successfully demonstrated as such), so why are we trying again now?

Maybe these things really are as hard as the old boys say. In any case, I wish the COTS competators every success, and we should definitely give them more money (albeit with strings attached), but neither we nor the government should count on them being fully successful.

— Donald

This “choice” is too broad and abstract to tell us much without details and numbers for a specific case: i.e., how radical is “radical?” You know better than most of us that space technologies tend to be very tightly integrated — they have to be, because they’re operating in extreme corners of engineering and economic trade space. Changes in one subsystem ripple through everything else. During STS’ second decade, a lot of people pointed out that its computer systems were N years behind off-the-shelf PC capabilities — as if an upgrade were a matter of swapping out a motherboard and using faster RAM, and NASA was just too damn dumb to keep up with Intel and Gateway.

I’ve long argued that it would have taken many design and testing iterations to get from the 1970 state of the art to what STS was supposed to achieve in one. It would be great to live in a world where NASA could have treated reusability as an X-goal and started work on STS 2.0 in 1981, STS 3.0 in 1984, etc. Unfortunately, we live in one where STS 1.0 was declared “operational” after four flights, and in 1984 it was “On to Space Station Freedom!”

It depends on who’s defining “failure” and what their definition is.

With its current underfunded budget, I do not believe that COTS Phase 1 (Cargo) can deliver all of the ISS cargo transport capabilities that NASA needs. COTS Phase 1 involved three different types of cargo transport capabilities:

– Unpressurized cargo delivery
– Pressurized cargo delivery
– Cargo return

And all of these capabilities require rendezvous and docking. To develop all of these capabilities, NASA has provided each competitor about $250 million. They must cost-share whatever the remaining amount is to develop their specific vehicles through private financing.

By comparison, the Air Force provided each competitor in the EELV program about $500 million and all they had to do was develop what is essentially an unpressurized cargo delivery capability with no rendezvous and docking requirement.

It’s a WAG, but if you just count up the types of cargo delivery and add in the rendezvous and docking requirement, COTS Phase 1 is about two to four times more difficult than EELV. And NASA is funding COTS with half the dollars of EELV, which arguably makes COTS four to eight times more difficult than EELV. I certainly believe that Kistler, Space-X, and other start-ups can be smarter, leaner, and meaner than Boeing or LockMart. But can they be four to eight times better? I sincerely wish them the best, but I don’t think so.

To be brutally honest, when we look at the costs of rendezvous and docking demonstration missions, like DART and the recently launched Orbital Express, which alone reach several hundreds of millions of dollars, I’m not sure that COTS Phase 1 can succeed in delivering even one of the desired ISS transport capabilities, especially since Kistler and Space-X also have launch vehicle developments to fund to get that rendezvous and docking system into space.

I also seriously question Kistler and Space-X’s ability to raise substantial amounts of private sector financing when NASA is spending billions of taxpayer dollars building an in-house competitor in Ares 1. Griffin can talk all he likes about standing down government capabilities like Ares 1 if the private sector delivers. But the reality is that this decision will not be his to make — it will be up to a future NASA Administrator (and Congress and White House). Even if the politics surrounding NASA jobs were not at stake, private financiers would have to be dumb as rocks to accept the risks associated with the decisions of unknown future NASA managers and federal politicians.

So… Do I think COTS Phase 1 can deliver all of the desired ISS cargo transport capabilities without additional NASA funding? No, almost certainly not. Do I think COTS Phase 1 will deliver any, even one, of the desired ISS transport capabilities without additional NASA funding? Probably not. I’d give it less than 50/50. Do I think NASA will cough up additional funding for COTS? No, not as long as Griffin is at the helm, and given the budget squeeze, probably not after the next election, either. Do I think that there will be a COTS Phase 2 for crew transport? No, if COTS fails to deliver on all or even most ISS cargo transport capabilities during Phase 1, there will be another commercial backlash among NASA human space flight managers and no Phase 2.

But all this is measuring COTS success from the NASA or ISS perspective.

If you look at COTS from the broad industry perspective, even if NASA gets no ISS servicing out of the effort, Kistler or Space-X or someone else can still leverage the development towards new launchers. Even getting one new U.S. medium satellite launcher that was not developed by a military contractor into the market would have huge implications going forward. It would be a major proof-of-concept for commercial space and could dramatically reshape the market, depending on its desirability and affordability. Given enough time, such a launcher and other developments started under COTS could certainly lead to private orbital human space flight capabilities. It won’t happen by 2014 and I think the odds are still less than 50/50 by 2020. But when we start looking at 2025 or 2030, I think the likelihood shifts in the other direction. That will be the actual success and legacy of COTS.

Hope this helps.

Im gonna start with Donald, and work my way up.

And, none of these will be designed for deep space missions, at least at first. . .
I’d argue thats not entirely true. Bigelow’s modules could easily be adapted for long duration, deep spaceflight. Adminitaly, they can’t land on earth, but at a bare minimum, we do already have soyuz which can be used for transporation to and back. Anyway, Im just saying.

Secondly anonymous,
I think Ares 1/Orion will continue to plod along even after Griffin is gone (too much Ares 1/Orion camel nose under the tent and Shuttle retirement and ISS servicing largely dependent on Ares 1/Orion).
Does that mean you think that COTS will be canceled, or will fail, or the government won’t follow through and use private industry? BTW, just for clarification, I mean the government program, not the Dragon capsule or the CXV, or the actual hardware, since you seem at least somewhat optimistic about them latter on in your post.

Finally, and hopefully no one will mind if I go slightly off topic, Stephen Metschan, I have to admit not having read your entire proposal through in its entirity – I’ve only skimmed it, so if I mis characterize your proposal, feel free to correct me. But from what I’ve read and seen (and your comments over at Nasaspaceflight) you’ve seen to indicate your not particularly optimistic when it comes to commerical spaceflight (im not just refering to space tourism here, although that is one aspect). I am pretty certain you don’t mention SpaceX, or the Falcon, or Kistler and its K-1, or Bigelow’s modules. Do you think most of these will fail, and don’t offer any usable items? Or was your study to far along when the companies started advancing? Or what?

If only ESAS had more seriously examined such options…