Not to mention they are claiming credit for many things NASA had nothing to do with. From SpaceRef.com

http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html?pid=24700

ASA Strategic Management Council 25 April 2007: Strategic Communications Framework Implementation Plan
STATUS REPORT
Date Released: Monday, July 2, 2007
Source: NASA HQ

[[[Members questioned some of the technologies cited in the testing as growing out of NASA research and development, stating that NASA does more fundamental than applied research. Porter specifically questioned including smoke detectors in the list and stated that there are aeronautics inventions that NASA can take full credit for having done the research. Members stressed the need to be accurate.]]]

For example, page 48 covers applications that sound like robotic satellite applications: “GPS, weather, climate, defense, imagery”. Aren’t ESAS and Shuttle/ISS drastically cutting back on this kind of application (or similar robotic missions that would share costs with, or improve technology for, this kind of mission) from NASA? It seems that lately even most of the VSE’s lunar robotic plans are being scrapped. Is the NASA branch that’s putting out this document sneakily advocating a reversal of that? ESAS and Shuttle are designed and operated in-house by NASA with contractors following the NASA designs and operations. They seem to have little or nothing to do with these applications, unless they are suggesting that ESAS be eliminated, or totally redone commercially, so NASA can work on this kind of application.

The slide also mentions space infrastructure and logistics. To me this term makes me think of Bigelow (or similar) space stations, space tugs, space refueling, and similar utility-like infrastructure. Again it seems like they are going against ESAS, because ESAS doesn’t use this kind of infrastructure.

It mentions commerce “services”, but again ESAS is a NASA in-house effort. ESAS for the most part doesn’t use commercial services in the sense that I think of it. Are they recommending that ESAS be dropped in favor of NASA purchasing more services?

Tourism is also mentioned, but ESAS has nothing to do with tourism. Are they recommending that ESAS be dropped in favor of an architecture that encourages space tourism (eg: by using commercial transportation vehicles that can also be used for space tourism)?

On page 47 it says “NASA uniquely positioned to be a primary driver of innovation and competitiveness”. I thought ESAS was specifically not supposed to be innovative, so safe, tried-and-true vehicle components could easily be put together?

Page 8 goes into “Science, Economic, Security” rationales. These, as central parts of the VSE, have already been discussed here many times in terms of ESAS not doing much for any of them compared to other options. Again it seems like some part of NASA is getting a jab in against ESAS and recommending a switch to some kind of architecture or mission with more relevance to “Science, Economy, and Security”.

My guess is that this is what happens when you have NASA leaders who care enough about “space commercialization”, to force the bureaucrats to listen to them, but have no real power to affect NASA’s core strategy or culture.

I am guessing this is why Eric Sterner left recently. He was in officially in charge of NASA’s communication strategy. Mr. Sterner probably could see the writing on the wall.

It is common knowledge (to those in the industry) that people like Dale, Sterner, Pace, Shank, Stadd, Ladner, and Frelk are all advocates of space commercialization. They all have actively promoted new space commercialization approaches in other jobs. They all have been part of the Griffin team at one point or another.

What has not been remarked on is that four out these seven have left the Griffin train.

Not surprising given that the NASA’s new communication strategy is rehash of “spin-offs”, and there is little sign that they have been able to effectively influence the agency to adopt more commercial approaches. I say this, noting that COTS existed before they were put in charge, that the Centennial Challenges was actually doing better under O’Keefe, that Red Planet Capital is dead, and they have failed to come up with a strategy to encourage private participation in their top priority … their lunar program.

The core problem is that their boss has imposed a core strategy & transportation architecture that severely inhibits commercialization. I would probably leave too, if were one of them.

– Al

PS — While advocates for commercialization are leaving the Griffin train, I repeatedly hear (from multiple sources) that the regular NASA troops and bureaucrats “love Griffin.” That “he is one of us”.

http://images.spaceref.com/news/2007/StratCommPlan.2007.06.26.pdf

The new campaign The Space Economy is indeed “Mission Home Redux”. Basically it plans to build public support for NASA by highlighting the benefits space has created for the general public like GPS, Satellite Radio, Weather Satellites, the usual list of medical spin-offs, robots for the troops, space tourism (on slide 48…), DirectTV. Etc…

Yes, space exploration has bought you all these great benefits, so supporting NASA and its missions to Mars will bring you more benefits in the future. The fact that the NASA link to most of the benefits cited is tenuous at best as and if it exists at all traces to the legacy of Apollo isn’t discussed.

I guess since it’s the 50th anniversary of NASA, and since NASA “invented” space exploration any benefits related to space, like XM radio, are due to NASA. At least they are no longer claiming credit for Tang, Velcro or Teflon…

I see this as basically DOA. Critics will have blast asking why NASA is taking credit for XM Radio or GPS? And if weather satellites are a benefit why is it cutting funding for them?

Like Mission Home it may excite the usual space cadets, and help some advocate groups and space publishers by buying advertising space in their publications like Mission Home did, but it won’t have any lasting impact for NASA funding in any measurable way. The spin-off argument has never worked long-term and NASA dodges the big question of what its future relevance, if any, is.

Indeed all it really does is leave the door wide open to critics who will point out how weak NASA contributions have been to the economy in the Shuttle generation.

I am teaching a graduate advertising class this session. I think I will have them evaluate this presentation as their final assignment. It should be interesting.