GuessWho,

Please recall, that

1) NIAC was focused on projects that were 10+ years in the future.

2) Because of the compounded discounted present value of money, that private companies have a huge incentive to focus on the near-term, and to NOT invest in anything in the long-term. For many companies, anything longer than 3 years is “long-term”. 5 years is clearly long-term for almost all private companies.
……(Historically, there are a few rare exceptions, such as AT&T and IBM, which had the luxury to invest in such projects. Most of that long-term research has disappeared, and their lab managers must now justify their research on the probability shorter-term successes, and are measured in this way.)

The fact that NIAC acquired $10M in private matching funds, on $30-41M in government funds, is pretty amazing. I would have suggested to NIAC’s managers that they expect much less.

The appropriate way to measure NIAC’s “effectiveness” is how effectively it advanced new technology & technology concepts (like how Mr. Cowing recently highlighted the skin tight space suit.)

The availability of new tech is the REAL output that needs to be measured. Acquiring matching funds is, at best, an indirect measure of effectiveness for all programs, and at worst can distract you from your real objective. In all cases, the amount of matching funds should not be used as a primary tool to judge the effectiveness (e.g., ROI).

You can apply this same policy to other programs, such as COTS, or the EELV … both of which have/had private investment.

The way EELV was judged to be a success is that the DOD acquired two new highly reliable rockets that are somewhat cheaper than their predecessors. Reliability is what the DOD really cared about, since they launch billion-dollar satellites. The DOD is pretty pleased with themselves (and the EELV) at the moment with over 50 successful flights in a row.

For COTS, the “success” we all really care about is measured by whether at least one of the two COTS winners flys successfully. If they both fail, it is irrelevant how much “matching funds” they had.

The same is true of NIAC.

– Al

To expand on your ideas, and respond to GuessWho, i would like to point out that the charter of NIAC was to explore ideas that were considered 25-50 years out (or further, using caves as habitats on mars is a long ways from here) on a TRL scale. Point in fact; that NO BODY, including the original Space Elevator study team (which I was a part of, in the last year of a 2.5 year program) thought that the SE could be built so ‘quickly’.

So, to say that NIAC had a poor ROI is to not give it enough credit.

That it has ANY ROI for projects – this early in the TRL scale – is to be commended…

I have heard NIAC referred to as the “Hail Mary” division of NASA, specifically because EVERYTHING it granted funds to was (by design and intention) a long shot… What they did was grant funds to wild/crazy/unrealistic project, and in a few cases, it was proven (on paper, not in the markets, yet) that some of the wild/crazy/unrealistic projects were in fact achievable.

And these researchers broke new ground and opened up new opportunities. The SE being (admittedly) perhaps the most unlikely in a set of many unlikely projects.

Whether the SE is ever built or not, is beside the point. Certainly I think it will be, much sooner than the official NASA claim of “300 years, to never…” What we have achieved so far are (developing) breakthroughs in communications (www.tetheredtowers.com is just in the birthing process), robotics, nanotech, and that is just the beginning. For us to succeed, eventually we will have to have additional breakthroughs in material sciences, lasers, solar cells and computing/AI.

In terms of real world results, NIAC did what it was designed to do – it was a catalyst for breakthrough technology.

In terms of raw dollars and sense (pun on purpose) I can confirm from my own experience that of the $570k that was granted this project, more than $7M has been spent or is budgeted and pledged. Beyond that, more than 800 researchers have spent countless hours and have added to the body of knowledge. These hours were volunteered, so while that is not ‘trackable’ in real dollars, it has real value).

Is that a lot of money compared to a project of this scope? No. Is that a lot of money, compared to NASA’s budget? No. Is that a helluva ROI for a project that, 5 years ago no one thought possible? YES!

NIAC should continue its past and should be funded.

Take care. mjl

With due respect to NASA, there are a number of us who have agitated for an advanced concepts organization that is truly national in scope and continues to focus on audacious concepts for our future in space. NIAC may be on its deathbed, but its work is not over.

Keep in mind that the funding criterion for a NIAC project is that it has a ten to 40 year development time frame. The twelve examples in the report you cite include at least five that were funded only within the last couple of years. Keep in mind also that some of the earliest funded NIAC projects include the Space Elevator, a pretty ambitious undertaking by any standard.

If you read further in the document cited, you will see instances of earlier concepts that have so far brought in 3-4 times more in additional funding, for example the promising electromagnetic formation flying effort, and tether work.

You are correct in how the two programs were managed. My reference was more to how funding for SLI was achieved. If my memory is correct, to secure congressional support for SLI, ISPP was initiated and promises made as to the level of funding that would be allocated to this area. Once approved, dollars were quickly allocated to SLI while ISPP funding was placed on the back burner. It wasn’t until a number of members of Congress threatened to pull SLI funding if ISPP wasn’t ramped up that ISPP actually began to get dollars and started to look at potential technologies.

“I’d also quibble technically regarding assertions about single-pass aerocapture (at Earth or Mars) and long tethers being ready for commercial prime-time.”

I am not sure where the quibble is. As for single-pass aerocapture, it comes down to how much risk you are willing to take. In the case of Mars missions, the two extremes (aerobraking in the case of MRO and ballistic entry (MER, Phoenix)) are practiced. It is a function of taking what has been learned from these two approaches and applying to a single-pass aerocapture. It is less of a technical risk (overheating, higher than expected aerodynamic loads, etc.) than a mission risk. Aerobraking gives you multiple chances to get it right and a failure at the wrong time does not end the mission. Ballistic entry ensures you reach your destination (the surface) and it comes down to designing for the landing. Aerocapture is a one-shot deal, either you get it right the first time or the mission is over. As for tethers, I would agree. They are a long way from being ready for any mission application and in my opinion, never will be. I would include solar sails in this category as well.

I would argue that cancellation of the JIMO aspect of Prometheus was the right thing to do. While the reactor development costs were in the range of $3.5B, the development costs for the rest of the S/C were $4.8B. The S/C development costs have for the most part been overlooked and the finger pointed at the Rx as the reason for the program’s demise. I would argue that a small, capable space reactor could be developed and fielded for less than $2B for either Lunar surface power or as a small NEP power source. To me, that is a worthy investment of NASA R&D dollars.

~Jon

Since you asked………

Most of non-science, non-aero NASA is being very intentionally turned into a single program office; ie, not only go to Moon, then Mars; but do that in one and only one way (or so it seems to me). What we’re talking about is needed is the stuff that won’t fit in that increasingly-narrow, increasingly less-flexible paradigm.

A separate – totally separate – office that is, by definition, to remain outside the mainstream, is needed; something that can’t be arbitrarily rated. Basically, something that is a cross between NACA(for space) and DARPA, in one group; and run the way Tether runs DARPA today.(ie, small; flexible; no one allowed to make a career out of the space-DARPA, etc. )

DARPA survives in spite of it being inside DOD. Congress has clearly and traditionally drawn a line around it; and it has had excellent people run it in the past (and in my view, right now), who really make the most with relatively little.
Just re-constituting another Mission Directorate for this stuff will get raided and killed in the current NASA. But drawing a line around it – call it DARPA-S (for space) or whatever, with it’s own separate budget line – is what is needed. Congress is moving on doing this – or at least they think they are – with the provision moving through Congress right now to create a “DARPA-E” in the Department of Energy.

Heck, call it ‘SARPA’ – Space Advanced Research Projects Agency. You heard it here first.

I’m nitpicking, but ISPP was not part of SLI. SLI was run out of the old Aerospace Technology Enterprise while ISPP was a Space Science Enterprise initiative.

MSFC management is another issue.

“Second, the technologies they are pursuing no longer fit the goals of the ISPP.”

ISPP was/is not about paving the way for commercial applications or human space flight. Rather, it was propulsion work to support more capable, more aggressive, and faster space science missions. In that context — such as major leaps in SEP size and performance for interplanetary robotic missions and solar sails for propellentless Sun/Earth observation missions — the program’s investments are very relevant. I’d also quibble technically regarding assertions about single-pass aerocapture (at Earth or Mars) and long tethers being ready for commercial prime-time.

Whether NASA’s ISPP investments should have been focused on commercial applications or human space flight instead of science missions is another argument. But against the goals of the ISPP program as laid out, ISPP investments were highly relevant to a new generation of space science missions.

“”I would rather see ISPP continue, but with the charter to develop NEP and NTP as propulsion technologies that are high $ investments, high development efforts that the commercial sector cannot pursue.”

Major investments are important over the long-run in this area. Unfortunately, Griffin sacrificed Project Prometheus (the major NEP initiative under the VSE) on the ESAS/Ares I/Orion altar very early in his tenure as Administrator.

In concept, yes this is a bad sign. However, there are two things that temper my disappointment. First, it is a MSFC run program that had its genesis as part of the SLI program that was a complete failure. ISPP has not been run much better. Second, the technologies they are pursuing no longer fit the goals of the ISPP. Ion engines are now commercial flight products and there is significant overlap with the efforts of GRC for higher power ion engines. MSFC should no longer be involved with this effort as it has proceeded past the basic R&D level. Aerocapture is a natural extension of aerobraking and is well understood by industry. Solar sails have (in my opinion) such a limited potential role for any future mission application as to be a waste of time. Tethers have flown as space experiments on a number of occasions nad have yet to show any level of success. It is time to give them up. I would rather see ISPP continue, but with the charter to develop NEP and NTP as propulsion technologies that are high $ investments, high development efforts that the commercial sector cannot pursue.

Agreed. When the “D” eats the “R” in an R&D agency like NASA, it’s time to reconsider the scope and cost of the “D”.

“This is true. The entire In-Space Propulsion Program (under the Science Mission Directorate) has been slated for shutdown. This group has been developing ion engine, aerocapture, solar sail, and tether technology for the past six years at NASA, with a budget ranging from $20M to $60M per year. Now it is being cancelled even as its deliverables are nearing flight-ready status.”

This is a real shame.

An advanced studies program should not be judged solely (or even at all) by a cost-sharing metric. By definition, advanced studies involve high-risk concepts that will usually not attract private investment. (It’s actually quite impressive that NIAC achieved a 1-to-4 cost-sharing ratio.) Advanced studies are first and foremost about uncovering concepts that can give an agency or organization breakthrough capabilities, not a for-profit metric like ROI. (And even cost-sharing on standard development projects shouldn’t be measured by ROI.)

Prizes, however, should demonstrate leveraged investment. If an R&D agency puts up a prize with X value, it should see some multiple of X in terms of the total investment by the teams pursuing the prize. Some of that investment may just be sweat equity, but regardless, a prize that attracts less than its value (less than X) is potentially a poorly constructed competition.

FWIW…