In my case you would be wrong. While I think I have educated myself reasonably well in spaceflight theory and history, my degree and training is in archeology. The value I think I bring to the discussion is a long-term perspective that sets our goals within the wider sweep of human history. This is a space politics discussion board, and, for better or worse (better, I would say), engineers and scientists are never the sole deciders of our society’s course of action.

In the case of Anonymous (and I wrote this before reading his post below) I would guess (and it is no more than that, based on the nature of their knowledge and arguments) that Anonymous is in a policy position somewhere. Rest assured, I do take Anonymous’ views with large grains of salt — and I often do not agree with them — while fully respecting their obvious breadth of knowledge of the subject.

As for Mike Griffin, if anyone here thinks he or she is more technically talented or capable and better educated, then please, by all means, stand up, introduce yourself, and make your case by telling us how long you were Chief Engineer of NASA, one of its centers,

Dr. Griffin may be the best engineer since the beginning of the Universe (I am not qualified to say), but he is truly terrible at politics. He’s done a decent job of spreading the bacon, but whether ESAS is acheivable or not, he clearly put a human lunar return on shaky polticial ground by choosing an architecture that cost too much and took too long, when other alternatives were available. Far worse, he has made gobs of unnecessary enemies (by canceling science projects and, worse, reinstating them; remember, space scientists were not initially opposed to the VSE, which was, I think, one of the policy’s great achievements). Worse again, he needlessly antagonized environmental scientists through probable sensorship and by making unnecessarily provocative statements about the environment, in addition to cutting their budgets before being overruled this year, all at a time when it was already clear that the next Administration might well be favorably disposed to environmental science and scientists.

— Donald

Wrong.

“But here’s the problem with consultants–they only get told what they need to know to do the job they are being consulted on, which is usually something that is going, or may very well go, wrong. So they see a highly skewed world.”

Again, argue the post, not the poster. If you resort to ad hominem attacks based on made up assumptions about other posters, then you shouldn’t be posting here. Base your argument on logic and evidence, not on whom you’re arguing with.

“That’s not what the GAO wrote.”

It is absolutely what the GAO wrote. Here’s one (of several) passages in which the GAO argues that J-2X development will take two additional years:

“NASA’s Administrator has publicly stated that if Congress provided the Agency an additional $2 billion that NASA could accelerate the Constellation program’s initial operational capability date to 2013. We believe that this assessment is highly optimistic. The development schedule for the J-2X engine, the critical path for the Ares I development, is already recognized as aggressive, allowing less than 7 years for development. The development of the Space Shuttle Main engine by comparison took 9 years.”

And here’s one (of several) passages in which the GAO argues that a delay in the J-2X schedule results in a delay to the whole Ares I schedule:

“The J-2X development effort represents a critical path for the Ares I project. Subsequently, delays in the J-2X schedule for design, development, test, and evaluation would have a ripple effect of cost and schedule impacts throughout the entire Ares I project.”

I don’t know how to make this any simpler or more clear. GAO is arguing that J-2X will probably take two additional years to develop, and that any delay in the J-2X schedule will result in a similar delay to the overall Ares I schedule.

“So far, over the 2 years that the J-2X contract has been in effect, none of those slips has occurred.”

Actually, there have been slips in the J-2X schedule, resulting in the schedule compression that GAO refers to here:

“Given the linear nature of a traditional test-analyze-fix-test cycle, even large funding increases offer no guarantee of program acceleration, particularly when the current schedule is already compressed and existing NASA test facilities are already maximized.”

J-2X slips have not hit the bottom line yet but there’s little slack left.

“As for Mike Griffin, if anyone here thinks he or she is more technically talented or capable and better educated… Those critics should tread very lightly when criticizing Gene Kranz’ technical judgements of NASA’s implementation of VSE because quite frankly few can fill his shoes.”

Kranz certainly deserves a high degree of respect for his mission operations acccomplishments. But that’s not evidence that Kranz knows how to develop launch vehicles or spacecraft.

Griffin certainly deserves respect for his extensive academic background. But that’s not evidence that Griffin can properly formulate and manage the execution of engineering development programs.

And again, you’re basing your arguments on personalities, instead of logic and the evidence at hand.

“In closing, thanks Keith for exposing the Direct 2 folks to be what they are, charlatans. I mean, they’re led by a toy rocket maker!”

In point of fact, that’s simply not true. Chuck Longton has worked Titan, Atlas, aircraft turbofan engine, and nuclear submarine development for some four decades. Stephen Metschan worked NASA studies at Boeing for a decade before founding his own engineering analysis software company. You can read their bios here, among other places (add http://www):

thespaceshow.com/guest.asp?q=494
thespaceshow.com/guest.asp?q=455

I’m not plugging for DIRECT/Jupiter 120 — I think their study should be subject to thorough external review and options comparison just like ESAS and Ares/Orion should have been. But we shouldn’t criticize alternatives based on false accusations.

FWIW…

The argument-from-authority logical fallacy doesn’t carry much weight here, sorry. If you want to be convincing, you have to learn how to actually argue.

Don, everyone, I’m not trying to belittle anyone’s accomplishments or hurt their feelings. But if someone stands up and wants to write about how they know better than Mike Griffin or Gene Kranz when it comes to getting people into Space, you’d better be able to stand toe-to-toe with those two individuals.

I’d be happy to debate either of them, as would (I suspect) anonymouspace, if (s)he didn’t feel a need to remain anonymous. My credentials (and his or hers) are irrelevant to my willingness or ability to do so.

I would assume all of us here have an aerospace background and engineering education commiserate with that background.

As for Anonymouspace, from what I can tell he is an industry veteran and is presently a consultant. But here’s the problem with consultants–they only get told what they need to know to do the job they are being consulted on, which is usually something that is going, or may very well go, wrong. So they see a highly skewed world. Anonymouspace keeps reading things in the GAO report that are not there. He had a big discussion about it a few posts back over his interpretation of two GAO reports. Don, if you take the time to read those two reports, and they are not engineering docs but written for all of us, you’ll see that delta between the GAO’s wording and Anonmouspace’s interpretation is…well, vast, e.g. Anonymouspace keeps saying that the GAO, and I’ll use his word here,

“What GAO is arguing is that J-2X is going to take considerably longer to develop than what NASA has planned and that this is likely to cause about a two-year slip in the overall schedule for Ares I”

That’s not what the GAO wrote. I’m paraphrasing here, the GAO acknowledges that the J-2X program is risky–duh–but also notes that NASA and its J-2X contractor Rocketdyne are mitigating that risk by, among other things, doing what was done so successfully during Apollo and building up testing from the component to the system, and building in time-slips (think of this is a launch hold time) for 29 reworks. So far, over the 2 years that the J-2X contract has been in effect, none of those slips has occurred. And the series of tests just finished on the J-2X went smoothly. Yes, yes, a couple of firings only lasted, and I’m trying to remember here, 40 sec. for a 80 sec. firing and another was something like 240 sec. for a 400 sec. firing. One of those was due to cavitation of the LOX due to a valve being vibrated loose on the test stand. In other words, not a problem with the engine’s power pack but with the test stand.

As for Mike Griffin, if anyone here thinks he or she is more technically talented or capable and better educated, then please, by all means, stand up, introduce yourself, and make your case by telling us how long you were Chief Engineer of NASA, one of its centers, Boeing, Rocketdyne, or other aerospace firm, and how long you ran a FFRDC such as Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory.

The reason I first posted here was become some here were critical of Gene Kranz’ testimony last week in support of NASA’s VSE efforts. Those critics should tread very lightly when criticizing Gene Kranz’ technical judgements of NASA’s implementation of VSE because quite frankly few can fill his shoes. For those of you here who are equally accomplished on a technical level, who have directed manned missions to the Moon, who were Director of Mission Operations at a NASA center for over 11 years, you have my apologies.

Don, everyone, I’m not trying to belittle anyone’s accomplishments or hurt their feelings. But if someone stands up and wants to write about how they know better than Mike Griffin or Gene Kranz when it comes to getting people into Space, you’d better be able to stand toe-to-toe with those two individuals.

In closing, thanks Keith for exposing the Direct 2 folks to be what they are, charlatans. I mean, they’re led by a toy rocket maker! Jeezzz.

Although I’m sure some folks have strong opinions about what the “perfect” rocket engine is, it obviously depends on the application in mind. J-2X will be great for some things and terrible for others.

GAO is _not_ arguing that J-2X will be a useless piece of junk. What GAO is arguing is that J-2X is going to take considerably longer to develop than what NASA has planned and that this is likely to cause about a two-year slip in the overall schedule for Ares I.

Far more often than not, GAO turns out to be right about these things. Witness all their reports that predicted the massive overruns we’ve seen in recent years in military and intelligence spacecraft development programs. Based on that history, I’d tend to take GAO at their word.

But we don’t have to. The GAO reports on Ares I lay out a very compelling set of evidence — from the almost complete lack of J-2 heritage at the component level, to unproven breakthroughs in nozzle technology, to problems getting test stand time, to SSME experience — that supports their finding that J-2X development is going to take a couple years longer than NASA has scheduled. Again, I’ve excerpted the relevant portions above. Read them for yourself.

What I take away from this is that it was stupid to put a completely new engine development like J-2X in the critical path of a new system to get NASA astronauts flying again after Shuttle retirement. It was doubly stupid to put two new engine developments — counting the 5-segment SRB (GAO has a lot to say about that, too) — in the critical path. If NASA wants to develop new and better rocket engines, that’s a fine and worthy goal. But NASA shouldn’t make those engines a requirement for a human launch system that is on a tight schedule to get flying ASAP.

Moreover, there’s no reason that NASA had to go down this path. This is not the early 1960s where there weren’t existing rocket engines and launch vehicles lying around. It’s 50 years later and we have two existing launch vehicles available to the nation (Atlas V/Delta IV), a third one on the way with engines that are much farther along in DDT&E than J-2X (Falcon 9), and other Shuttle-derived designs that do not require new engine development (like Jupiter 120). Stupid, stupid, stupid…

FWIW…

That said, I always take anyone’s views with a grain of salt. There are supporters of the current architecture — not least, Dr. Griffin — who are knowledgeable and present good reasons for their choices.

So, bottom line for this non-engineer, and given the totality of what I’ve read and seen, I’m enclined to believe that reality lies closer to Anonymous’ views, while reserving judgement and hoping that he or she is wrong.

Time will tell. . . .

— Donald

Judge for yourself. I included all the links and references.

FWIW…

Where did I say that J-2X “would quickly start to slide”? Please don’t put words in my mouth.

And again, it’s not me saying that J-2X is going to require an additional two years to develop. It’s the GAO. Here’s the relevant excerpts from their latest April 2008 report:

“Ares I upper stage essentially requires development of a new engine…”

“… the J-2X engine represents a new engine development effort that, both NASA and Pratt and Whitney Rocketdyne recognize, is likely to experience failures during development. Addressing these failures is likely to lead to design changes that could impact the project’s cost and schedule.”

“Although the J-2X is based on the J-2 and J-2S engines used on the Saturn V and leverages knowledge from the X-33 and RS-68, the number of planned changes is such that, according to NASA review boards, the effort essentially represents a new engine development. NASA and Pratt and Whitney Rocketdyne recognize that some level of developmental problems are inherent in all new engine development programs. As such, the project has predicted that the J-2X development will require 29 rework cycles. In addition, the J-2X faces extensive redesign to incorporate modern controls, achieve increased performance requirements, and meet human rating standards. The J-2X developers also face significant schedule risks in developing and manufacturing a carbon composite nozzle extension needed to satisfy thrust requirements. According to contractor officials, the extension is more than 2 feet—i.e., about one-third—wider in diameter than existing nozzle extensions.”

“The development schedule for the J-2X is aggressive, allowing less than 7 years from development start to first flight, and highly concurrent. Due to the tight schedule and long-lead nature of engine development, the J-2X project was required to start out earlier in its development than the other elements on the Ares I vehicle. This approach has introduced a high degree of concurrency between the setting of overall Ares I requirements and the development of the J-2X design and hardware. Consequently, the engine development is out of sync with the first stage and upper stage in the flow-down and decomposition of requirements, an approach our past work has shown to be fraught with risk. NASA acknowledges that the engine development is proceeding with an accepted risk that future requirements changes may affect the engine design and that the engine may not complete development as scheduled in December 2012. The J-2X development effort represents a critical path for the Ares I project. Subsequently, delays in the J-2X schedule for design, development, test, and evaluation would have a ripple effect of cost and schedule impacts throughout the entire Ares I project.”

“NASA’s Administrator has publicly stated that if Congress provided the Agency an additional $2 billion that NASA could accelerate the Constellation program’s initial operational capability date to 2013. We believe that this assessment is highly optimistic. The development schedule for the J-2X engine, the critical path for the Ares I development, is already recognized as aggressive, allowing less than 7 years for development. The development of the Space Shuttle Main engine by comparison took 9 years. Further, NASA anticipates that the J-2X engine is likely to require 29 rework cycles to correct problems identified during testing. Given the linear nature of a traditional test-analyze-fix-test cycle, even large funding increases offer no guarantee of program acceleration, particularly when the current schedule is already compressed and existing NASA test facilities are already maximized.”

“According to NASA, at this time, existing test facilities are insufficient to adequately test the Ares I and Orion systems. Existing altitude test facilities are insufficient to test the J-2X engine in a relevant environment. To address this issue, NASA is in the process of constructing a new altitude test facility at Stennis Space Center for the J-2X… Further, Pratt and Whitney Rocketdyne—the J-2 X upper stage engine contractor—indicated that existing test stands that could support J-2X testing will be tied up supporting the Space Shuttle program until 2010. NASA has taken steps to mitigate J-2X risks by increasing the amount of component-level testing, procuring additional development hardware and test facilities, and working to make a third test stand available to the contractor earlier than originally planned. NASA has compensated for this schedule pressure on the Ares I project by adding funds for testing and other critical activities. But it is not certain that added resources will enable NASA to deliver the Ares I when expected.”

If GAO’s findings give you so much heartburn, then you need to take it up with them. I don’t work at GAO. Arguing with me isn’t going to force GAO to retract their findings.

“Yes, Orion is overweight because NASA is still trying to figure out how much redundancy to have.”

A very inaccurate portrayal of the situation.

The problem is not that NASA has to “figure out how much redundancy to have.” NASA knows how redundant Orion _should_ be. Per NASA’s own human rating documents, Orion is required to have dual redundancy on all systems that are critical to crew safety.

The problem is that the Orion project can’t meet the requirement to have dual redundancy on all systems that are critical to crew safety (among other requirements) within the allowed mass. Geyer even confirmed in today’s telecon with reporters that Orion’s PDR has slipped two months to November because the team is still looking to save mass, including being more aggressive on load margins.

“Bottom line is that AnonymousSpace knows some particulars that you and I don’t, that hasn’t helped his batting average.”

I have not quoted or referenced any “particulars” that you can’t verify in GAO reports, Flight Global articles, Orlando Sentinel reporter blogs, or Nasaspaceflight.com articles. I’m just repeating what these sources have found.

Again, if these findings give you so much heartburn, then go argue with all those investigators and reporters. Arguing with me isn’t going to change what they report on.

And if it’s the facts supporting these findings that give you so much heartburn, then don’t be mad at me or with these investigators and reporters. Be mad at NASA for allowing Constellation program to have gotten to this point in the first place.

“As for the super long post…full of sound.”

I count 25 links and references in my last two posts. I count two references in your last two posts. If you have more evidence that things are going well in Constellation, I’m all ears. But if not, don’t make ridiculous claims that the evidence weighs in favor of an Ares I/Orion system that will fly with anything close to its promised performance, safety, cost, and schedule. The evidence has clearly and overwhelmingly gone the other way.

FWIW…