“I think he’s got a better appreciation for the significance of technology” because of that experience, Cernan said.

Does he realize McCain doesn’t know how to use email or computers? Taking this out of presidential politics, can anyone appreciate “the significance of technology” when they’ve said – more than once, in public – that he doesn’t use computers and has no interest in learning?

That was a well written response and I thank you for your insight on this subject.

Senator McCain may not be as eloquent as Obama, but people who are doers versus talkers rarely are.”

Where’s the logic chain? Exactly what has McCain done here that would qualify him as a “doer”? Giving a junior credit for something his father did (especially 40-odd years ago) doesn’t turn the junior into a “doer”.

McCain was one of my two two picks for the Republican candidancy, but let’s not give credit where no credit is due.

“Personally I think this explains a lot about Senator McCain’s tough love for NASA,” namely his disappointment in NASA failing to live up to the potential demonstrated in Apollo.”

McCain has been tough on NASA, the VSE, and NASA Administrators in the past, but there’s no evidence that it has anything to do with personal disappointment over the end of Apollo. McCain has a well-established track record fighting wasteful government spending and is well-known for his temper. Either or both of those factors are much more likely to be the cause of McCain’s criticism of NASA, the VSE, and various NASA Administrators.

“Imagine what someone like Admiral Steidle would accomplish in salvaging the VSE as NASA administrator?”

Steidle has taken the Rogers Distinguished Chair of Aerospace Engineering at the Naval Academy. It’s not clear that he would leave that commitment to be NASA Administrator (or for any other position). Aside from an unsubstantiated statement in the comments section of this blog that Steidle is advising McCain and a common naval aviator past, there’s nothing else that connects Steidle and McCain. If Steidle were advising McCain on NASA, presumably we would have seen a substantive space policy statement out of the McCain campaign that is consistent with Steidle’s approach to the VSE. We havn’t. And if Steidle is advising McCain, advice doesn’t necessarily equate to political appointment. It’s not even certain that Steidle is a Republican. He was not a political appointee in his prior position at NASA.

I like Steidle a lot, but I wouldn’t get my hopes up. As much as it pains me to say so, there’s probably just as good a chance or better that Griffin, a dyed-in-the-wool Republican, will remain Administrator under a McCain Administration.

FWIW…

I’m not out to score points in a debate. I just wanted to know your data source because my own impression and readings (I too am a lifelong spaceflight devotee, albeit 5 years behind you on the age scale) disagree with your opinion/assessment, in particular the notion that 30 to 70 percent of the public might have been hostile to space exploration by the mid-60s. I am always wary of cited polls (as Disraeli said, “There are Lies, Damned Lies, and Statistics”), so when you quoted such specific numbers that went against my own impressions I was curious regarding their source.

Contrary to your recollections/impressions, I believe (based on my own early recollections & extensive reading) the public was still enamored of spaceflight and the virtue of technological progress right up and through Apollo 11’s landing. While they may not have been following every detail to the extent they had during Mercury (in part due to the media’s lessening of their coverage and the lack of freshness to the exploits), most still viewed Gemini and Apollo as something we ought to be doing and they paid attention when major milestones were achieved.

Perhaps your perceptions have been colored by then-media coverage of politicians and activists such as Walter Mondale & Ralph Abernathy, who were able to hook the ears of journalists in search of contrary copy for their newspapers. Abernathy’s protest march on Cape Canaveral during the launch preparations of Apollo 11 garnered some press but it hardly represented 30-60% of the American people.

And I would offer that the anti-technology bias of which you speak didn’t pervade the greater public’s mindset until the early to mid-70s, after the environmentalist movement (an underlying tenet of which had always been that industrialization & technology are bad) had (ironically) made huge inroads into the public’s consciousness on the coat-tails of Apollo 8’s December 1968 Earthrise image.

While some older folks have always distrusted “newfangled technology” (I have an aunt who can offer an earful on this point), until the early-to-mid 1970s the majority of Americans still held to the belief (culturally, it was almost “American” to do so) that advancing technology would improve our standard of living and serve to protect us militarily. [The shock of Sputnik was all about this mindset and how it had been shaken to its roots; it didn’t get dislodged as an American value/presumption until the strife of the late sixties gave way to the malaise of the early 70s—colored, in part, by the anti-technology attitudes of the growing environmentalist movement and the seeming inability of our high-tech military to win decisively in Vietnam, both of which didn’t grab hold of the wider public until 1972-73.]

BTW, according to the review at the following link (I haven’t read the book myself either), “The Reluctant Spacefarers” does NOT appear to be a reference that would shed light on (much less support) your points.
(http://ocw.mit.edu/NR/rdonlyres/5D9FE549-0CFE-4042-B54B-AFFBDBDEF6D0/0/bok_rev_gillespi.pdf)

I personally still hold McDougall’s “The Heavens and the Earth” to be a superior reference, in particular when read in concert with the NASA History Series (especially the program & center histories). [Speaking of references, Cernan’s “The Last Man on the Moon” is an enjoyable read that provides excellent insight regarding his own outlook at the time.]

As for the other primary theme of this thread, I too am all for expansive exploration and exploitation of the solar system, but I’m not out for an “Apollo-like Program” per se. As Rand notes, Apollo definitely isn’t the model. Apollo existed and succeeded in its way because it was of its own time, a very unique set of circumstances (geopolitical, cultural, technical) that aren’t likely to repeat themselves. “Spaceflight and the Myth of Presidential Leadership” (edited by Launius & McCurdy) is an excellent reference addressing this question and how it fits into the greater historical tableau.

But to bring about more extensive solar system exploration (govt & private), we’re going to have to do a better job of engaging the public. While I disagree with the chronology and precise estimates of Mr. Ernst’s assessments regarding public opinion on space, I don’t disagree with the core of his overall point.

It has been a long time since the public has clamored for major efforts in space, and without (at the least) more public interest, we will continue to face an uphill battle securing public monies, implementing coherent strategies, and generating tech-leveraged innovations that will advance our moving outward to explore new destinations and exploit immense resources—and thereby improve life for everybody.

Warmest regards.

Bob Mahoney

Well, I’m not. I think that those who are are fooling themselves, and have not learned from history.

http://sev.prnewswire.com/aerospace-defense/20080617/LATU50917062008-1.html

The 2008 Gallup Poll shows more than 52 percent of those surveyed would support an increase in space exploration funding.

— Donald

But its goals, and the urgency of meeting them, were different than today’s, as are the political and budget constraints. Which is why Griffin’s attempt to redo it is turning out to be such a disaster. And in fact we’ve only had one strategy since, which was based on Apollo’s success–give NASA a mandate to build some huge new system, and provide it with budget, but never quite enough. There is a fundamental flaw with this strategy, and giving NASA the lead on VSE was the administration’s biggest mistake.