We would all hope that to be the case, but I see not a shred of evidence for it. I’d like to think more than wishfully here.

to be a “slash & burn” hatchetman is not the kind of job that anybody wants. It is not fun. It makes you lots of enemies. Members of Congress yell at you.

I’m with you there. But up-and-coming leadership entrepreneurs are not beyond putting themselves in positions where they have to make hard choices and inflict pain as a way of proving themselves for higher service. The hair-on-chest test. Or, let’s say that Obama tells Gration, “You get out there and deconstruct NASA, get out of the way for someone who can reconstruct it, and then we’ll have a look at Secretary of the Air Force for you.” Gration salutes and marches ahead, forcing a smile on his face. One might speculate that Gration was originally not at the top of the priority list the transition team made up, and those above him did not, in fact, want the job for precisely this reason.

BTW, members of Congress yell at anyone for anything, and they don’t have life terms. Gration isn’t that old, and he’ll outlive most of them.

I have a strong suspicion that Gration is a closet space buff, and asked for the NASA job because he wants to help our nation in space.

At the same time, to be a “slash & burn” hatchetman is not the kind of job that anybody wants. It is not fun. It makes you lots of enemies. Members of Congress yell at you.

I admit this is all speculation, but human nature being what it is, and considering that Gration has many other choices, I doubt that he would want the NASA job if Obama wanted him to be a hatchet man.

FWIW,

– Al

Since Gration does not have the deep aerospace and science connections that would allow him to credibly organize some serious replanning of the agency, his nomination might lead one to assume that the new administration has pretty much already determined where NASA will go. No, I don’t think that just keeping the rudder straight is what any new administrator would be asked to do.

One wonders if Obama was looking for somewhere to put Gration, and assured him that if planted at NASA to achieve near term goals there, would be able to eventually move up to where he might really want to be. The selection of such a person by an insider-focused transition team is puzzling, however. If the transition team was, in fact, asked to scope out new administrators, they may have just been handed a list.

That Obama would listen to Gration as administrator would be certainly be beneficial to the agency, and I’m in no position to criticize his leadership potential, but I suspect that if he was nominated and confirmed, things might get a lot worse for NASA before they got better.

NASA in the years that follow will be in total infrastructure building mode under these crushing financial lean years.

1. His heavy involvement with writhing Obama’s space policy document puts him hands-on to its implimentation, with clear access directly to the President. A successful Administrator needs to be able to work the room in the White House and Congress. Gration can do that, while Griffin could not.
2. Being a space community outsider, he would be less likely to simply “press on” with current programs without some kind of thorough top to bottom review. That would be good for the agency, especially in light of all the cost, schedule and technical difficulties with the current project. He will look at it with fresh eyes and with no dog in the hunt. Dr Griffin is emotionally attached to Ares and that’s bad for the agency. Gration would not suffer that impediment.

Now if we match that with a Deputy Administrator that can “work the room” at the upper eschelons at NASA to keep the projects going properly, That would be a good match. I think Lori Garver would be able to do that and if so, then a Gration/Garver matchup would be good.

Dr Griffin is a good engineer. He should have been tapped as the chief engineer at NASA instead of its Administrator. He would have been perfect in that position. I hope the new Administrator, whoever is finally tapped, has a chief engineer of the kind that Griffin could have been.

Too bad. I think Griffin would heave been much happier at NASA in that position.

I believe the fact that his position on VSE/Constellation changed so significantly during the campaign (moving from considering it to be a funding source to be mined to help pay for education initiatives to representing a viable program needing support but possible reassessment—how perfectly slippery) bears this out.

I do agree, Al, with your point about access to the president being a valuable commodity. To some extent this was one of the advantages that O’Keefe (and Webb before him) brought to the job.

And, Bill, you may be correct that the policy statement can serve as a tool. I’m just suggesting that it’s a tool possessing very little leverage.

Of course the statement does not hold any AUTHORITY over what they will do. Bush-Cheney had a wonderful space policy statement in 2000 (developed by a Committee led by Bob Walker and Courtney Stadd), which made lots of promises, but some small fraction of those policies every came true.

So there is reason to be skeptical.

However, the Obama space policy statement is good data point on what they are thinking of doing, and would like to do. Many pieces of the Obama space policy statement were clearly written to illustrate desires & intentions. It is clear that very few people vote (for or against) a candidate based on what his/her space policy is, so I would not leap to conclusions about them lying in the statement to gain votes.

But there is a real risk of the WH focusing on other priorities, and forgetting to do anything about a national space agenda.

Which is one big plus in Scott Gration’s corner.

Gration will have access.

– Al

“Politics is not rocket science, which is why rockets scientists do not understand politics.”

Politicians can be relied upon to say one thing and do another – all politicians, including Barack Obama. That being said, quoting their own words back at them when in a political dispute can be helpful.

That August 2008 paper is not a reason to be complacent or over-confident, rather it is a tool that can be used to advocate on behalf of COTS or ITAR reform or anything else found in that report which “we” (as space advocates) support.