Thanks for the detailed response. I have great respect for your thinking — and knowledge — which is well demonstrated without sharing your resume.

I choose not to share my resume. I will have to let my command of verifiable facts and (hopefully some level of) logic speak for themselves. I hope that is enough.

A couple issues:

STERNER: What was OMB’s job when it came to the space program? Was it to contain the NASA budget or achieve the President’s vision?

I suggest it is the President’s job to answer that question, and not anybody else’s.

It could go either way, based on the President’s stated desires.

This is all circumstance based — the total sum of the President’s *real* desires are unlikely to be all written down on paper in a policy statement.

Those desires are different for every federal agency, and what OMB does is a partial reflection of those desires.

STERNER: If NASA, the President, and OMB were on the same page in re the big picture, the question shouldn’t have come up. If the President and Griffin were on different pages, then Griffin should’ve been fired or done a better job toeing the line.

Only the President, and perhaps his closest advisors, can answer why the President did not resolve this conflict between OMB and NASA.

I am guessing that the President felt it was not important enough to fire Griffin (he then would have had to hire a new person), and he had other more important priorities.

Somehow President Bush communicated to OMB his intent — his real desires — on NASA’s budget, as well as every other federal agency. That is his job.

I think it goes without saying that the President’s *real* priorities in the federal budget received the level of funding that the President wanted.

Again, I appreciate your participation in this discussion. Thanks for the story on the OMB micromanagement of security card requirements to implement the EO policy.

FWIW,

– TANSTAAFL

Ouch, way to put me on the spot! You’re asking me to remember specifics from a few years back…a period I’ve tried to put out of my mind!

A few quick points in the interests of full disclosure:

First, I worked at NASA as Associate Deputy Administrator for Policy and Plans. In that job I reported directly to Shana Dale, the Deputy Administrator, for whom I had worked in the 90s. The main gig there was helping her handle agency management & ops. I didn’t get involved in programs. About six months into the job, the Chief of Strategic Communications left. So, I took that responsiblity on as well, first on an acting basis and eventually, on an official basis. That’s not an AA slot and, technically, was not actually a management job. As O’Keefe conceived it, it was a coordination function that, apparently, was meant to reduce the number of direct reports to him, or so the CW inside NASA went. As a matter of practice, it was a hybrid between coordination and management by default because the agency, Congress, and eventually OMB were dissatisfied with the functions nominally grouped under “strategic communications:” PAO, OLA, External Relations, & Education at HQ. We added a planning office out of hide to build a common communications plan and help with messaging. (The centers, mission directorates, and programs had their own shops, so you’re looking at a spaghetti wiring diagram in trying to figure out how it works.) Before NASA, I was the senior PSM for national security policy on the House Armed Services Committee, a Special Assistant in OASD/ISP (the Pentagon), a PSM and Staff Director for the House Science Committee’s Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, and a defense contractor, mainly working on proliferation issues and challenges presented by new technologies. I am currently a fellow at the George C. Marshall Institute and have done some consulting work for companies that had NASA contracts, although I do not currently have any clients who work with NASA. So…there’s full disclosure. (Can I suggest that others do the same?)

Second, in re the suggestion of specifics on OMB’s unhelpful management guidance. The one that struck me the most was the requirement to have access/ID badges in place by a date certain. I forget the Presidential circular and am reaching back into the dim recesses, but you may recall it was part of the process that led some JPL folks to sue the government in order to avoid elementary background checks that are being required of all incoming government employees. Basically, OMB set up detailed requirements and a timeline to complete the transition to new id cards. To help things along, it identified a possible contractor, the use of which would result in a “green” score. The problem was that the card available from the contractor at that point only met the near term OMB performance requirements. It didn’t meet the mid- or long-term requirements–and apparently wouldn’t in the time allotted. Moreover, IIRC, no agency had been given additional resources to compile biometric data that had to go on the cards, designate access areas based on info on the cards, or procure and install swipe pads that made the cards very useful from an access standpoint. So, one could waste a lot of time, energy, and money complying with OMB’s guidance without solving any real problems, or, for that matter, getting one inch closer to the moon or Mars. NASA went into a months-long effort to get “permission” to build a better program from the ground up, which I think it received after I left. IMHO, the amount of time, energy, and resources that went into convincing OMB to loosen up a little was not well spent. Don’t get me wrong, the Presidential circular was overdue and NASA’s compliance task was made harder because: 1) it had ignored an EO on background checks dating back to Eisenhower, 2) it had a technical culture of trying to promote easy access and openness (yes, believe it or not), 3) it always suffers from a NIMBY reaction to outside solutions; and 4) it often seems to believe that external guidance is a mere suggestion, and not a requirement. (It’s more guilty than other agencies of using a decision as a departure point to begin the discussion.) That said, in this case, NASA was right, had solid analysis to back up its position, and attempted to clearly communicate that position to OMB on multiple occasions. Still, it took months and the general reaction from NASA folks dealing directly w/OMB was that OMB had no interest in solving the problem, provided that the letter of its guidance was followed. It was their opinion that OMB was more interested in its report card than in the substance of the policy. It would’ve been better for OMB simply to leave it to the agencies to demonstrate how they had complied with the circular, rather than issuing detailed instructions. To its credit, OMB saw the light in this case (again, if my memory serves) and gov’t worked properly. No doubt I’ve forgotten many of the details, but you get the gist. Nobody was acting maliciously; everyone had good intentions and wanted a good outcome, but the process was inefficient. (FWIW, I represented NASA on an interagency management council sponsored by OMB usually made up of only politicals and the consistent complaint from EVERY agency was about OMB micromanagement. I didn’t think it was just folks complaining about life; there was a substantive problem.)

Third, someone suggested that if Griffin got rolled by OMB civil servants on budget issues that it reflected poorly on Griffin. I’m paraphrasing because I’m too lazy to go cut and paste. But, I think the observation, whether true or not, makes my point. Why would Griffin, appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate to carry out national policy, have had a budget conflict with OMB in the first place? What was OMB’s job when it came to the space program? Was it to contain the NASA budget or achieve the President’s vision? If NASA, the President, and OMB were on the same page in re the big picture, the question shouldn’t have come up. If the President and Griffin were on different pages, then Griffin should’ve been fired or done a better job toeing the line. I believe that the President was fully capable of firing Griffin and that Mike was doing his best to toe the President’s line as he understood it. So, what does that leave, since the issue kept coming up? OMB was the odd-man out. If you think those statements are naive, you’re making my point. Of course they come up because OMB IS a player, which to my mind means that OMB can and should be held accountable for the things it does that affect the program. Some may want to excuse civil servants from that role, but I don’t think you can entirely. They know the programs better than anyone in the WH, are valued by the politicals for that reason, and contribute to the WH decision-making process by defining the options and serving as a buffer between the agency and the politicals.

In the main, we seem to agree that: 1) frustration with total budget levels accorded to NASA to achieve the President’s vision lies with senior politicals in the WH, most probably the President. I cut him some slack because the nation had higher priorities and Presidents don’t usually spend a lot of time on department/agency budgets. Those things are delegated to…OMB. But, ultimately, it was still his responsiblity; 2) the civil servants at OMB are sincere, knowledgeable professionals doing what they think is best for the country given their responsibilities as budget folks.

I hope we agree that: 1) OMB is not responsible for mission success and responds to different incentives; 2) OMB is a player in national policy; and, 3) OMB is a bureaucracy capable of pursuing its own interests.

We seem to disagree in that based on my experience, I believe that 1) OMB civil servants are capable of pursuing their agency’s institutional agenda, which may or may not reflect those of the President and 2) OMB civil servants should be held accountable when they do; 3) others believe OMB civil servants are neutered when it comes to affecting the direction of national progams and policies; and/or 4) others believe that OMB civil servants are not accountable for the results when they succeed in influencing the national agenda to their liking because they work for/through more senior politicals.

On that, I think I’m concluding my posts on this chain, although I probably will post occasionally on other subjects.

Thanks for the exchanges. Look forward to more in the future.

You really think POTUS and VPOTUS spend a lot of time on the NASA budget?”

Of course not. But, contrary to Griffin’s claims, that doesn’t mean that OMB civil servants are responsible for POTUS and VPOTUS decisions. If Griffin appealed an OMB passback to the POTUS or VPOTUS, but got shot down, that’s not OMB’s fault. Either Griffin’s team didn’t do a good job making their case, or the POTUS or VPOTUS made a bad decision. Griffin should blame himself or his former bosses, not OMB.

And, in fact, in order for OMB to publish a budget, the White House has to reach agreement with the department or agency in question, i.e., Griffin has to agree to the budget numbers he’s being given. There’s gobs of Congressional testimony from Griffin when he was Administrator in which he makes it clear that he stands by the President’s budget. For Griffin to go back now and imply that he didn’t actually agree to or support those budgets would indicate that he was dishonest then or is being dishonest now.

And I failed to make this last point in the prior posts, but it’s just boggling that Griffin would blame a $15 billion reduction in NASA’s multi-year budget projections for Constellation’s current budget woes when the program’s own cost estimates have experienced $35 billion in growth and are threatening another $18 billion in growth according to the CBO. That’s the most blatant and worst kind of blame-shifting. Regardless of whether OMB staff, the POTUS, the Congress, or Martians are responsible for the $15 billion reduction in budget projections, clearly the great majority of Constellation’s budget problems, $35-53 billion worth of cost growth, are due to decisions by NASA managers and their prior Administrator. For Griffin to argue otherwise demonstrates a worrisome ignorance of the numbers involved or a transparent attempt to shift the blame.

“Do you you really think the OMB PAD consistently knows and cares enough about NASA and the challenges of running any high-tech program to do much more than sign off on what the civil service experts tell him?”

I think that’s an inaccurate understanding of the the PADs’ role and involvement. My understanding is that OMB PADs typically have broad backgrounds in the areas that they cover (NASA’s PAD is often an engineer or scientist even if they’re not in aerospace discplines), that they sit in on the initial budget overview briefings provided by departments/agencies to OMB staff, that they typically spend a half-day to a day getting briefed on and working program and budget options for a particular agency with OMB staff, that they typically send OMB staff back to the showers when they don’t like the program and budget options being presented to them, that they are active participants in the final briefings and decision meetings with the OMB Director, that they have to review and sign off on the passback sent to the agency, and that they play a crucial role in negotiating the final appeals/reclamas with the departments/agencies.

I guess there could be lazy PADs that just repeatedly hit the rubber stamp, but given the nature of the process, I don’t see how they’d survive more than one budget cycle.

And so what if there were lazy PADs, does that somehow make the civil servants responsible for their PAD’s laziness?

“It’s ‘so hard to understand’ your version of the way the world works because it doesn’t work that way.”

In addition to the role of the PADs discussed above, I’ve heard of at least one instance where the OMB Director himself sent OMB staff back to the showers because he didn’t agree with the options being presented for NASA budget content (i.e., there were two meetings with the OMB Director on NASA’s budget before it went to the White House). Contrary to Griffin’s claims, the political levels at OMB are actively engaged in developing department and agency budgets. They’re not being rolled by civil servant staff.

“If all you do is read the annual budget request, even in great detail, then you don’t understand budgets or government. Of course the columns add up fine.”

That may not be what you meant, but it was strongly implied when you differentiated between the budget fiscal year and the five-year runout.

“1) changing program-budget confidence intervals”

NASA does this, not OMB. For example, it was Griffin who decided to allow Ares I/Orion to be budgeted at the 65% confidence level for a 2014 IOC (now 2015 with zero confidence) in order to accommodate those projects’ large amount of programmatic content (versus a less technically and budgetarily challenging alternative).

“2) assuming magic “savings” from some other program;”

The only example of this I can think of is the difference in assumptions about projected savings during the Shuttle flyout under O’Keefe versus Griffin. Although O’Keefe was previously at OMB, the difference in assumptions is driven by the different Administrators, not OMB.

“3) planning on “paying back” a short-term budget cut in the out-years (which sometimes happens, but not always);”

Again, NASA does this all the time in the science budget, where there are lots of ongoing projects that can do those kinds of budget swaps. But I don’t see OMB brokering those intra-agency agreements.

“4) masking short-term problems by managing cash flows differently;”

I’m not sure what this means, specifically. Cash flow is a business accounting term not really used in government.

“5) obligating the money, but failing to “cost” it by delaying the work in any given fiscal year, creating a nice little revolving fund that can be used in an emergency;”

Again, NASA runs contracts and has the power to delay work, not OMB. Among its many weaknesses, Griffin’s Constellation budget assumed a large year-to-year rollover to carry the program until Shuttle retired.

“6) just plain ol’ pushing work that has to be done–and would best be done sooner, rather than later, into the outyears.”

NASA and OMB are guilty of this, but when a program is overrunning and content can’t be taken out of the program, the only alternative left is stretching out the schedule (or termination).

“That’s not to say that Griffin is right to round on OMB civil servants as the source of the problem… I do agree with the point that Griffin’s anger might better be directed at levels higher up than the civil servants at OMB.”

That’s the central argument, and regardless of the details above, on this, we appear to agree.

FWIW…

BUT I would hope that someone takes responsibility for their subordinates and thir actions. For example, the WH for say OMB and the NASA Admin. I believe pointing fingers only is the reflection of those who relinquished their responsibilities. Sorry.

Is it difficult to do everything? You bet and that is why we elect WH and Congress. Does it require diplomacy? Of course and they are being paid (fairly well) to do it. Is it difficult to go to the Moon and beyond? Well, if we cannot even manage our administrative people to properly manage budget or NASA, then please allow me to be skeptical that we will ever do it, ever again. Therefore the NASA we know will most likely go the way GM is going.

It is time to stop pointitng fingers and SERIOUSLY refelect. What do we want to do? Going to the Moon or perserve the status quo. Those who are in charge should really start to THINK or pretty soon they’ll also be looking for something to do.

Thanks for contributing your insights. I agree with basically everything you said, and I am guessing that “Major Tom” will grudgingly agree to the core points of your latest response to his first response.

I wanted to emphasize a point of substance that you accepted and agreed to, and ask you a follow-up question (to expand on something you said in your first post.

1) STERNER: I do agree with the point that Griffin’s anger might better be directed at levels higher up than the civil servants at OMB.

I think this is the core point that people were making. I am glad you agree.

A note for those who don’t know Eric — Eric used to work for Mike Griffin at NASA (most recently as AA for Strategic Communications). If even Eric can acknowledge that Griffin’s ire is misdirected, then I think that most everybody else should be able to accept this point.

2) STERNER: That said, OMB is still a bureaucracy. It still practices politics. It’s still vulnerable to having its own priorities, which may or may not coincide with those of the political higher-ups in the White House.

I wanted to emphasize this because I think it is important, and I think Major Tom should be able to agree with this too.

NASA is a bureaucracy, with institutional interests sometimes at odds with public interests (sometimes glaringly — think “white collar welfare” of protecting jobs at Centers without regard to whether it is good for the nation).

Congress is a bureaucracy, with institutional interests sometimes at odds with public interests (sometimes glaringly — think “pork” or think how Members of Congress join NASA bureaucratic interests to protect jobs at a Center).

The White House (including OMB) is a bureaucracy, with institutional interests sometimes at odds with public interests (not as glaringly, because most observers can’t see how the game is played — think “closed door budget games that don’t reflect the real truth about our budget problems, as Sterner laid out”).

3) STERNER: It still, occasionally, can’t resist the temptation to invent goals, procedures, and practices against which it can measure departments and agencies with an eye towards justifying its own existence…not in order to assist a department or agency achieve whatever mission/function it has been assigned.

I would like you to expand on this. OMB is not just of the “Bureau of Budget” anymore. It is the “Office of MANAGMENT and Budget”. It has been given the explicity responsibility to help the White House “manage” the federal agencies. To do its job, the OMB needs to “invent goals, procedures and practices” to help the WH manage federal agencies.

Now, I am willing to acknowledge that they may not be “good at it”, but that does not mean that they should not try to figure out how to execute on this responsibility. I am also willing to consider that they may abuse this responsibility, but I would want to hear the specific circumstances.

Can you share some specific circumstances to shed light on this issue?

– TANSTAAFL

You really think POTUS and VPOTUS spend a lot of time on the NASA budget? Really? Truly? Do you you really think the OMB PAD consistently knows and cares enough about NASA and the challenges of running any high-tech program to do much more than sign off on what the civil service experts tell him? It’s “so hard to understand” your version of the way the world works because it doesn’t work that way.

That’s not to say that Griffin is right to round on OMB civil servants as the source of the problem.

I noted:

“Remember, the definition for success at OMB differs from the definition of success at NASA, EPA, DOD, etc. etc. etc. OMB is fully capable of closing a budget because the numbers work 1 year, knowing full well that the 5-year runout it releases at budget time does NOT bear any relation to the reality it purports to represent and knowing full well that the programs contained in that budget are NOT sustainable at the projected funding levels. Dishonest budgeting? In Washington? Who’da thunk.”

You responded:

“This is totally false, and anyone who believes it has not studied a NASA
budget request in enough detail. Every annual NASA budget request to Congress is a five-year budget down to the project and sub-project level. The numbers add up from top to bottom in all five years, not just the fiscal year. Go visit the NASA CFO’s website and see for yourself.”

My reaction:

If all you do is read the annual budget request, even in great detail, then you don’t understand budgets or government. Of course the columns add up fine. But, they don’t reflect the projected likely costs of the program and everyone knows it. NASA, OMB, and Congress skirt the problem by using budget gimmicks, including: 1) changing program-budget confidence intervals; 2) assuming magic “savings” from some other program; 3) planning on “paying back” a short-term budget cut in the out-years (which sometimes happens, but not always); 4) masking short-term problems by managing cash flows differently; 5) obligating the money, but failing to “cost” it by delaying the work in any given fiscal year, creating a nice little revolving fund that can be used in an emergency; and, 6) just plain ol’ pushing work that has to be done–and would best be done sooner, rather than later, into the outyears. That’s why GAO or CBO are so frequently in the news when they run the numbers, compare them with likely performance, point out some of the budget shenanigans, and otherwise note the disconnects. (See GAO’s reports on MTPE’s uncosted carryover balances in the 1990s and practically every report it did on cost/schedule for ISS, particularly those that occured in conjunction with the multi-billion dollar over-run NASA presented to Bush in 2001.)

None of this has anything to do with changing priorities or unanticipated problems. It is budget politics pure and simple and OMB–civil servants included–is masterful at it.

I do agree with the point that Griffin’s anger might better be directed at levels higher up than the civil servants at OMB. I don’t know whether any of the career folks at OMB staffed papers up the chain laying out the consequences of continued budget cuts, or whether they promised to “take care of it without doing damage to the President’s agenda” because their bosses didn’t want to hear bad news. Certainly, their bosses would deserve more blame for either ignoring the warnings or creating an environment in which bad news wasn’t welcome–assuming there was someone willing to deliver it. Sadly, this kind of stuff doesn’t generally rise to the President’s desk on its own, or even the Veep’s. Space was managed at relatively low levels in the WH (the NSC and OSTP folks were director level civil servants and OMB jealously fights to keep them out of budget issues) and there didn’t seem to be any senior politicals who cared enough to take the time to follow-up on VSE. I don’t know if anyone has asked Mike whether, in hindsight, he regrets not just throwing his badge on the table and walking. You always have to ask yourself whether you can do more good on the inside than on the outside.

FWIW…

Please reread the earlier posts. No one stated that they wanted to “absolve” OMB of all responsibility. The argument was that Griffin was placing blame where it didn’t belong. Griffin was blaming OMB civil servant staff in his speech for budget decisions that they simply don’t have the authority to make. Those decisions are made by the political staff at OMB (program associated directors, the deputy director, and the director of OMB), by the West Wing staff, and by the VPOTUS and POTUS. There’s also usually inputs from OSTP, NSC, and other White House agencies. Griffin may just be ignorant of how the White House budget process works or he may just be continuing in the time-honored and cowardly tradition of criticizing White House decisions without criticizing the President or his advisors by blaming “rogue” civil servant staff. Regardless of whether Griffin’s remarks are made out of ignorance or cowardice, they’re false — OMB civil servant staff can’t publish budget numbers unless there is sign-off at the political level. Civil servant staff present options — political decisionmakers make decisions.

I don’t know why this is so hard to understand, even for folks who have worked in the federal government. OMB’s basic functions and processes are no different than any other agency or department budget office.

“Remember, the definition for success at OMB differs from the definition of success at NASA, EPA, DOD, etc. etc. etc. OMB is fully capable of closing a budget because the numbers work 1 year, knowing full well that the 5-year runout it releases at budget time does NOT bear any relation to the reality it purports to represent and knowing full well that the programs contained in that budget are NOT sustainable at the projected funding levels. Dishonest budgeting? In Washington? Who’da thunk.”

This is totally false, and anyone who believes it has not studied a NASA budget request in enough detail. Every annual NASA budget request to Congress is a five-year budget down to the project and sub-project level. The numbers add up from top to bottom in all five years, not just the fiscal year. Go visit the NASA CFO’s website and see for yourself.

That doesn’t mean that programs won’t encounter problems or priorities might not change from one year to the next and affect the five-year runout. But each five-year budget is whole and coherent.

“To do less, is to treat OMB as a mere adding machine, which is generally disrespectful of the fact that its personnel are living, breathing people who make anlaytical judgments, have opinions, and feel a responsibility to make their views known.”

No doubt. But to blame civil servant staff for suppossed $15 billion dollar budget cuts, almost the size of NASA’s entire annual budget, is ludicrous and/or cowardly. If Griffin is really so upset by the budgets he received while Administrator, then he should be criticizing the President and Vice-President that he worked for, the OMB, OSTP, and NSC Directors at the time, and their political staff.

And if Griffin was really so ineffective as NASA Administrator that he could be rolled by a few civil servant staff, then maybe he should look in the mirror when assigning blame for the budgets he received. Every agency and department is allowed to appeal OMB budget recommendations all the way up to the President. One has to wonder where Griffin and his staff were during that process each year.

FWIW…