We can all whine all we can about budget but if and when major technical mistakes are made there is no cure. Sidemount cargo will be difficult but possibly feasible. Sidemount crew is a total nightmare in the making especially with a LAS: Increased complexity is NOT EQUAL TO increased safety. It just is increased complexity.

In the case of Dr. Ride, that’s a better bet than with most former astronauts.

Unfortunately, Sally Ride is wrong. Between FY 2004 (the first fiscal year for the VSE) and FY 2009 (the last budget of the Bush II Administration), NASA’s Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD — the division within NASA responsible for building Constellation) received almost $2.5 billion more than than what the Bush II Administration promised in the FY 2004 budget.

Here’s what was promised in the FY 2004 budget:

FY 2004 $1,646.0M
FY 2005 $1,782.0M
FY 2006 $2,579.0M
FY 2007 $2,941.0M
FY 2008 $2,809.0M
FY 2009 $3,313.0M

Total $15,070.0M

And here’s what ESMD actually received in each fiscal year:

FY 2004 $2684.5M
FY 2005 $2209.3M
FY 2006 $3050.1M
FY 2007 $2869.8M
FY 2008 $3299.4M
FY 2009 $3505.5M

Total $17,618.6M

The total difference is $2,458.6 million. So the Bush II Administration and prior Congresses provided almost $2.5 billion more for ESMD than what the Bush II Administration promised to develop systems and technologies to return to the Moon. This doesn’t include the $400 million that ESMD received in the Recovery Act (passed after the Bush II Administration), which would increase the total difference to $3 billion.

There is no way that budget reductions or deferments are the cause of the schedule slips in Constellation/Ares I/Orion because there have been none. Other parts of the NASA budget have been cut, but not ESMD. In fact, ESMD’s budget has been larger than the Bush II Administration’s original VSE budget commitments.

The reasons that Constellation/Ares I/Orion have slipped so much are both technical (PDR deferrels) and cost growth (near doubling in costs to first lunar landing in CBO documents).

You should check your facts before accepting what others say at face value. Even former astronauts and blue-ribbon panel members can be wrong.

FWIW…

“NASA has not been given the resources to support this vision,” she said. “You can’t expect the agency to achieve grand and glorious goals” and then not provide the necessary funding, she said.”

Sally Ride quoted me better than I quoted myself.

There was never enough in the budget to execute the existing Constellation plan. Constellation costs through first landing have nearly doubled, far exceeding the original VSE budget.

Just because ESAS screwed up and Constellation was poorly managed doesn’t mean that an affordable manned lunar program can’t be mounted.

“Flexible Path is so vacuous”

Manned deployment and servicing of deep space telescopes capable of resolving Earth-like planets in other solar systems is vacuous?

Manned spacewalks to conduct research on near-Earth asteroids that pose existential threats to civilization is vacuous?

Manned missions to the moons of Mars is vacuous?

Telerobotic surface operations from lunar or Mars orbit is vacuous?

Commercial resupply of propellant depots at points throughout the inner solar system is vacuous?

“Plus its a National Lab”

Which means nothing. No substantial funding or activities have been added to the ISS since Congress made the designation.

“and those never close.”

Whether it happens sooner or later, deorbiting will certainly close this national laboratory.

“I’ve always felt, since 2005, that Griffin wanted CLV as it was designed because he wanted to hedge his bets that the VSE would be discarded in later years.”

No, exactly the opposite. Griffin pursued Ares I to lock-in Ares V. Ares I makes no technical or financial sense unless Ares V gets built. But Griffin didn’t consider the possibility that problems with Ares I would stand in the way of either vehicle getting built.

“Any seasoned Washington insider, such as Mr. Griffin sure is,”

Most of Griffin’s career was spent outside the federal government, in industry, FFRDCs, or academia. The couple of government jobs he had were as a technical manager in the civil service. He was never a political appointee or interface prior to becoming NASA Administrator.

Moreover, this is the same NASA Administrator that:

— Argued that it is “arrogant” to view climate change as a threat, causing White House Science Advisor Jack Marburger to disown Griffin’s statement as not “attempting to represent the [Bush] Administration’s views or broader policy.”

— Claimed that a research database of airline crew safety complaints contained nothing that the “traveling public would care about”, despite obvious implications for airline passenger safety.

— Sent an email to top NASA officials complaining that the Bush White House was on a “jihad” to shut down the Space Shuttle.

— Told the lead for the NASA transition team that “If you are looking under the hood, then you are calling me a liar.”

Griffin was not a Beltway insider, and even if he was, he was certainly not politically savvy.

“would know that funding in DC is never foreordained.”

But you just said that national labs never get shut down because Congress always funds them. Which is it? Is federal funding a constant or not?

“He designed the CLV”

CLV is the generic term. Griffin didn’t design “the CLV”. (EELVs, DIRECT, Falcon 9, etc. can all be CLVs.) Ares I was ESAS and Griffin’s choice for CLV.

“With a CLV flying, all the costs to keep Michoud building Li-Al tanks is paid for; so is J2-X; so is SRB.”

Unless Ares V is also built (and actually uses the same engines as Ares I, which appears unlikely), the costs of these systems will be spread over a very small number of Ares I flight components, driving Ares I per flight costs through the roof.

“Of course the bad news in all of this, should ISS be the driving requirement for selecting a launcher, in time the ISS will be as decrepit as MIR was in the last century.”

This sentence makes no sense. If a launch vehicle is developed with the ISS as the driver, why would that harm the ISS? If anything, the ISS would benefit from a vehicle designed specifically for its needs.

“Because that is all we have for Nasa to do for its human space program, the US will be keeping it together with spit and bailing wire just to have something to do”

There’s no logic here. If NASA’s human space flight program has only one mission, logically it will be able to focus on doing that mission well, rather than spreading its efforts across multiple projects.

“….like the broken down, bankrupt Russians of the the 1990’s.”

The state of the Russian space program last decade had everything to do with the collapse of the Soviet economy, and nothing to do with their lack of any program to send humans beyond LEO. By that logic, NASA’s human space flight program should have been in the same state.

FWIW…

It boils down to Soyuz forever
or
EELV
or
CLV
and it excludes Ares V, Direct or NSC(Not Shuttle C).

I’ve always felt, since 2005, that Griffin wanted CLV as it was designed because he wanted to hedge his bets that the VSE would be discarded in later years. Any seasoned Washington insider, such as Mr. Griffin sure is, would know that funding in DC is never foreordained.

He designed the CLV to be a building block for heavy lifter. With a CLV flying, all the costs to keep Michoud building Li-Al tanks is paid for; so is J2-X; so is SRB. Then should times change a Ares V class could be built in around 7-10 years using those critical CLV workforce and components.
Of course the bad news in all of this, should ISS be the driving requirement for selecting a launcher, in time the ISS will be as decrepit as MIR was in the last century. Because that is all we have for Nasa to do for its human space program, the US will be keeping it together with spit and bailing wire just to have something to do….like the broken down, bankrupt Russians of the the 1990’s.

When there’s a small fragmenting comet headed your way not too much else really matters.

There are some additional points that need to be emphasized. One is enhancement of science return. There needs to be a thorough evaluation of whether the reduction in communications latency translates into real improvement in scientific return, at least compared to the autonomous methods in use today. Some of us suspect that this is the case, but it needs to be evaluated more thoroughly before we start committing to this on a grand scale.

Another is that the Flexible Path/IHRAX/HERRO approach does not rule out eventual surface missions by human crews. In fact, by facilitating development of a deep-space transportation capability, it would offer more opportunities for landings led by a commercial entity, international effort or by NASA. All this approach does is focus the NASA effort on an in-space bent that simplifies overall development.

I should also mention that this approach is also similar to the one that Buzz Aldrin has been advocating. His plan, however, concludes with crewed missions to the Mars surface. I feel that it is best to leave this open for now, and focus instead on the in-space elements.

You do make a good point.

The trick is to not dissociate NASA’s exploration mission from anything else, unlike what appeared to have happened recently. A correctly done exploration program MUST help solve problems we have here on Earth, until the time we choose to go live elsewhere.

The disconnect between exploration’s message and the rest of what is important to the public does result in a poor exploration program with limited, unambitous, if at all attainable goals. If this old way does not actuallly change soon then exploration will evetually disappear as a major endeavor.

I’ve worked in the space field most of my life, but finally getting involved with important medical research that could really save many lives here on earth, and finding just how hard it is to get even a tiny amount of funding, has made me wonder.