http://nasawatch.com/archives/2010/01/direct-delusion.html

“if/when NASA decides to go ahead and procure a replacement for Ares V or any other heavy lift launch system, it will do so via standard commercial procurement process – just like it is going to be doing for LEO access. ”

Yes. And I suspect this is where a real competition is about to start. The RFP will state to come up with a LV whose requirements will be to send a crewed spacecraft somewhere, and it’ll be far, far away… Hence the purported $6B for commercial space…

We shall see.

I’m not sure that it does because there’s no commercial or military market for an HLV. I don’t think industry has the same incentive to start developing a competitor to Ares V or its successor as they did to start developing Falcon 9.

That said, some of the press reports indicate that even the new HLV will be “commercial” so who knows… I assume that means either an EELV derivative or an open industry HLV competition that could include Falcon derivatives or clean-sheet designs.

FWIW…

I’d like to come back to the HLV subject for a minute. I am and was not saying that it is the way to go. That I don’t know for sure. But the HLV timeline is important in the following sense and this is based on the Ares I observation. Had Ares I been flying today we probably would not be all ecited about LVs. The fact of the matter is that Ares I is years away while current EELVs do fly today and Falcon 9 might pretty soon. Therefore those LVs essentially killed Ares I despite all the work put on it. If the same logic applies to a HLV, NASA might be on for one big HLV but considering how long it will take for something even more complicated to develop than Ares I, the commercials may come up with a solutions YEARS before NASA is done. Therefore the NASA HLV will eventually be canned. BUT while they, NASA and contractors, work on that, and I assume Shuttle-derived, the workforce is not laid off, save for retirements, the younger ones aree being trained and might be hired by the private sector in the end. So politically (the keyword here) you get some sustainability since you make some people in Alabama for example your “friend”.

I was not talking financial or technical issues, not even operational ones.

In the absence of a good reason to meet a certain schedule (e.g., beat the Soviets to the Moon by midnight Dec. 31, 1969), the HLV timeline is really secondary to its costs and sustainability over the long-term. This is especially critical in an era of flat or inflationary budgets, versus the huge Apollo-era NASA budget ramp-up.

Although history can always be proven wrong, there is no history showing that an HLV could be developed and operated at a cost that would allow more than maybe a couple launches per year within a flat or inflationary NASA budget profile (assuming NASA still has other activites like science, aeronautics, ISS, etc. to fund). Saturn V didn’t show that, the Shuttle stack (another HLV) didn’t show that, SEI didn’t show that, and Ares V didn’t show that. And all that a couple HLV launches would enable is maybe one exploration mission per year. That’s not much of a human space exploration program.

Again, maybe Bolden’s HLV study will reveal a better, more viable option. All those examples were built around the existing Apollo/Shuttle infrastructure. Maybe an EELV heavy lifter, by sharing common component production across a larger market and industrial base, could squeeze in another couple launches per year within a within a flat or inflationary NASA budget profile.

But to really enable a vibrant exploration program with several to many missions per year, we have to enable a much larger annual lift to orbit (especially for propellant and other consumables) at the same cost and to do that, I think we have to pursue something more revolutionary than another big expendable rocket for which the basic technology has not changed in several decades. Propellant storage in space is critical, of course, and ready for testing. Hopefully the new exploration technology program will get this tested. On the launch side, a lot of folks look to reusable launchers. I would just add the more radical concepts, like small dumb expendable and gun-launched concepts I referenced above, to the mix. I think their development costs may be quite a bit lower than the equivalent reusable launcher.

“All the while commercial is given a chance to go to LEO. But why would they stop there? Look how quickly SpaceX is developing an LV and an RV and on what budget. IF (BIG IF) they are successful then there is no reason why they could not build an HLV themselves. As time goes by the attrition by retirement takes some of the workforce away while the younger ones move to companies like SpaceX that will need the people to work all these programs.

How about that?”

To be honest, I need to familiarize myself with Space-X’s HLV plans. With their vertical integration, I would guess that they might be able to squeeze in a couple more annual HLV launches over EELVs (maybe up to six HLV launches or three exploration missions per year) within a flat to inflationary NASA budget. That would be better, but I have a hard time seeing how anyone could enable a significant jump in mission rate if their HLV is still fundamentally an expendable, chemical rocket. I think we have to move to a different set of technologies if we want to move out of the mode of one or two Apollo missions per year.

Unfortunately, any of these options besides Shuttle-derived HLV (EELV-derived HLV, Space-X/clean-sheet HLV, in-space propellant storage and small reusable launchers, in-space propellant storage and radically cheap launch solutions, etc.) would make the Apollo/Shuttle infrastructure/workforce obsolete. So I think we’re in for another 2-6 years of HLV design, and maybe even some development, before the next Administration figures out that it’s not affordable or productive, cancels the HLV, pursues a more productive alternative, and finally lifts the albatross of Shuttle’s carrying costs off of NASA’s neck.

FWIW…

I am not sure what HRC or McCain would have done differently be it for Space or the rest for that matter. But it’s another topic.

I am not worried about this. I came to learn my lessons and I am not surprised. I would not confuse VSE and Constellation though. VSE was not all that bad, it actually was a fairly good plan, save for the ridiculously optimistic milestones. The spiral approach to which Flex-Path is similar in spirit at least would not have put HSF in that much trouble. ESAS and its implementation with no Plan B is what killed the whole thing. No, not this WH. Of course for one to be able to know one would have had to work inside it and most commenters here did not. Period.

I believe you are very optimistic so to speak about your three points, regardless whether I adhere to them as goals.

But we shall see. Pretty soon for that matter since if you predict is to happen it has to start right with the new budget. If not you’ll know. He has 3 years as of now, not 7.

Good leadership can accomplish a lot, particularly in the absence of any coherent alternative programs…

Look…I didnt vote for Obama, I voted for McCain (and in retrospect although I hate the idea of dynasties am starting to think that the “best man” (grin) in the race was HRC…) but actually I am quite hopeful that something good is going to come out of this.

Things like legacy programs end with a whimper not a bang (see Obama’s health care program) and that is what the Bush “vision” is doing…just fading to black and its pretty painful to watch.

BUT I can see how Bolden could use his skills honed at 3MAW to make some good work out of this. I can see “right now” three pivots occurring.

First the pivot to commercial access (and I think) eventually commercial rebuild of the space station.

Second a very reduced NASA/contractor infrastructure.

Third a very aggressive R&D agency…with heavy lift being part of that. I can see Bolden putting together a smart tough team, sort of “Cougar vehicle” sort of effort among both industry and internal NASA…that freed of legacy designs goes “postal” and looks at different (SpaceX like) combinations that can make a low(er) cost vehicle emerge.

Look in my mind NASA has become a microcosm of the US in general.

The program of record and the folks like Whittington who fight to preserve it are legacy programs tired and run out of innovation…infact they stifle innovation. One reason Obama is floundering nation wide is that he has accepted the notion of his predecessor that somethings are “to big to faiL” and hence we have to find ourselves dragged down trying to save them.

The only thing that cannot fail is The Republic. That means jettisoning “things and institutions” which no longer serve it. NASA and its POR are things which serve only NASA, not The Republic in general.

If Charlie is half the leader he was at 3MAW he can do this.

Robert G. Oler

You are giving a lot of responsibility to Charles Bolden. Not everything resides in his lap! How would you see NASA designing AND flying an “affordable” HLV? Especially based on past programs including the ongoing one. I cannot think he or anyone would be able to alter NASA so much in so little time (3 years left so far) to do anything about it. It is not just NASA, nor Charles Bolden. What do you plan to do about certain Congress members?… Unless of course they get elected out, but that is a lot of ifs…

It is precisely what it is if it is done. Let’s think about it for a minute. Assume NASA gets the direction to build an HLV. How long will it take? ..

that depends entirely on what one thinks of General Bolden’s leadership.

Assume for a moment that the direction most are speculating about is the direction everything goes.

Assume Bolden’s imprint on the agency is a new heavy lift vehicle one that is affordable to build AND fly.

We are at that point going to get to see how good a leader he is. With all the layoffs etc he should be able to pick his own team…and see where it goes.

Robert G. Oler

“Personally, I think that a Shuttle-derived heavy lifter is more about providing a temporary solution to NASA institutional issues than providing a permanent solution to the problem of sustainable human space exploration. ”

It is precisely what it is if it is done. Let’s think about it for a minute. Assume NASA gets the direction to build an HLV. How long will it take? Look at Ares I as a basis for estimate if you wish. During that time the workforce which is at risk may still be employed, may be with some trimming but not too bad. All the while commercial is given a chance to go to LEO. But why would they stop there? Look how quickly SpaceX is developing an LV and an RV and on what budget. IF (BIG IF) they are successful then there is no reason why they could not build an HLV themselves. As time goes by the attrition by retirement takes some of the workforce away while the younger ones move to companies like SpaceX that will need the people to work all these programs.

How about that?