No they didn’t. The phrases “sound engineering” and “likely to succeed” don’t even appear in the Augustine Committee’s final report. The report’s finding on Ares I states that “Ares I is currently dealing with technical problems… that should be resolvable with commensurate cost and schedule impacts. Its ultimate utility is diminished by schedule delays, which cause a mismatch with the programs it is intended to serve.”

And it’s the Augustine Committee, not “commission”. If you’re going to misrepresent the work of a White House blue ribbon panel, at least correctly name the panel.

“… its ok to rely on the Russians if the commercial guys fail… it’s ok if both the commercial guys fail and the Russians embargo their services”

That’s no different than the old program. Orion overruns forced Constellation to drop its ISS cargo variant. If COTS failed, ISS would have had to rely on foreign vehicles for ISS cargo transport.

Orion’s ISS crew variant wouldn’t have been ready for at least seven more years, likely nine more years, per Augustine. And there was no funded commercial crew alternative — Constellation ate that funding out of the starting gate. Soyuz would have been the only crew transport to ISS for almost a decade.

Under the new program, there’s a commercial crew program aiming to deliver at least two domestic crew transport providers.

“the VSE that was whipped out after Columbia, it was handled with great skill as congressional support was built for it long before it was presented to the public”

Wrong. Congressmen from both sides of the aisle criticized the VSE in multiple hearing statements and Q&A.

For example, McCain warned in his statements:

“It has been reported that the President’s new proposal could cost between $170 and $600 billion. Needless to say, the $12 billion the President has suggested be spent over the next 5 years, falls far short of what might be required to actually return to the moon and reach for Mars and beyond. We must acknowledge that space exploration, particularly manned exploration, is costly. We have existing obligations relating to the safe operation of the Shuttles and the International Space Station. I think the American public is justifiably apprehensive about starting another major space initiative for fear that they will learn later that it will require far more sacrifice, or taxpayer dollars, than originally discussed or estimated.”

“As I mentioned during Administrator O’Keefe’s confirmation hearing, a vision without a strategy is just an illusion. The country is not interested in, nor can it afford, another space illusion.”

Mollohan was concerned that the VSE was “too much, too fast” and that “many facets are still very unclear”.

Breaux had concerns about “relying on other countries’ vehicles” to reach ISS during VSE hearings.

Wyden repeatedly called for “a cost-benefit analysis of the relative merits of manned versus unmanned space exploration” during VSE hearings.

Etc., etc.

The upshot of all this criticism is that both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees recommended cuts to the first year of VSE spending in their bills, large enough that the Bush II Administration threatened to veto the VA/HUD/IA appropriations bill if those cuts were sustained.

Don’t make up history.

Gosh darn DC, why didn’t I think of that? Maybe because in the case of planes, trains and automobiles there are abundant markets with lots of choices. In the case of commercial human access to space there is NOT ONE choice today nor one in the intermediate future that isn’t nearly totally dependent upon the USG creating and funding that market. Don’t forget, the USG pre-Obama had the Ares I backed up by COTS-D with long term funding in place for Space X. That government obviously felt that US manned access to space was a national priority and made sure it had the hardware in place to guarantee it. Don’t forget, despite what many axe grinders were saying, Ares I was sound engineering and likely to succeed so said the Augustine commission.

Given that, the Obama Administration is saying its ok to rely on the Russians if the commercial guys fail. Or he’s saying it’s ok if both the commercial guys fail and the Russians embargo their services. Don’t forget the story from former Treasury Sec Hank Paulson when he asserted the Russian government tried to enlist the Chinese in dumping billions of dollars of mortgage backed bonds, guaranteed by the US Treasury, during the height of the financial meltdown during 2008. In short they ain’t our friends. But in Obama’s world, its ok depending upon them for US access to space.

One final point, Bolden gave a presser a couple days ago. I read the transcript. He was as unfocused in his Q&A as the administration’s new space policy. Makes me wonder if most of NASA’s sharpest critics will long for the good old days of Mike Griffin, O’Keefe or Goldin. One thing I do find ironic, the VSE that was whipped out after Columbia, it was handled with great skill as congressional support was built for it long before it was presented to the public. It was coherent in outlook and presented a clear roadmap on making the big decisions needed to implement it. Compare and contrast its handling to the Amateur Hour this team is playing in designing an alternative. Wait, that’s an insult to amatuers. With the VSE it was implemented by Congress in almost complete form as laid out by Cheney and O’Keefe and then overwhelmingly supported by 5 Congresses. Does anyone think that Obama’s plan will be implemented the way Bolden is presenting it by even one Congress?

There has only been 6 because that is all the seats the russians had available. But over three hundred have asked the russians about going up. There have been two studies on space flight parcipitation and the numbers are closer to a few hundred per year at 20 million a seat.

You should read the Futron and Zogby studies on human spaceflight.

“I suspect that something like the COTS model will be used. In other words, no company is willing to pay for all of the development cost of a commercial rocket without knowing that NASA will definitely buy their services, since the development costs are high and the chance that NASA, a large potential customer, will use something in-house like Ares if given the chance are also high. However, if NASA and the commercial companies both pitch in development funding as in COTS, NASA pays as development milestones are reached, and NASA commits to buying a certain amount of services if the services meet the specifications, both parties can come out ahead.”

If NASA pays for the majority of cost, which is what I expect will happen, they will be able to dictate the needs of the vehicle. Contracts on Ares are firm fixed price not cost plus like Shuttle. In order for COTS to be viable, there needs to be requirements and expectations written down. Currently, these do not exist. This will take a couple years to put together minimum since most of the knowledge for human rating is tribal knowledge within NASA. The the contractors will know what they are getting into in order to bid it. This is why it takes every engineering project a lot of time just to get started.

Set it straight: “for (assuming) 1 customer (unless costs were so low that a normal person could afford it)”

I wouldn’t assume NASA would be the only customer. If by “a normal person” you mean a single middle class potential space tourist, I don’t think the price needs to be that low for the business case to close for non-NASA customers. Some potential markets including NASA ISS, other NASA, other U.S. government, other governments, and non-government markets:

– NASA ISS crew support (of course)
– Space tourism/ personal spaceflight to ISS (as we have seen already)- only a handful of people have done this and it’s not considered a true market
– Personal spaceflight to non-ISS space stations (eg: Bigelow, etc)
– Corporate/national spaceflight to ISS or non-ISS space stations
– ISS (or other) cargo support
– ISS (or other) emergency crew return vehicle support
– Use of the rockets for non-HSF or non-station purposes (eg: launching government or commercial satellites, launching propellant for depots)
– Use of the spacecraft for non-HSF or non-station purposes (eg: space tug, something like the SpaceX DragonLab, etc)
– Other NASA (or other government agency) HSF uses (eg: transport crew to meet in-space beyond-LEO spacecraft)

I won’t argue that point except that it is not in the foreable future for most of those things to exist or be viable which is what we have now. If commercial truly sees these things as a market, why hasn’t any commercial contractor built something? Regulatory commissions, lack of capital, lack of market… SpaceShipTwo doesn’t count since it is strictly sub-orbital.

Set it straight: “(which will likely cost more at a commercial company since wages are in general more than what the government pays). Then, you have to put profit on the whole thing where NASA doesn’t… Costs will go up not down!”

Are you saying NASA pays less than commercial operators? Does that include NASA’s contractors? Are you saying that NASA’s current contractors don’t need to make a profit? Why do you think costs will go up, not down, when with the existing method

Well, on average, they do except their benefits are much better. NASA contractors pay more than NASA employees but don’t receive the benefits.

– NASA has to pay for oversight of its contractors, not just for safety, but for everything else as well

– This will happen as well since it will still be their product since they will pay for most of it.

– The contractors have to pay for interfaces with the contractor oversight (beyond oversight for safety which commercial crew will also have).
This happens today already.

– NASA has to pay for the NASA staff (which is small for commercial crew) and the contractor staff

Wrong, NASA would not allow their astronauts to fly without strict oversight and therefore would be in the shorts of the contractors like they are today.

– Contractors are less motivated towards low cost and meeting schedules, since they get paid more if the cost is high and the schedule drags out, whereas commercial COTS-style vendors need low cost to make a profit and to attract other customers, and they need to meet their milestones to get paid by NASA

Not true. Any good business would focus on how to lower costs. It’s good business practice. Especially for Fixed price contracts which are what the Ares contracts are. The contractors for Ares are paid by milestones as well and are dinged when they don’t perform in certain areas.

– Contractors don’t pitch in funding for the effort, while commercial vendors in the COTS approach contribute significant funding (which is appropriate since they will be able to sell their services beyond NASA)

– Comparisons of the NASA $500M COTS cargo investment for 2(!) solutions involving new rockets and spacecraft to the ISS to the ~100(!) times greater cost for the single Ares I/Orion ISS crew solution show that even though the NASA investment is much much less for COTS cargo, and the COTS effort started later (much later for Orbital), COTS cargo seems to be making much more progress. Note that commercial crew does not need to use brand new rockets (eg: it can use EELVs, COTS cargo rockets, possibly offshoots of NASA Constellation or Shuttle work, etc)

You do realize that it costs significantly more to design a human rated vehicle? You have to bring people home safely. Any existing rocket will have to go through redesigns, qualifications and safety tests to meet new human rated requirements. The requirements don’t currently exist so, when will they be ready? I’m not saying it can’t be done but, we are not there yet nor will be ready in the short term time-frame.

– As current news shows, NASA is clearly in a political environment that encourages higher costs (i.e. the Congressional “jobs in my district” issue we read about in Space Politics). How can you say that? Each and every year for as long as I can remember, they’ve had to do more with less forcing them to reduce costs… Compare NASA to the Air Force and see what you find. The Air Force in my mind is probably the worst cost management government entity we have.

I guess we are on the same side on this one. I wasn’t originally a big fan of the “Griffin Approch” but since it is likely that keeping the lead components of it is the only high confidence way to save the U.S. manned space effort, I’m on board. Also, I don’t think the enabling technologies are advanced enough nor the budget large enough to do anything better right now. To try to leap forward now would leave us with a lot technology research and no space flight. The the vultures on here would be wanting to cancel it because it wasn’t on schedule or over some sales pitch budget that everyone know wasn’t real.

Storm:

“They don’t need to get all the way to LTO in one shot if there is LEO refueling and other exotic mechanisms like plasma rockets. The plasma rockets, by the way, are almost ready to be tested to boost the ISS into higher orbit (in answer to John’s earlier question).”

I well aware of VASIMR and am a big time advocate. But, if you are going to Mars in weeks (and back) you need a nuclear reactor in the 200MW range. Do I really believe the Obama and Congress are really going all the way this this? And, based on hints not firm commitments? No way.

I salute the efforts of Dr. Chang-Diaz and the Ad Astra company but right now they close to a truster that can be use for orbital maintaince on the ISS. There is a LONG way to go before we are fly a device that will go to Mars in weeks. I do support a greater commitment to developing these technologies but operations on the scale Bolden is talking about are way off. I don’t we are advance enough to hold this to a firm cost/schedule program.

“If NASA is the only company willing to pay for development cost of a commercial rocket (since no company would be strategically wise to build something on their own dime”

I suspect that something like the COTS model will be used. In other words, no company is willing to pay for all of the development cost of a commercial rocket without knowing that NASA will definitely buy their services, since the development costs are high and the chance that NASA, a large potential customer, will use something in-house like Ares if given the chance are also high. However, if NASA and the commercial companies both pitch in development funding as in COTS, NASA pays as development milestones are reached, and NASA commits to buying a certain amount of services if the services meet the specifications, both parties can come out ahead.

Set it straight: “for (assuming) 1 customer (unless costs were so low that a normal person could afford it)”

I wouldn’t assume NASA would be the only customer. If by “a normal person” you mean a single middle class potential space tourist, I don’t think the price needs to be that low for the business case to close for non-NASA customers. Some potential markets including NASA ISS, other NASA, other U.S. government, other governments, and non-government markets:

– NASA ISS crew support (of course)
– Space tourism/ personal spaceflight to ISS (as we have seen already)
– Personal spaceflight to non-ISS space stations (eg: Bigelow, etc)
– Corporate/national spaceflight to ISS or non-ISS space stations
– ISS (or other) cargo support
– ISS (or other) emergency crew return vehicle support
– Use of the rockets for non-HSF or non-station purposes (eg: launching government or commercial satellites, launching propellant for depots)
– Use of the spacecraft for non-HSF or non-station purposes (eg: space tug, something like the SpaceX DragonLab, etc)
– Other NASA (or other government agency) HSF uses (eg: transport crew to meet in-space beyond-LEO spacecraft)

Set it straight: “(which will likely cost more at a commercial company since wages are in general more than what the government pays). Then, you have to put profit on the whole thing where NASA doesn’t… Costs will go up not down!”

Are you saying NASA pays less than commercial operators? Does that include NASA’s contractors? Are you saying that NASA’s current contractors don’t need to make a profit? Why do you think costs will go up, not down, when with the existing method

– NASA has to pay for oversight of its contractors, not just for safety, but for everything else as well
– The contractors have to pay for interfaces with the contractor oversight (beyond oversight for safety which commercial crew will also have)
– NASA has to pay for the NASA staff (which is small for commercial crew) and the contractor staff
– Contractors are less motivated towards low cost and meeting schedules, since they get paid more if the cost is high and the schedule drags out, whereas commercial COTS-style vendors need low cost to make a profit and to attract other customers, and they need to meet their milestones to get paid by NASA
– Contractors don’t pitch in funding for the effort, while commercial vendors in the COTS approach contribute significant funding (which is appropriate since they will be able to sell their services beyond NASA)
– Comparisons of the NASA $500M COTS cargo investment for 2(!) solutions involving new rockets and spacecraft to the ISS to the ~100(!) times greater cost for the single Ares I/Orion ISS crew solution show that even though the NASA investment is much much less for COTS cargo, and the COTS effort started later (much later for Orbital), COTS cargo seems to be making much more progress. Note that commercial crew does not need to use brand new rockets (eg: it can use EELVs, COTS cargo rockets, possibly offshoots of NASA Constellation or Shuttle work, etc)
– As current news shows, NASA is clearly in a political environment that encourages higher costs (i.e. the Congressional “jobs in my district” issue we read about in Space Politics).

What I’m worried about is the HLV plans. What are they and will we even have them? There’s a lot of big stuff I’d like to see blasted up there, specifically those huge telescopes. I don’t care so much about how advanced the HLV is – I care more about what its putting up there. Too advanced and I’m afraid there will be a lot of cost overruns and delays.

I would feel so grateful if the Obama administration would just get the HLV finished asap. NASA’s charter concerning spaceflight should be re-written so as to come around the unifying and overarching goal of achieving eventual star flight, so that humanity can get started with the monumental task of discovering, and then exploring habitable planets around neighboring solar systems. We shouldn’t keep re-tooling all the time while we have no HLV.

Remember, Augustine was commissioned by Obama, for Obama.

This isn’t develpment but also production and operations. How much will the alternative cost? How certain are their performance and schedules? It seem to me that NASA need to get a top notch manage to run this thing and we can whip it into shape.

We don’t know with certainty if they’re right, but we have to use some independent assessment. Augustine used the independent Aerospace Corporation. The history of the Constellation project and others like it make it seem like a reasonable estimate.

John: “I tend to dismiss this as just an Obama excuse to cancel a Bush program rather than an objective study.”

If they wanted to cancel a Bush program, why not just cancel it instead of having a diverse committee of space experts analyze the program? How would they be able to control what conclusions the committee came up with? I find the Augustine Committee to be a pretty good independent assessment, even in cases where my preconceived notions don’t agree with their conclusions (eg: that heavy lift is needed, that Mars should be our long-term goal, etc).

The fact that Augustine’s recommendations match so closely with Bush’s Vision for Space Exploration and with the Aldgridge Commission on so many points (eg: focus on innovation and new technology, emphasis on commercial and international participation, need for a strong robotic precursor program — i.e. the things the new NASA policy brings about) also speaks against it being some sort of scheme to get rid of a Bush program.

John: “What we need to do is to keep the Ares I on schedule.”

Ares I is already far off schedule. Since it started it has been slipping its schedule faster than time has been passing.

John: “Where do you get the $100 billion number?”

That was just a very rough figure for getting the Constellation lunar transport system going (not just Ares I/Orion).

John: “The Ares I should be fairly affordable. It’s just an extended shuttle SRB with a modest LH2/LOX upper stage. The real expense is in the Ares V and the Altair.”

The GAO states the following: “NASA estimates that Ares I and Orion represent up to $49 billion of the over $97 billion estimated to be spent on the Constellation program through 2020. While the agency has already obligated more than $10 billion in contracts, at this point NASA does not know how much Ares I and Orion will ultimately cost, and will not know until technical and design challenges have been addressed.”

$49B is a huge amount of money. Even if ~$10B of it has already been spent, the remainder makes a huge difference in what NASA can do, such as:

– multiple commercial crew solutions for ISS, likely shortening the gap
– incentives for more commercial cargo support for ISS
– ISS to 2020+
– actual use of ISS
– a very strong technology program that had practically been removed from NASA
– a strong (and essential) HSF robotic precursor program
– additional buffer for possible Shuttle delays
– patching up other NASA areas damaged by HSF (eg: Aeronautics, Earth Observations, etc)
– there should be more left over for other things, too (especially past 2015)