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	<title>Comments on: For military launch, failure is not an option</title>
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		<title>By: Rand Simberg</title>
		<link>http://www.spacepolitics.com/2010/03/27/for-military-launch-failure-is-not-an-option/#comment-293073</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Rand Simberg]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 29 Mar 2010 22:24:21 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.spacepolitics.com/?p=3286#comment-293073</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&lt;em&gt;But why suddenly drop reliable civil HSF liquid &amp; solid rocket motor hardware base to favor unproven launch system to deliver SAT controlled model airplanes (easily shot down by human pilot) by smaller cadre of companies?&lt;/em&gt;

OK, now please provide the several missing steps in logic that allows you to ask this question based on anything that Payton has said.

You seem to be able to miraculously knit an entire wardrobe of fantasy conjecture out of a slender thread of fact.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>But why suddenly drop reliable civil HSF liquid &amp; solid rocket motor hardware base to favor unproven launch system to deliver SAT controlled model airplanes (easily shot down by human pilot) by smaller cadre of companies?</em></p>
<p>OK, now please provide the several missing steps in logic that allows you to ask this question based on anything that Payton has said.</p>
<p>You seem to be able to miraculously knit an entire wardrobe of fantasy conjecture out of a slender thread of fact.</p>
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		<title>By: Bruce Behrhorst</title>
		<link>http://www.spacepolitics.com/2010/03/27/for-military-launch-failure-is-not-an-option/#comment-293071</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bruce Behrhorst]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 29 Mar 2010 22:04:08 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.spacepolitics.com/?p=3286#comment-293071</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&quot;He said he started to see price increases for engines last summer as production of the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) wound down with the impending retirement of the shuttle. â€œWeâ€™ve known that for many, many months and weâ€™ve been working with independent cost estimators and ULA, United Launch Alliance, to mitigate those predicted cost increases.â€ One possibility would be to do a bulk buy of vehicles, something he said that would require the ability to do a multi-year procurement.&quot;

Smell an entitlement program for this mil SAT delivery system over others ?

&quot;Still, he said, â€œwe very intelligently have to walk down the path of the potential reduction in the solid rocket motor industrial base.â€ He said he had met just earlier in the week with NASA administrator Charles Bolden to discuss â€œhow the Air Force, NRO, and NASA will work together as the future unfoldsâ€ with respect to the industrial base and other issues.&quot;


Reductions in the solid rocket motor industry are also due to arms limitation agreements which is Ok. understand the logic here.
But why suddenly drop reliable civil HSF liquid &amp; solid rocket motor hardware base to favor unproven launch system to deliver SAT controlled model airplanes (easily shot down by human pilot) by smaller cadre of companies? 

I guess looking for &#039;waldo&#039; in deserts has it&#039;s benefactors over peaceful human space exploration-huh.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8220;He said he started to see price increases for engines last summer as production of the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) wound down with the impending retirement of the shuttle. â€œWeâ€™ve known that for many, many months and weâ€™ve been working with independent cost estimators and ULA, United Launch Alliance, to mitigate those predicted cost increases.â€ One possibility would be to do a bulk buy of vehicles, something he said that would require the ability to do a multi-year procurement.&#8221;</p>
<p>Smell an entitlement program for this mil SAT delivery system over others ?</p>
<p>&#8220;Still, he said, â€œwe very intelligently have to walk down the path of the potential reduction in the solid rocket motor industrial base.â€ He said he had met just earlier in the week with NASA administrator Charles Bolden to discuss â€œhow the Air Force, NRO, and NASA will work together as the future unfoldsâ€ with respect to the industrial base and other issues.&#8221;</p>
<p>Reductions in the solid rocket motor industry are also due to arms limitation agreements which is Ok. understand the logic here.<br />
But why suddenly drop reliable civil HSF liquid &amp; solid rocket motor hardware base to favor unproven launch system to deliver SAT controlled model airplanes (easily shot down by human pilot) by smaller cadre of companies? </p>
<p>I guess looking for &#8216;waldo&#8217; in deserts has it&#8217;s benefactors over peaceful human space exploration-huh.</p>
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		<title>By: Rand Simberg</title>
		<link>http://www.spacepolitics.com/2010/03/27/for-military-launch-failure-is-not-an-option/#comment-292725</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Rand Simberg]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 29 Mar 2010 03:38:58 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.spacepolitics.com/?p=3286#comment-292725</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&lt;em&gt;Let me get this right; you have a USAF deputy under secretary crowing about error in launch vehicles to put up recon, comm SATS for drone ops. in the field. And this high cost system is suppose to be better than the existing system the military blames as faulty when tageting enemy operations in some cases resulting in killing civilians in the theater.&lt;/em&gt;

Was there supposed to be some intended relationship between this incoherent blather and what Payton said?]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Let me get this right; you have a USAF deputy under secretary crowing about error in launch vehicles to put up recon, comm SATS for drone ops. in the field. And this high cost system is suppose to be better than the existing system the military blames as faulty when tageting enemy operations in some cases resulting in killing civilians in the theater.</em></p>
<p>Was there supposed to be some intended relationship between this incoherent blather and what Payton said?</p>
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		<title>By: Bruce Behrhorst</title>
		<link>http://www.spacepolitics.com/2010/03/27/for-military-launch-failure-is-not-an-option/#comment-292676</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bruce Behrhorst]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 29 Mar 2010 01:54:08 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.spacepolitics.com/?p=3286#comment-292676</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&quot;Gary Payton, the deputy under secretary of the Air Force for space programs, itâ€™s that thereâ€™s no room for error when launching key military spacecraft. â€œWeâ€™re at the point now where our programs are so critical to the warfighter that we cannot afford a launch failure,â€ he said.&quot;

LOL!!

Let me get this right; you have a USAF deputy under secretary crowing about error in launch vehicles to put up recon, comm SATS for drone ops. in the field. And this high cost system is suppose to be better than the existing system the military blames as faulty when tageting enemy operations in some cases resulting in killing civilians in the theater. 

Oh... and spare me the bad intel argument-please!

OMG!! He has to pay extra &#039;cause Obama/Bolden cut constellation?

Well Duh, you cut civil HSF down to nothing so the only people doing space ops is a politically correct NASA and Dot Space with the military industrial complex.

Is this crazy war logic for anyone-hello ?]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8220;Gary Payton, the deputy under secretary of the Air Force for space programs, itâ€™s that thereâ€™s no room for error when launching key military spacecraft. â€œWeâ€™re at the point now where our programs are so critical to the warfighter that we cannot afford a launch failure,â€ he said.&#8221;</p>
<p>LOL!!</p>
<p>Let me get this right; you have a USAF deputy under secretary crowing about error in launch vehicles to put up recon, comm SATS for drone ops. in the field. And this high cost system is suppose to be better than the existing system the military blames as faulty when tageting enemy operations in some cases resulting in killing civilians in the theater. </p>
<p>Oh&#8230; and spare me the bad intel argument-please!</p>
<p>OMG!! He has to pay extra &#8217;cause Obama/Bolden cut constellation?</p>
<p>Well Duh, you cut civil HSF down to nothing so the only people doing space ops is a politically correct NASA and Dot Space with the military industrial complex.</p>
<p>Is this crazy war logic for anyone-hello ?</p>
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		<title>By: red</title>
		<link>http://www.spacepolitics.com/2010/03/27/for-military-launch-failure-is-not-an-option/#comment-292658</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[red]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 28 Mar 2010 23:39:20 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.spacepolitics.com/?p=3286#comment-292658</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Jeff: &quot;He also discussed the impact to the solid rocket motor industrial base caused by the shuttleâ€™s retirement and plans to cancel Ares. The bigger impact of that, he said, is on the Minuteman and Trident ballistic missiles, and not the strap-on motors used by EELVs.&quot;

The impact to the solid rocket motor industrial base is one part of the equation, but we should look at the broader impact the new NASA plans will have on the military, NOR, NOAA, and other government agencies that work in space or that use space products.

In the case of the military, we should look at

- the impact to the solid rocket motor industrial base and related prices
-  the impact to the (currently over-capacity) military space access industrial base and related prices from changes like

    * additional capabilities enabled by new funding for commercial cargo to ISS
    *commercial crew and the related prospects for new launchers or greater use of existing launchers
    *greater use of launchers because of more capabilities on ISS, more use of ISS, and longer support for ISS
    *greater use of launchers because of the new lines of robotic HSF precursors
    * greater use of launchers because of the new Earth observation missions
    * new NASA use of commercial suborbital RLVs
    * modernization of KSC and the Florida launch range
    * greater use of launchers for exploration technology demonstrations
    * greater use of launchers for general space technology demonstrations
    * new heavy lift and propulsion technology work, including the U.S. RD-180 class engine possibly built with at DOD-NASA partnership and foundational propulsion research

- the impact to the military satellite industrial base and related prices from changes like

    * potential changes to space access costs, reliability, responsiveness, and other characteristics from the items listed above that would affect the satellite business
    * new Earth observation missions, including traditional ones and the new Venture-class line
    * new HSF robotic precursor missions, including larger missions and smaller &quot;Scouts&quot;
    * new NASA general space technology work, much of which is likely to apply to DOD satellites and their subsystems (for example, sensors, in-space propulsion, high bandwidth communications, energy storage systems, etc) ... (some of this work will be done in partnership with DARPA, AFRL/Operationally Responsive Space, etc)
    * new NASA exploration technology demonstrations, some of which may have implications for the DOD (eg: propellant depots, high performance materials, etc)

- the impact to the military aircraft industrial base and related prices from changes like

    * new fuel efficient aircraft work
    * integrating UAVs in the airspace

There are more examples like this.  I&#039;d argue that a lot of these changes are going to lower DOD costs or increase DOD capabilities.  I&#039;d argue the same for other government agencies like NRO and NOAA.  However, that&#039;s just a rough assessment by me.  A serious analysis of the implications of the full scope of the NASA changes, not just the things that are being removed, across multiple agencies would be better than focusing on solid rockets.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Jeff: &#8220;He also discussed the impact to the solid rocket motor industrial base caused by the shuttleâ€™s retirement and plans to cancel Ares. The bigger impact of that, he said, is on the Minuteman and Trident ballistic missiles, and not the strap-on motors used by EELVs.&#8221;</p>
<p>The impact to the solid rocket motor industrial base is one part of the equation, but we should look at the broader impact the new NASA plans will have on the military, NOR, NOAA, and other government agencies that work in space or that use space products.</p>
<p>In the case of the military, we should look at</p>
<p>&#8211; the impact to the solid rocket motor industrial base and related prices<br />
&#8211;  the impact to the (currently over-capacity) military space access industrial base and related prices from changes like</p>
<p>    * additional capabilities enabled by new funding for commercial cargo to ISS<br />
    *commercial crew and the related prospects for new launchers or greater use of existing launchers<br />
    *greater use of launchers because of more capabilities on ISS, more use of ISS, and longer support for ISS<br />
    *greater use of launchers because of the new lines of robotic HSF precursors<br />
    * greater use of launchers because of the new Earth observation missions<br />
    * new NASA use of commercial suborbital RLVs<br />
    * modernization of KSC and the Florida launch range<br />
    * greater use of launchers for exploration technology demonstrations<br />
    * greater use of launchers for general space technology demonstrations<br />
    * new heavy lift and propulsion technology work, including the U.S. RD-180 class engine possibly built with at DOD-NASA partnership and foundational propulsion research</p>
<p>&#8211; the impact to the military satellite industrial base and related prices from changes like</p>
<p>    * potential changes to space access costs, reliability, responsiveness, and other characteristics from the items listed above that would affect the satellite business<br />
    * new Earth observation missions, including traditional ones and the new Venture-class line<br />
    * new HSF robotic precursor missions, including larger missions and smaller &#8220;Scouts&#8221;<br />
    * new NASA general space technology work, much of which is likely to apply to DOD satellites and their subsystems (for example, sensors, in-space propulsion, high bandwidth communications, energy storage systems, etc) &#8230; (some of this work will be done in partnership with DARPA, AFRL/Operationally Responsive Space, etc)<br />
    * new NASA exploration technology demonstrations, some of which may have implications for the DOD (eg: propellant depots, high performance materials, etc)</p>
<p>&#8211; the impact to the military aircraft industrial base and related prices from changes like</p>
<p>    * new fuel efficient aircraft work<br />
    * integrating UAVs in the airspace</p>
<p>There are more examples like this.  I&#8217;d argue that a lot of these changes are going to lower DOD costs or increase DOD capabilities.  I&#8217;d argue the same for other government agencies like NRO and NOAA.  However, that&#8217;s just a rough assessment by me.  A serious analysis of the implications of the full scope of the NASA changes, not just the things that are being removed, across multiple agencies would be better than focusing on solid rockets.</p>
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		<title>By: red</title>
		<link>http://www.spacepolitics.com/2010/03/27/for-military-launch-failure-is-not-an-option/#comment-292649</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[red]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 28 Mar 2010 21:57:49 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.spacepolitics.com/?p=3286#comment-292649</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Jonathan Goff: &quot;During a Senate Armed Services strategic forces subcommittee hearing, Rear Adm. Stephen Johnson, said he expects solid rocket motor prices to rise 10 to 20 percent. He assured Vitter that 100 percent price growth is not likely.&quot;

I wonder how the Athena Ic and IIc fit into this discussion.  These will use the Castor 120 and Castor 30 solids.  Will these soften that 10 to 20 percent increase?  Will they suffer from that increase?

&quot;Lockheed Martin and ATK Announce 2nd Generation Athena Launch Vehicles&quot;

http://www.lockheedmartin.com/news/press_releases/2010/0325_ss_athena.html

With NASA&#039;s plans for a line of small &quot;Scout&quot; missions within the new robotic precursor budget, a line of small &quot;Venture-class&quot; Earth observation missions that can include smallsats, a line of &quot;Edison Small Satellite Demonstration Missions&quot; in the new Space Technology budget, a &quot;Small Satellite Subsystem Technologies&quot; line in the new Space Technology budget that may help drive smallsat business, and various other technology demonstrations that may come in all sizes, could there be a healthy need for Athena IIc services within NASA?

What if Orbital&#039;s COTS entry Taurus II (second stage, Castor 30) gets more ISS cargo business because of the increased use and longer life of the ISS?  What if it gets commercial crew business?  Delta II replacement business?

Or ... will the new $312M in the Commercial Cargo line allow Orbital to replace the Castor 30?  Here&#039;s the relevant line in the 2011 budget:

&quot;Accelerating enhanced capabilities may include adding milestones for
early development of items such as the high energy engine for Orbitalâ€™s Taurus II upper stage...&quot;]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Jonathan Goff: &#8220;During a Senate Armed Services strategic forces subcommittee hearing, Rear Adm. Stephen Johnson, said he expects solid rocket motor prices to rise 10 to 20 percent. He assured Vitter that 100 percent price growth is not likely.&#8221;</p>
<p>I wonder how the Athena Ic and IIc fit into this discussion.  These will use the Castor 120 and Castor 30 solids.  Will these soften that 10 to 20 percent increase?  Will they suffer from that increase?</p>
<p>&#8220;Lockheed Martin and ATK Announce 2nd Generation Athena Launch Vehicles&#8221;</p>
<p><a href="http://www.lockheedmartin.com/news/press_releases/2010/0325_ss_athena.html" rel="nofollow">http://www.lockheedmartin.com/news/press_releases/2010/0325_ss_athena.html</a></p>
<p>With NASA&#8217;s plans for a line of small &#8220;Scout&#8221; missions within the new robotic precursor budget, a line of small &#8220;Venture-class&#8221; Earth observation missions that can include smallsats, a line of &#8220;Edison Small Satellite Demonstration Missions&#8221; in the new Space Technology budget, a &#8220;Small Satellite Subsystem Technologies&#8221; line in the new Space Technology budget that may help drive smallsat business, and various other technology demonstrations that may come in all sizes, could there be a healthy need for Athena IIc services within NASA?</p>
<p>What if Orbital&#8217;s COTS entry Taurus II (second stage, Castor 30) gets more ISS cargo business because of the increased use and longer life of the ISS?  What if it gets commercial crew business?  Delta II replacement business?</p>
<p>Or &#8230; will the new $312M in the Commercial Cargo line allow Orbital to replace the Castor 30?  Here&#8217;s the relevant line in the 2011 budget:</p>
<p>&#8220;Accelerating enhanced capabilities may include adding milestones for<br />
early development of items such as the high energy engine for Orbitalâ€™s Taurus II upper stage&#8230;&#8221;</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>By: Rand Simberg</title>
		<link>http://www.spacepolitics.com/2010/03/27/for-military-launch-failure-is-not-an-option/#comment-292630</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Rand Simberg]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 28 Mar 2010 18:27:40 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.spacepolitics.com/?p=3286#comment-292630</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&lt;em&gt;I think the answer would have been no, mainly because they are already working with launchers that meet their needs (cost + reliability), but also because the SRB-based Ares I is an unknown regarding reliability &amp; cost.&lt;/em&gt;

Not to mention that they probably don&#039;t want their fragile birds to get shaken apart...]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>I think the answer would have been no, mainly because they are already working with launchers that meet their needs (cost + reliability), but also because the SRB-based Ares I is an unknown regarding reliability &amp; cost.</em></p>
<p>Not to mention that they probably don&#8217;t want their fragile birds to get shaken apart&#8230;</p>
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		<title>By: Robert G. Oler</title>
		<link>http://www.spacepolitics.com/2010/03/27/for-military-launch-failure-is-not-an-option/#comment-292628</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Robert G. Oler]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 28 Mar 2010 18:12:34 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.spacepolitics.com/?p=3286#comment-292628</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Major Tom wrote @ March 28th, 2010 at 1:24 pm 

nothing there to disagree with...nicely put (both post BTW)

Robert G. Oler]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Major Tom wrote @ March 28th, 2010 at 1:24 pm </p>
<p>nothing there to disagree with&#8230;nicely put (both post BTW)</p>
<p>Robert G. Oler</p>
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		<title>By: Coastal Ron</title>
		<link>http://www.spacepolitics.com/2010/03/27/for-military-launch-failure-is-not-an-option/#comment-292620</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Coastal Ron]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 28 Mar 2010 17:29:41 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.spacepolitics.com/?p=3286#comment-292620</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[I wonder if anyone has publicly asked the Air Force if they would have wanted to launch their most valuable satellites on the Ares I?  I think the answer would have been no, mainly because they are already working with launchers that meet their needs (cost + reliability), but also because the SRB-based Ares I is an unknown regarding reliability &amp; cost.
- 
For Ares I to get any sort of high flight rate, they would have had to add cargo missions, and the military is the only customer with enough demand to go after.  Then the debate would have been to discard a working system (Atlas V &amp; Delta IV) in favor of a new and unproven one (Ares I).  Even with the political posturing that is going on today, I can&#039;t see Ares I winning that one, which means it would have been doomed to be a niche launcher with low demonstrated reliability, and high inherent costs (infrastructure, materials, processing, etc.).
- 
One way to reduce the cost of Air Force cargo launches is to increase the flight rate of the launchers in general, which supports using Atlas or Delta for human crew.  It doesn&#039;t help the SRM costs, but I agree with Major Tom in that the overall cost for refurbishment doesn&#039;t merit a separate launcher program (Shuttle extension or even Ares I/V).]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I wonder if anyone has publicly asked the Air Force if they would have wanted to launch their most valuable satellites on the Ares I?  I think the answer would have been no, mainly because they are already working with launchers that meet their needs (cost + reliability), but also because the SRB-based Ares I is an unknown regarding reliability &amp; cost.<br />
&#8211;<br />
For Ares I to get any sort of high flight rate, they would have had to add cargo missions, and the military is the only customer with enough demand to go after.  Then the debate would have been to discard a working system (Atlas V &amp; Delta IV) in favor of a new and unproven one (Ares I).  Even with the political posturing that is going on today, I can&#8217;t see Ares I winning that one, which means it would have been doomed to be a niche launcher with low demonstrated reliability, and high inherent costs (infrastructure, materials, processing, etc.).<br />
&#8211;<br />
One way to reduce the cost of Air Force cargo launches is to increase the flight rate of the launchers in general, which supports using Atlas or Delta for human crew.  It doesn&#8217;t help the SRM costs, but I agree with Major Tom in that the overall cost for refurbishment doesn&#8217;t merit a separate launcher program (Shuttle extension or even Ares I/V).</p>
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		<title>By: Major Tom</title>
		<link>http://www.spacepolitics.com/2010/03/27/for-military-launch-failure-is-not-an-option/#comment-292618</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Major Tom]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 28 Mar 2010 17:24:20 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.spacepolitics.com/?p=3286#comment-292618</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&quot;My point and it remains is that Gary was well out of line to make the statement he made WITHOUT A STUDYâ€¦ and his statement of a â€œrangeâ€ which was a â€œGuessâ€ was ridiculous given some back of the envelope calculations that say Major Tom did.&quot;

It was a little unfortunate that Payton said &quot;potentially double&quot; in an earlier hearing, only to have another DOD official state that the SRM cost increase will be more like 20%.  Payton probably should have just taken the question for the record rather than answer off the top of his head.  But it wasn&#039;t a big deal.  Now that he&#039;s differentiating between launch vehicle SRMs (Payton&#039;s responsibility) and ICBM/SLBM SRMs (not Payton&#039;s responsibility), Payton has better gotten his arms around the issue.

That said, my calculations don&#039;t show whether the cost increase will be 20%, 100%, or something else.  What my calculations show is that at 20% or 100% (or even something much higher than that), it&#039;s far more cost-effective from a national perspective to take that hit on SRM costs rather than spend orders of magnitude more money extending Shuttle operations and/or completing Ares I/Orion.  It makes no sense to spend billions or tens of billions of dollars at NASA to save hundreds of millions or even a few billion at DOD.

FWIW...]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8220;My point and it remains is that Gary was well out of line to make the statement he made WITHOUT A STUDYâ€¦ and his statement of a â€œrangeâ€ which was a â€œGuessâ€ was ridiculous given some back of the envelope calculations that say Major Tom did.&#8221;</p>
<p>It was a little unfortunate that Payton said &#8220;potentially double&#8221; in an earlier hearing, only to have another DOD official state that the SRM cost increase will be more like 20%.  Payton probably should have just taken the question for the record rather than answer off the top of his head.  But it wasn&#8217;t a big deal.  Now that he&#8217;s differentiating between launch vehicle SRMs (Payton&#8217;s responsibility) and ICBM/SLBM SRMs (not Payton&#8217;s responsibility), Payton has better gotten his arms around the issue.</p>
<p>That said, my calculations don&#8217;t show whether the cost increase will be 20%, 100%, or something else.  What my calculations show is that at 20% or 100% (or even something much higher than that), it&#8217;s far more cost-effective from a national perspective to take that hit on SRM costs rather than spend orders of magnitude more money extending Shuttle operations and/or completing Ares I/Orion.  It makes no sense to spend billions or tens of billions of dollars at NASA to save hundreds of millions or even a few billion at DOD.</p>
<p>FWIW&#8230;</p>
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