If he wants a more aggressive space exploration plan, he should push for more NASA funding within the context of the 2011 NASA plan. That plan includes all sorts of aggressive work towards affordable space exploration, as well as other important aspects of civil space work. I’m going to cut and paste some examples from neilh at NASAspaceflight.com:

http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=22070.0;all

“Laurie Leshin from ESMD recently gave a presentation which gives target dates for many of the exploration-specific items, although I’m sure much of this is still in the planning stage. Trade studies and finalization of development plans is set for FY2010. Also note that this doesn’t include non-ESMD space technology, aeronautics, or science:”

… (neilh includes some links) …

“I’ve typed out the dates and technology/demonstration/mission items below.

(Also, I think this is the first mention I’ve seen that the plan is to have one flagship technology demonstrator mission launching each year starting with 2014)

Acronyms:
FTD: Flagship Technology Demonstration
ETDD: Enabling Technology Development and Demonstration
RP: Exploration Robotic Precursor Mission
HLPT: Heavy Lift & Propulsion Technology Program
HRP: Human Research Program
C3PO: Commercial Crew and Cargo Program
Orion: Orion Emergency Rescue Module

2011: human robotics interfaces (ISS) (ETDD)
2011-2016: 3 SpaceX demos and initial 12 operational cargo flights (ISS) (C3PO)
2012: ALHAT (autonomous landing and hazard avoidance) (ETDD)
2012: biomed tech demo (ISS) (HRP)
2012-2016: 1 Orbital demo and initial 8 operational cargo flights (ISS) (C3PO)
2013: radiation risk model (HRP)
2014: advanced in-space propulsion mission (FTD)
2014: closed-loop ECLSS (ETDD)
2014: high-energy systems (ETDD)
2014: NEO robotic precursor (RP)
2014: performance health tech demo (ISS) (HRP)
2014: commercial crew demo flights (ISS) (C3PO)
2015: Lunar lander robotic precursor (RP)
2015: advanced in-space propulsion (ISS) (ETDD)
2015: advanced in-space propellant transfer and storage (FTD)
2015: LOX/methane or LOX/H2 in-space engine demo (HLPT)
2015: another biomed tech demo (ISS) (HRP)
2015-2020: commercial crew missions (ISS) (C3PO)
2015-2020: Orion Emergency Rescue Module missions (ISS) (Orion)
2016: lightweight/inflatable modules and closed loop life support (ISS) (FTD)
2016: ISRU (ETDD)
2016: Mars robotic precursor (RP)
2016: LOX/RP prototype engine (HLPT)
2016: further radiation risk model (HRP)
2017: aero-assist/entry, descent, and landing with inflatable aeroshell at Mars (FTD)
2017: performance health suite demo (ISS) (HRP)
2018: EVA demo (ISS, maybe for suitport/suitlock tech) (ETDD)
2018: another Mars robotic precursor (RP)
2018: Mars Medical Suite demo (ISS) (HRP)
2019: another NEO robotic precursor (RP)
2020: LOX/RP operational engine, thrust >= 1M lbs (HLPT)
2020: nuclear thermal propulsion (ETDD)

(I’ll also add the caveat that some of the later items, like nuclear thermal propulsion, are contingent on the results from earlier efforts.)

In addition to the items above, I’ll also add the following list of separate Space Technology items to be initiated just in 2011 (not counting later years):”

… (another link from neilh; see NASAspaceflight.com if you want it) …

“200 Space Technology Research Grants
• 500 Space Technology Graduate Fellowships
• 20 NIAC2 Phase I Awards
• 125 Center Innovation Fund Awards
• 400 SBIR/STTR Phase I Awards
• 50 SBIR/STTR Phase II Awards
• 5 New Centennial Challenges
• 6 Game Changing Development Awards
• 2 Small Satellite Technologies
• 3 Technology Demonstration Missions
• 1 Edison Small Satellite Missions
• 40 FAST Awards
• 2 CRuSR Award”

I should point out that neilh’s list is not comprehensive. It doesn’t include all of the valuable new NASA space work in the new plan, or even all of the valuable new NASA HSF space work, or even the valuable new NASA HSF exploration space work, in the new plan. For example, there are more robotic precursor missions planned – some “mission of opportunity” robotic precursor instruments hosted on science missions, and some “small scout” HSF robotic precursor missions. The small scouts:

2014: xS1 (robotic precursor Scout 1)
2016: xS2 (robotic precursor Scout 2)
2018: xS3 (robotic precursor Scout 3)

http://www.spacepolitics.com/2010/06/16/battling-for-constellation-and-looking-beyond/

Then why not redirect Cx and fund it? We’ll never know.”

There are a few reasons for this:

– The Vision for Space Exploration didn’t have a government rocket like Ares I. In the VSE NASA was supposed to acquire crew rides, not build and operate them. Thus it’s difficult to transition the Ares I piece back to a VSE-like approach.

– The VSE didn’t necessarily have an HLV – it would only have it if NASA’s plan required it. Only possibly having an HLV is pretty far from Constellation’s definitely having a monster Ares V. So, it’s pretty tough to transition what little work was done on Ares V to a VSE-like approach.

– As things stand now, the VSE is gone. Constellation wiped it out. Now we have an expensive transition to go through. Because of that, we don’t have the money to do it all, so the beyond-LEO crew vehicle gets shrunk to a CRV, at least for now. We get some transition here, but not as much as many Constellation interests want.

– A lot of the VSE pieces are nothing like Constellation’s Ares rockets and similar components, so it’s not easy to transition to them back to a VSE-like approach. The VSE’s robotic precursor missions, strong use of commercial space, and technology development and innovation all appear in the new NASA plan, but it’s difficult to transition Constellation to them, since Constellation is so different from these VSE items.

Of course, there are some of you who would argue deep dark nasties are afoot. They are, just not in this case, circa 2008.

We, the undersigned space leaders, are strong supporters of human spaceflight. We are writing to urge you to both (1) fully fund the commercial crew to Space Station program proposed in the President’s FY2011 budget request for NASA, and (2) accelerate the pace and funding of NASA’s human space exploration projects beyond Earth orbit.

“Commercial Rockets are ‘Fundamental’ to Space Exploration” — More than 50 ex-astronauts, aerospace businessmen and scientists signed a letter supporting Obama’s proposal to replace the space shuttle with commercial rockets. (Click here to read the letter.)

“Shelby Named ‘Porker’ for Protecting Constellation” — Citizens Against Government Waste named U.S. Sen. Richard Shelby of Alabama as its “porker of the month” for supporting NASA’s Constellation program, “which has cost taxpayers at least $9 billion so far but has little chance of meeting its goal of a moon mission by 2020.”

“The main problem wuth the “new vision”: no transition plan”

Don’t you mean, “no ‘smooth’ transition plan” as the main problem?

Vested interests opposed smooth transitions to commercialization and lower costs every step of the way for decades.

NASA’s leadership since 2004 could not navigate a “smooth transition” once shuttle was canceled.

Any direction taken by the new administration would have meant rough waters, given the unavoidable gap and the prohibitive budget and development timeline of Ares.

A few years from now, when at least one of several companies is servicing the ISS, launching for the private sector and contracting with Bigelow, things will look less dire and more sustainable.

Ares plans may end up in a file cabinet (or hard drive) but human spaceflight will continue to advance. I wish it could have happened in the 1970s, but perhaps the next generation will reap the benefits of the current shift in approach.

for the sake of argument, lets say the astronauts were were over ridden and the Shuttle was completely outfitted for full automatic operations. How would that have saved money and what was thee point you were trying to make in relation to SpaceX?

well I thought I made that point in my initial post. But perhaps I was not clear.

The essence of any cost effective operation is to design a process that allows the entire operation to be done “lean and hard”…ie with a look at everything that can save money and make the operation more efficient.

If you are SWA and only have three planes but need five to make your schedule to actually compete…how do you do it? By making 3 do the work of 5. So instead of a 1 hour turn where cleaners come on the plane and do their stick, you get the flight/cabin crew to “tidy up” the cabin between flights and only have the cleaners come on every 5 cycles instead of every one.

If you are NASA and you need to make the shuttle system more efficient, you have autoland. Then you dont need the MASSIVE simulator time dedicated to the landing process (for both pilots) nor do you have the STA where the pilots practice those “last few steps” to land the shuttle…that means you are not for 7 crews (it was going to be more when the thing was going to fly 51 or 24 or 12 times a year) 14 people going through almost endless training cycles.

(and that cost a ton of cash)

Second now you can have the long duration orbiter. Without the autoland the problem was how long could both pilots stay current on the “landing”. There have been some “laptop” solutions to this problem but they were completely unneeded if you just did autoland.

It is a mindset that one gets into. (or stays out of).

As I pointed out the airlines go through this all the time. There use to be an approach called “a circle to land”. Most airlines never train this and just wrote it out of their ops specs…pilots even get licenses now that has the “no circle to land” limitation on it. Why? It cost to much money to spend the sim time (which is cheap compared to the STA …shuttle training aircraft)

NASA has developed a neat sort of circular logic to defend all this. Something like this “spaceflight is expensive so any steps we take on earth to practice make it less likely to fail…” of course that adds to the expense of spaceflight.

I DONT know if this is still accurate because I have been “out” of the loop for a decade on shuttle flight training…but when I left it was taking longer (in terms of training hours) for each astronaut/pilot to qualify for the non autolanding part of the flight profile, then it was to take a Student Naval Aviator through the aircraft carrier landing/catapult metric.

There are so many other things that using autoland would have changed in terms of crew ops and cost…but as one “mythic hero” stated in response to autoland “what do you think I signed up for, to let a (blank) computer have my moment of glory?”

Yes

Robert G. Oler