Do you think that will work? I myself prefer hope and magic, even though they never seem to produce any reproducible results.

Word

The question now is whether the Administrator and the Administration have the courage of their own conviction. I certainly see enough leeway in the bill’s language to implement the FY11 plan largely as intended but it is not the path of least resistance. The implementation is going to be interesting to watch.

They can’t, but technically it probably doesn’t matter. The Senate HLV design language with respect to using the Shuttle/Constellation workforce and contracts and other design features is contingent on “where possible” clauses. This means that, at least by the authorization bill, it’s really up to the NASA Administrator (and White House to the extent they want to get involved) to decide what the design parameters and technical basis of the HLV will be.

No doubt congressmen in certain districts and states will continue to complain and obstruct when the HLV is not as Shuttle- or Constellation-derived as they would like it to be. But I wouldn’t be surprised if NASA continues to push down the LOX/kerosene and EELV/commercial path for HLV laid out in the FY11 budget. (I also wouldn’t be surprised if the Administration’s FY12 budget proposes to reduce/slow HLV in favor of boosting underfunded commercial crew and exploration technology programs, consistent with the FY11 budget.)

The real HLV test will come if the Republicans take control of Congress and cut the non-defense discretionary budget by the ~20% figures they’re tossing around. The Senate language already underfunds its SDHLV. That kind of cut to NASA’s topline would certainly make an SDHLV, and maybe even an EELV- or commercially-derived HLV, totally untenable.

FWIW…

Have a great day tomorrow.

Bennett

Ares I doesn’t “necessarily initiate a yaw maneuver”. Ares I _has_ to undertake a pad avoidance maneuver to avoid a catastrophic collision with its own launch structure. The Ares I-X pad avoidance maneuver caused anticipated damage to the existing Shuttle launch pad and avoiding the damage caused by the pad avoidance maneuver in operational Ares I launches is a major reason why the Shuttle pads were being redesigned and rebuilt at great cost before Constellation’s termination.

It’s bad engineering — like having to repave your driveway because you built your car to be so slow and unmaneuverable in low gear that its exhaust melts the driveway while the car slowly tries to avoid running into the flower bed. Just buy an existing car with enough speed and steerability to avoid the flower bed in the first place.

And even setting aside the costs of rebuilding the Shuttle pads, there are still unknowns associated with what weather conditions Ares I could have safely executed the pad avoidance maneuver.

“Fully explained.”

Not for Ares I, which was designing beyond the limits of existing parachute dimensions.

“Due to bucking at impact.”

The SRB casings experienced buckling at ocean impact, not “bucking”.

And that buckling was due to the SRB hitting the ocean at too high a velocity after the parachute failures.

And that’s unacceptable because the safety and cost promises of Ares I were predicated on the recoverability and reusability of those SRB casings. If Ares I-X can’t demonstrate parachute recovery with a four-segment SRB, then Ares I recovery beyond the limits of existing parachute dimensions for a larger five-segment SRB is highly suspect. And if Ares I SRBs couldn’t be recovered, then Ares I safety trends couldn’t be tracked. And if Ares I SRBs couldn’t be reused, then Ares I operational costs would increase dramatically when new steel casing production or composite casing development had to be undertaken.

“Ares I-X was was not equipped with separation motors, nor was it guided.”

This is patently false. Ares I-X employed Atlas V avionics, including a Fault Tolerant Inertial Navigation Unit (FTINU) on both the first and second stages and Redundant Rate Gyro Units on the first stage. The first stage also included a new Ascent Thrust Vector Controller (ATVC) and the second stage included a new active roll control system (RoCS).

Don’t make stuff up.

“The vehicle had the same mass, profile, and inertial characteristics of the flight vehicle.”

No, it didn’t. A four-segment SRB does not simulate the flight profile or inertial characteristics of a five-segment SRB, not by a long shot.

“Time magazine called Ares I-X the invention of the year for 2009.”

Only because Horowitz knew one of the editors.

And since when do journalists at a nontechnical photomag written at the junior high school level qualify as good judges of aerospace engineering?

And since when do you subscribe to leftist mainstream press?

“You shouldn’t be dishonest if you expect to be taken seriously.”

Doctor, heal thyself.

“Ares I is ready to fly!”

Yes, five-segment first-stage and J-2X upper-stage issues ranging from the weather envelope for pad avoidance to thrust oscillation to SRB recovery beyond existing parachute design limits to Orion debris interaction on flight termination have all been fully vetted in flight tests.

Not.

Even if they had been, it doesn’t matter. Ares I’s last, scant hope died in tonight’s vote.

Now the question becomes whether NASA can afford the already underfunded, Senate-designed SDHLV if the Republicans take control and cut the non-defense discretionary budget as much as they’ve promised to.

Closer than we might think.