“Dragon? If you have post-flight data analysis on the performance of Cheesebox One, please share w/t class. Might be nice to know before anoiting it a viable system. It may be a gem or a death trap. Throw in any data on its environmental control system. Investors would like to know.”

Let’s assume I have such data, what is it that makes you believe I’d be naive enough to post said data here or elsewhere? This being said, all I said is that Dragon effectively killed Orion. There is not even a hint of a clue of a data that shows Orion would fly according to specs. Assuming there is any real spec for Orion. Problem is, still, that you don’t know what you’re talking about and I do.

As far as investors go, if you were one such investor then you would know what you need to know. You are not an investor, just someone angry with SpaceX. Nothing else, nothing more. I even suspect you have no, zero, background in engineering of any kind. Yet you make claims about the engineering capabilities of such and/or such system bet it Dragon or Orion. Never to backup your claims. See, SpaceX just backed up my claims about Dragon vs. Orion, they flew Dragon to orbit and back. It may be a deathtrap but we now have a lot more data about Dragon than we ever will about Orion.

Orion did not fly any one in space or anywhere for that matter. And never will. Get over it.

“For one, this isn’t a business plan. You might call it a draft white paper, a pre-print, a case, or something else.”

Based on conversations with Paul on this Air & Space blog, this paper was meant to be the justification for getting Congress to fund the program.

“The flexibility is in the fact that plan doesn’t rely on NASA developing the largest launcher in the world. It works with or without it, and arguably better without it.”

The paper disagrees with you.

“Satellites, ICBMs, Facebook and Dr. Pepper address no immediate pain points.”

Well that’s a mixed bag of examples. Satellites do address a pain point for communication. iCBM’s address the pain point of needed rapid and un-defendable strike capability. Facebook addresses the desire people have to communicate. Dr. Pepper, out of all of them, is a nice to have, but otherwise a fungible commodity (a friend of mine would disagree however).

“Arguably, we won’t have lots of hardware flying out of LEO until the Moon becomes useful.”

I disagree, but that is probably the core disagreement between “Moon First” proponents and everyone else. I’m in the camp where we see an organic expansion of space activity out of LEO, and that resources from the Moon won’t be needed until there is an economic basis for them.

Robotic exploration and exploitation should be going on during this time, but large scale ISRU should only be done because it’s more dependable or less expensive. Otherwise it’s money being spent too soon, and slowing down other space activities that would have driven demand for lunar resources on their own. In other words, when it’s needed, but not before.

“And right now, what reason do we have to believe that lifting water from a gravity well one-sixth as deep as Earth’s is necessarily more costly than lifting it from Earth herself.”

The infrastructure for getting water from Earth to LEO (or anywhere) exists today. According to Paul’s plan, getting water from the Moon would take 15 years or more, with a minimum expenditure of $88B – and that’s just for the first liter.

IF there was a need for large quantities of water in orbit near Earth, we could satisfy that demand today using existing launchers, and likely lower the cost with competition over the ensuing years. How cheap could it go? Already SpaceX is advertising Falcon 9 Heavy for $/kg far lower than what Spudis/Lavoie say is the “plateau” ($5,000/kg). If that were true, then how does that change the economics of their plan?

“Assuming it holds, then there’s no need to appropriate additional monies to do Spudis-Lavoie.”

Considering the recent budget battle that NASA just went through, I don’t think that would be correct.

In any case, great conversation, and I’ll let you have the last word.

Happy New Year.

I’ve seen a lot of business plans, and their’s is not very clear. The title is “Mission and Implementation of an Affordable Lunar Return”, and the first line starts off by saying “We present an architecture that establishes the infrastructure for routine space travel…”. ISRU is not even mentioned specifically until the second sentence. Mixed messages.

For one, this isn’t a business plan. You might call it a draft white paper, a pre-print, a case, or something else. Spudis and Lavoie outline an architecture and suggest one implementation out of presumably many that falls within the constraints. The actual business execution of the plan–up to and including selection of transportation method–is left as an exercise to the reader.

Two, it’s hard to find any paper that couldn’t stand to be a little more clear. “Mission and Implementation” isn’t a final draft, but even if it were I was immediately able to take away the following simply from the abstract:

1. The paper presents an architecture to support routine space travel,
2. Lunar resources are central to sustaining this architecture
3. The component objectives of the architecture are or yield small, manageable tasks.
4. Components are tackled in increments, and each component encapsulates a useful activity in and of itself.
5. Scheduling components is “a free variable.”

And the conclusion: all the components taken together add to a permanent presence on the Moon, the supply chain needed to sustain it, and the supply chain needed to sustain other space activities in the Earth sphere (bringing us back to point 1).

So does the paper’s subsequent substance reasonably support the argument laid above? I say yes, provided that the accounting work not provided justifies the numbers.

Whether the example implementation is the most optimal configuration is a separate question, and one a good number of us would answer with a resounding “no.” That’s besides the point; the paper clearly shows that even with a less than ideal launcher, lunar exploitation and routine space access is doable within NASA’s projected HSF budget.

Besides, any plan that relies on NASA developing the largest launcher in the world does not have “a lot of flexibility”. For instance, what happens if the launcher is delayed, or cancelled? Does the Moon mission get cancelled too? Where is the flexibility in that?

The flexibility is in the fact that plan doesn’t rely on NASA developing the largest launcher in the world. It works with or without it, and arguably better without it.

In the business world, you have to find the pain points that people are willing to pay money to solve. There are no immediate pain points that the Moon solves for the U.S. – none.

That the core mission of business is to meet immediate need is a mere principle, not physical law. Satellites, ICBMs, Facebook and Dr. Pepper address no immediate pain points. Neither did Columbus, the conquistadors, nor the expeditions to open up the American West, Manchuria, Africa, or Siberia. The economic intuition here is that the risk of failing to meet demand increases the farther out in time you try to project the emergence of said demand. What do you say of a government that is thrifty when it comes to assuming such risk but will gladly fork over billions on projects that address no clear need or opportunity–immediate or otherwise?

Sure the resources of the Moon will be useful at some point, but not until we have lots of hardware flying out of LEO.

Arguably, we won’t have lots of hardware flying out of LEO until the Moon becomes useful. That’s the essential argument behind lunar return. Space is a long way out of the way to simply be a thoroughfare between points on Earth.

My quick calculations based on the $88B mission cost showed that the trade off for Earth vs Moon for water doesn’t happen until after 4M liters of water are needed. That’s going to be a while.

You actually showed that at a price point set by commercial lift of water from Earth, it takes 4 million (or up to 33 million, after you jiggered with the assumptions) liters to retire the $88 billion in sunk costs.. Demand is a quantity derivative in time. Neglecting the risk of lunar ISRU costs ballooning into continuing losses at the given price point, then you simply operate as long as it takes to deliver the 4 (or 33) million liters. And that assumes that government is going to pass on the cost in the first place.

Once again, there is always a risk that operating costs will turn ISRU into a money losing proposition. I also noted that quantifying such risk right now is dodgy at best. But hey; this is space. If we waited for absolute certainty we’d never get anything done. And right now, what reason do we have to believe that lifting water from a gravity well one-sixth as deep as Earth’s is necessarily more costly than lifting it from Earth herself.

Well that was obvious, since they tried to put a price tag on it. We’ll see if anyone in this next congress steps up to spend more money. Don’t hold your breath.

The price tag falls within NASA’s existing runouts for HSF as projected by Augustine. Assuming it holds, then there’s no need to appropriate additional monies to do Spudis-Lavoie. Arguably, getting smarter about transportation would result in savings.

A NASA HLV is what’s called a single-point-of-failure (SPOF). Tell me how that defines “flexibility”?

Then swap it out.

“My hat’s off to you and your patient and generous efforts to educate.”

Thank you very much. And I compliment you on the same.

If you’re still checking this thread, I wanted to give you a heads up to look at the questions and the discussions going on about the architecture over here:

http://blogs.airspacemag.com/moon/2010/12/21/can-we-afford-to-return-to-the-moon/#comments

“When do you think you will submit your architecture for publication?”

As soon as an ROI for mining water on the Moon becomes apparent.

I’m kind of funny that way, in that there has to be a need to do something for me to propose it. And not just a wish, but a real need. That and money is why we haven’t returned to the Moon since Apollo, and I don’t see that changing anytime soon.

You present facts Mr. Mellberg and they seek refuge in fiction.

My hat’s off to you and your patient and generous efforts to educate.

Bring it on Ron. Bring it on. Put your architecture out on the table.

When do you think you will submit your architecture for publication?

It is good to go through that process and justify what you say.

Martijn,

The starry-eyed speculation of a few was not representative of the material put out for public consumption by NASA at that time. The Number One publication distributed by NASA to the general public when the Space Shuttle was being developed in the mid-1970s was NASA SP-407 (“Space Shuttle”). Produced in 1976, it was my primary source when I was writing press releases about the Space Shuttle and Spacelab for Fokker-VFW during that time. (Spacelab was being built by our ERNO division in Bremen.) NASA SP-407 was the standard media reference guide during that era. It can be read online at:

http://history.nasa.gov/SP-407/contents.htm

I suggest you read the Foreword (“A New Era in Space”), as well as the first chapter “Space Shuttle System and Mission Profile”). You’ll find that NASA portrayed the Space Shuttle — and those who would fly in it — exactly as I’ve described it in my previous posts.

Again, there was NO mention of tourists or commercial activities, other than launching commercial satellites.

Note the following lines:

“Space flight will no longer be limited to intensively trained, physically perfect astronauts but will now accommodate experienced scientists and technicians.”

“The primary mission for the Space Shuttle is the delivery of payloads to Earth orbit.”

“Some crewmembers and payloads for Spacelab will be international in origin and others will be provided by U. S. Government and industry.”

These sorts of statements were repeated in one NASA publication and brochure after another. This is how the Space Shuttle program was ‘sold’ to the U.S. taxpayer. It was never depicted in general publications as a program that would provide space access to the masses.

See http://www.nss.org/resources/library/shuttledecision/chapter06.htm#intro.