And yet, when NASA Administrator Bolden went to China, he met w/ the head of the China Manned Engineering Space Office. Why?

More to the point, where does CNSA fit within the Chinese political structure? Certainly, from a protocol perspective, the head of CNSA is nominally head of the Chinese civilian space program–which assumes that CNSA, and not the General Armaments Department, is the main administrative element of the Chinese space program.

For that matter, when you take a look at Chinese reporting on things like Chang’e and Shenzhou space launches, it is not CNSA that is given credit, or even the source of the senior leadership of these very high visibility programs.

Because it was PROPAGANDA. The Soviet Union was in a constant state of falling apart and waiting in lines to buy toilet paper because the space program was costing so much is the reason it had to be justified and heros had to be generated.

First, you tend to view ISS in China-US terms, but there are also China-Russian, China-Japan, China-Europe views that also must be considered.

Second, China has expressed no interest in manned flight to Mars.

Three, China’s space leadership has expressed its interest in the Moon, and explicitly stated the reasons for their interest:
1) CAPS
2) 3He
3) future property rights.

Four, cooperation with China will continue to take place in certain areas simply because of the technical needs, as it already does today.

Five, it will be several years in any case before China reaches the technical level to participate in the ISS.

Six, at that point, China will be able to operate in LEO or on the Moon independently at that point, and whether we choose to join them then in any of their ventures will be up to us, and to Europe, and to Japan, and to Russia.

Weather is minor concern to the general public?

I’m talking about the issue of cooperation with the Soviets. I don’t think the general American public spent much time thinking about whether we were cooperating with the Soviets on weather forecasting or geomagnetic field research. These aren’t perceived as national strategic areas because a scientific breakthrough in these areas isn’t likely to result in a national advantage.

Launching humans may be a minor concern to the general public, but that would only be because spaceflight is a minor concern in general. In your quote, it mentions how human spaceflight rapidly eclipsed all other kinds of spaceflight in Soviet propaganda after Gagarin’s flight. Why else would they obsess over the cosmonauts’ menu and exercise routine if the manned component of spaceflight was not perceived to be the most important?

“If the U.S. and Soviets cooperated on weather, the geomagnetic field, and communications, that doesn’t say much. These don’t involve launching humans, and are minor issues as far as the general public is concerned.”

Are you joking? Weather is minor concern to the general public? More people can name a weatherman than they could name an astronaut.

Launching humans is one of thee most minor concerns to the general public.

“…hopefully many non-core activities will be dropped entirely.”

Like the SLS. Congress was jumping the gun on it anyways, since the VSE stated:

“NASA does not plan to develop new launch vehicle capabilities except where critical NASA needs—such as heavy lift—are not met by commercial or military systems. Depending on future human mission designs, NASA could decide to develop or acquire a heavy lift vehicle later this decade. Such a vehicle could be derived from elements of the Space Shuttle, existing commercial launch vehicles, or new designs.”

Every funded program NASA has can use existing launchers, and Congress does not have plans requiring anything bigger. Killing the unneeded SLS will save billions – that’s $illions with a ‘B’. Oh, and re-competing (or killing off too) the MPCV/Orion will also save $illions.