“ Furthermore, the ISS has to “create everything” as it goes along.”

Nope, all the R&D is done, the tooling is built, the modules have been tested on the ground and in space, so we are now in sustaining mode. In fact, if we wanted to build another ISS, it would cost far less, especially using commercial launchers instead of the Space Shuttle.

“There is NOT any pre-existing infrastructure in LEO either! ”

This is a weird statement, especially because the ISS is in LEO, and it has an infrastructure that supports it.

The issue for the future is that the infrastructure needs to become more robust (i.e. have lots of redundancy), and it needs to become less expensive over time. The combination of these two will allow NASA to do more with less money, and it means that exploration take place much quicker (don’t need to build every facet of transportation).

All of this supports the goals of the VSE, which stated:

“As we move outward into the solar system, NASA will rely more heavily on private sector space capabilities to support activities in Earth orbit and future exploration activities. In particular, NASA will seek to use existing or new commercial launch vehicles for cargo transport to the Space Station, and potentially to the Moon and other destinations.”

You also stated:

“ They will need enormous subsidies just to be able to launch a single manned capsule to even a single near earth orbit.”

This gets down to the question of how to accomplish a goal. Is it less expensive for NASA to pay commercial providers to provide LEO crew services, or less expensive for NASA to do it on their own? The answer of course is that it will be less expensive for NASA to pay commercial providers, because NASA doesn’t do any cheap. So call it what you want, subsidy, investment, contract, whatever, all that matters is that NASA pays less over time, and that there is competition to keep prices in check and provide redundancy. That is the goal, and not to create another government-run rocket that has to beg Congress for the funds to keep people standing around.

“Today we import many (if not most) of our consumer goods; and we’ve become a debtor nation.”

If you don’t like it, then stop buying product made there. You get what you want, which so far, apparently, is that you’re OK with the imports (as you’ve said earlier).

Here is an interesting factoid:

U.S. exports now account for roughly 12 percent of GDP, up from 3 percent in the 1930s.

The solution for American industry is the same for expanding our presence in space, and that is we need to focus on reducing the cost to manufacture things.

At some point China is going to stop being the low-cost production center that is it today, and we already see wages rising, especially with the iPhone production facilities, so China is becoming less competitive every day. Unfortunately they still are far less expensive than we are, but it will help us keep existing industry here in the U.S., and hopefully let new industries take hold here.

I spent my career in manufacturing, and so I know a little about this. Look around in just about any city, mainly in the gritty areas, and you will find a lot of manufacturing going on. One area that will help new industries get established is better education for potential workers, and this is one of the areas that the U.S. does not do well.

As I’ve mentioned before, the first company I worked for had it’s own training system because they could not find enough people with machining experience to work in our factory. Years later when I was the manager of a machine shop, I had problems finding qualified CNC operators – this is one of the reasons new companies have a hard time starting up and being competitive enough to survive.

So to me, the answer to America becoming more competitive is to educate our workers so THEY are more competitive.

“But you’ve been advocating that the U.S. is losing to China, so that makes it your problem (as well as all citizens). What is your solution?”

Unfortunately, it might be too late to solve the problem. There was a time when the United States manufactured most of its own consumer products and was a creditor nation. Today we import many (if not most) of our consumer goods; and we’ve become a debtor nation. One solution would be to restore manufacturing in this country. But that is easier said than done. What was it Ross Perot said about a “giant sucking sound” as U.S manufacturing jobs were going overseas? We’re even seeing the service sector going offshore.

As for the space program …

One of the things I like about the Spudis-Lavoie plan is that it is flexible enough to adjust for lean years — like the ones we’re in now. This is a good time for greater robotic exploration of the Moon. Sending unmanned rovers to the polar regions to evaluate lunar resources (such as water ice) would likely be an affordable goal — and one which could assess the potential for future human outposts. I certainly agree that we don’t need another “Apollo moment” with either the Moon or Mars. Humankind should return to the Moon to stay. Ditto for Mars. Which means we won’t be leaving footprints in the lunar dust or martian sand for quite some time. Unless, of course, the Chinese reach the Moon sooner than any of us might expect.

Given the economic realities and the budgetary contraints of the next several years — especially with regard to discretionary spending — I expect to see some major belt-tightening at NASA. That doesn’t mean we should take our eyes off the prize. It just means that human exploration beyond Earth orbit is going to be slowed down even more. Hopefully, the pace of robotic exploration will be increased, as has been suggested. And I hope the foundations for long-range human exploration can be laid despite the slowdown. Otherwise, to paraphrase an old von Braun line, the next time American astronauts land on the Moon, they might have to pass through Chinese Customs.

Meanwhile, Space X seems to have the lead in providing a replacement for the Space Shuttle to service the International Space Station in LEO. As such, I wish them well. And I hope the ISS will be more productive (in terms of results) now that the facility has been basically completed.

“We will really become proficient in space by turning our attention Moonward.”

Where is the money coming from to do that? Even if you stopped funding the ISS, you don’t have enough money to fund a lunar outpost. We don’t have the infrastructure yet to do that, so just as Constellation found out, you have to create everything – very expensive.

If you want to go to the Moon, then you need to outline a fundable plan to do it. What are your goals, how much will it cost, over what period of time will it last?

And more importantly, how do you fund it in today’s budget environment, and what happens if a future Congress doesn’t see enough results to continue the funding – will it turn into another Apollo moment, where we leave the Moon alone for decades at a time?

As Bush proved with the Iraq war, if something has enough support, it gets funding, even off-budget. So your biggest problem is getting enough of Congress to agree with your viewpoint. So far they don’t, and I don’t either, so regardless how “extremely upset” you may be, that’s life. I hope you can deal with it.

“In any case, the L-1011 TriStar and DC-10 were both excellent aircraft. Their only problem was the size of the market. It was too small for both Lockheed and DAC to reach a break-even number in sales…”

And this is the exact problem that the Congressionally mandated 130t Space Launch System will run into, which is not enough work to merit the product.

At least McDonnell Douglas and Lockheed had launch customers, but the SLS doesn’t. No payloads, no upcoming funded programs to help figure out what size it should really be – nothing. It’s a launcher for nothing.

Even the smaller 70t SLS has no customers, and no payloads. The SLS is being built before there is a need, and money spent too early is a waste. Another example of government waste foisted upon the nation by pork barrel interests. We’ll see how this plays out in the new Congress…

“Lockheed and McDee got the notion of a tristar wrong. I wouldnt give airbus all that much hammer for the twin motor…Boeing knew where they were going with two engines very early they never seriously considered another tri motor after the deuce seven.”

Lockheed and Douglas didn’t get the “notion of a TriStar” wrong. They were satisfying the requirements of two launch customers, Eastern and TWA, both of which called for a tri-jet. Moreover, until C.R. Smith left the helm to become LBJ’s Secretary of Commerce, American was leaning toward the TriStar, as well. United was an old Douglas customer and leaned toward the DC-10. But to stay in the running with American, DAC went with three engines, after studying both four-engine and two-engine configurations. In fact, Boeing offered a competing three-engine version of the 747 which was called the 747-300 (not to be confused with the 747-300 launched by Swissair more than a decade later which featured an extended Upper Deck). But Boeing had its hands full with the four-engine, long-range version of the 747, and decided to let Douglas and Lockheed fight over the medium-range tri-jet market.

In any case, the L-1011 TriStar and DC-10 were both excellent aircraft. Their only problem was the size of the market. It was too small for both Lockheed and DAC to reach a break-even number in sales — even with KC-10 tankers thrown into the equation. Moreover, as mentioned previously, the question mark that hung over the Rolls-Royce RB.211 not only delayed the TriStar … it nearly sent Lockheed into bankruptcy, forcing the Nixon Administration to give the firm a loan guarantee. (The U.S. government could hardly afford to let one of its biggest defense contractors collapse at that time.)

Whether you realize it or not, Airbus Industrie pioneered the wide-body, twin-jet concept with its A300. For a time, it looked like they had gotten it wrong as A300 sales were stuck at a relative handful of aircraft until Frank Borman ordered the type for Eastern. That’s when the floodgates opened for Airbus. And that’s when Boeing was forced to respond with a wide-body, twin-jet of its own — the 767 which was designed (initially) to compete with the A310.

Until 1978, Boeing was developing a long-range, tri-jet version of the 767 called the 777 (not to be confused with the later 777) for American. The original tri-jet 777 was to have followed the 767 by about a year. It was designed around a long-range requirement from American. But it was replaced by extended range versions of the 767, including the 767-300.

So much for your contention that Boeing “never seriously considered” another tri-jet after the 727.

“That comment reminds me of George Armstrong Custer at the Little Big Horn.”

sorry about using LOCKMART…new habits die hard and it has been quite a few years “Lockmart”…of course that doesnt negate anything I said, nor does your discussion of the RB211…the salaint fact is what I said…Lockheed and McDee got the notion of a tristar wrong.

I wouldnt give airbus all that much hammer for the twin motor…Boeing knew where they were going with two engines very early they never seriously considered another tri motor after the deuce seven..

As for the analogy with Custer. No he was worried almost from the word go at the Big Horn…his worries changed over the battle but he was worried.

I am not worried about the PRC…or at least I am worried about the US more

Robert G. Oler

“The Chinese aren’t in a hurry. They’ve been very methodical in their approach. As I mentioned earlier, it’s the old story of the tortoise and the hare. Patience is a virtue.”

And that is why they will not enter in a full out military conflict with the US. They saw how stupid we can be and are just waiting for us to go into oblivion by our own making. In the mean time they reap the fruits of our former economic strength and fill in their coffers.