“There was another alternative available.”

I agree, if they would have put out bids for a straight per seat price for a commercial capsule & launcher and launched skylab 2. I wonder where we would be if the Nation would have pushed for a commercial path almost 40 years ago.”

That (of course) is not what I meant, but I suspect you know that.

Have a nice day.

“There was another alternative available.”

I agree, if they would have put out bids for a straight per seat price for a commercial capsule & launcher and launched skylab 2. I wonder where we would be if the Nation would have pushed for a commercial path almost 40 years ago.

Yes, on at least one crucial point. You mention NASA’s past “failures” and I could add to the list. However I would offer another reason for those “failures”. Apollo was (for a civilian space program anyway) a high budget/high priority program. Its success prompted the mindset that all future programs would be that way as well. So when Apollo was ended the final decision was to go to the Space Shuttle (the game changing/paradigm shifting bold new technology of its day). But Shuttle was not given Apollo like budget/priority. It did not fail, at least in the sense that it eventually became an operational vehicle; but it was almost cancelled several times before it finally succeeded (years late and over its artificially low budget).

There was another alternative available. That was to develop specialized vehicles (both boosters and payloads) based on the Apollo Saturn hardware and incrementally improve them as needs dictated (there is some good information on these concepts at the Astronautix website). This would have allowed a continuation of operational capabilities while staying within a less than Apollo like budget (and presenting substantially less technical risk). We are now, in my opinion, on the verge of repeating that mistake. The Shuttle hardware (and the Orion/ISS hardware on the payload side) could be used to achieve a much sooner BEO capability (at least in Cis-lunar space and I will hear plead guilty to believing Paul Spudis has the right idea strategically about how we need to proceed – that makes me what some people around here derisively call a ‘moonie).

None of that negates support for nurturing the development of commercial capabilities (first in LEO and them to the rest of Cis-Lunar space), development of in space propellant depots or eventually (when the transportation infrastructure has sufficiently developed) going well beyond the moon.

But fitting that into limited budgets while holding a political coalition together is going to be extremely difficult.

“In any case anybody wanting to see a happy outcome to this situation is going to be threading a needle through a very narrow opening for about the next 10 years.”

I understand your concerns, and I think it’s a matter of solutions that we disagree.

In that regard though, I haven’t seen any evidence that the next big NASA program will be any better managed than the last (Constellation or even JWST), so I place my hope in getting real commerce going in space. It won’t be fast, and it may not grow quickly, but I have no confidence in Congress funding an entire BEO effort through to completion – not with NASA doing everything like on Constellation.

They (Administration, Congress & NASA) are going to have to leverage commercial services to a greater extent, and NASA needs to plan their exploration using existing or near-term launchers.

We are in “violent agreement” on that statement. I would point out that this was the case with the previous administration also (the Commercial Program began then). I would hope that this leveraging will eventually continue beyond LEO to BEO. My problem with the original FY 2011 budget proposal is that (at least in my opinion) it jeopardized a very delicate balance as to how to accomplish that goal, both technically/politically (it eliminated any specific BEO goals and objectives, in favor of “open ended” research) which (in my opinion) is begging to get your funding cut off; and just politically (it “open looped” the entire Congress – then overwhelmingly in control the administration’s own party – which alienated what should have been their natural allies).

The Authorization Act of 2011 was (again in my opinion) a Heroic attempt to “fix” that problem. The real questions now are what will happen with the 2011 appropriations (as opposed to authorization – that is in Congress court) and the 2012 Budget request (does it reflect the 2011 Authorization intent – that is in the administrations court). The open letter from Harry Reid to the administration literally begging them to work to the intent of the Authorization is “scary” (does he have information that they do not intend to?)

In any case anybody wanting to see a happy outcome to this situation is going to be threading a needle through a very narrow opening for about the next 10 years.

You could also base a craft in a high earth orbit or a Lagrange point. You can send cargo via slow but efficient ballistic trajectories (about 100 days) or directly (4-9 days depending). Returning to an high earth orbit or Lagrange point would be easier than getting to LEO from the Moon or Mars.

Crew could be sent also but it would take either slightly upgraded versions of current launchers or two launches of the heaviest kind (Delta IV heavy plus Orion). Heavy lift here would be helpful but it does not need to be ARES V or Saturn V Class. 50- 70MT would be plenty and again here the heavy lift would not be needed (just very helpful).
Coming back to LEO is what poses problems due to the amount of propellant needed (and time if using slow trajectories/low thrust). However the crew could depart and directly renter via a transport capsule.

You could assemble a craft in LEO, launch to a Lagrange point and never have it come back to LEO.

You could also set up a solar electric tug service between LEO and a Lagrange point (or high earth orbit). There are issues with repeated exposure of the solar panels to the radiation of the Van Allen belt but it could be solve able. The bigger issue is scale. For SEP to be useful to manned spaceflight it needs to move about 10mT or more. So far nothing on this scale has be built yet but VASIMR and NASA’s NEXT ion thrusters are on this scale. Solar thermal could also work.

“…but keep in mind that HSF (at least the American version of it) has been danger of ending several times over all those Administrations…”

Not only the Presidents, but also the various Congresses. And that will continue to be a problem as long as our efforts in space are “Space Programs” instead of a space marketplace.

The way I see it, we have an opportunity right now to leverage the governments needs (supporting the ISS) into a small but diverse commercial industry that can survive past 2020 without NASA. But it won’t happen unless The Government (Congress & the Administration) want a commercial industry to take hold. The Administration does, and we’ll have to see what happens with Congress.

But as long as putting humans into space is based on the whims of Congress, our participation in space won’t be assured or secured.

“My question about subs is that if they do some servicing at sea below the surface in particular they have to have some spare parts, technicians they already have onboard. A situation somehow similar to what servicing in space might look like.”

My experience is more with naval electronic systems (we built the first COTS computer suites), but I think naval ships are a better analogy than subs, mainly because the deep ocean is even less hospitable than space. U.S. Navy ships do carry spare parts for needed and critical systems, and usually have machine shops to manufacture simple parts and repair battle damage. Aircraft carriers are mobile A&P shops, and are able to repair, replace or rehabilitate significant portions of the aircraft they carry, as well as repairing their own battle damage.

In the undersea environment, a good example of doing work in a remote & harsh environment is the oil industry with underwater wells. They do amazing work at bone-crushing depths, where space, with it’s clean environment and less harsh atmosphere difference, is far easier.

As our work on Hubble and the ISS have shown us, repair work in space is not too hard, and I think it’s more a matter of getting good long-term wear & tear history so we can understand how to build even better & more dependable space hardware.

My $0.02

That was the plan with Constellation. That is the plan with Sidemount missions. It will work. What will not work is the absurd fuel depot schemes and inferior lift vehicles putting together spacecraft in orbit.

So, how big does a rocket will we need when we go to Mars? And Jupiter? Are we going to be building a Nexus?

Docking with an EDS is one thing- building tinker toys that will actually fly is another.

So, yet again you are maintaining ignorance of ISS? BTW, we can do lunar missions with minimal “building” (IE docking an EDS with a craft) using a single launch propellent depot, and do it with Delta IV Heavy.

Storing liquid hydrogen in space for long periods and transferring it is a zero experience technology.

Am I the only one who had trouble understanding that sentence?

Any kind of reusable spacecraft is going to need maintenance and there are no hangars in space. Do not even compare them to satellites that fly until they fail.

Luckily, we’ve got something that can serve as a 1st generation hanger, called ISS.

Can I suggest watching this.

““Easy one, Yes.”

OK. That helps me with future discussions, and in my mind it also puts you in a more rational category of posters than those who thought the end of Constellation was the end of HSF.”

Good, but keep in mind that HSF (at least the American version of it) has been danger of ending several times over all those Admiistations (some how it has always managed to survive – though not in a robust form and just barely). In my opinion it is once again in grave danger and the outcome this time is (of course) still unknown.