This is precisely what we did 30-40 years ago. STS first, then space station, then beyond, all very much conceived and implemented as your preferred so-called “multiple-use building blocks”. [Read the 1969 Agnew-Mueller-Paine architecture study for a full appreciation.]

And now we’re back where we started. Except that the “building block” vehicle designs being promised/developed today are more limited—by huge margins—in capability than the one we’re about to retire.

Why are so many folks so certain that things will be different this time?

Many are confident that cost will make the difference. Perhaps it will. But will the road ahead really be that much cheaper? I’m not so sure; once we fully get our hands around the new ‘commercial’ paradigm of space transportation providers and sort out the kinks lurking in the details, maybe not.

And since we’re starting off this new paradigm with inherently more limited designs as our building blocks, I fear that our options may be even further constrained (this time for lack of technological potential and/or operational ease) than our options had been during the past two decades by economics… [But for cost the shuttle could have supported lunar return; perhaps the new providers may bring down cost, but the notion of Dragon or a close derivative thereof (offered up after one brief Earth-orbit test flight) actually getting us to Mars is laughable.]

I do so hope that my fears are misplaced…but I’m enough of a student of history to appreciate that actual societal implementations of technology rarely follow the path defined by the hopes of the most ardent optimists among us. And even when the technologies themselves exceed wildest expectations, unintended (and sometimes painful) consequences typically temper the promises thereby bestowed.

We shall see…

“…and no, I don’t accept that all WH administrations do so, at least not to the intense degree this one does.”

The last administration was much more calculating and cohesive than the current one. I’m not saying which one is better for the country, but the last one definitely was a well-oiled political machine.

But back to more important matters.

“And this has always been my greatest fear. Without a commitment to a roadmap to somewhere…”

If everyone could agree, then a roadmap would be easy, but there are so many opportunities out there that it’s hard to get a consensus without what I call a “national imperative”. There is no “need” for NASA to take us to the Moon, Mars or anywhere else, and the ISS is really a research outpost that survives on the perception that it is returning value (a squishy proposition in itself).

The only funded HSF program right now is the ISS, so “dates” to anywhere else are meaningless. Cough up the money, outline the tasks, and then dates can be discussed, but before that point they are still just aspirational, which is a nice way of saying fake. Fake is not the basis for anything good.

I’ve been a life long space and aerospace fan, and I’ve been active on this blog for close to two years. I’ve learned a lot, and here’s what I think of our chances of getting to the Moon.

If every destination program that NASA gets funded for starts with the premise “first we build our own transportation system from Earth to our destination”, then it is doomed to fail. And that includes the VSE under a non-Constellation design. NASA’s puny budget cannot sustain major construction (rockets, spaceships, landers, etc.), concurrent major operations (ISS), and major exploration (many missions to justify the effort) at the same time. They don’t have the money, and they don’t have the political latitude to do things with the best hardware, and they don’t have the requisite management skill-sets anymore.

The question has never been CAN we go back to the Moon. We did it 40 years ago, so we have the basic knowledge, and even better technology. The question is can we AFFORD to do it, and within the budget constraints, IS IT WORTH IT (i.e. science ROI).

What I like about the current direction is that it encourages building blocks that have multiple uses. Commercial crew to LEO can be used for the ISS, but also any other destination in LEO, plus as a way to get exploration crew to LEO for transfer to an EDS. NASA could pay as little as $20M/astronaut to get to LEO, which is about what they would spend to study the cost effectiveness of using commercial services vs building their own rocket. Need to get 3 astronauts to LEO? Send an email saying you’re exercising your GSA Schedule contract for three seats. No politicians involved, nor mid-level bureaucrats. The lead time will be quicker too.

Commercial cargo can get payloads to LEO, so likely all NASA will need is an EDS and the destination transportation (which could be sent ahead by commercial launchers). That reduces program costs and development leadtimes.

When costs drop, and leadtimes shrink, the amount of time and money you need to go somewhere drops too. We see that already with Zubrin and NASA thinking out loud about possible Mars missions they could do using Falcon Heavy and Dragon. For probably $250M, NASA could send a Dragon capsule to Mars to test out a number of things, and that is the type of event (low cost, entrepreneurial-driven, new things for NASA) that drives public interest. Maybe not anymore money, since I do agree with Rand that in general the public is oblivious to what we do in space, but by driving down costs you can do more with the same money, so that’s a net increase in capabilities.

In short, we need to concentrate on one transportation segment at a time, which right now is Earth to LEO. We already know that there is demand for crew services to LEO (NASA”s “Commercial Market Assessment for Crew and Cargo Systems” report), and the best way to sustain that demand, and create more, is to put it in place so people can try it out and see if they want to depend on it for commerce. Once that’s in place the next step will be to Lagrange/lunar orbit, which will be a lot closer and easier. Step by step.

My $0.02

Because people are people…and they always have been and always will be. As Linus once said “I LOVE humanity! It’s people I can’t stand!”

I am currently reading a biography of Hyman G. Rickover focused on how his unforgiving and remarkably honest approach was instrumental to bringing into being not only the nuclear navy but also the nuclear industry. Most illuminating, with much wisdom in his quotations that introduce each major section. By Thomas Rockwell, someone who worked with him in the thick of it for many years.

“Congress is going to be involved.”

No, not necessarily. Or at least not in the way it is today, designing LV instead of NASA.

“The challenge to the ‘space community’ (such as we are) is to get Congress to work with us, not against us.”

That is a very good point. But so far we are nothing like a space community, we are a collage of communities, at war on LV designs, timeline and destinations. We seem to seek leadership at NASA, at the WH or even in Congress. What we really, REALLY need is leadership within our communities. We need people to come together. The only way to go about it is to look at the budget and projections for budget. Some people may want to re-run the (in)famous 90-day study and take oh may be a full year. To examine different structures, different timelines, destinations that are AFFORDABLE within said budget. Then we can go and lobby Congress to do the right thing. It will not come from any of the usual suspects I am afraid. I support commercial LEO access because I see it as a stepping stone for BEO. And I see no other solutions. Whatever else has been proposed so far, SLS/MPCV, Plymouth, HEFT are bridge to nowhere. Why don’t we stop the nonsense for once? WHY?

I’m not out to ‘blame’ anyone for the current lack of a long-term strategy; I’m aware that it came about due to a sequence of events & decisions across multiple administrations stemming from various motivations. I was merely indicating my dissatisfaction with its absence because a lack of direction is harmful in a number of ways, some potentially unforeseen. I described some of these in my previously referenced essay/article. As for your suggestion for ‘the culprit’, I have always found it most ironic that ‘congress’ is just another word for getting scr**ed.

However, your later suggestion that Congress ‘get out the way’ is untenable. If the govt must be involved to any degree (and I suspect that it must be, but we need to be smart how), Congress is going to be involved. Such is the nature of the beast. The challenge to the ‘space community’ (such as we are) is to get Congress to work with us, not against us. Theoretically, this might be the best spin-off of regressing to the old NACA model… Without big rockets and flashy spaceships to sink their political teeth into, Congress folks might be content to merely know that research is going on in their districts. But I doubt it…

As for your 4th-to-last & 3rd-to-last paragraphs, I think your typing got ahead of your thinking again. I couldn’t quite discern what you intended to say. I would agree with you (I think) that what Congress is trying to impose on NASA currently is not particularly helpful toward achieving long-range & long-term sustainable exploration beyond LEO. Like I said: the tattered entrails of Constellation…

Gotta run.

The latter seems pretty unlikely to me…

Y’know all those fingers messing my keyboard…

Look. O’Keefe’s plan would have given us, most likely, a CEV on top of an EELV. All that was needed was a LAS and “man rating” for the EELV. The EELVs were already flying. So if you did not have to put all that cash in Ares 1 you could have put it in CEV/LAS (LAS was part of CEV btw). 4 years to put a CEV on top of an EELV? See it this way. One flight uncrewed of a capsule on top of a non man rated EELV not possible? Reminds you of anything that happened recently? In Dec 2010? Please. It was all possible. Of course they still could have cancelled the program but it would have been a lot harder to say it was a failure. A lot harder. If you assume this WH had bad intentions which I believe not.

CCDev is ignoring BEO, for now because there is no cash for BEO, come on. You know that. You know as well that MPCV/SLS is not a solution.

I am not sure who you are blaming for the lack of plan. Personally I blame Congress. Without cash there is no plan that will work. And Congress will not pay. Apollo like plans are a dead end. Again you give way too much importance to timeline. Until the reorg occurs there will be no timeline with this WH or any WH. And I mean any meaningful timeline.

Yes I agree it is not clear that commercial only will make lunar or whatever BEO. That is why we still need NASA to do it. But people in Congress think they can do that with an unfunded program which will stifle any real BEO work at NASA. Congress must get out of the way OR you will never ever see a BEO program at NASA. NEVER.

I am not arguing that NASA has the expertise for flight ops. How could I? I am not even saying that the commercials have this expertise. Actually I think they probably don’t have it, nor do they know the extent of the difficulty, for now. But they may “buy” the expertise at NASA one way or another… A smart move is to have NASA “support” the nascent commercial LEO ops, and I think they will eventually do it. All the while developing true next generation spaceship for BEO. BUT again this is not what Congress is trying to force down the throat NASA to do. I mean come on don’t you agree with that? I can’t believe you don’t see it.

I don’t know for sure about commercials surviving a loss of crew since it is not rational and highly politicized. They should in a rational world where we happen to lose passenger acft. But… I also know that NASA is unable, at least today, to deliver either. What choice do we have? Don’t tell m increase NASA budget, your friends (?) even in the GOP won’t do it.

Yes NACA for now (see I learn to type since then) is the better way, actually there is no other way. Wait for the new cuts to happen soon.

Long term… Oh well…

I hope your palantir sees clearly and is not overly influenced by Sauron.

I’m quite confident it can, and will, given the people involved.

Will CCDev (and the commercial industry as a whole) survive a crew fatality?

CCDev may not, given the number of people who intrinsically oppose it who will use this as an excuse to kill it if they can, but it won’t slow down the commercial industry as a whole, any more than airline fatalities have ever substantially damaged the airline industry.