“If we cannot find a way to continue, sustain and expand our operations in LEO, whether from taxpayer dollars, tourism, or satellite servicing, it is difficult to see how we could possibly finance human spaceflight BEO.”

Agreed.

“the plan presented by NASA was to keep the Shuttle and Station working together…”

Well of course they would say that, because that was the vehicle they had operating. But we could have built the ISS without the Shuttle, although it would have required new space hardware. Though building the ISS with the Shuttle probably was probably a great use of it’s abilities, we certainly don’t need the Shuttle to maintain the ISS now, or even to expand it later.

“If we are going to build a future shuttle, it would make sense to keep together the people who figured out painfully and over 30 years how to keep the current one flying. They might have some lessons to teach.”

That only works if we’re actively working on a Shuttle replacement, but we’re not. All NASA is getting funding for is to build commercial transportation to LEO, and a short duration exploration capsule.

Regarding transferring existing knowledge, you would hope that all current parts, processes and procedures have been documented, and I see that USA states that: “USA Quality Management System (QMS) is the business operating system for producing products and services. The USA QMS is certified to both the ISO 9001 and the AS9100 International Standards.” That plus NASA’s own documentation processes should retain the as-is knowledge.

For the “why did we do it that way” type stuff, all I can say is who knows when their knowledge will be needed, if ever. Just like with aircraft today, lots of legacy systems are being replaced with different ones (like hydraulics replaced with electric motors), so the challenges of tomorrow may not need all of the knowledge from yesteryear.

Of course some Shuttle workers will get new jobs in their fields of expertise, so we’re not really losing their knowledge. What percentage of “lost knowledge” is not just migrating to other employers?

“As to the costs, those you quote may include include overhead, R&D etc. When the reflight of the tethered satellite was added, the budget was only increased $77M.”

No, I quoted actual contract costs that NASA pays for the ET & SRM’s. Here is the info:

http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewpr.html?pid=24363
http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewpr.html?pid=8785

If we cannot find a way to continue, sustain and expand our operations in LEO, whether from taxpayer dollars, tourism, or satellite servicing, it is difficult to see how we could possibly finance human spaceflight BEO. What would be the practical return to the taxpayers, in a time when we cannot even get them to pay for the current budget? Moreover the Orion/HLLV would have to maintain the same high-overhead Apollo-era facilities as the Shuttle, and at a lower flight rate. The decision to continue or scrap a program should not be based on what it cost to develop and build (i.e. sunk cost) but on what it you would save by scrapping it now.

Throughout the Station program (until 2004 and the “Vision for Space Exploration”) the plan presented by NASA was to keep the Shuttle and Station working together, in fact the term “Space Transportation System” was coined to refer to the Shuttle, Station, and the planned Orbital Transfer Vehicle. Although it was assumed that new generations of launch vehicle and space station might replace the current ones, there was never a point where we would shut either down without a replacement in place.

I am not saying we need to keep the Shuttle itself flying indefinitely. I am saying that only a fully reusable launch system provides any hope of making human spaceflight cheap enough to produce any sort of return, to allow a person in space to produce work equal in value to what it costs to keep him there. If we are going to build a future shuttle, it would make sense to keep together the people who figured out painfully and over 30 years how to keep the current one flying. They might have some lessons to teach.

As to the costs, those you quote may include include overhead, R&D etc. When the reflight of the tethered satellite was added, the budget was only increased $77M. As you point out, the majority of the marginal cost is in the parts that either have to be built (ET) or salvaged, totally disassembled and rebuilt (SRBs). This is further evidence that a fully reusable system is the only way to reduce these costs.

“Let’s throw a big party, congratulate all that were involved, and concentrate on what’s next.” Who will pay for it? As your neighbors if they are willing to chip in $100B. Without a more practical approach to human spaceflight, there is no next.

“but the actual marginal cost of adding an additional Shuttle mission to the schedule, the few times it was done, was under $100M.”

I don’t know what time period you are referencing, but during it’s last decade the External Tank (ET) cost $173M/ea and SRM’s $68.6M/set – that equals $241.5M just for those two items.

Also, the term “marginal cost” with regards to low-event government programs (only fly a few times a year) is kind of misleading, since that would make some flights more expensive than others, regardless if they are exactly the same. I don’t think GAAP would agree with that.

The real cost is the total cost divided by the number of flights, which means that if the budget stays the same, then the per flight cost will average down with more flights since there are overhead and infrastructure costs that don’t change. But I think the “fixed” costs do vary based on more work, as there would be more overtime, consumables and such.

I think the Shuttle was a worthy experiment, but I’m glad we’re ending it. The ISS is the last major program where we should need a vehicle with the abilities that the Shuttle had, and there are no more major projects funded at this point for the Shuttle to support. Let’s throw a big party, congratulate all that were involved, and concentrate on what’s next.

While NASA was created in 1958 (I remember it well) the agency really began in 1915, with the formation of the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics, only a dozen years after the first powered flight. NACA was created because even then we were losing the race to conquer the air. It’s mission was to support the nascent US aviation industry, and for forty years every project, whether theoretical or applied, wa intended to be of practical value to aeronautics. This era is well documented in Hansen’s book Engineer in Charge

The moon race was the aberation

Martijn Meijering wrote “So what are you proposing? Giving NASA money to try to develop a cost-effective RLV? They’ve tried that several times and failed. A rerun of SLI or (gasp) STS is unlikely to be more successful than previous attempts. ”

SLI was not an RLV program. The Shuttle was remarkably successful considering it was the first attempt ever to build a reusable spacecraft. It was saddled with high overhead and numerous programs that it was forced to fund, which inflated average cost, but the actual marginal cost of adding an additional Shuttle mission to the schedule, the few times it was done, was under $100M.

The other NASA RLV programs were cancelled mainly because the Bush administration did not understand their goal. Since Bush also canceled the Shuttle it can be assumed he had little understanding of why we cannot afford to throw away billion dollar launch vehicles after just one flight.

But the logic remains. A market for more than one or two seats a year requires that the cost to orbit be reduced to at most $1M per seat. The cost of all the fuel that puts the Shuttle in orbit is essentially nothing. LH2 is 98 cents a gallon, LOX is 60 cents. The cost is in the parts of the vehicle that must be built, or rebuilt. So the answer is the same as it was in 1973; only way to reduce cost is reuse.

There are certainly contractors that could do the job, and even some people at NASA that could lead it. The vehicle analysis branch at Langely put together a sensible TSTO RLV plan a few years ago. They just could not sell it to the political management.

Huh?? RE: NASA’s original mission:

On July 29, 1958, The National Aeronautic and Space Act of 1958 was signed into a law by President Eisenhower.- (source, Public Law 85-568, 85th Congress, H.R. 12575, subject: National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, July 29, 1958.)

In August, 1958, President Eisenhower assigned the responsibility for the development and execution of a manned space flight program to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. (However, NASA did not become operational until October 1, 1958 per the above mentioned legislation.) source- (House Rpt. 671, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 8.)

“… the development and execution of a manned space flight program” –this is called an ‘operational mandate’– a directive from the President of the United States.

So what are you proposing? Giving NASA money to try to develop a cost-effective RLV? They’ve tried that several times and failed. A rerun of SLI or (gasp) STS is unlikely to be more successful than previous attempts. Government bureaucracies are incapable of achieving cost efficiency. NASA should limit itself to exploration and consequently indirectly providing demand for launch services. Most of the workforce should be disbanded as it is consuming value instead of adding it. They would contribute more to the space program by paying taxes instead of living off them. NASA HSF is a disgrace.

Inaccuate. The ixon Administration definitatively cancelled/terminated/ended/killed/dismantled the Apollo Program. And with glee, given his attitude toward all things Kennedy.

Actually true. Congress did not approve a 2nd round of Saturn V’s in 1968 leaving NASA with a space program that was running out of rockets(only 15 Saturn V’s were built and. All Apollo application projects were canceled with the execption of Skylab. One moon flight had to be canceled to allow Skylab a rocket to get to Orbit. Remaining lunar flights were delayed.

Nixon would cancel more lunar flights.