SpaceX did an EMI test recently on the Falcon 9 and blew some sensors. So much for “designed for human rated from Day 1″. Anyway, the April 30 launch is very, very…VERY much in doubt. Oh, and OSC used a contractor, one blacklisted by both the Air Force and NASA, in building their Wallops launch complex. Over 187 valves and a lot of fuel plumbing had to be replaced. Yup, those commercial guys really are proving that they are faste, better, and cheaper…with the same record of success that Dan Golden’s “faster, better, cheaper” NASA had in the 1990’s.

So, yeah, ISS will need additional Russian resupply missions. Those additional flights must be purchased. Thus, another INKSA waiver. And I’m sure the members of Congress will also force NASA to disclose, so that it’s in the record, why another waiver is necessary.

As I’m sure all of you are aware, SpaceX is coming up on its 18th month anniversary since its last launch. Clearly, given its lack of progress, we can all be grateful that Congress didn’t buy into SpaceX’s March 2010 Senate testimony by Gwynne Shotwell that SpaceX would be able to launch crews within 3 years of a contract being signed. After all, they can’t seem to launch another cargo test flight within 1 1/2 years since their last one.

Many of them are personal friends, including the highest levels of FAA-AST (not “OCST”), and someone who is permanently stationed in Mojave. And you have no idea what you’re talking about. If you don’t satisfy the requirements for the license (including the need to ensure public safety), you don’t fly.

I suspect your ignorance comes from spending WAY TOO MUCH time on the internet fueling your virtual understanding of reality.

Your suspicion is idiotic, particularly since I have no such “ignorance.”

Physician, heal thyself.

I suspect your ignorance comes from spending WAY TOO MUCH time on the internet fueling your virtual understanding of reality. I occasionally get on the internet and am amazed at the self-important eggheads who blaze away on their blogs with literally no perspective on the real world. Live long and prosper, my Vulcan friend…

“Ignorant” Daddy

In fact, you have to wonder whether they are at all qualified to make judgments about that. I think NASA would do well to hire some commercial procurement expertise, a few former heads of corporate purchasing departments for example.

“They either do too much oversight or too little. From what I know about CCDev, they’re swinging toward “too little”, like they’ve done for LSP.”

Just for perspective, when my wife works in the garden, she prunes lightly, but when I work in the garden I hack away at the undergrowth so things can grow again new.

As another point of reference, I was on the proposal team and part of the management team for one of the first DoD Commercial-Off-The-Shelf programs (a different COTS). It was quite a learning process for the local DCAS inspectors to not have total sway over what we were building. While I could probably list a number of areas where we could have done better, the DoD was getting a lot more useable equipment for their money compared to what they would have gotten under a full mil-spec program (which I’ve worked on also).

And I’m not suggesting a complete lack of oversight, and that is not the case with either COTS or CCDev. But NASA’s primary experience with HSF revolves around Shuttle and ISS, and I don’t think they know everything about building and operating a low cost, relatively low-tech, transportation system.

What I have liked about COTS and CCDev is that NASA is involved but acting more as a consultant and guide, which to me allows the best of both worlds, especially since NASA has a wealth of public-funded knowledge that is free for U.S. companies to tap. Win Win.

And just like NASA’s approach to building and operating space hardware isn’t perfect, I don’t expect perfection from cargo or crew carriers. But this new generation of crew vehicles will be far safer than the Shuttle was, so if we had no shortage of NASA personnel to fly on Shuttle, the same will be true for Commercial Crew.

NASA is strangely schizophrenic. They either do too much oversight or too little. From what I know about CCDev, they’re swinging toward “too little”, like they’ve done for LSP. The trouble is, for CCDev the military won’t be there to pick up the slack as they have done for LSP. Notice that OCO and Glory failed on vehicles DOD hasn’t used in a decade, while all NASA’s EELV launches have been successful.

They’ve got to be able to write and enforce a reasonable set of requirements, there’s no way around it. EELV let contractors write the requirements and lived to regret it, with continual, expensive and time-consuming review activities to try to compensate. CCDev sounds like a replay of the original plan for EELV and certain satellite programs from the 90s.

Google “smc standards revitalization” to get a flavor of their current thinking.

That is not a fact, plain or otherwise. It is nonsense.

The FAA is pro-actively regulating commercial space right now, precisely to prevent a “rocket crash into a populated area.” They are statutorily required to do so. They are not regulating passenger safety, because they are currently statutorily prohibited from doing so, at least until October 2015. It has nothing to do with how much they “have on their plate.”

I never fail to be astounded at some peoples’ repeated willingness to flaunt their ignorance on the Internet.

Validating requirements too. Part of the job of the procurement function is to make sure that demands for goods and services generated by the wider organisation are not overspecified. Or at least that’s what the textbooks I’ve read say. This allows you select from a wider range of suppliers, order larger quantities to get a discount etc.

What I’d be worried about is that detailed specification by NASA would turn this into just another NASA project, with NASA engineers in effective control. I don’t see how this is likely to be better than the traditional approach or likely to lead to commercially viable crew transport, or even semi-commercially viable transport, say for someone like Bigelow.

Plain Fact 1: The FAA will not do anything proactive to regulate commercial space until either a rocket crashes into a populated area or a commercial space passenger is killed. Their people have said as much because they have way too much on their plate already with civil air travel. Headline grabbing commercial space tragedies may indeed be an eventuality, as Mr. Simberg infers. But NASA has and will always be focused on trying to prevent unfortunate tragedies, rather than waiting for the next one to occur.

Plain Fact 2: There are, unfortunately, commercial space entities that are not taking the human element seriously. Scaled Composites had a pretty dismissive attitude before 3 of their workers were killed in the Mojave. They didn’t have to die if they, and their employer, had simply paid some respect to the energy they were working with. Just one more example where a little thought was needed, not more money or control. There are other behavioral and attitude examples I have heard, but I will not pass on the hearsay.

It is unfortunate that NASA works for 50 years to pursue safe space travel and is maligned as if it were twiddling its collective thumbs.

NASA has been working to integrate their efforts with the FAA. Both have mutual interests. NASA is not in the regulation business, and the FAA does not have a robust level of space travel acumen. NASA has cooperated with the FAA on many fronts associated with commercial space, and they have been sharing representatives to learn from one another.

I fear that the Senate saber-rattling may very well throw gas on the fire and drive a political wedge between the FAA and NASA, when they need to continue, if not accelerate, their cooperative progress.

“Clueless” Daddy