Which is of no value in planning the future of America’s space program.

Besides, there is no longer any sport in antagonizing Mr. Oler and Mr Simberg. The hot air spewed on this topic has got me goofy dizzy…

Until next time….

remember there is no proof of POGO…only an accusation…and you suckered into it.

Robert G. oler

“I certainly hope so, but I’m not optimistic this is going to happen any time soon.”

If you mean “soon” as in years, then I agree.

That is part of the problem though, in that some people have a false sense of scale for space-related progress – they don’t understand that the amount of money it currently takes to do large NASA hardware programs limits their progress to something like a decade or more.

The only way to reduce that timeline is to commoditize infrastructure. Instead of the current method of starting a new space effort, where the first decision is to build a new rocket and new spacecraft, we need to be reusing existing rockets and existing hardware designs as much as possible. That immediately reduces the leadtime for starting a program by at least 10 years, lowers the capital cost needed up front, and encourages commodity markets for fuel and supplies.

About 18 months ago I did a costing exercise to see if a small reusable habitat could be put at L1 with two crew exchanges for less that $10B. As it turns out, my assumptions ended being very close to the design NASA is looking at called DSH. I assumed only one new element, sort of a Service Module, but everything else was based on current designs. Including using Delta IV Heavy for the big stuff (this was before Falcon Heavy) and Falcon 9/Dragon for crew, I was estimated that the hardware costs for the whole 18 month mission would be about $7B. And the hardware would still be there for further use.

Reusability is still something new for NASA, and it certainly goes against the grain for politicians that want large hardware programs being built in their districts. We can’t change the behavior of politicians, so we need to take away the need for large new programs, and the only way to do that is by changing over to a service model instead of NASA owning everything.

Commercial cargo and crew will start that process, and they may help kill the SLS before it does too much financial damage to NASA, but someone needs to put forth an exploration vision for Congress that will get them to look at funding real space exploration platforms like Nautilus-X, or start looking at rotating spaceships or space stations for use on long-term lunar or Mars missions. Those could even be commercial efforts under the right circumstances

The goal should be to always keep NASA on the leading edge of exploration, and not let it get bogged down in the routine stuff like transportation and logistics.

“I think we’re in violent agreement.”

I think we were talking past each other (or worse at each other – an all too common occurrence around here). I, by my current understanding, I did not change my position; but you did not either. We could debate more about the efficacy of fixes for thrust oscillation, but I find nothing to argue about in what you say about the POGO Effect.

“All reviews have problems, but there are matters of degree in both the number and magnitude. Like you, I have insight into these reviews, and I’ll take a SpaceX FRR over what I saw in the Ares I and Orion SRRs and PDRs — by a long shot — anyday.”

I actually participated in some of the Constellation reviews, but was not directly involved in the dry run. However I have a number of friends who were. Their opinions of the outcome were very stark, one in particular on the SW side (a very calm individual with no “ax to grind” was particularly astonished by the review). I am not claiming that is dispositive, but it is enough to raise concerns.

“That’s just my hearsay, but it’s just as valid as your hearsay.”

Agreed. I guess we will see what happens on April 16 (if the review still happens then) and after.

There is an old episode of the Simpsons where Bart and Lisa have been cornered at a car show (where the Bat mobile is being displayed) by Adam West who is insisting they believe he is the real Batman.

The quote from Homer coming to the rescue seems to apply here.

“OK kids, back up slowly don’t make eye contact.”

This is just nitpicking terminology.

“Boeing did not think they had one because the Delta IV Heavy first stage was simply (nothing is ever simple in this area) three Delta IV Medium stages burning in parallel. They discovered the problem in flight and had to go ‘back to the old drawing board’.”

I think we’re in violent agreement. The reason Boeing didn’t put passive pneumatic shock absorbers on the maiden Delta IV Heavy flight was because they didn’t know that they had a problem that needed such a solution (or tool or whatever you want to call it).

Earlier, you were arguing that Boeing should have put absorbers on the maiden flight if absorbers were a widely applicable solution (or tool), as I argued earlier. But, as you argue now, it doesn’t matter how widely application a solution (or tool) is if you don’t know that you have a problem to begin with. You can’t fix something, with any solution (or tool), no matter how widely applicable, if you don’t know that something is broken.

“I can tell you that Space X performance at last Falls dry run for their FRR (which is where the most recent round of launch delays began) does not inspire confidence.”

All reviews have problems, but there are matters of degree in both the number and magnitude. Like you, I have insight into these reviews, and I’ll take a SpaceX FRR over what I saw in the Ares I and Orion SRRs and PDRs — by a long shot — anyday.

That’s just my hearsay, but it’s just as valid as your hearsay.

“it is therefore not unreasonable for “Daddy” (or whoever) to report on various potential problems”

It’s a free country — Daddy can “report” on whatever he wants. But without something to back it up, it’s just hearsay, which is what I and others are pointing out.

Worse, in the case of Daddy, his hearsay doesn’t match reality in terms of what’s in the Falcon 9 payload user’s guides and in terms of the long list of customers that have made payments to SpaceX and are designing payloads to Falcon 9 specifications. If Falcon 9 does have a major problem with POGO or something else in its acoustic environments, I have a hard time believing that SpaceX would open themselves up to huge litigation by withholding that information from their payload user’s guides. Even if they were withholding that information, I seriously doubt that SpaceX could fool all the engineering teams and old hands at Iridium, Orbcomm, SES, etc. that are building payloads to SpaceX specs.

I’m not saying that Daddy is lying — he may be misunderstanding something or just passing along that someone else told him — but there doesn’t appear to be much truth to his claim.

it is therefore not unreasonable for “Daddy” (or whoever) to report on various potential problems..

we are back here to Saddam…”Daddy” is not reporting on various “potential” problems…he is making a claim…one thats suckered you in and he cannot substantiate. “We know where the WMD is”….(Donald Duck lying Rumsfeld)

Robert

“Yes, I was aware that it carried a dummy payload, which has nothing what so ever to do with a discussion of the Pogo Effect.

So why do you bring it up?”

for the reason that it shows how little you know about technical management (and perhaps other things).

Boeing knew that there might be a problem with the Delta and they figured that a test shot was worth the issue…this is typical Boeing; at some point you have to go fly…they did this with the 777 even though both engines compressor stalled at liftoff…

they knew that there might be a problem so they launched concrete…

they found the problem and fixed it..the next launch was a “valued” national security payload.

goofy RGO