That’s not a foregone conclusion.

What killed SEI was it’s pricetag — the piling of one uncompleted, multi-ten billion dollar human space flight project on top of another until decisionmakers were looking at a half-trillion dollar effort — not the Mars goal. In Byerly’s editorial, he replaces STS/ISS with humans-to-Mars, instead of piling their budgets on top of each other, and restricts the effort to the $7 billion per year STS/ISS budget wedge, instead of expecting the White House and Congress to fund major NASA budget increases annually ad infinitum.

In doing so, Byerly removes the major argument against SEI.

“- There would be no HSF Program but there would be no extra money for robotics either. So what would you do to improve robotic exploration, rob money from aeronautics research?”

Egregious cost estimating, poor management, multi-year slips, and multi-billion dollar overruns on flagship projects from MSL to JWST offer many, big opportunities to improve robotic exploration/science. In planetary exploration alone, the competitive Discovery and New Frontiers Programs offers a proven and much better model for encouraging mission innovation and selecting missions that will perform to budget and schedule than assigning a flagship to a NASA field center in the absence of competition. New capabilities are also coming to the fore, like the Red/Ice Dragon study, that could dramatically drop the cost of getting missions to planets and allow more missions within the existing budget profile.

“- There would be no ISS (remember he wanted it shut down as well). So there would be no goal for anything like commercial crew/cargo. What rationales (if any) would you be using to attempt to justify them?”

There was no ISS for the first decade and a half of the Space Shuttle program. You don’t need a space station or other destination to justify a human space flight capability, whether its government or commercial. If there was a need to start reconstituting a human space flight capability down the line, there’s no reason that NASA couldn’t rapidly do so with DragonLab and Dragon equivalents. And if a space station was needed after that, Sundancer equivalents could also be rapidly fielded.

It’s actually an attractive hypothetical — zero out the Apollo/Shuttle infrastructure and workforce that requires ~$7-8 billion per year no matter what it does — and then rebuild it for pennies on the dollar half a decade later with competed, commercial elements.

“Glad you are looking forward to it.”

Well. Allow my surprise. But I am glad we are making progress. See I always look forward to different views. I wish though yours would not be as fact-less as they often are. I would rather debate you a lot more on facts. I understand the emotional content of the current status of our space program(s) but we can lament forever or go forward. I chose to go forward. Can you?

If there is something pertinent to be said on another topic.
Glad you are looking forward to it.

Oh thank Lord!

“two questions to ponder. ”

He’ll be back…

Oh well.

They could argue for whatever they want (if they demonstrate “exciting results within budget”) but when as Byerly says the money “saved” from cancelling the HSF program is removed from the NASA Budget (“cutting roughly half of the U.S. space agency’s budget”) there will be no money to give them unless it is taken away from aeronautics (the only other remaining part of NASA under the Byerly Plan B).

“And again, if Byerly has an “activist” axe to grind against NASA’s human space flight program, other people in positions of responsibility are not going to invite him to write articles about the most sensitive of NASA human space flight topics (Challenger and Columbia) or edit major space policy tomes with a couple dozen contributers.”

There is no conspiracy needed Byerly shares an ideological position shared by many in academia since the days of the Apollo Project. His position is just natural background to them.

This conversation is going nowhere. I will leave you (and others) two questions to ponder. If the positions that Byerly expressed in the editorial had come to pass NASA would be approximately half the size it is now:
– There would be no HSF Program but there would be no extra money for robotics either. So what would you do to improve robotic exploration, rob money from aeronautics research?
– There would be no ISS (remember he wanted it shut down as well). So there would be no goal for anything like commercial crew/cargo. What rationales (if any) would you be using to attempt to justify them?

I’m not doubting your quotes. I’m doubting your conclusion that Byerly prefers one option over the other. He never states such in the editorial. It’s an inference you’re making that has no basis in what Byerly has actually written.

“No he was not holding out the prospect of a ‘better funded unmanned space exploration program’.”

Yes, he did. In that editorial, Byerly wrote:

“After space science demonstrates exciting results within budget it can argue for growth.”

You’re selectively quoting (and make accusations about intent where none is apparent in the actual text) as much as you cherry-pick data.

“The idea that a politically motivated academic never gets to write ‘encyclopedia articles’ or ‘edit major collections of space policy issue papers’ is countered by the practical experience of any one who follows general news. How many times have we all seen some esteemed professors representing highly reputable organizations present dueling studies supposedly proving diametrically opposed points?”

None of which means that Byerly is the “anti HSF [sic] activist” that you accuse him of being.

And again, if Byerly has an “activist” axe to grind against NASA’s human space flight program, other people in positions of responsibility are not going to invite him to write articles about the most sensitive of NASA human space flight topics (Challenger and Columbia) or edit major space policy tomes with a couple dozen contributers. Your accusations about Byerly’s suppossed agenda require tens of other editors and contributors to share his agenda. It strains credulity that such a conspiracy against “American human space flight” is afoot among so many who write on space policy.

“I do not begrudge Byerly the right to make his case (even if he has to ‘cook the books’ to do it).”

If Byerly has “cooked the books”, then you should be able to challenge his data. You’ve provided no such evidence. Stop throwing false accusations about Byerly’s motives, and prove your case quantitatively. If you can’t, then you’ve lost the debate.

Debate the man’s argument, not the man.

No I quoted his own words from his own editorial accurately. The editorial is a classic “bait and switch”. Published in Space News (an industry publication – where it can be presumed most readers will be pro space) he first offers them a grand vision of Human Mars Missions, then at the very end he changes course

“In his own words, he desires “a better space program” than Shuttle/ISS and offers two possibilities, one a manned Mars exploration program and the other a better funded unmanned space exploration program.”

No he was not holding out the prospect of a “better funded unmanned space exploration program”. Just to repeat his words: “…focus on space science, aeronautics: Phase out the Space Shuttle, the International Spaces Station, and other unjustifiable programs, and several related NASA centers, such as Marshall, Johnson, most of Kennedy; cutting roughly half of the U.S. space agency’s budget.”

If you intend “cutting roughly half of the U.S. space agency’s budget” that means any money “saved” by cancelling the entire HSF program would come out of NASA’s budget not be transferred to unmanned projects. Plan B according to Byerly (his words not mine) was to completely eliminate the HSF program take that money out of NASA and give unmanned projects absolutely nothing extra.

“An “anti HSF [sic] activist” is not invited to write encyclopedia articles…”

“Nor is an “anti HSF [sic] activist” invited to edit major collections of space policy issue papers…”

The idea that a politically motivated academic never gets to write “encyclopedia articles” or “edit major collections of space policy issue papers” is countered by the practical experience of any one who follows general news. How many times have we all seen some esteemed professors representing highly reputable organizations present dueling studies supposedly proving diametrically opposed points?

I do not begrudge Byerly the right to make his case (even if he has to “cook the books” to do it). I do maintain that anyone who wants to be well informed and think for themselves should know where the good professor is coming from.

Amen. I could buy an argument that NASA needed its own launch system if they used their launcher a lot say the shuttle had flown 10 times a year (or more). However 4-6 manned flights to the ISS could be handled by using existing rockets. And BEO spaceflight by it nature is going to be something done rarely (you are not going to afford moon landings like you could shuttle flight). You should build systems that take thoose considerations in mind. However they choose political considerations far over practical ones. Sure it is nice to have something politically catchy, but it also needs to be something that can be done within a reasonable timeframe and budget.

You could do a fair amount with Orion and exsisting EELV if they choose to. You could develop exsisitng launcher into a HLV if they wanted to. They could even have gone for prop depot technology and/or SEP but instead they are attempting to develop a rocket(something industry could do by itself).

You’re putting words in Byerly’s mouth that are not in his editorial. In his own words, he desires “a better space program” than Shuttle/ISS and offers two possibilities, one a manned Mars exploration program and the other a better funded unmanned space exploration program. Byerly expresses no preference between the two.

“I will leave it to the individual reader to decide for themselves if the good professor is a neutral economist seeking data or and anti HSF activist seeking to construct a polemic.”

An “anti HSF [sic] activist” is not invited to write encyclopedia articles on the Challenger and Columbia accidents or on NASA (especially for an encyclopedia on technology and ethics):

http://find.galegroup.com/gic/infomark.do?contentSet=EBKS&docType=EBKS.Article&idigest=fb720fd31d9036c1ed2d1f3a0500fcc2&type=retrieve&tabID=T001&prodId=GIC&docId=CX3434900645&userGroupName=itsbtrial&version=1.0&searchType=BasicSearchForm&source=gale

http://find.galegroup.com/gic/retrieve.do?qrySerId=&inPS=true&prodId=GIC&userGroupName=itsbtrial&tabID=T001&searchId=&searchType=BasicSearchForm&contentSet=EBKS&relatedDocId=3434900447

Nor is an “anti HSF [sic] activist” invited to edit major collections of space policy issue papers from tens of contributors:

sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/…/space_policy_alternatives_contents.pdf

sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/…/space_policy_considered_contents.pdf

And even if Byerly is an “anti HSF [sic] activist”, he and Pielke’s numbers come straight from NASA’s annual budget submissions, the CAIB report, OMB budget deflators, and the Shuttle manifest. There may be something you want to debate in Byerly’s opinions, but there’s nothing to debate about Shuttle launch costs using these primary sources.

“Given that a number of the local posters seem (at times at least) to agree with Byerly about wanting to end American HSF”

Googaw is the only poster here who wants to “end American HSF” (in favor of satellite applications). I think everyone else would like a vibrant program making obvious progress and generating clear benefits. But the traditional way that the U.S. has approached human space flight has not produced such a program. Case in point, it’s beginning to leak that SLS is facing another schedule slip into 2018, its second year-long slip in as many years:

“SLS is currently scheduled to launch in 2017, but recently started to show signs it will slip into 2018 – even at this early stage of development – after a core stage design issue was revealed.”

http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2012/10/atlas-v-saa-milestones-preparation-crewed-launches/

Some or most of us are dissatisfied with the lack of progress in NASA’s human space flight program currently and historically and the enormous sums of taxpayer money being spent to generate so little in benefits. But that doesn’t mean we oppose human space flight. The two are not synonymous. We could have a (much) better program.

“whether or not you believe the professor is being honest about his motives.”

Someone who cherry picks data and falsely accuses another individual of being an “anti HSF [sic] activist” really shouldn’t be questioning other people’s motives.

It’s also a period of transition. When space was deregulated, NASA HSF should have concentrated on finding ways to integrate commercial capacities into HSF- which means a focus on spacecraft instead of rockets. The EELV could have saved all those MPLM shuttle flights(8 of them) and gotten the ISS up sooner. It would have also allowed a smoother transition. Honestly there was no way to transition a system that required 10,000-20,000 workers into a system that only had at most 3,000 per company(ULA). However NASA HSF’s resistance to commercialization in the past has left in a more painful position than it needed to be. Imagine if we had a small space plane able to launch on an EELV that could carry crew and act as a lifeboat or just act as a lifeboat!

It isn’t the end of human spaceflight, the only capability that the shuttle has that no system can match is large down mass. Dragon brings some down mass and in terms of up mass the EELV can match that. In terms of on orbit assembly the space station itself could do that (or you could launch a small contruction stack).

The plan was to use the shuttle to service the ISS…4 flights a year(which is almost a normal launch year). 4 flights a year would pretty much tie up the shuttle.

“Trouble is, if that is the case why do we need Space X/Orbital Sciences. It would probably be cheaper to buys the limited launch services required from the Russians and just admit we are abandoning space activities.”
Because they are not domestic. Because Progress cannot carry as much as Dragon or Cgynus. Because the Russians can only produce so many Soyuz and Progress a year(they share an assembly line). Because Flying the shuttle another 20 years is unrealistic esp. after the Columbia accident. Because we are not abandoning spaceflight, we are retooling.

“We are ending the American HSF program (in stages) and as we need less and less capability to meet out constantly shrinking needs we are shrinking those capabilities.”

In terms of the shuttle it’s needs had been shrinking since 1986! After Challenger Regan banned commercial launches from the shuttle. That relegated the shuttle to the role of a psedo spacestation for science. Once the ISS was built you no longer needed the shuttle for the manned zero-g research (an experiment on the ISS could last years, one on the shuttle is limited to 2 weeks). The shuttle often flew with an very empty cargo bay. In short part of the reason why the thing was so expensive is that it was oversized for the role (and rendered even more oversized by moving commercial and miltary launcher over to the ELV. ).

There is an old song called Ford has made a lady out of lizzy. It is about the model T. The model T might have been a great car, but if Ford had continued making it, he would have run out of business. He laid off his entire work force to retool his plants to make the model A. While it was ugly for the worker, it would have been even uglier for Ford had it not updated.

Even locally political forces had prevented the EL from updating till the CTA take over. The CTA closed lines and stations, but Chicago got a El system that was relevant to the age of the auto vs. One that had mostly been built to compete with horse carriage and electric street cars owned by other companies. It sound ugly but they closed about ¼ of the system at the time(it was latter extended to places that parts of the old system did not serve).

I view the shuttle as something like the Great Eastern. A ship perhaps too far ahead of it’s time that did some remarkable work and showed what NOT to do also.