That makes sense. Very true that major technology pushes are targeted to flagship concepts.

As to training of PIs, let’s just say the entrepreneureal spirit that PI-type missions encourage makes a scientist VASTLY more useful to science than those without any of that experience. I don’t care if requirements change slightly. A business entrepreneur who spends a decade building a successful business is by no means handicapped when it comes to building another a decade later. I should say that the suborbital rocket and balloon, and even aircraft programs also build that project and technology entrepreneurship. That particular expertise development was looked at with some care by the NRC Bohlin report (~2009). But putting in an HST proposal (or even for Explorer GI time), getting a data file back, and churning out a paper does not. It’ll be the same with non-instrument team JWST users. Just sayin’.

As to “call my congress person”, um, you bet. That’s part of the game, and if you don’t know how to play the game, you lose. If you can’t convince Congress that your science is worth doing, it’s hard to imagine why federal dollars should be expended on it. The NASA science community has been attentive to congressional advocacy for only a decade or two. BTW, a non-NASA PI finds it a lot easier to do that advocacy than a civil service person.

w/o Flagships, technology money disappear, leaving Explorer PI’s wondering how to advance technologies that could support their mission.

If there is imbalance between the two, I think it ruins both programs.

Regarding ‘training of PI’s’. For the PI who has a second chance at proposing and winning an Explorer, their first go round does provide a good training opportunity for their second go round. However, how often does that happen? And if it does, what is the time between missions? And most likely what NASA requires of the PI will undoubtedly grow in effort between their two wins, so how much does the training aspects really benefit the the average PI who may win once in their life time? I’d say not much as it is many times a baptism by fire. If they can translate that into future benefits for the community, then sure; does anyone track such instances though?

And the winners are sometimes savvy already; indeed, I bet some PI’s have played the game of ‘call my congress person’ to alter the results of NASA HQ (not TMCO) decision on who goes forward.

Again, I’m all for more of everything, and am disheartened to see the imbalance JWST has caused to both flagships and explorers.

I have a hard time using the term “manager” in the same sentence as “Administrator Bolden”. Time and again, he’s either failed to make a decision or act — as was the case with JWST, as I argue below. Or he’s made a decision or acted and then contradicted himself a short time later — as was the case with flagship missions — sometimes twice — as was the case with Orion’s cancellation then rebirth as ISS crew rescue vehicle and then re-rebirth as MPCV.

That said, I’ll take Bolden’s lack of decision making and benign neglect over Griffin’s awful decision making and bullheaded determination to drive programs and the agency over the cliff. But being forced to pick between neglectful leadership and malignant leadership is a poor choice to begin with. The agency needs much better leadership at the top, regardless.

“And I think the ability of JWST to survive can be traced to his efforts to keep the program on track.”

I’m unaware of any actions that Bolden initiated to keep JWST on track. Congress (Mikulski) imposed the independent review on the project, not Bolden. And she did so in the summer of 2010, a full year after Bolden took office. All Bolden has done since is implement the review’s recommendations.

If a manager waits for his board of directors to call for an independent review, then that manager is not managing. He’s just acting as a figurehead. Bolden (and Griffin) should have been delving into (or having someone delve deeply into) JWST and been shaking it up long before Congress had to intervene.

The Explorer rate is slowing more as JWST sucks up money and less as costs are increasing. Everyone understands that. But yes, the Explorer program budget has been roughly flat for a decade in RY$, and dropping in proportion to the agency total. I should add that the infrequency of Explorer AOs has made international partnering especially difficult.

With regard to stampeding young graduates, there is more to science and community development than shoveling dollars at them. What PI-class missions produce, as well as great science, is training in science management, science policy savvy, and general scientific entrepreneurship. That promotes scientific productivity. Research grants from flagships (read, Great Observatories, if you like) don’t really do that. That’s why the Explorer program was referred to as the “crown jewel” of NASA space science by the Decadal Survey report. The flagships may carry the flag, but they don’t carry the crown jewels!

As to ExoPlanet science as a field that’s ripe for community development, it is interesting that particular community isn’t concentrating on a flagship mission any more (used to be SIM). How does it get away with that? Easy. It’s a field that can increasingly map itself onto many different missions. The Great Observatories were flagships that were more about wavelengths than specific science. ExoPlanets is different. I mean, geez, definitive and high priority exoplanet work is now destined for a #1 priority dark energy mission.

So, HQ likes to flip flop between A Heliophysics mission, and an Astrophysics mission in tier selection process. So, perhaps, if lucky, each discipline gets two Explorers per decade.

Now, the science theme may be ‘astrophysics’, or ‘heliophysics’, but the scientific focus speaks to only a few scientists of a particular discipline in that theme. And it’s the focus, not the theme, where young scientist spend their PhD years. So, how often will their expertise/focus actually fly as an Explorer?

I”ll argue : not enough to warrant a stampede of young graduates into a Phd science focus curriculum that will collect data once every 20 years.

Young graduates are looking at ExoPlanet science as the mission cadence for those missions is going to be greater in the years ahead.

In today’s era Cobe would have been cancelled, as it was bumped from Shuttle to an ELV, and had half the work force as civil servants – not charging full cost

What does a congress member talk to a PI and say you need more pork in my district if you want the mission?

seems like chicken and the egg. Do you want the new high tech bells and whistles or do you simply want the data. Which comes first. because if it truely is data your after….

No, but you don’t need a “community” to preserve a discipline. You need young people being trained in that discipline, Explorers do that in spades. Also, read what I said. The number of people being supported is the same. One flagship is worth LOTS of Explorers. You seem to be arguing that one Explorer isn’t worth one flagship. That’s a dumb argument. No one is saying that it is.

“And are not designed to break new ground scientifically.”

That’s just BS, and you proved it yourself, so I won’t belabor it. But by the way, COBE didn’t rewrite books as much as WMAP did. It’s fair to say that flagships can do what Explorers cannot, but it is not fair to say that, as a result, a flagship should replace lots of Explorers. The Decadals in several sciences were committal about that.

It hasn’t been your observation that Explorers are feeding the huddled masses because flagship mission have been eating the funds that would do that.

Others may use R&A funding to write papers and follow up on some of the data collected, but it hasn’t been my observation that Explorers feed the huddle masses.

Observatory class, multiple instrument class, missions, like a flag ship break new ground and unearths unknowns that the Explorer class mission can’t. Explorers can follow up on Flagship discoveries though; indeed, that is their best use.

Of course COBE was an Explorer, and re wrote the books; so there are exceptions to the rule.

Not really true. There are large pieces of the astrophysics community (e.g high energy, infrared, UV, radio) that see no hooks on JWST to hang any of their ornaments. But yes, the purpose of a flagship is to bring the community together with at least a broad science perspective, if not a technology and wavelength specific perspective. One idea is that *eventually* new investments in different disciplines motivated by that broad science can enjoy the legacy of a flagship. A flagship brings attention to the greater science.

“Science communities will go out of business w/o flagships, because there isn’t enough money in Explorers, Discover, or New Frontier to sustain everyone’s pet discipline.”

No, the idea is that with level-of-effort budgets in science divisions, what you don’t spend on a flagship will flow into smaller missions. The number of people that are sustained is exactly the same, but smaller missions promote more diversity in the way that support is provided. In fact, as I said above, there are communities that are largely excluded from JWST. Those communities will go out of business exactly because a flagship is dramatically reducing opportunities on Explorers. Ultraviolet astronomy is in particularly hideous shape, because there are no ground-based opportunities.

But that’s something that is worth some thought. What exactly does a flagship science mission bring to the greater community? It’s got to be more than several disciplines simply conceding influence, with the understanding that “I’ll get my turn eventually.”