I don’t believe that’s the history. The Augustine panel declared Constellation unviable in October 2009. While the NASA 2008 Auth bill had endorsed Constellation enthusiastically, that endorsement by the authorizers disappeared in the 2010 Auth bill (passed in October 2010). The authorizers no longer stood behind it. But at that time, Constellation spending was still mandated by the FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act (December 2009). Money was still shooting at Constellation. It took the Continuing Resolution Approps bill in February 2011 to actually cancel Constellation funding. So Constellation was formally terminated by the appropriators four months AFTER the authorizers removed their support for it.

As to “power and prestige” going to Approps, yep, because that’s where the dollars show up AND that’s the committee that used to have earmarks to play with. They really aren’t as powerful as they used to be, now that formal earmarking isn’t permitted. Also, lobbyists are judged by their 1-year performance on dollar flow. But Congress understands very well that appropriating money that hasn’t been authorized is dangerous and somewhat sleazy. It’s forking over money without real foresight.

“Is it possible that lack of an authorization bill is a factor in the non-appearance of the SLS Key Decision Point C?”

I hadn’t thought of that, and I had to go look up what the SLS Key Decision Point C is. Apparently there are three key documents prepared in advance of KDP-C:

– The Program Commitment Agreement (PCA)
– The Program Plan
– The lifecycle cost estimate

From another article:

“The lifecycle cost estimate “forms the basis of the Agency’s external commitment to OMB [the White House Office of Management and Budget] and Congress,” according to NPR 7120.5E. In essence, this estimate defines the budget for the rest of the SLS development.”

So apparently this would be very relevant to the NASA budget, especially if the budget profile exceeds expectations (on the high side of course).

That wasn’t my point. My point is that the authorizers couldn’t get a bill passed last year and are now relying on last year’s appropriations to set authorized budget levels for the next three years. That’s backwards. Authorizers can’t set policy if all they’re doing is following last year’s appropriators. There’s no point to the authorizers’ existence if they let the appropriators set both policy and budget.

The authorizers are impotent. They need to get their act together or Congress should do away with their committees as they relate to NASA.

“But Auth provides long-range and detailed guidance for that money that survives new elections.”

I’d question this historically. The authorizers stood behind Griffin’s Constellation, but Congress still voted overwhelmingly to terminate it a half decade later after a change in Administration. MPCV/SLS is on the same path. Maybe they’re needed for FAA launch and space flight regs, but the authorizers have no effective purpose when it comes to NASA programmatics.

The purpose of an Auth bill is fundamentally different than an Approps bill. The latter is for precisely one year. How many NASA projects are completed in precisely one year and even in one congressional delegation? The former is not only for several years, but it provides vastly more rationale and justification for expenses than an Approps bill does. Yes, Approps provides real money. But Auth provides long-range and detailed guidance for that money that survives new elections. There are those who consider the former more important than the latter, but I think that’s a policy-narrow view. Approps are where the dollars are, but Auth is where the policy is.