Since it’s a made-up scenario anyway, I guess we could make some assumptions about extending the trends in the 2011 budget beyond 2015. Constellation transition and Shuttle Slip Contingency would be long done by 2016. 21st Century Launch Complex is trending down to $200M by that time, so let’s say that wedge is more or less done, too. That leaves the Heavy Lift and Propulsion Technology wedge, which trends up to $754M by 2015. If the HLV and propulsion line continues to be drained for Orion, maybe by 2018 Orion would be done. But … I assume that leaves open the question of getting Orion to space.

The Orion scenario also falls apart if we don’t assume all of the listed funds are available for Orion. For example, a lot of the $2.5B for Constellation transition would still be needed in this scenario for non-Orion Constellation shutdown costs.

Major Tom: “I’m not sure that’s a good deal versus Dragon or other developments. Even if Orion-lite comes in at half of the remaining $10 billion Orion development budget — call it $5-6 billion — it would still cost as much as the entire budget for commercial crew development in the Augustine report ($5 billion) or in the FY11 NASA budget request ($6 billion).”

Maybe Orion-lite could at least fit in the budget wedge, but just barely using your estimates if we figure some of the Constellation transition money would still be needed to close non-Orion contracts, that we actually want to use some of the HLV funds for HLV work, etc.

Major Tom: “John Shannon’s Shuttle-derived sidemount presentation to the Augustine Committee quoted a price of $2.6 billion for Block I development and another $4.0 billion for Block II development, or $6.6 billion total. … And we havn’t built a capsule or other hardware to make use of that sidemount HLV.”

This could be another case where we assume the Heavy Lift and Propulsion Technology line stays at $750M/year for a few more years after 2015 … and that it’s diverted to sidemount development (not a completely inappropriate use, I suppose). That could drag it out somewhere near 2020, but it could still give the HLV supporters a rocket much earlier than either Constellation or the new plan.

As for what to put on it … there are critics of using sidemount for crew at all. If we have $8B, and then another $3B from 2016-2019 from the HLV line, that’s $11B, which leaves a few billion for HLV payloads. I guess one could also use the HLV for NASA robotic science payloads, technology demonstration payloads, or ISS support … if the missions really require the HLV and if they can be done in a cost-effective manner that doesn’t play havoc with the area funding the HLV payload (using the HLV in part to lower payload costs rather than falling for the trap of squeezing every last bit of capability onto the HLV ride). I suppose one could also invoke international partners as possible HLV users. In those cases we’d be finding funding sources outside the $11B (or $8B) for the HLV payloads.

Major Tom: “And we’ll pay in the long-run for either of these Shuttle-derived HLVs due to the high costs of maintaining the Shuttle infrastructure on NASA’s dime alone. … It’s an expensive infrastructure for which NASA must carry all of the costs.”

Yes, there’s that sort of thing looming over all of these Orion and Shuttle-derived HLV variants.

Major Tom: “I wouldn’t waste money on Shuttle contingency ($600 million) or upgrading KSC facilities ($1.8 billion) that no commercial vendor may use.”

I’m seeing KSC facilities as $1.9B and change, so you may have a bit more buffer for the items you suggested. The KSC upgrades seemed to me like a likely place to look for funding for Orion or HLV work because it wasn’t clear to me how much value those upgrades would be, or if they would make sense if a Shuttle-derived HLV were made. It would be interesting to know what the potential commercial vendors think about the 21st Century Launch Complex item, and what the details will be for this work. The wording of the budget makes it sound like some of the work in this area will also benefit Cape Canaveral, which might be useful depending on the details. Some of it also sounds necessary (dealing with unused facilities, etc). I suspect jobs are a part of the thinking behind this item.

Major Tom: “I’d put that $2.4 billion to work on:

– Human-rating Dragon ($300 million)
– Human-rating Atlas V ($400 million)
– Human-rating Delta IV ($1.4 billion)”

I’d think that much of this would be covered under the commercial crew budget already (in reality and in the scenario I made up), assuming they do well in the competition. Maybe the $2.1B would be better if just added to the commercial crew budget to make sure we get a diverse set of launchers and spacecraft out of it.

Major Tom: “I’d use the $300 million remaining and combine with LockMart’s share of the $2.5 billion in Constellation closeout costs for Orion and renegotiate with them for a second, small, affordable capsule (i.e., allow the Orion team to start from scratch).”

I think that idea meets the intent (if not the wording) of my original question – how to get something useful out of that $2.5B transition, etc, while at the same time cushioning or removing the effect of the changes on some of the potential opponents to the 2011 budget.

Major Tom: “And I’d keep the $3.1 billion in Heavy Lift and Propulsion Technology to build the engines needed to evolve one or both EELVs or Falcon 9 to big HLVs in the future.”

Yes, I just picked on this line item since it made more sense to me to use that if a Shuttle-derived HLV were to be built than most of the rest of the 2011 budget. It’s not clear to me if they’re looking for a direct but improved and domestically-made RD-180 replacement or not. If they can use it even without moving to HLV, it seems like a good approach. Since I’m inclined to put HLVs pretty far down on my priority list, I’d want most HLV work to pay for itself by being useful in a non-HLV context – engines that can be used on HLVs and non-HLV rockets, R&D that applies to both, etc.

It’s an interesting proposition. Assuming we totally diverted these funds, let’s see how much there is to work with in the President’s FY 2011 budget request for NASA:

Constellation Transition $2.5B
Heavy Lift & Propulsion Technology $3.1B
Shuttle Slip Contingency $0.6B
KSC 21st Century $1.8B

Total $8.0B

So $8 billion to work with. Let’s see what we can buy, starting with Orion.

FY 2010 Budget Runout for Orion Development:

FY11 $1.9B
FY12 $2.1B
FY13 $1.9B
FY14 $1.8B

Total $7.7B

Just Orion development through FY14 (the end of the FY10 runout) will use up practically all of our available $8 billion. But per Augustine, Orion development won’t be done until 2017, at the earliest. Even Constellation would have assumed another couple years of development, through 2016. So building Orion to the Constellation specs and schedule (or modified Augustine schedule) will require at least a couple billion more dollars, call it $10 billion, busting our $8 billion budget.

Maybe the LockMart/Bigelow Orion-lite, especially if it could be developed by 2014, would come in under our $8 billion. Looking at these numbers, though, I’m not sure that’s a good deal versus Dragon or other developments. Even if Orion-lite comes in at half of the remaining $10 billion Orion development budget — call it $5-6 billion — it would still cost as much as the entire budget for commercial crew development in the Augustine report ($5 billion) or in the FY11 NASA budget request ($6 billion). Moreover, as the Augustine report pointed out and Jeff Greason has warned, Orion is operationally a very cost-intensive vehicle with an internal volume that’s bigger than what’s needed for ISS but smaller than what’s needed for any exploration target except short-duration lunar stays. Probably better off with a smaller, simpler capsule that costs less to develop and operate for ISS/LEO and that can be augmented with a habitation module for exploration.

So if Orion is out of the question and even Orion-lite may only be marginally affordable, what about an HLV?

John Shannon’s Shuttle-derived sidemount presentation to the Augustine Committee quoted a price of $2.6 billion for Block I development and another $4.0 billion for Block II development, or $6.6 billion total. Block I employs the 14 existing SSMEs, while Block II requires development of a new, expendable SSME (RS-25E). So, at three SSMEs per HLV launch, under Block I, we could afford an HLV capable of three to four launches before the 14 existing SSMEs run out — maybe enough to support a couple exploration missions. But then we’d have to invest in Block II, and that uses up most of our $8 billion budget. And we havn’t built a capsule or other hardware to make use of that sidemount HLV.

DIRECT is more expensive — $8.3 billion for Jupiter 130 according to Steven Metschan’s presentation to the Augustine Committee, which slightly busts our $8 billion budget and we still havn’t built a capsule or other hardware to make use of that inline HLV. And we’ll pay in the long-run for either of these Shuttle-derived HLVs due to the high costs of maintaining the Shuttle infrastructure on NASA’s dime alone.

“Is there some way to satisfy at least some of them to some extent without harming the non-Constellation parts of NASA and the U.S. space industry?”

We can’t build Orion within this budget, but maybe we could build some version of Orion-lite and launch it on an EELV. But we’re still facing Ares I and Shuttle infrastructure shutdown.

We probably can’t build an inline STS-derived HLV within this budget, but maybe we could build a sidemount STS-derived HLV. But it doesn’t look like we’ll have much money left to build anything to put on that HLV and we’re still facing Orion shutdown.

When you’re limited to these kinds of dollars, it’s very hard to produce something useful and affordable using Constellation/Shuttle elements. It’s an expensive infrastructure for which NASA must carry all of the costs. It’s counterintuitive but “leveraging” this infrastructure often costs more than it saves.

For example, SpaceX quotes a price of $300 million to NASA to human-rate Dragon (mainly to pay for an LES). Even if we assume this estimate is off by a factor of ten, human-rating Dragon would cost NASA only $3 billion. For getting crew to LEO, that compares very well with a ~$10 billion Orion, and probably even Orion-lite if my $5-6 billion WAG is right. And we’re not stuck with an oversized capsule that costs a lot to operate down the line.

On the HLV side, in its Augustine Committee presentation, ULA quotes a price to NASA of $1.3 billion to human-rate the Delta IV Heavy (and $400 million for Atlas V Medium). The cost of human-rating that Delta IV Heavy could go up by a factor of four to $5.2 billion and we could still afford a massively overrunning $2.8 billion Dragon (or its equivalent) within our $8 billion budget.

Going back to our original budget, personally, if I were king, I wouldn’t waste money on Shuttle contingency ($600 million) or upgrading KSC facilities ($1.8 billion) that no commercial vendor may use. I’d put that $2.4 billion to work on:

— Human-rating Dragon ($300 million)
— Human-rating Atlas V ($400 million)
— Human-rating Delta IV ($1.4 billion)

That’s $2.1 billion. I’d use the $300 million remaining and combine with LockMart’s share of the $2.5 billion in Constellation closeout costs for Orion and renegotiate with them for a second, small, affordable capsule (i.e., allow the Orion team to start from scratch). And I’d keep the $3.1 billion in Heavy Lift and Propulsion Technology to build the engines needed to evolve one or both EELVs or Falcon 9 to big HLVs in the future.

Actually, if I were king, I’d compete rather than direct all this work. But if you made me choose specific vehicles, this is what I’d choose. If everything worked out, it would produce two crew capsules, three human-rated launchers, and engines to evolve those launchers to HLVs. But these are no doubt optimistic estimates and something would inevitably overrun. So I’d stage each development, run them in parallel, and at the gates, kill off the one or two worst performing projects and redirect their funds to the others. To the extent possible, I’d also do all these projects under Space Act Agreements (like COTS) to control NASA requirements and encourage contractor cost-sharing. At the end, NASA and the nation should still wind up with one to two crew capsules and one to two human-rated launchers and engines to evolve those launchers to HLVs.

I’m not saving any of the Constellation/Shuttle infrastructure except some of the Orion team to produce a clean-sheet capsule. But that’s the price NASA has to pay to get these kinds of results in these kinds of budgets. And most of the Constellation transition dollars remain available to pay off those contractors, anyway.

(Of course, this assumes that other Exploration R&D for things like in-space cryo storage remains in place. If not, I’d prioritize it over some of this work. I’d actually like to avoid HLV costs down the road, if possible.)

My 2 cents… FWIW…

Unfortunately I don’t think so. The damage has occured 5 (five!) years ago and it might be fixed but at very large expense. It would require so many mods to the program that just the plan to fix it might take 1 or 2 years.

Oh well…

Major Tom: If NASA didn’t have to carry the costs of the expensive Shuttle infrastructure by itself to support a Shuttle-derived HLV, that might be a better use of that funding. But $2.5 billion isn’t enough to develop either Orion or an HLV (Shuttle-derived or not).

I wonder how far you could get on any of this (Orion, Shuttle-derived HLV, or other HLV) with diverted Constellation transition funds, plus some portion of the “21st Century Space Launch Complex” funding line, plus some portion of the “Heavy Lift and Propulsion Technology” research and development line, plus perhaps a piece of the Shuttle $600M schedule slip contingency money if it’s not needed for ISS resupply (instead of using the $600M to add to Constellation transition funds)?

If none of this fits even with those changes, what about extending beyond the 2015 horizon considered in the 2011 budget? The Shuttle infrastructure maintenance costs would be a long-term problem, but not for some sort of Orion offshoot on an EELV or a non-Shuttle-derived HLV.

Personally I don’t see a need for any of this. I’m just trying to think from the point of view of the opponents of the 2011 budget. Is there some way to satisfy at least some of them to some extent without harming the non-Constellation parts of NASA and the U.S. space industry?

Mike Coats made an unbelievable error to publicly fight Charles Bolden (I wonder how the WSJ got the memo, see what I mean?). Ther is no Plan B, there never was, ever. I know I was there at the beginning. The so called Plan B is to save Ares/Orion. In 5 years they could not come up with an alternative, never. Do you think they will this time around? What can possibly be the niche for Ares? For Orion? They already burnt $9B, with a B. Are they going to come up with a plan that provides cash back??? There is wishful thinking and there is reality. Ares/Orion is in one of those “niches”, guess which…

Oh well…

A one year delay doesn’t change the big picture: We have long term competition…

LOL competition from people who cannot even manage Rendezvous and docking? Robert G. Oler

one hates to give suggestions to people who are stupid (not you but Mike Coats) but he should learn from projects which have managed to save themselves as the death panels meet…instead of just being stupid.

Coats is in a bind. He has pronounced Plan A as non viable by virtue of trying to find a Plan B. I have no doubt his Plan B will validate the entire concept of FAlcon/Atlas/Delta taking over lift to space for the space station as NASA JSC is desperate to save that role…

…but if he was trying to save Constellation he would go for something like a “Freedom/ISS” move…where he tried to find a “niche” that only Ares/Orion could meet and move to meet that.

Robert G. Oler