On Wednesday, a day after losing her Texas gubernatorial bid, Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison announced she was introducing legislation to close the gap in US human spaceflight. “We must close the gap in US human space flight or face the reality that we will be totally dependent on Russia for access to space until the next generation of space vehicle is developed,” she said in a statement announcing the bill.
The bill is being described as a shuttle extension bill, and it does include provisions to keep the shuttle flying beyond this year. However, the bill’s provisions are similar to what Jeff Bingham suggested it would contain back in January, focusing not just on the shuttle but other needs to ensure optimum US access to and utilization of the ISS. A summary of some of the key provisions of “Human Space Flight Capability Assurance and Enhancement Act of 2010″:
Shuttle:
- The bill would require NASA to create a five-person committee to assess the ability to safely fly the shuttle for up to five more years, at a flight rate of up to two missions a year; their report would be due 120 days after the bill’s enactment.
- Shuttle missions would have to continue until the remain flights on the current manifest are flown, as well as any other ISS equipment that had been manifested to fly as of November 2005, and a determination from the president that termination of shuttle flights “will not cause a degradation of the equipment, logistics, cargo up-mass and down-mass delivery capability necessary” for full operation of the ISS.
Station:
- ISS operations would be extended to at least 2020. NASA would be required to carry out a review of all the elements of the station to identify needs for spare parts or replacements within 90 days of the bill’s enactment.
- NASA would create an “office of responsibility” for the ISS National Laboratory within the Space Operations Mission Directorate, headed by someone at the deputy associate administrator level. It would also be required to enter into an agreement with a nonprofit organization who would be responsible for “developing and implementing research and development projects” for the station’s US segment. This organization would be guaranteed access to 50 percent of the research facilities on the US segment, gradually growing to 100 percent by 2020.
Transportation:
- The bill would require NASA to develop a plan for creating a “National Space Transportation System” with 90 days of the bill’s enactment. This would include “an architecture of government developed and operated space transportation systems”, which could include elements of Constellation “to the extent that such elements are determined to be cost effective and operationally effective”.
- NASA would also be required to perform a review of alternative heavy-lift options, specifically including shuttle-derived concepts. It also would incorporate “alternative vehicles… developed in an evolutionary fashion with the objective of supporting initial crew and cargo transportation to the International Space Station by the end of 2013 and missions beyond low-Earth orbit by the end of 2018.” NASA would select a heavy-lift vehicle concept and crew vehicle design within six months.
- On the commercial side, NASA would be directed to develop human-rating standards and perform a market study, as well as examine procurement mechanisms “to determine the most cost-effective means of procuring commercial crew capabilities and related services”. Once commercial systems are available, the legislation notes in a “sense of Congress” provision that “the United States should make use of domestic commercially-provided crew transfer and crew rescue services to the maximum extent practicable.”
The key question, of course, is what odds this bill has of making it through Congress. Hutchison’s statement notes that companion legislation will be introduced in the House next week by Reps. Suzanne Kosmas (D-FL) and Bill Posey (R-FL). However, neither representative has much clout there, being freshmen; Posey’s separate legislation introduced nearly a year ago to extend the shuttle’s life has gone nowhere. Hutchison, though, has much greater influence as the ranking member of the full Senate Commerce Committee—assuming she plans to stay in the Senate and see the legislation through.
Jeff Foust, a question . . .
Has an Authorization Bill been introduced with respect to the budget proposed by NASA on 1 February 2010?
If so, do you have a link?
This bill represents the first step in development of a full NASA Authorization bill with respect to the proposed budget submitted on February 1, 2020. You will note it includes a section authorizing appropriations for all of NASA, which reflects the numbers in the NASA accounts as requested by the President. It includes a separate section authorizing additional funding above those levels specifically for shuttle operations, should that be found to be necessary under the terms outlined in the bill dealing with that question. The “policy” language of his bill is essentially what would be proposed for inclusion in the full authorization bill, but it focuses on the exploration and human spaceflight portions of NASA because that is where the major uncertainty has been over the last year, and the area where it was considered necessary to focus and help “frame” the range of the issues that need to be debated and resolved sooner, rather than later, given the current circumstances. Ultimately, as the authorization committees develop their NASA reauthorization bills, Senator Hutchison will offer the language of this bill as the “core” of a broader bill that would address the other NASA portfolios with similar policy-level language. At this point, then, this bill represents the closest thing, at present, to an authorization response to the proposed FY 2011 Budget Request, in either House of the Congress.
Really comprehensive article on this from Chris Bergin, here
http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2010/03/lawmakers-bill-extend-shuttle-2015-hlv/
No, that Auth bill is just starting to be put together. Traditionally, the House Space and Aeronautics subcommittee hearing about the budget with the NASA Administrator as a witness is what kicks that process off. That happens when the previous Auth bill is expiring, which the last one now is. The process should conclude with a bill by late spring. That bill is usually passed by the House, and unless it marks major changes (as this one should) often just dies in the Senate. But even if it does, it still carries the flavor of Congressional intent.
The strained relationship between the Auth committee and the WH on the issue of the future of our space exploration is going to make the process pretty messy this time. The fact that the subcommittee chair is a Constellation hugger will only add to that messiness.
“The strained relationship between the Auth committee and the WH on the issue of the future of our space exploration is going to make the process pretty messy this time. The fact that the subcommittee chair is a Constellation hugger will only add to that messiness.”
I’m repeating myself from the prior thread, but this bill actually clears things up with respect to Constellation.
The bill extends Shuttle operations, confirms commercial cargo and crew as the preferred solution to meeting NASA’s ETO needs, confirms ISS extension, asks NASA to study HLV acceleration, and asks NASA to articulate a “National Space Transportation System†(but really just a NASA human space transportation) plan.
But the bill provides no support for Constellation unless NASA determines that Ares I/Orion have a “cost-effective†and “operationally effective†role to play in the “National Space Transportation System†plan. NASA is obviously not going make such a determination under the current NASA Administrator and White House.
Passage of any authorization bill is always an iffy proposition since they’re not required to pass a federal budget and keep the government operating. And even if this bill becomes law, the appropriators would have to provide additional funding, which they almost never do, to make the Shuttle extension the bill supports real. So it’s a low probability that the Shuttle extension in the bill would become reality.
That said, more important than passage is the message this bill sends to the appropriators (who actually do have to pass a budget to keep the government operating). Sen. Mikulski (chair of NASA’s Senate appropriations subcommittee) sent a letter to Sen. Nelson (chair of NASA’s Senate authorization subcommittee) asking for the authorizers’ inputs. If this is their input, then it’s a vote for commercial crew and cargo and an early HLV over Ares I/Orion. The appropriators are unlikely to come up with the extra billions for Shuttle extension, but within the President’s budget request they have to work within, they’re getting a clear signal from the authorizers to terminate Ares I/Orion and push most of the basics (commercial crew, HLV, ISS extension) of NASA’s new budget plan forward.
FWIW…
Put this in context with the WSJ article, NASA Chief Boldne Seeks ‘Plan B’ for the Space Agency, by Andy Pasztor.
That Bolden does not seem to have worked with the White House in starting down this road means that the White House plan to kill Constellation is…well, dying.
Now the question is what will Congress do? Will there be blowback against some in NASA?
Amazing times we live in. Amazing.
“That Bolden does not seem to have worked with the White House in starting down this road”
Per the WSJ article, all Bolden has done is ask Constellation managers to develop a Plan B. That doesn’t mean that Bolden wants to pursue a Plan B for Constellation. They don’t even know what Plan B is yet.
Good management preparation and contingencies aren’t the same thing as decisions.
“Now the question is what will Congress do?”
Per the draft authorization bill, the preference is for Shuttle extension, commercial cargo and crew, ISS extension, and HLV acceleration over Constellation. So far it’s up to NASA to decide whether Ares I and Orion would have a “cost-effective†and “operationally effective†role to play going forward. Given NASA’s budget request, that decision would obviously be a “no”.
FWIW…
“Per the WSJ article, all Bolden has done is ask Constellation managers to develop a Plan B.”
Actually, Bolden hasn’t even done that. Per the article, JSC Director Mike Coats wrote the memo, and Bolden only gave him the go-ahead to send it out. Coats still has to report back through ESMD AA Doug Cooke, who is tasked with the new exploration plan. There doesn’t appear to be any significant buy-in above Coats level.
FWIW…
“But the bill provides no support for Constellation unless NASA determines that Ares I/Orion have a “cost-effective†and “operationally effective†role to play in the “National Space Transportation System†plan.”
However, no boundaries exist for what is actually cost-effective and operationally effective. Cost-effective doesn’t mean cheapest and operationally effective isn’t defined. So, really without boundaries, this statement doesn’t amount to a hill of beans.
However, this statement:
Systems developed and operated by the United States Government shall be the primary means for delivering crew and cargo to destinations in low-Earth orbit until such time as commercial entities demonstrate, through a successful flight regime, as determined by established milestones within current Space Act Agreements, that they have the capability to deliver cargo to destinations in low-Earth orbit, including the International Space Station. Systems developed and operated by the United States government shall be the primary means for delivering crew and cargo to destinations beyond low earth orbit. Commercially developed launch systems, such as those being developed under NASA’s Commercial Orbital Transportation System, for which the
United States government will serve primarily as a customer, shall be the primary means for delivering cargo to the International Space Stations once they have successfully demonstrated that capability, as required by this subsection.
is actually the key statement in the bill. So either, you start over with a government funded and operated vehicle or continue with Ares.
It looks like we are starting to see some progress here. We can’t do everything. It seems to me there is have to be a choice between Shuttle extension and Constellation. The Shuttle extension works well with commercial because the latter is relatively cheap. Given the expense of an Ares I/Orion combo Shuttle extension would require an unlikley budget increase.
Jim Hillhouse wrote @ March 3rd, 2010 at 11:20 pm
what is amazing to me how stupid Coats is. I mean I knew Mike was a second rate staff officer but this is really pathetic.
From the article and what I hear here (grin) Major Tom has nailed the background of this alternate plan. On the plan of canning a federal program this is a textbook case of step 6.
When you get the folks who are managing the program to be extinguished to start coming up with “alternative plans” that is a tacit admission of them that the things said by the folks trying to kill the program are correct…the program is non viable as it stands. It wont meet budget or time schedule or both…(as in this case).
The “rethink” (or “Plan B”) is an admission that Plan A is not viable. to quote the article “In an email, Mr. Coats told senior managers at other centers and program offices that Mr. Bolden “agreed to let us set up a ‘Plan B’ team” to come up with alternate budget and program priorities”
every recent program that is in the dumpster has gone through this…for instance the F-22 comes to mind had several “Plan B’s”.
Coats will putz around with the thunderheads on Ares and Orion (mostly Ares) and they will come up with a program that sheds (to meet timeline and some cost) a lot of the “things” that supposdly made Ares “the safest launcher around”…if Bolden is lucky they will start to undercut their own arguments about the Falcon and Atlas and Delta (ie has to demonstrate success etc).
Before long Coats will answer a couple of questions that will help kill the project like 1) why it is so expensive, 2) why it is taking so long and 3) why it is underperforming mostly on schedule but also cost. The final question will be “if this would work why didnt you do it oh about two years ago”.
This will give Bolden and a lot of congress folks the final nail to kill it.
coupled with the Hutchinson effort…it is just another step in “the death of a program”. It is somewhat amazing to me that Coats is this inept from a management/bureacratic standpoint…but…
Robert G. Oler
John wrote @ March 4th, 2010 at 12:08 am
It looks like we are starting to see some progress here. We can’t do everything. It seems to me there is have to be a choice between Shuttle extension and Constellation.
no…that is not the choice.
Robert G. Oler
I think the critical element here is timing. The FY 11 budget has come down from the oval office and enough rancor and raised voices have stirred the pot. There are some, though definitely still a small number, of non-space-state players who are paying attention that weren’t before. And with a cancellation of the program of record and jobs on the line in space districts this may actually get some traction. The NASA issue, at least for the moment, is more than a poster child for American nationalism.
Now I’m optimistic, but I’m not naive. I’ve seen enough of these come and go including one dubbed a ‘miracle’. This is a long shot. But the chemistry for getting a few billion more for NASA is as good as we’re likely to see for some time.
What I really love is the carrot they’re throwing out there with giving more definition to the HLV (though I’m a little annoyed they’re requiring another study in addition to the HLV study Bolden just finished), and closing the dreaded gap all without making any major waves in the FY 11 budget plan. I really gotta hand it to Hutchison, she knows how to sweeten the pot. She deserves some serious credit here, even if it doesn’t pass.
I’ve never been a fan of continuing to fly STS, but that was more because, whether Cx or private, any new program was being held back by budgetary issues as long as STS flew. But if the hail mary pass works here and we get the separate funding to keep STS flying I’m all for it. And once again Orion is also back on the board in at least study form. So is Ares I, but my bet is that Ares I will see the circular file in the end.
“Cost-effective doesn’t mean cheapest and operationally effective isn’t defined.”
Assuming the language makes it into law (unlikely), NASA will get to define those terms in the study. And Griffin isn’t running NASA these days.
“So either, you start over with a government funded and operated vehicle or continue with Ares.”
Or extend Shuttle, which is also a system “developed and operated by the United States Government” that can deliver “crew and cargo to destinations in low-Earth orbit”.
Even if the language wasn’t aimed at Shuttle, Ares I/Orion wouldn’t be ready before “commercial entities demonstrate, through a successful flight regime, as determined by established milestones within current Space Act Agreements, that they have the capability to deliver cargo to destinations in low-Earth orbit, including the International Space Station” anyway.
FWIW…
The “positives” for commercial here appear to be hand-waving, while there are plenty of rabbit-holes to fall into for creating the negatives:
“On the commercial side, NASA would be directed to develop human-rating standards and perform a market study,…”
Who’s market? What the hell is NASA – such an examplar of reducing costs for the last 40 years – doing trying to project markets for _non-NASA_ human spaceflight?
“..as well as examine procurement mechanisms ‘to determine the most cost-effective means of procuring commercial crew capabilities and related services.’
Oh, so we perhaps can keep cost-plus contracting anyway, despite several years of experience with COTS? Well, that’s a relief for the standing army crowd that would rather keep a small number of government jobs certain than venture into something that could open whole new markets.
“….Once commercial systems are available,…”
Magically, despite having discouraged their development by kicking the can down the road on actions that would actually encourage them…
“…the legislation notes in a ‘sense of Congress’ provision that ‘the United States should make use of domestic commercially-provided crew transfer and crew rescue services to the maximum extent practicable.'”
I’m supposed to feel a “sense of relief” at this statement after all the rest weasels away from encouraging this to occur? I don’t think so.
http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Chinas_space_station_plan_delayed_for_technical_reasons_999.html
so much for the chinese threat! Robert G. Oler
I am sorry, but I agree with Mr. Lurio – its one thing to allow NASA to retain the Shuttle until Commercial shows up (provided the funding for shuttle comes in a budget increase, and not from commercial, R&D, or science). Its an entirely other thing to have NASA trying to allow NASA to consider market development, and require them to develop vehicles that will actively discourage new investment into this emerging industry.
The current langauge is unacceptable. I want a spacefaring society, something we’ve never had, and I want it in 10-15 years. To do so, we’ll need at least $20 Billion of new investment, per year. If government can’t provide that, the least it could do is not try and screw us out of it in the private markets.
Major Tom may be right, and I hope he is. But too much has happened that makes me nervous.
If Congress is going to talk about how NASA “needs to inspire the next generation”, then its time they invite us to the hill, swear us in, and listen to our voices
Robert, you really should be ashamed of yourself writing about Mike Coats the way you do. It’s a reflection of both bad manners and bad taste.
And you really should follow your own advice and read the WSJ article–I did. Here’s the operative quote from Andy Pasztor,
“NASA chief Charles Bolden has asked senior managers to draw up an alternate plan for the space agency after members of Congress indicated they wanted to reject a White House proposal to hire private companies to ferry U.S. astronauts into orbit and beyond.
In an internal National Aeronautics and Space Administration memo viewed by The Wall Street Journal, Mr. Bolden ordered officials to map out “what a potential compromise might look like” to satisfy critics on Capitol Hill. By calling for an alternative plan, Mr. Bolden threatened to undercut White House efforts to get its proposed NASA budget through Congress.
The NASA memo, dated March 2, came just a few days after Mr. Bolden faced a tough round of questioning in Congress over the White House plan.”
Yes, Mike Coats’ own memo, in response to Bolden’s memo, is featured as well. To wit…
“In an email, Mr. Coats told senior managers at other centers and program offices that Mr. Bolden “agreed to let us set up a ‘Plan B’ team” to come up with alternate budget and program priorities.”
Anyone who has ever negotiated would appreciate how devastating it is for the other side when they concede most of your points. This move sure makes life easier for Congressional critics.
And since I’ve been up too late, I’m punchy and will relate all of this to an old joke of a man and a woman sitting at a bar. He introduces himself to her, she to him, and then he asks if she would go to bed with him for a million dollars. She thinks about it for a bit and then says yes. He then asks if she’d do it for $1,000, to which she sharply responds, “What kind of woman do you think I am?”. “Ah,” he responds, “we’ve already established that, now we’re just negotiating price.”
Now Congress and Charlie are just negotiating price and content.
Bottom line is that the plan by the White House is circling the drain.
Ad astra Constellation!
“Bottom line is that the plan by the White House is circling the drain.”
And that would be a real pity, because anyone who would take the trouble to read de VSE by O’Keefe and Bush would notice that Bolden and Obama are trying to get the VSE back on course.
For those interested:
http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/55583main_vision_space_exploration2.pdf
Page 17 contains amongst others information about R&D and the use of commercial launch vehicles (some already existing at the time the VSE was written). There is also information about robotic testbeds on the moon and mars.
The budget chart on page 19, showing to what activities money will go, may also be of special interest.
In my view it all combines rather well with the budget remarks made by Charles Bolden:
http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/420994main_2011_Budget_Administrator_Remarks.pdf
For those who won’t believe we will go back to the moon, look at page 8 of the remarks:
“In addition to the trailblazing technology programs, the President’s budgetprovides $3 billion over five years for robotic exploration precursor missions that will pave the way for later human exploration of the moon, Mars and nearby asteroids.”
These developments not only suggest that the new plan was not Bolden’s, hence his willingness to abandon it, but that he also thinks he has cover from the Congress to defy his masters in the White House and try to preserve something from the Obama train wreck space policy. It was inevitable, of course, when the White House tried to be too clever by half in trying to kill a popular program and be sneaky about it.
Oh good lord.
A popular Program? Based on what?
Mr. Lurio:
“The ‘positives’ for commercial here appear to be hand-waving, while there are plenty of rabbit-holes to fall into for creating the negatives:
… Who’s market? What the hell is NASA – such an examplar of reducing costs for the last 40 years – doing trying to project markets for _non-NASA_ human spaceflight?
… Oh, so we perhaps can keep cost-plus contracting anyway, despite several years of experience with COTS? Well, that’s a relief for the standing army crowd that would rather keep a small number of government jobs certain than venture into something that could open whole new markets.”
Even if this bill language becomes law (iffy for any authorization), these are just studies. They’re under NASA’s control, and we know who is in control of NASA now and what their program preferences are. Unless Bolden pulls an O’Keefe, leaves for another job soon, is replaced by another Griffin, and the Obama White House looks the other way like the Bush II White House did, it’s unlikely that these studies would come back with answers that don’t support commercial crew and cargo.
Mr. Valyn:
“Its an entirely other thing to have NASA trying to allow NASA to consider market development,”
Actually, the bill language asks NASA to contract for an independent market study. NASA itself won’t be doing the study. (But again, given who’s in charge at NASA, I doubt the answer that goes back to Congress will be negative.)
“and require them to develop vehicles that will actively discourage new investment into this emerging industry.”
Per the bill, only until COTS demonstrates ISS delivery — not enough time to develop a government-owned and operated competitor for ETO duties.
FWIW…
The White House plan may not be circling the drain but it is receiving a lot of push back from congress. The fact that Bolden is looking for a “plan B” after only month suggests that he may not be as committed to it as it first appeared.
I think Bolden is looking for a compromise that keeps key elements of the WH plan while also responding to the concerns of congress.
I think that compromise might look something like this.
Earth Sciences, Education and Commercial crew funding says intact.
Instead of closing out Constellation that funding is diverted to development of Orion and Aries V lite / Direct HLV.
Retirement of one shuttle to be used as parts for the remaining two to fly 1 to 2 flights per year till existing ETs are used up.
I know Tom and Oler will rage against something like this and the Constellation fanboys aren’t going to like it either. That’s the nature of compromise. I do think this could be the start of a way forward.
To paraphrase Major Tom
FWIW
“Yes, Mike Coats’ own memo, in response to Bolden’s memo, is featured as well.”
There was no Bolden memo. Per the article, Coats wrote the memo, and Bolden only agreed to let Coats send it out:
“The memo suggests the NASA chief and his team were more inclined to try to pacify lawmakers than wage a tough battle to end multibillion-dollar contracts signed under the previous administration. It was written by Michael Coats, director of the Johnson Space Center.
In an email, Mr. Coats told senior managers at other centers and program offices that Mr. Bolden ‘agreed to let us set up a Plan B team to come up with alternate budget and program priorities.”
Furthermore, the article states that Coats has to report back to Doug Cooke, not Bolden. Bolden may be letting a center director put together an alternate plan for Constellation shutdown, but there’s no buy-in to that plan at the Headquarters level, nevertheless in the Administrator’s suite (or even a plan yet to buy into).
“Anyone who has ever negotiated would appreciate how devastating it is for the other side when they concede most of your points. This move sure makes life easier for Congressional critics… Now Congress and Charlie are just negotiating price and content.”
Congress and Bolden aren’t negotiating on anything, nevertheless making any concessions. A NASA center director is trying to put together an alternate plan for Constellation termination. That’s all there is.
“Bottom line is that the plan by the White House is circling the drain.”
Yeah, that draft Senate authorization language endorsing commercial crew and cargo, extending ISS to 2020, and directing NASA to study HLV acceleration while asking NASA only to study Ares I/Orion to see if it makes cost and operational sense within a larger space transportation plan was a real kick in the gut to the new budget.
“Ad astra Constellation!”
You do realize that, between Coats and the draft Senate authorization bill, Constellation has been reduced to a couple studies, right?
FWIW…
“These developments not only suggest that the new plan was not Bolden’s, hence his willingness to abandon it,”
Where has Bolden stated or indicated that his is willing to “abandon” the FY11 budget plan? Because one center director is developing an alternate plan for Constellation termination?
“but that he also thinks he has cover from the Congress to defy his masters in the White House and try to preserve something from the Obama train wreck space policy.”
Why would Obama think he has cover from Congress to reject the FY11 budget plan when the Senate authorization bill endorses its major components (commercial crew and cargo, extend ISS to 2020, HLV acceleration study, Constellation reduced to a study)?
“It was inevitable, of course, when the White House tried to be too clever by half in trying to kill a popular program and be sneaky about it.”
How was Constellation popular? In scientific polls, most of the populace wasn’t even aware of the program.
And how was the White House “sneaky” about Constellation termination? It was right there in bold black and white in the FY11 budget release.
FWIW…
On the subject of shuttle extension:
I’m pretty sure that horse has already left the barn. Several suppliers have already been “turned off”, there are only enough parts left to build 4 additional ETs, and it typically takes ~3 years to build an ET from scratch. At a flight rate of 2/ year that’s only 2 years worth of additional flights leaving a 1 year hiatus to build more tanks. Then there’s the fact the CAIB concluded that the shuttle would require re-certification to fly past 2010.
And then there’s the real 800 lb gorilla in the room. The shuttle is not designed to stay docked to the space station for a full crew expedition (6 months). It can’t carry enough consumables to last that long nor were its components designed with requirements to survive that long in space (they may or may not be able to, but they were never tested and certified for 6 month missions). The ISS crew will still need a “lifeboat” in case of a major emergency, and there’s only one current manned vehicle that I know of that can stay in space docked to the ISS for up to 6 months at a time. That would be the Soyuz. For a crew of 6 we would need 2 Soyuz docked to the station at all times, so we would still have to pay the Russians to launch at least 4 per year.
So in summary we’d be launching shuttles twice a year to ferry crew & cargo to/ from the ISS at a cost of ~$1 Billion a pop (at least) and STILL have to pay the Russians to launch Soyuz’? Oh, and we’ll probably have to once again raid other NASA programs to come up with the money for shuttle flights just so that we can say “Hurray, we don’t have to rely on the Russians for crew transport, and look how many jobs we saved!” Does that make sense to anyone other than congress critters?
“The White House plan may not be circling the drain but it is receiving a lot of push back from congress.”
No doubt, there’s been sturm and drang in the hearings.
But what congressmen say to look good to voters back home isn’t necessarily what they do (or allow to happen) in legislation. What congress writes into law is much more important that any congressman’s tirade in a hearing. And with the exception of authorizing extra funding for Shuttle extension, the Senate authorization bill adopts the key space transportation elements of NASA’s FY11 budget request.
“The fact that Bolden is looking for a “plan B†after only month suggests that he may not be as committed to it as it first appeared.”
But Bolden isn’t looking at an alternative. He’s only told a center director that it’s okay for that center director (and whatever team he pulls together) to look at an alternative and report back to the ESMD AA (not Bolden).
“Instead of closing out Constellation that funding is diverted to development of Orion and Aries V lite / Direct HLV.”
If NASA didn’t have to carry the costs of the expensive Shuttle infrastructure by itself to support a Shuttle-derived HLV, that might be a better use of that funding. But $2.5 billion isn’t enough to develop either Orion or an HLV (Shuttle-derived or not).
“Retirement of one shuttle to be used as parts for the remaining two to fly 1 to 2 flights per year till existing ETs are used up. ”
For better or worse, the Shuttle program can’t operate with a two orbiter fleet.
“I know Tom… will rage against something like this”
I don’t think reiterating the facts as they stand is “rage”.
FWIW…
“On the subject of shuttle extension:”
All good points, Loki. For these and other reasons, even if this authorization bill beats history and becomes law, it’s doubtful that the Shuttle extension provisions will be funded by the appropriators.
FWIW…
“…how was the White House “sneaky†about Constellation termination? It was right there in bold black and white in the FY11 budget release.”
The OMB didn’t give NASA their passback after thanksgiving like they normally do. Instead NASA didn’t get the passback until Friday, Jan 29 and had to go announce the new budget on Monday Feb 1. That’s the main reason the announcement was so devoid of details. Normally NASA would have had a couple months to negotiate with OMB as well as flesh out the new budget. Instead they had 2 days.
Whether or not OMB was deliberately being “sneaky” is doubtful. It’s likely that they waited for the Augustine report before they even started drafting the passback. Combine the lateness of the Augustine Report with the OMB being staffed by pencil pushers and career bureaucrats who likely don’t give 2 $#!%$ about space and there probably wasn’t really much sense of urgency wrt NASA’s budget.
If you’re a tin foil hat wearer it may appear that they were being “sneaky”, but I don’t think they were. Besides, apathy and/ or incompetenece is usually a much more likely explanation in cases like this.
Rectification of the orbiters is not problematic. Most of that work was done during RTF.
Retiring one orbiter and a flight schedule of 1 to 2 a year will allow for a workforce reduction in shuttle processing while keeping people with the needed skill sets if we go with a real SD HLV. But it would still require an estimated 1.2 to 2 billion for shuttle flights. Shuttle has very unique capabilities, mainly cargo capacity that we could barter to the Russians to off-set most of the cost of the Soyuz.
“The OMB didn’t give NASA their passback after thanksgiving like they normally do.”
But Congress and the public don’t see the budget, for any department or agency, until the rollout in early February. Even if NASA/OMB negotiations dragged out into January, that didn’t affect the display of the Constellation termination in the President’s FY 11 budget rollout. It was still there in multiple White House documents for any congressman or taxpayer to read (and reiterated in both the OSTP and NASA press events the day of the budget rollout). Going back to the original poster, none of that meets the definition of “sneaky”.
FWIW…
so much for the chinese threat! Robert G. Oler
A one year delay doesn’t change the big picture: We have long term competition.
Retiring one orbiter and a flight schedule of 1 to 2 a year will allow for a workforce reduction in shuttle processing while keeping people with the needed skill sets if we go with a real SD HLV.
Shuttle extension fits in well with the Direct HLV approach.
““Per the WSJ article, all Bolden has done is ask Constellation managers to develop a Plan B.â€
Actually, Bolden hasn’t even done that. Per the article, JSC Director Mike Coats wrote the memo, and Bolden only gave him the go-ahead to send it out. Coats still has to report back through ESMD AA Doug Cooke, who is tasked with the new exploration plan. There doesn’t appear to be any significant buy-in above Coats level.
”
I don’t know why people are getting all worked up about this. As a very good manager, Charles Bolden is empowering his subordinates to do something. They’re all up in arms to revive Constellation. So he says goo ahead and show me what you can do. This is a final chance. It is normal, it is fair and it is good management practice to buy in your subordinates trust. It is not that difficult to understand. NASA is getting $2.5B, with a B, to terminate a program. Probably unheard of in the industry where a program terminatuion is “pack up and be out by noon”. So you might as well let them do something constructive with the cash. People don’t seem to be used to smart managers all around… Maybe they are managers themselves!
Ah and on a sidenote. Goes to show how other managers don’t think, I mean really don’t think. Charles Bolden came up with a plan for NASA. He is being fought by his subordinates in a very publicly challenging way. He agrees to some Plan B bs. What do you think will happen???? Almost comical. They will not have anything, they never had anything or they would have taken action beefore then. As a result theey will demonstrate they failed Plan A, failed to come up with a viable Plan B. What will happen to them??? What do you think? The right course of action should have beeen to go ask for a Plan B in a semi-private kind of way so not to embarass Charles Bolden. He may still have agreed to it. They would have failed but they would have done the “right” thing which is “stick with their people in something they believe”. This is not what it looks like and they will pay the price.
MrEarl wrote @ March 4th, 2010 at 11:03 am
The White House plan may not be circling the drain but it is receiving a lot of push back from congress. The fact that Bolden is looking for a “plan B†after only month suggests that he may not be as committed to it as it first appeared…
no not so much. As I noted in another thread this is how federal programs die and Mike Coats is doing his part.
I guess it is the drowning person syndrome as all the “save our jobs” people latch on to this…wierd
Robert G. Oler
common sense wrote @ March 4th, 2010 at 1:22 pm ..
one hates to give suggestions to people who are stupid (not you but Mike Coats) but he should learn from projects which have managed to save themselves as the death panels meet…instead of just being stupid.
Coats is in a bind. He has pronounced Plan A as non viable by virtue of trying to find a Plan B. I have no doubt his Plan B will validate the entire concept of FAlcon/Atlas/Delta taking over lift to space for the space station as NASA JSC is desperate to save that role…
…but if he was trying to save Constellation he would go for something like a “Freedom/ISS” move…where he tried to find a “niche” that only Ares/Orion could meet and move to meet that.
Robert G. Oler
John wrote @ March 4th, 2010 at 12:59 pm
A one year delay doesn’t change the big picture: We have long term competition…
LOL competition from people who cannot even manage Rendezvous and docking? Robert G. Oler
@Robert Oler:
Mike Coats made an unbelievable error to publicly fight Charles Bolden (I wonder how the WSJ got the memo, see what I mean?). Ther is no Plan B, there never was, ever. I know I was there at the beginning. The so called Plan B is to save Ares/Orion. In 5 years they could not come up with an alternative, never. Do you think they will this time around? What can possibly be the niche for Ares? For Orion? They already burnt $9B, with a B. Are they going to come up with a plan that provides cash back??? There is wishful thinking and there is reality. Ares/Orion is in one of those “niches”, guess which…
Oh well…
[…] Hutchison’s bid to preserve US access to the ISS http://www.spacepolitics.com/2010/03/03/hutchisons-bid-to-preserve-us-access-to-the-iss/ […]
“Instead of closing out Constellation that funding is diverted to development of Orion and Aries V lite / Direct HLV.â€
Major Tom: If NASA didn’t have to carry the costs of the expensive Shuttle infrastructure by itself to support a Shuttle-derived HLV, that might be a better use of that funding. But $2.5 billion isn’t enough to develop either Orion or an HLV (Shuttle-derived or not).
I wonder how far you could get on any of this (Orion, Shuttle-derived HLV, or other HLV) with diverted Constellation transition funds, plus some portion of the “21st Century Space Launch Complex” funding line, plus some portion of the “Heavy Lift and Propulsion Technology” research and development line, plus perhaps a piece of the Shuttle $600M schedule slip contingency money if it’s not needed for ISS resupply (instead of using the $600M to add to Constellation transition funds)?
If none of this fits even with those changes, what about extending beyond the 2015 horizon considered in the 2011 budget? The Shuttle infrastructure maintenance costs would be a long-term problem, but not for some sort of Orion offshoot on an EELV or a non-Shuttle-derived HLV.
Personally I don’t see a need for any of this. I’m just trying to think from the point of view of the opponents of the 2011 budget. Is there some way to satisfy at least some of them to some extent without harming the non-Constellation parts of NASA and the U.S. space industry?
“Personally I don’t see a need for any of this. I’m just trying to think from the point of view of the opponents of the 2011 budget. Is there some way to satisfy at least some of them to some extent without harming the non-Constellation parts of NASA and the U.S. space industry?”
Unfortunately I don’t think so. The damage has occured 5 (five!) years ago and it might be fixed but at very large expense. It would require so many mods to the program that just the plan to fix it might take 1 or 2 years.
Oh well…
“I wonder how far you could get on any of this (Orion, Shuttle-derived HLV, or other HLV) with diverted Constellation transition funds, plus some portion of the “21st Century Space Launch Complex†funding line, plus some portion of the “Heavy Lift and Propulsion Technology†research and development line, plus perhaps a piece of the Shuttle $600M schedule slip contingency money if it’s not needed for ISS resupply (instead of using the $600M to add to Constellation transition funds)?”
It’s an interesting proposition. Assuming we totally diverted these funds, let’s see how much there is to work with in the President’s FY 2011 budget request for NASA:
Constellation Transition $2.5B
Heavy Lift & Propulsion Technology $3.1B
Shuttle Slip Contingency $0.6B
KSC 21st Century $1.8B
Total $8.0B
So $8 billion to work with. Let’s see what we can buy, starting with Orion.
FY 2010 Budget Runout for Orion Development:
FY11 $1.9B
FY12 $2.1B
FY13 $1.9B
FY14 $1.8B
Total $7.7B
Just Orion development through FY14 (the end of the FY10 runout) will use up practically all of our available $8 billion. But per Augustine, Orion development won’t be done until 2017, at the earliest. Even Constellation would have assumed another couple years of development, through 2016. So building Orion to the Constellation specs and schedule (or modified Augustine schedule) will require at least a couple billion more dollars, call it $10 billion, busting our $8 billion budget.
Maybe the LockMart/Bigelow Orion-lite, especially if it could be developed by 2014, would come in under our $8 billion. Looking at these numbers, though, I’m not sure that’s a good deal versus Dragon or other developments. Even if Orion-lite comes in at half of the remaining $10 billion Orion development budget — call it $5-6 billion — it would still cost as much as the entire budget for commercial crew development in the Augustine report ($5 billion) or in the FY11 NASA budget request ($6 billion). Moreover, as the Augustine report pointed out and Jeff Greason has warned, Orion is operationally a very cost-intensive vehicle with an internal volume that’s bigger than what’s needed for ISS but smaller than what’s needed for any exploration target except short-duration lunar stays. Probably better off with a smaller, simpler capsule that costs less to develop and operate for ISS/LEO and that can be augmented with a habitation module for exploration.
So if Orion is out of the question and even Orion-lite may only be marginally affordable, what about an HLV?
John Shannon’s Shuttle-derived sidemount presentation to the Augustine Committee quoted a price of $2.6 billion for Block I development and another $4.0 billion for Block II development, or $6.6 billion total. Block I employs the 14 existing SSMEs, while Block II requires development of a new, expendable SSME (RS-25E). So, at three SSMEs per HLV launch, under Block I, we could afford an HLV capable of three to four launches before the 14 existing SSMEs run out — maybe enough to support a couple exploration missions. But then we’d have to invest in Block II, and that uses up most of our $8 billion budget. And we havn’t built a capsule or other hardware to make use of that sidemount HLV.
DIRECT is more expensive — $8.3 billion for Jupiter 130 according to Steven Metschan’s presentation to the Augustine Committee, which slightly busts our $8 billion budget and we still havn’t built a capsule or other hardware to make use of that inline HLV. And we’ll pay in the long-run for either of these Shuttle-derived HLVs due to the high costs of maintaining the Shuttle infrastructure on NASA’s dime alone.
“Is there some way to satisfy at least some of them to some extent without harming the non-Constellation parts of NASA and the U.S. space industry?”
We can’t build Orion within this budget, but maybe we could build some version of Orion-lite and launch it on an EELV. But we’re still facing Ares I and Shuttle infrastructure shutdown.
We probably can’t build an inline STS-derived HLV within this budget, but maybe we could build a sidemount STS-derived HLV. But it doesn’t look like we’ll have much money left to build anything to put on that HLV and we’re still facing Orion shutdown.
When you’re limited to these kinds of dollars, it’s very hard to produce something useful and affordable using Constellation/Shuttle elements. It’s an expensive infrastructure for which NASA must carry all of the costs. It’s counterintuitive but “leveraging” this infrastructure often costs more than it saves.
For example, SpaceX quotes a price of $300 million to NASA to human-rate Dragon (mainly to pay for an LES). Even if we assume this estimate is off by a factor of ten, human-rating Dragon would cost NASA only $3 billion. For getting crew to LEO, that compares very well with a ~$10 billion Orion, and probably even Orion-lite if my $5-6 billion WAG is right. And we’re not stuck with an oversized capsule that costs a lot to operate down the line.
On the HLV side, in its Augustine Committee presentation, ULA quotes a price to NASA of $1.3 billion to human-rate the Delta IV Heavy (and $400 million for Atlas V Medium). The cost of human-rating that Delta IV Heavy could go up by a factor of four to $5.2 billion and we could still afford a massively overrunning $2.8 billion Dragon (or its equivalent) within our $8 billion budget.
Going back to our original budget, personally, if I were king, I wouldn’t waste money on Shuttle contingency ($600 million) or upgrading KSC facilities ($1.8 billion) that no commercial vendor may use. I’d put that $2.4 billion to work on:
— Human-rating Dragon ($300 million)
— Human-rating Atlas V ($400 million)
— Human-rating Delta IV ($1.4 billion)
That’s $2.1 billion. I’d use the $300 million remaining and combine with LockMart’s share of the $2.5 billion in Constellation closeout costs for Orion and renegotiate with them for a second, small, affordable capsule (i.e., allow the Orion team to start from scratch). And I’d keep the $3.1 billion in Heavy Lift and Propulsion Technology to build the engines needed to evolve one or both EELVs or Falcon 9 to big HLVs in the future.
Actually, if I were king, I’d compete rather than direct all this work. But if you made me choose specific vehicles, this is what I’d choose. If everything worked out, it would produce two crew capsules, three human-rated launchers, and engines to evolve those launchers to HLVs. But these are no doubt optimistic estimates and something would inevitably overrun. So I’d stage each development, run them in parallel, and at the gates, kill off the one or two worst performing projects and redirect their funds to the others. To the extent possible, I’d also do all these projects under Space Act Agreements (like COTS) to control NASA requirements and encourage contractor cost-sharing. At the end, NASA and the nation should still wind up with one to two crew capsules and one to two human-rated launchers and engines to evolve those launchers to HLVs.
I’m not saving any of the Constellation/Shuttle infrastructure except some of the Orion team to produce a clean-sheet capsule. But that’s the price NASA has to pay to get these kinds of results in these kinds of budgets. And most of the Constellation transition dollars remain available to pay off those contractors, anyway.
(Of course, this assumes that other Exploration R&D for things like in-space cryo storage remains in place. If not, I’d prioritize it over some of this work. I’d actually like to avoid HLV costs down the road, if possible.)
My 2 cents… FWIW…
Major Tom: “Just Orion development through FY14 (the end of the FY10 runout) will use up practically all of our available $8 billion. But per Augustine, Orion development won’t be done until 2017, at the earliest. Even Constellation would have assumed another couple years of development, through 2016. So building Orion to the Constellation specs and schedule (or modified Augustine schedule) will require at least a couple billion more dollars, call it $10 billion, busting our $8 billion budget.”
Since it’s a made-up scenario anyway, I guess we could make some assumptions about extending the trends in the 2011 budget beyond 2015. Constellation transition and Shuttle Slip Contingency would be long done by 2016. 21st Century Launch Complex is trending down to $200M by that time, so let’s say that wedge is more or less done, too. That leaves the Heavy Lift and Propulsion Technology wedge, which trends up to $754M by 2015. If the HLV and propulsion line continues to be drained for Orion, maybe by 2018 Orion would be done. But … I assume that leaves open the question of getting Orion to space.
The Orion scenario also falls apart if we don’t assume all of the listed funds are available for Orion. For example, a lot of the $2.5B for Constellation transition would still be needed in this scenario for non-Orion Constellation shutdown costs.
Major Tom: “I’m not sure that’s a good deal versus Dragon or other developments. Even if Orion-lite comes in at half of the remaining $10 billion Orion development budget — call it $5-6 billion — it would still cost as much as the entire budget for commercial crew development in the Augustine report ($5 billion) or in the FY11 NASA budget request ($6 billion).”
Maybe Orion-lite could at least fit in the budget wedge, but just barely using your estimates if we figure some of the Constellation transition money would still be needed to close non-Orion contracts, that we actually want to use some of the HLV funds for HLV work, etc.
Major Tom: “John Shannon’s Shuttle-derived sidemount presentation to the Augustine Committee quoted a price of $2.6 billion for Block I development and another $4.0 billion for Block II development, or $6.6 billion total. … And we havn’t built a capsule or other hardware to make use of that sidemount HLV.”
This could be another case where we assume the Heavy Lift and Propulsion Technology line stays at $750M/year for a few more years after 2015 … and that it’s diverted to sidemount development (not a completely inappropriate use, I suppose). That could drag it out somewhere near 2020, but it could still give the HLV supporters a rocket much earlier than either Constellation or the new plan.
As for what to put on it … there are critics of using sidemount for crew at all. If we have $8B, and then another $3B from 2016-2019 from the HLV line, that’s $11B, which leaves a few billion for HLV payloads. I guess one could also use the HLV for NASA robotic science payloads, technology demonstration payloads, or ISS support … if the missions really require the HLV and if they can be done in a cost-effective manner that doesn’t play havoc with the area funding the HLV payload (using the HLV in part to lower payload costs rather than falling for the trap of squeezing every last bit of capability onto the HLV ride). I suppose one could also invoke international partners as possible HLV users. In those cases we’d be finding funding sources outside the $11B (or $8B) for the HLV payloads.
Major Tom: “And we’ll pay in the long-run for either of these Shuttle-derived HLVs due to the high costs of maintaining the Shuttle infrastructure on NASA’s dime alone. … It’s an expensive infrastructure for which NASA must carry all of the costs.”
Yes, there’s that sort of thing looming over all of these Orion and Shuttle-derived HLV variants.
Major Tom: “I wouldn’t waste money on Shuttle contingency ($600 million) or upgrading KSC facilities ($1.8 billion) that no commercial vendor may use.”
I’m seeing KSC facilities as $1.9B and change, so you may have a bit more buffer for the items you suggested. The KSC upgrades seemed to me like a likely place to look for funding for Orion or HLV work because it wasn’t clear to me how much value those upgrades would be, or if they would make sense if a Shuttle-derived HLV were made. It would be interesting to know what the potential commercial vendors think about the 21st Century Launch Complex item, and what the details will be for this work. The wording of the budget makes it sound like some of the work in this area will also benefit Cape Canaveral, which might be useful depending on the details. Some of it also sounds necessary (dealing with unused facilities, etc). I suspect jobs are a part of the thinking behind this item.
Major Tom: “I’d put that $2.4 billion to work on:
– Human-rating Dragon ($300 million)
– Human-rating Atlas V ($400 million)
– Human-rating Delta IV ($1.4 billion)”
I’d think that much of this would be covered under the commercial crew budget already (in reality and in the scenario I made up), assuming they do well in the competition. Maybe the $2.1B would be better if just added to the commercial crew budget to make sure we get a diverse set of launchers and spacecraft out of it.
Major Tom: “I’d use the $300 million remaining and combine with LockMart’s share of the $2.5 billion in Constellation closeout costs for Orion and renegotiate with them for a second, small, affordable capsule (i.e., allow the Orion team to start from scratch).”
I think that idea meets the intent (if not the wording) of my original question – how to get something useful out of that $2.5B transition, etc, while at the same time cushioning or removing the effect of the changes on some of the potential opponents to the 2011 budget.
Major Tom: “And I’d keep the $3.1 billion in Heavy Lift and Propulsion Technology to build the engines needed to evolve one or both EELVs or Falcon 9 to big HLVs in the future.”
Yes, I just picked on this line item since it made more sense to me to use that if a Shuttle-derived HLV were to be built than most of the rest of the 2011 budget. It’s not clear to me if they’re looking for a direct but improved and domestically-made RD-180 replacement or not. If they can use it even without moving to HLV, it seems like a good approach. Since I’m inclined to put HLVs pretty far down on my priority list, I’d want most HLV work to pay for itself by being useful in a non-HLV context – engines that can be used on HLVs and non-HLV rockets, R&D that applies to both, etc.
[…] be a largely settled issue, seems a little less so now. Last week Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX) introduced legislation that would at least study extending the shuttle for up to five more years at up to two missions a year; companion legislation is expected to be […]
[…] Capability Assurance and Protection Act”, which they called the companion version to legislation introduced by Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX) last week. The text of the legislation isn’t posted yet, but the summary included in Kosmas’s […]