Congress

Posey and Kosmas introduce House version of spaceflight gap bill

Yesterday Reps. Suzanne Kosmas (D-FL) and Bill Posey (R-FL) introduced the “Human Spaceflight Capability Assurance and Protection Act”, which they called the companion version to legislation introduced by Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX) last week. The text of the legislation isn’t posted yet, but the summary included in Kosmas’s press release covers the major issues in the Senate version, including supporting a shuttle extension, encouraging commercial crew vehicle development, support development of a heavy-lift launcher, and include authorization for NASA funding for 2011 and 2012.

“By continuing to fly the Shuttle until the next generation space vehicle is ready to launch, we can continue to operate our space program without interruption, the loss of highly skilled American jobs or ceding ground to Russia or China,” Rep. Posey said in his statement. “Shuttle extension is the only way to close the gap in the near-term and with certainty.”

Besides Kosmas and Posey, 12 other members of Congress have signed on to co-sponsor the bill, primarily from Florida, with a scattering from Texas, Ohio, and Louisiana (and a couple outliers: Jim Costa (D-CA), whose district covers part of the Central Valley including parts of Fresno and Bakersfield; and Chellie Pingree (D-ME)). Notably missing from the list of cosponsors is the Democratic and Republican leadership of the House Science and Technology Committee, including chairman Bart Gordon and ranking member Ralph Hall as well as and space subcommittee chair Gabrielle Giffords and ranking member Pete Olson.

7 comments to Posey and Kosmas introduce House version of spaceflight gap bill

  • red

    Let’s suppose the provisions in the bill (as described in the press release) make it into law. We get a Shuttle extension and a requirement to start developing a government HLV. This comes with a $3.4B budget boost over 2011 and 2012. We still want to have the things in the 2011 budget like commercial crew, robotic precursors, technology development and demonstrations, and robotic science. How can all of this come together with such a small budget boost? This is similar to a discussion in an earlier thread, but with the Shuttle extension and $3.4B boost in the mix.

    $3.4B – added [probably unlikely to last through budget work, but let’s go with it]
    $1.9B – KSC upgrades – assume most of this isn’t needed with a SDLV
    $3.1B – HLV and propulsion – assume most of this is diverted to a SDLV
    $2.5B – Constellation transition – assume much of this is diverted to SDLV
    $0.6B – Shuttle slip contingency – assume this is rolled into Shuttle extension

    $11.5B – maybe assume $10B of this is available. This is through 2015.

    We’re seeing numbers like $2.4B/year, under $2.4B/year, and over $2.5B/year for Shuttle extension. Let’s go with $2.4B/year. That’s $12B over 5 years. We’re already under $1 or $2B, and we haven’t started on the HLV. It looks to me like the type of budget increase that’s in the bill for 2011-2012 would have to be sustained as long as the Shuttle is sustained.

    Let’s say the HLV is the Block 1 side-mount, with no crew support, and no extra enhancements for launching more mass to LEO. It’s something like a 72MT to LEO launcher. Is this a viable long-term launcher, or do we need to go to Block 2 at some point, if we have the Shuttle production lines open? If Block 2 is needed, let’s put it beyond our 2015 horizon. Per Shannon that’s $2.6B for Block 1 development. I don’t know the operations numbers.

    That’s already $3.6B we’ve overshot the budget, assuming it’s all done before 2015. We don’t have a payload for the HLV yet.

    I tend to think Shuttle and side-mount cargo wouldn’t overlap. Is that reasonable?

    Is there anywhere else we can squeeze funding without losing more than we’re gaining?

    Corrections are welcome …

  • red

    Along a similar line, the Space Review article “A Better Plan” by Stephen Metschan covers DIRECT in a similar scenario (Shuttle extension, NASA HLV). It tries to fit in some of the 2011 budget items.

    http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1571/1

    It links to a budget spreadsheet in PDF and Excel formats; here’s the PDF:

    http://www.directlauncher.com/documents/nasa-compromise-budget.pdf

    For 2011-2013, it has 4 more Shuttle missions for $6.25B. It also has SDLV and spacecraft development and operations from 2011-2015: $14.8B.

    The following questions then come to mind:

    Is all of that realistic with the proposed budget and timeline?

    and

    What is sacrificed?

    I’ll have a try at the 2nd one. It looks like the DIRECT budget does the same thing I did above, but all the way, for HLV work, Shuttle extension, and Constellation transition. It absorbs these into major Shuttle and DIRECT lines. I was surprised that it kept the KSC modernization. I guess the content of that line would be very different in the 2011 budget and the DIRECT budget.

    It reduces the commercial crew and cargo lines from $6.1B from 2011-2015 to $4.725B. That’s a bit worrying. What would the implications be?

    The new lines for exploration technology, robotic precursors, and general space technology all take a hit. Those lines are down to $6B, $2.65B, and $3.5B, respectively. Those are serious reductions that go to the heart of the future of exploration and general use of space, but I don’t think there would be a risk of program collapse in them – just a slower pace.

    Planetary Science takes a hit. Aeronautics takes a hit.

    Earth Science goes from over $10B over the 5 years to under $9.2B. I think the DIRECT folks are being a bit politically tone-deaf on this one.

    Note that some of these areas took big hits during Constellation already. The early years in the DIRECT budget look pretty harsh in some cases for areas that are trying to revive themselves from the hammering they took under Constellation.

    I don’t see the Exploration Human Research line at all. Even Constellation had something there.

    Cross-agency support goes from $16B or so to $13.2B. That’s a major change. What are the implications? Now considering that Innovative Partnerships has been taken out of Cross-agency support in the 2011 budget, and that there is an emphasis on commercial crew and other commercial partnerships that might not require as much oversight (assuming the commercial partners are self-motivated by “skin in the game” and potential business), maybe it’s a reasonable reduction. I wouldn’t just assume that, though.

    I don’t see anything at all in the DIRECT budget for things like Space Communication and Navigation.

    I guess I remain pretty skeptical about the DIRECT budget until I understand where some of the missing (as far as I can see) budget went, how to make it align with political reality in certain areas, how to ensure that things like commercial crew succeed on a reduced budget, how to convince certain areas that they can continue with budgets similar to what they suffered under Constellation for a while longer, and what the implication is of going ahead with some of the new technology and robotic precursor efforts, but with reduced budgets.

  • jhan

    I’m sorry, I don’t know the publisher of this extraordinary service. I meant to send an email, but I have a question that’s only a bit related to this post.

    Does anyone have a list of the astronauts that are opposed to giving up the VSE (which probably should read, giving up that good, solid, in-our-lifetimes moon goal! ). I know the last crew to walk on the surface of the moon, Cernan and Schmitt, and also probably Armstrong. But I’ve heard more.

  • @jhan The VSE was just:

    * Implement a sustained and affordable human and robotic program to explore the solar system and beyond;

    * Extend human presence across the solar system, starting with a human return to the Moon by the year 2020, in preparation for human exploration of Mars and other destinations;

    * Develop the innovative technologies, knowledge, and infrastructures both to explore and to support decisions about the destinations for human exploration; and

    * Promote international and commercial participation in exploration to further U.S. scientific, security, and economic interests.

    The Constellation program was a failed attempt to do half of the second item.. and that is all. It wasn’t sustainable or affordable. It didn’t prepare for Mars or other destinations. It didn’t develop any innovative technologies, knowledge or infrastructure. There was no international or commercial participation. It was funded by raiding the science and aviation budgets.

    Put simply, Constellation != VSE, not even close.

  • Robert G. Oler

    red wrote @ March 12th, 2010 at 7:30 am

    Along a similar line, the Space Review article “A Better Plan” by Stephen Metschan covers DIRECT in a similar scenario (Shuttle extension, NASA HLV). It tries to fit in some of the 2011 budget items……

    that notion on its face is absurd.

    Lets see…we are going to take old hardware, hardware that is workforce intensive, retain the same workforce for years while it is developed…we are going to develop old hardware along a line it was never intended to be used…and contain cost?

    that is an absurd possbility

    Robert G. Oler

  • Brad

    I have the awful feeling that after Congress finishes big footing NASA policy, all that will remain is Shuttle and ISS. Because you know Congress won’t vote for the extra funds needed to support the mandates Congress imposes on NASA. Bleah.

  • Brad

    Trent

    VSE also included important transition planning, such as retiring Shuttle by 2010, completing the ISS with remaining the Shuttle flights, and retiring the ISS by 2016. As such, VSE was a well considered strategic plan that did not shrink from making hard choices about what path to take for the future. A mature admission that NASA didn’t have enough money to ‘have it all’, while still respecting past commitments.

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