Last week the GAO issued a report on the Defense Department’s responsive space plans, particularly the TacSat series of experimental small satellites. The report, commissioned by Congressman Terry Heaton, chairman of the strategic forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, is largely complimentary of the first satellite, TacSat 1, which was built in 12 months for $10 million; the report credits that in large part to setting the requirements for the spacecraft early in the process and not changing them during the development phase of the project. (Three other TacSats are in various phases of development now, but none will be as inexpensive nor be built as quickly as the first one.)
There are several concerns with the program, and responsive space in general, that the GAO report identifies. One of the biggest is the lack of a responsive launch vehicle, something being remedied now though the Falcon program; SpaceX’s Falcon 1 could also serve that role. (There is reportedly some opposition within the DOD to the Falcon program because of the perception that the launch vehicle is too small given the current lack of small payloads; a chicken-and-egg problem.) The report also raises concerns about the lack of communication between the technology and acquisition communities, and the lack of an overarching strategy for responsive space in general.
One interesting argument the report makes is that responsive space may have a role helping reform larger space programs: the report argues that TacSat-like programs can test technologies to be used in larger programs and also give personnel experience managing small programs before handling larger programs. That makes responsive space sound like a farm team for the major leagues of big military space programs. Will that make the difference in winning over skeptics to responsive space?
