The Orlando Sentinel reports today about an internal NASA email by Mike Griffin that expresses frustration and criticism with the current state and future direction of the agency, particularly in regards to the shuttle, access to ISS, and the future of Constellation. The email, available here, has a tone that “depicts a man watching as his finely crafted plans for a revitalized space-faring NASA appear to be melting before his eyes,” in the words of the Sentinel’s Robert Block.
“Exactly as I predicted, events have unfolded in a way that makes it clear how unwise it was for the US to adopt a policy of deliberate dependance upon another power for access to ISS,” he writes in the August 18th message. In a “rational world”, he writes, the shuttle retirement would have been better timed with the availability of Ares 1 and Orion and NASA would have been given the “necessary budget” to make that happen.
Griffin blames the lack of that rational approach on the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). “[F]or OSTP and OMB, retiring the Shuttle is a jihad rather than an engineering and program management decision,” he wrote. “Further, the actively do not want the ISS to be sustained, and have done everything possible to ensure that it would not be.”
He later writes that he believes the next administration, be it McCain or Obama, will change course. “This Administration will not yield with regard to continuing Shuttle operations past 2010, but the next Administration will have no investment in that decision. They will tell us to extend Shuttle,” he wrote, adding that while it may appear “irrational” but that it will be the only “politically tenable course” when faced with otherwise abandoning the ISS at least temporarily. “Extending Shuttle creates no damage that they will care about, other than to delay the lunar program. They will not count that as a cost. They will not see what that does for U.S. leadership in space in the long term.”
NASA confirmed the authenticity of the email, but when the Sentinel approached the White House for comment, they got something of a retraction a few hours later from Griffin himself. “The leaked internal e-mail fails to provide the contextual framework for my remarks, and my support for the administration’s policies,” he wrote.
The timing of the email struck me, since it was dated just a few hours after he gave a speech at the DC-X Reunion conference in Alamogordo, New Mexico. There’s little in the text of the speech relevant to this topic, unless you want to try and read through the lines about the comment on page 5 that “NASA, as the implementing agency simply carries out policy within the resources provided. We don’t make it.” That comment was made regarding the decision in the early 1970s to abandon the infrastructure created during the Apollo program, which Griffin said “was a mistake of strategic proportions.”
During the Q&A session after the speech, Griffin was asked about the effect the Russian incursion into Georgia would have on INKSNA and access to the ISS, and whether it might generate any “political pressure” to change the status quo in terms of policy and budgets. “Well, I might hope that it would, but I don’t know that it will,” Griffin said. He reiterated that it was “unseemly” to have to rely on another country for access to space, regardless of whether that country was friendly to the United States or not, putting the blame for this situation on “decisions made, frankly, before my tenure and decisions to which I have objected.” The space station, he said, “is not a bug in US space policy at this point, it is a feature” having been sustained over the years by various administrations and Congresses, and thus having it dependent on a single system is both politically and technically risky.
“The issues surrounding the Russian invasion of Georgia just go to illustrate exactly my point,” he said. “It’s not that I foresaw that coming, it’s just that I foresaw something happening. The world doesn’t go so smoothly that those kinds of things don’t happen.”
Griffin was also asked in Alamogordo whether he saw anything in the policies of the two presidential candidates that would “fundamentally change policy direction” for the agency, but the administrator declined to answer. “I don’t express political preferences because I think it’s bad for NASA,” he said. “NASA is, and should be, a non-political executing agent of US policy, and US policy is decided by those who get elected. So I just want to stay well away from anything that could be construed wrongly.”
Update: NASA issued a statement Sunday afternoon from Griffin regarding that email message:
The leaked internal email fails to provide the contextual framework for my remarks, and my support for the administration’s policies. Administration policy is to retire the shuttle in 2010 and purchase crew transport from Russia until Ares and Orion are available. The administration continues to support our request for an INKSNA exemption. Administration policy continues to be that we will take no action to preclude continued operation of the International Space Station past 2016. I strongly support these administration policies, as do OSTP and OMB.
In a “rational worldâ€, he writes, the shuttle retirement would have been better timed with the availability of Ares 1 and Orion and NASA would have been given the “necessary budget†to make that happen.
Of course, it could also be argued that in a rational world, there would have been no Ares 1. The focus and resources would have been on a capsule that could be quickly put on an existing vehicle, as originally envisioned, in which the gap would only be a year or so (first flight was supposed to be in 2011). I don’t think that either the WH staffers coming up with the VSE or the Aldridge Commission imagined that NASA was going to divert so many scarce resources to an unneeded completely new vehicle.
Michael Griffin : ‘It’s everyone’s fault but my own’.
Failure, personified.
Mike said it was “unseemly” having to depend on the russians. I think once this fact REALLY hits americans and somehow becomes an “issue” for the current contenders to the white house Americans will respond. I think all Americans will hate the idea of russia having us by our ‘astronuts’.
I believe that blogging might hold a partial answer. Turning it into a STRATEGIC National defense issue. Obama is looked at as being weak on that so in order for Obama to appear strong he would, at least in campaign retoric, be obligated to show how he will move America out of that position. McCain would also be forced to up the ante against Obama. It bloggers can get it to the forefront as an issue, we could move it into a position where the candidates are trying to outdo each other in space.
This means a NATIONAL blogging campaign aimed at ALL politicians:
“senator how do you feel about americans having to go hat in hand begging the russians for a ride to the ISS and what are you going to do about it”
If ALL politicans can be put on the hot seat maybe we can shake up and embarrass them into public comments and commitments towards American independance from the russians in human launch capability.
Another area is to blog members of the US press corps that have frequent interactions with the politicians and RANT at them for AVOIDING asking the candidates WHY they are not outlining a plan for avoiding having russia hold America by the ‘astronuts’
“They call your show “Hardball” yet you steadfastly REFUSE to ask the candidates HARDBALL questions about why america has to go hat in hand to the russians begging rides to the ISS”
sad to see, that, they [NASA guys] seem never (???) have read the articles (not in a perfect, but readable, english) published on two italian website/blog (g a e t a n o m a r a n o . i t and g h o s t N A S A . c o m) and the uplink.space/newmars/etc. threads and posts of their author, where, ALL THAT (post 2010 use of Shuttles, Ares-1 problems, too high costs, etc.) was already evaluated and predicted (and some alternatives suggested) up to THREE YEARS AGO!!! however, I do believe, there is no reason to be pessimist, since NASA could easy change its way to succeed
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how easy NASA leaks so personal email documents!…:)
gm,
quit spamming your own site.
You haven’t said anything that hasn’t been said before.
What we could be seeing is the begining for the end for U.S. Human Spaceflight. All it would take is a 3rd Shuttle accident (current accident rate is approximetly 1 in 30 based on 51L & 107) coupled with Congress not waiving INKSNA (once the accident occurs it might be too late, lead time for additional Soyuz’s is years). At that point we will not have any access to ISS and the Russians can rename it Mir II.
And even if the Shuttle continues to fly, won’t Congress still have to waive INKSNA in order to get the two additional Soyuz’s a year for 6 crew.? The word in the halls of JSC’s Bldg 4S is that unless Congress waives INKSNA, then 6 crew won’t happen – so there goes all the additional payload time.
And of course the return to the Moon is pushed back 10-15 years and Mars well beyond the lifetime of anyone reading this blog that’s over 30.
We have only ourselves to blame, as we’ve been putting the same low-grade politicians, from both parties, into the Congress and the White House for years. We’ll probably never learn, and 50 years from now the United States will no longer be a player on the world stage.
gm – So your saying that the Executive and Legistlative branches of the U.S. Government should make policy based upon a blog on an Italian website? If you’ve got such power, why limit yourself to just space issues? Aim a little bit higher – maybe you can influence U.S. energy policy or the prime rate? I’m sure the Chairman of the Federal Reserve would have your website marked as a favorite and would read it everyday.
My advice to you is to move out of your parents basement.
I will be the first to admit that Geronimo is incompetent, but his incompetence doesn’t even come close to the incompetence, criminality and sheer violence perpetrated in the name of the United States of America by the president, vice president, congress and their respective appointees and employees during these last eight years. Please give credit where credit is due.
Unlike many here, I think Griffin has been an excellent Nasa administrator. Much has gone right under his watch and that which his critics harp about, the ATK stick, well he’d also have critics if he went in another direction. Likely many of the lazy boy critics would trash him no matter what he picked.
Now that we are facing loss of access to the ISS, he’s getting his version of history out there first. Can’t blame him for that, after all he is an experienced bureaucrat.
The thing that has to kill him is we wouldn’t be in this fix if we had simply added a few hundred million to Nasa’s top line for the stick starting in 2005. That kind of money is nuisance spare change to the USG.
Money can’t change physics. The stick was broken when it showed up in the ESAS.
Griffin has been a crappy NASA Administrator because he has acted like the NASA Chief Engineer and a Program Manager vs administrating NASA
“So your saying that the Executive and Legistlative branches of the U.S. Government should make policy based upon a blog on an Italian website?”
however, good suggestions may come from everywhere 
however, hundreds (per month) of my blog and website’s visits come from space agencies (mainly the most important of them…) universities, space forums, aerospace companies, etc. 
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no, of course
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“I’m sure the Chairman of the Federal Reserve would have your website marked as a favorite and would read it everyday.”
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you may believe or not, but (from my sites’ logs) I’ve received a couple of visits from FED in the past
“I think Griffin has been an excellent Nasa administrator.”
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I agree on that, but, also a (7 degrees) “excellent administrator” do make “mistakes” and Griffin has made (at least) three BIG mistakes:
1. plan the Shuttle retirement in 2010 without have a replacement
2. start develop the new (and very expensive) 5/5.5-segments SRB
3. start develop the expensive (and very long dev time) J-2X
an ESAS plan based on READY AVAILABLE engines, motors and rockets would be very much CHEAPER and FASTER to accomplish
“you may believe or not, but (from my sites’ logs) I’ve received a couple of visits from FED in the past
however, hundreds (per month) of my blog and website’s visits come from space agencies (mainly the most important of them…) universities, space forums, aerospace companies, etc. :)”
Because people are looking for jokes and a good laugh. There is no usable information on the site
“…for jokes and a good laugh…”
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then, now we know why so many Ares and Orion delays!!! …they spend their time laughing and joking!!! …
Griffin is supposed to represent NASA leadership. The ARES 1, ARES V, and CEV plans do not work politically or economically.
Griffin’s problems are all of his own doing.
Everybody who remembers the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs, and the original O’Keafe plan, knows that Griffin could have built a cheaper/faster CEV capsule and placed it on top of an existing EELV rocket like the White House and Air Force wanted Griffin to do. Griffin was quoted in speaches when he was CTO of Orbital Sciences, that Orbital Sciences could build a manned Space Taxi and launch it on an EELV for $2-$3 Billion. Griffin was also quoted, before he became head of NASA, as saying that a Shuttle-derived booster could launch around 100 tons for a Moon program for under $10 Billion and within a reasonable amount of time.
Griffin’s problems are all of his own doing.
Do people really believe that it would have taken more than 8 years from the Bush speach in January 2004 to the time when the Soyuz waiver runs out in 2012 for NASA to figure out how to put a capsule on top of an EELV, and to build the long studied Shuttle-C? Do people really believe that ULA/Boeing/Lockheed/ATK can not build a 10-meter diameter version of the Delta IV with strap-on solids (and call this the ARES V) within the same factory that they already assemble the 5-meter diameter Delta IV rockets.
Griffin decided to have NASA engineers, who have little experience in building launch vehicles and building manned spacecraft, to spend Billions of taxpayer dollars and spend years of taxpayer time to have NASA build new rocket and spacecraft designs in competition with the US Military and with US Commercial Industry. This was done against the original White House, US Military, and even NASA’s (under O’Keafe) plan.
Griffin’s problems are all of his own doing. What options can he present to the White House and to Congress after intentionally dismissing the White House’s plans when he took over in 2005.
Mike Griffin is a smart guy, and he could present the White House and the nation with some better alternatives.
Anonymous
Just shows what happens when you send a Vulcan engineer to do the job of a Starfleet captian.
Whoever Griffin replacement is, they should have a leadership record showing they have no desire to micromanage by playing chief engineer. If O’Keefee had stayed on the job the CEV would be flying now on an EELV just as Admiral Steidle was working towards…
Griffin decided to have NASA engineers, who have little experience in building launch vehicles and building manned spacecraft, to spend Billions of taxpayer dollars and spend years of taxpayer time to have NASA build new rocket and spacecraft designs in competition with the US Military and with US Commercial Industry. This was done against the original White House, US Military, and even NASA’s (under O’Keafe) plan.
Well, they went along with it. The Pentagon didn’t complain, though it should have, and once Griffin had been appointed, the White House didn’t seem to care that much, having much bigger issues on its plate.
Reading Griffin’s email, it seems that he made a choice, perhaps not the best choice, and is now emotionally invested in that choice. Any problems simply have to have been others fault. Now, maybe he has some good points when he criticizes the WH and OMB and such, but what I don’t see is any critical self analysis (e.g. here’s what I should have done). Hard to believe that it was all somebody elses fault. Maybe that was another email. They should leak that one.
Reading Griffin’s email, it seems that he made a choice, perhaps not the best choice, and is now emotionally invested in that choice.
He is certainly emotionally invested in NASA’s future, but I wouldn’t hold that against NASA’s chief — I didn’t sense it as personal, however. Rather, it appears he is terribly frustrated that this “choice” has been forced as either/or, when in fact it did not have to be either/or. It was decided that Shuttle must be retired in 2010 to enable the space exploration program. Griffin appears to be expressing his frustration with this fallacy of false dichotomy. And I tend to agree. A new launch vehicle is required at some point to enable future human exploration, regardless of whether it is 2010 or 2020. Designing a new capsule to mate with existing launchers is a band aid that defers the problem to the future. “Gradualism in theory is perpetuity in practice.” (William Lloyd Garrison) Making the right choice for a new launcher did not have to mean abandoning ISS and the Shuttle. This appears to be a case of “America will do these amazing things like men on Moon and Mars” by the Administration in policy and speeches, without the actual commitment with national resources. And Griffin and NASA are left holding the bag for not getting it all done. The failure is much higher than Griffin’s pay grade, imo.
Perhaps, but many of the criticisms of Griffin I’m reading (such as those above) seem rather convincing. In any event, this just proves the old saying “success has a thousand fathers, while failure is an orphan.”
“And Griffin and NASA are left holding the bag for not getting it all done. The failure is much higher than Griffin’s pay grade, imo”
……When the White House heard that Griffin wanted to avoid the existing EELVs to build 2 new rockets, knowing that he was not going to get a significant budget increase, they should have taken the leadership initiative and gone in a different direction.
Griffin has worked at NASA twice in the last 20 years as the head of exploration, and he basically tried the same “FLO” plan twice.
I can not understand how the White House could believe that Griffin could make the budget numbers work with 2 new rockets, when the original plan had a skeptical budget using modifications to existing rockets.
He didn’t mean for it to be shown to the outside world, but the revisionism, hypocrisy, and self-adulation in Griffin’s email is pretty shocking, even this late into the ESAS/Constellation debacle. It’s either that, or he’s been lying about his real positions for a long time. Griffin wrote:
“Exactly as I predicted, events have unfolded in a way that makes it clear how unwise it was for the US to adopt a policy of deliberate dependence on another power for access to the ISS.”
Griffin never predicted this. Instead, Griffin repeatedly stated that the VSE — including its 2010 date for Shuttle retirement — and the accompanying NASA Authorization Act of 2005 provide the nation with its best civil space policy in decades. In fact, Griffin said so as recently as January 2008 in an STA speech:
“I consider this to be the best civil space policy to be enunciated by a president, and the best Authorization Act to be approved by the Congress, since the 1960s.”
See (add http://www):
.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html?pid=26756
In fact, just before becoming NASA Administrator, Griffin even _led_ a study that argued as one of its central conclusions/recommendations that the Space Shuttle could and should be retired after ISS assembly reached the stage of “U.S. Core Complete”, certainly no later than 2010.
See (add http://www):
.planetary.org/programs/projects/aim_for_mars/study-report.pdf
If Griffin was really so prescient as to predict the situation that NASA’s human space flight programs are in now, then he should have spoken up years ago instead of repeatedly signing onto studies and policies that are flawed according to the argument in his email. In fact, it would have been wrong for him to have lobbied for the job of NASA Administrator to begin with if he really thought that the President’s policy was so compromised.
Griffin should resign immediately and apologize if his email reflects what he’s actually believed all these years. If not, and his email represents how Griffin has recently changed his views, then Griffin should admit that he was wrong to sign onto the policy, argue that the policy needs to be revised, and resign if it is not revised in a manner that he can support.
Griffin also wrote:
“In a rational world, we would have been allowed to pick a Shuttle retirement date to be consistent with Ares/Orion availability”
Griffin is confused about both chronology and causality in this statement. The Shuttle retirement date came first — as a recommendation about Shuttle operability and certification in the CAIB report and then as policy in the VSE. The replacement for Shuttle (originally CEV in the VSE and then Ares/Orion in ESAS) came second and was supposed to have a schedule that was responsive to that Shuttle retirement date.
In a rational world, a rational NASA Administrator would have picked a rational Shuttle replacement that could be developed rapidly and fielded soon after the 2010 deadline for Shuttle retirement using the available budgetary and technical resources. Instead, Griffin chose an Ares/Orion system that is so technically compromised that it can’t complete even its preliminary design review before the end of the Bush II Administration and is so costly that it can’t be flown operationally within the available budget until 2015 (and even that date has only a limited chance of being met).
Gemini took less than four years to develop and fly. In the same amount of time, Ares I/Orion will not complete its preliminary design review. That is not rational.
Apollo took seven years to develop and fly (to the Moon). In the same amount of time, Ares I/Orion will still be (at least) three years from flying (to the ISS). That is not rational.
Griffin also wrote:
“We would have been asked to deploy Ares/Orion as early as possible (rather than “not later than 2014″) and we would have been provided the necessary budget to make it so.”
Griffin is just making up history with this statement. NASA was never asked to “deploy Ares/Orion” at all. Rather, the VSE directed NASA to develop a Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV, which eventually becameOrion), and provided a budget that supported CEV development. The VSE never directed NASA to develop a new launch vehicle that duplicated the nation’s military and commercial capabilities with yet another medium- to intermediate-lift launcher (Ares), and the budget never supported such a development. Ares I needlessly busted the VSE budget box from day one, requiring the termination of billions of dollars of ISS research and exploration technology development just to start its design activities.
And why does anyone have to ask Griffin to deploy a Shuttle replacement as early as possible when the VSE gives him the flexibility to develop a replacement anytime before 2014? Is the NASA Administrator really so unambitious and lacking in initiative that, instead of being given a deadline (which he’s blown by a year anyway), he also has to be told by the White House to execute a critical replacement program as rapidly as possible?
And then Griffin wrote:
“… for OSTP and OMB, retiring the Shuttle is a jihad rather than an engineering and program management decision.”
First, for the head of any federal agency to use the term “jihad” in written reference to the White House offices that set policy for and fund their agency – especially when the same White House has been leading a seven-year war against Islamic extremism – demonstrates such extremely poor judgement that it brings into question whether that agency head is still fit to serve.
Second, the 2010 date for Shuttle retirement was effectively set by the CAIB’s expert judgment about and extensive investigation into the vehicle’s operational and certification issues. OSTP and OMB (and NASA under the prior Administrator) simply reiterated the 2010 date in the VSE. If Griffin wants to challenge the 2010 Shuttle retirement date, then he needs to challenge the engineering and program management analysis and expertise of the 13-member CAIB and its 32 staff, not OSTP and OMB. OSTP and OMB read and followed the CAIB report on this issue. Apparently Griffin did not and has not.
The only things OSTP and OMB are guilty of is not fulfilling all of the White House’s funding commitments to the VSE and not stopping Ares I/Orion at the outset when those projects busted the budget, or later when they ran into insurmountable technical issues and schedule delays that made them programmatically and politically useless.
Griffin also wrote:
“Further, they [OSTP and OMB] actively do not want the ISS to be sustained, and have done everything possible to ensure that it would not be.”
For the same NASA Administrator who wiped out billions of dollars of ISS research and who referred to the ISS as a “mistake” in the press to criticize White House offices about their lack of support for the ISS is the height of hypocrisy. See (add http://www):
.usatoday.com/tech/science/space/2005-09-27-nasa-griffin-interview_x.htm):
Griffin needs to stop flailing in the political winds, make up his mind, and stick with a consistent position on the value (or lack thereof) of the ISS.
Finally, and this is a technical nit compared to the issues above, but towards the end, Griffin also wrote:
“The argument that we need to get Shuttle out of the way so that conversion of the VAB/MAF for Constellation can proceed is similarly specious.”
This totally misses the point. The VAB and MAF are just really huge shells that NASA can build anything in. It’s the launch and rocket test infrastructure (the pads, the mobile launcher platform, and test stands) that the Shuttle and Constellation system share, and which Constellation has to make modifications to, that will interminably slow Constellation development if Shuttle continues to make use of those facilities.
My kingdom for a rational NASA Administrator who reads and follows policy direction, develops programs within their allotted budgets, encourages and listens to independent technical advice, and has the capacity to admit when the current plan is fubar and adjust course in a timely manner.
Sigh…
“Gradualism in theory is perpetuity in practice.†(William Lloyd Garrison)
Your ninth grade biology teacher would flunk you without hesitation.
Ares I is a mutant. You know what that means, right?
“It was decided that Shuttle must be retired in 2010 to enable the space exploration program.”
Incorrect. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) recommended that Shuttle be retired by 2010 or undergo an expensive certification and refit to continue flying. The budgets for the human exploration elements in the VSE certainly benefit from Shuttle retirement, but the date was chosen based on the CAIB recommendation, not exploration needs. Because both must be maintained within a relatively flat NASA budget through 2010, the 2010 Shuttle retirement ends up stretching out the exploration elements into a longer and more expensive return to the Moon (circa 2020, or about 14 years from when the VSE was announced) than that supported by the Apollo budget (which achieved the same in about seven years). Even without taking on unnecessary and expensive Ares I development, the phasing of the Constellation budget is not ideal for the efficient development of a human lunar shot. Shuttle retirement drives the exploration budget, not the other way around.
FWIW…
Apologies for continuing a response over two posts…
“A new launch vehicle is required at some point to enable future human exploration, regardless of whether it is 2010 or 2020.”
Why? What for?
Depending on the requirements, architecture, and technology investment choices, even a new heavy- or superheavy-lift launch vehicle like Saturn V is not a requirement.
A new medium or intermediate-lift launch vehicle, of which the nation already had two and another on the way at the time of ESAS, is certainly not needed.
“Making the right choice for a new launcher did not have to mean abandoning ISS and the Shuttle.”
Agreed. But ESAS recommended and Griffin agreed to the wrong choice, an incredibly expensive and developmentally difficult launch vehicle that cannot make the Shuttle retirement date or any schedule close to it from either a budgetary or technical standpoint.
“This appears to be a case of “America will do these amazing things like men on Moon and Mars†by the Administration in policy and speeches, without the actual commitment with national resources.”
Although they did not match every VSE commitment, the White House and Congress have still provided the bulk of the resources necessary to carry out the VSE. But the VSE budget never included funds for the development of a new, intermediate-lift launch vehicle, even a well studied and designed one.
FWIW…
So much for the big space race with China that Administrator Griffin (and Senators Hutchison, Nelson, and others) kept trying to sell Constellation on. See (add http://www):
.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story.jsp?id=news/China090808.xml&headline=U.S.,%20China%20In%20Space%20Talks&channel=space
Although there’s more meat and urgency to the Russian situation, it makes one wonder how long that threat will last as a rationale for extending Shuttle operations.
Too bad NASA can’t design and execute a human space flight program that fits within the budget box and instead keeps groping for external and extraordinary foreign policy rationales to fund the unnecessary program elements, cost growth, and overruns.
FWIW…
For what it’s worth, my recollection of events is pretty similar to what anonymous.space presented. A lot of Griffin’s points in the email seemed like a revision of history or excuses for failure of a plan that shouldn’t have been made in the first place.
At any rate, if Griffin wants to avoid flying the Shuttle for the next 10+ years while destroying the Ares budget (or flying Shuttle and watching another accident), he should be pushing as hard as he can for NASA incentives for commercial crew transportation and support.
The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) recommended that Shuttle be retired by 2010 or undergo an expensive certification and refit to continue flying.
But why did they pick 2010? What is magic about that date (particularly when no one really knows what “certification” means)?
I had always assumed that the CAIB thought that the Shuttle should be retired ASAP, and that if it wasn’t, it would have to be “recertified” for longer life (ignoring the issue that the term was undefined). But ASAP meant no sooner than ISS completion, which (I think even then) was scheduled for 2010 (at least after the Columbia loss and standown). Hence the date (it doesn’t hurt that it’s a round number).
The Shuttle doesn’t suddenly become less safe to fly in 2011, or even 2012. If there is a degradation, it is a gradual one, not a binary condition, and there is no obvious “knee in the curve.” The date was driven by non-Shuttle considerations, IMO. If someone on the CAIB (e.g., Dr. Day) knows otherwise, I’d be interested to know that.
Anonymous,
I agree with everything you said.
I wanted to emphasize one statement.
In a rational world, a rational NASA Administrator would have picked a rational Shuttle replacement that could be developed rapidly and fielded soon after the 2010 deadline for Shuttle retirement using the available budgetary and technical resources.”
Amen.
Griffin deserves to be fired, but I highly doubt it will happen (before January 20th).
– Al
“Politics is not rocket science, which is why rocket scientists do not understand politics.”
“Gradualism in theory is perpetuity in practice.†(William Lloyd Garrison)
Eng Lead: Your ninth grade biology teacher would flunk you without hesitation.
Ares I is a mutant. You know what that means, right?
I don’t think you understood the meaning of that quote.
Interesting Email and revisionist history lesson from Administrator Griffin.
First rule of holes, when you are in one stop digging.
For example: “So far what you’ve referred to as freelancing has amounted to nothing more than noise because no one has produced an alternative which is safer, cheaper or available in a more timely way than the architecture we’ve recommended.” – Griffin
http://www.space.com/news/080907-griffin-interview.html
The Ares-1 will not work from just an engineering stand point. Funny thing about springs they flex. While that is good for isolating vibration that is not so good if you need a ridge structure in the same area at the same time. Any guesses on what happens when you put a flexible joint in the region of maximum bending of a rocket? That’s right you can’t keep the point end of the rocket into the wind because it just wags around and eventually gets sideways. In fact it is so bad that the springs will not be needed. Well before max-Q the Ares-1 will bend in half and the upper stage will disintegrate. The SRB will be out wandering the skies, and if the crew is lucky on parachutes descending within view of KSC well before the SRB vibrations, that the springs were intended to solve, even kick in. That is unless the range safety officer hasn’t already split the cases. All the above brought to you by a launch system that is less capable, more complicated, more dangerous, and more expensive than what we can buy today from ULA.
Now that we have proven who it is that is actually ‘freelancing’ as a rocket scientist because he will not listen to those under his command that are, we can get back to reality, real engineering and problem at hand.
First in order to eliminate the gap we need both a launch system and a spacecraft. The only system capable of eliminating the gap right now is the STS. The high fixed cost of the STS and our limited budget requires the replacement system to see the infrastructure and workforce of the STS as an asset to build up from not as a liability to be eliminated. The Jupiter-120 is that system.
The Space Shuttle won’t turn into a pumpkin come October 2010. The key to keeping the risk low is to minimizing the number of times we fly the Space Shuttle. Owning car doesn’t increasing your risk of an accident driving it does. Lowering the flight rate of the Space Shuttle would help close the gap ‘without’ additional flights. A lower flight rate will extend Space Shuttle operations increasing the ability of natural attrition to readjust the skill mix of the workforce to be closer to that required by the replacement system. The Space Shuttle operations and Jupiter-120 test flight program would occur at the same time resulting in zero gap solution that delivers an American Space program that is second to none.
While the Atlas and Delta systems are good systems they are not second to none. After spending half a trillion dollars over fifty years the American people deserve more and get more with the Jupiter-120 and Jupiter-232. If it will make Mike happy we can call them the Ares-II and Ares-III.
“How soon do you expect to get results of this study and make them public?â€-Space.com
“I don’t know that we will make the results public until and unless our congressional oversight committees or the White House, or later on a transition team, asks for the information. This is internal work which has come to your attention by means of a leaked memo. It’s classic pre-decisional stuff. When will it be done? I can’t imagine that a thoughtful study would be done in anything less than a few months.â€-Griffin
I couldn’t agree more. The last time I check the 60 days afford the ESAS team is at least 30 days short of a ‘thoughtful’ study. I would suggest that recommendations of 190 NASA STS derived studies done under five NASA administrators over thirty years beats a one non-thoughtful study done in 60 days under one NASA administrator.
Now do we want to go to the Moon or not?
“The Shuttle doesn’t suddenly become less safe to fly in 2011, or even 2012. If there is a degradation, it is a gradual one, not a binary condition, and there is no obvious ‘knee in the curve.’ The date was driven by non-Shuttle considerations, IMO.”
I would parse it a little finer than that.
The need to draw a certification line in the sand was certainly driven by Shuttle considerations. The CAIB pressed NASA on these kinds of issues, and the answer that came back was “we don’t really know” — the lifetime of certain Shuttle components has never been qualified, the slopes of the lines on various figures of merit are unknown, parts of the orbiters have never been inspected since they were built (even during OMDPs), etc.
So the CAIB came back with a recommendation that said, in so many words, since NASA doesn’t have its arms around all these known unknowns, NASA should draw a certification line in the sand and get its arms around them — and the sooner the better.
But I don’t have any special insight in the CAIB’s closed door deliberations and you may be right that, in the absence of any clear, quantitative understanding of Shuttle’s operational lifetime, the exact date was chosen based on ISS considerations.
But in the face of all those known unknowns on the Shuttle program and their potential consequences for NASA’s human space flight programs, that doesn’t obviate the need to set a schedule for Shuttle certification or retirement and follow it. OSTP and OMB (and the prior NASA leadership) did so in the VSE and built a reasonable strategy around it. Griffin, however, has failed to do so by pursuing a complex and expensive replacement vehicle that can’t meet the schedule technically or budgetarily, and is now threatening to do so again by extending Shuttle operations without certification.
My 2 cents… FWIW…
While the Atlas and Delta systems are good systems they are not second to none
First in order to eliminate the gap we need both a launch system and a spacecraft.
No, we only need the spacecraft. We have a launch system (Atlas V).
The only system capable of eliminating the gap right now is the STS.
The STS is not capable of “eliminating the gap,” if by that you mean ability to permanently crew ISS without Soyuz.
While the Atlas and Delta systems are good systems they are not second to none.
No, but they’re good enough. At least Atlas is, for a capsule. We don’t need to develop yet another expendable launch system.
Rand;
If you mean “good enough†as in doing laps in LEO for another thirty years then I would agree. The VSE has sets America’s long term objectives in space exploration and development a bit higher than that. Also the Atlas uses Russian engines that can also be used as geopolitical pawn to cut us off from the ISS even if NASA would agree to fly crews with them in an as is condition. I’m sure the Russian would go tell us to go pound sand if we wanted man-rating changes anyway. NASA ‘man-rating’ issues aside, both the Atlas and Delta systems place the same mass constraints on the Orion that the never to fly Ares-1 is doing now.
The Gap is defined as having independent American crew access to the ISS after the Space Shuttle is retired. Concerning ISS crew safety, the Russian’s need a life boat as well. A better use of the remaining capsules we do have on order is put an additional life boat at the ISS enabling a full six person crew at the ISS. We can then rotate out our crews using the Space Shuttle if needs be. In our plan America will have ‘independent access’ therefore the leverage the Russians have over us if we retire the Space Shuttle in 2010 is gone. In this scenario the Russian may be more reasonable on their price because they won’t hold a trump card over us. Just like energy independence needs to be an official policy objective. With any luck the next administration may help eliminate the underlying reason we are concerned about giving money to the Russians in the first place and the need for placing missile defense systems near their border.
The STS is ‘both’ launch system and spacecraft. My point is that Orion is out to 2015 as well. Having an EELV ready to go is only half of what we need to close the gap. The STS/Jupiter-120/Orion is the way to go all things considered.
Now do we want to go to the Moon or not?
Who’s we?
Last time I checked, I only speak for myself.
Personally, my immediate goal is to get America back to the ISS with a reasonable long duration lifeboat, for example, one that doesn’t use a lot of friable explosive bolts, and with an engine and enough extra hardware and residual fuel to enable reboosting said space station. That can either be an upper stage of an EELV, or something different, but I would prefer it not to be a 30 metric ton vanity capule launched by two very large SRBs.
I can think of a whole lotta better ways to spend that kind of money.
And no, I don’t want to go BACK to the moon.
If you mean “good enough†as in doing laps in LEO for another thirty years then I would agree.
I mean “good enough” to close the dreaded “gap.” When it comes to going back to the moon, and beyond, we don’t need new expendable launch systems. We need affordable launch systems, and in-space infrastructure.
Engineering Lead;
We as in We the People, as in what our elected representatives placed into law. The same law the enables NASA to exist at all or buy launches from ULA and the Russians, the same law that gives NASA the money ‘and’ authorization to do things like the VSE or laps in LEO or no laps at all.
Rand;
Ah yes the mythical too cheap to charge ‘affordable’ launch system you see in your Science fiction dreams. Unfortunately real engineers like me have to live in the real world. Not to say NASA couldn’t be at least four times more efficient than they are now but even then Space will still be the domain of big governments or deep pocketed individuals paying for sub-orbital joy rides. As Carl Sagan once said, human ambition and the laws of physics do not need to correspond.
According to Dr. Neil Degrasse Tyson, 80% of the life cycle cost of space is in the spacecraft and mission not the launch system. For what it is worth he happens to be right. That is why the primary advantage of the large launch system is seen in its ability to reduce the volume and mass restrictions placed on human class spacecraft (saving serious money) not in the launch cost. Which is why shoehorning everything into 5m launch systems optimized for unmanned spacecraft is counter productive for those who want to reduce the lifecycle cost for manned space exploration. Not to despair, the way you save money for manned space exploration is by reusing the spacecraft and ISRU.
We as in We the People
VSE was implemented by executive order, by a chief executive with a well documented record of criminality. That you haven’t taken the time to peruse that record of criminality is YOUR problem, not mine, nor anyone’s but your own. You speak for yourself, you vote for yourself. It’s all you have.
Which is why shoehorning everything into 5m launch systems optimized for unmanned spacecraft is counter productive for those who want to reduce the lifecycle cost for manned space exploration.
Existing launchers with three and five meter cores and liquid engines easily out compete any hypothetical launch vehicle architecture by their very existence. By kilo per dollar metric integrated over life cycle, SRB assisted launch vehicles are more expensive than liquid powered launch vehicles.
This is documented. That you are unable to recognize that is your problem. It’s not for a lack of evidence or documentation. Delusions are wonderful, but they won’t get you past any rational CEO who has to sign the checks.
Your chief executive’s checks will start bouncing any day now.
According to Dr. Neil Degrasse Tyson, 80% of the life cycle cost of space is in the spacecraft and mission not the launch system.
That’s because we haven’t been doing human exploration to the moon and Mars for the time period over which he gathered that data. The vast amount of payload delivered to orbit for a spacefaring civilization (at least initially, until we are getting it from extraterrestrial sources) is propellant, which costs almost nothing on earth, but is very expensive in space when it’s put up on an expensive launch system. And propellant is almost infinitely divisible, and something that can go up on large vehicles, small vehicles, high-reliability vehicles and low-reliability vehicles. But the important thing about it is that it go up on low-cost vehicles.
I’m always amused by the absurd notion that the mistake we made in the past was mixing crew and cargo.
No.
The real mistake that we made was mixing cargo (which is high value, at least if it’s space systems, as opposed to logistics, regardless of whether people are being delivered) and propellant. Once you stop doing that, the rationale for large vehicles goes away completely. It can be done with existing vehicles, or new lower-cost vehicles. But it doesn’t need expensive new and large expendable vehicles. And in fact they are counterproductive.
METSCHAN: Unfortunately real engineers like me have to live in the real world.
METSCHAN: According to Dr. Neil Degrasse Tyson, 80% of the life cycle cost of space is in the spacecraft and mission not the launch system.
I like Dr. Tyson, and he gives great and hilarious speeches, but …
I just found it very odd that a “real engineer” would quote a non-engineer who has never built a spacecraft or launch vehicle.
Usually, “real engineers” quote credible engineering authorities, not PhDs in Astrophysics who are clearly not a primary source of information.
I agree with Rand. And so do you, if you truly use your quoted statistic. If the launch is to cost about 1/4 of the cost of the payload, and the payload is propellant, that is going to be a truly affordable launch system.
– Al
If the launch is to cost about 1/4 of the cost of the payload, and the payload is propellant, that is going to be a truly affordable launch system.
Finally we have the necessary breakthrough in launch vehicle architecture.
I can only add the obvious observation that the fuel needs a container, and that container is called a core stage. Plus you get your engine back as well.
Now all you have to do is figure out what to do with those empty containers.
I don’t know about your culture, but where I come from fuel containers are our most valuable assets. I’ve seen Haitians build whole vessels out of fuel containers. I’ve seen vessels so tied up with empty fuel containers that you can’t even recognize the vessel within it. You guys are way late to the party.
Rand;
I agree with the need to separate propellant from spacecraft/crew. I also agree that once you do that it lowers the significant barriers to entry for new approaches and new companies to compete for what will be about 70% of the mass needed in LEO for VSE. Plus this opens up the potential commercialization of lunar material for propellant. International and commercial participation in VSE along with ISRU are central objectives that always seem to be forgotten.
I still stand by the fact that Spacecraft integration and testing on the ground is far superior in every way than tinker toying the system in LEO. Point of fact is that current ISS could have been placed into orbit in two flights of the SaturnV. At times brute force has a quality all its own.
Also, as the mT/year in LEO grows the optimal launch system size grows as well. The Jupiter-232 operational cost goes below $4K/kg at a flight rate of about 6 per year based on twenty-five years of historic Space Shuttle cost. I doubt that ULA or even SpaceX is anywhere near that number.
I would also suggest that given that MAF and KSC are about 90% run by the same organizations that staff ULA I see little advantage in destroying $12 billion dollars of heavy lift infrastructure because of non-effective senior NASA management.
The rank and file at NASA (Federal+Contractors) are very talented and more than capable of pulling of the VSE efficiently if properly lead.
I still stand by the fact that Spacecraft integration and testing on the ground is far superior in every way than tinker toying the system in LEO. Point of fact is that current ISS could have been placed into orbit in two flights of the SaturnV. At times brute force has a quality all its own.
Of course it does. But it’s expensive at current activity levels.
Also, as the mT/year in LEO grows the optimal launch system size grows as well. The Jupiter-232 operational cost goes below $4K/kg at a flight rate of about 6 per year based on twenty-five years of historic Space Shuttle cost. I doubt that ULA or even SpaceX is anywhere near that number.
Are you amortizing development costs? If not, you’re cheating in comparing it to ULA, whose costs are sunk. And SpaceX is paying for their own.
I would also suggest that given that MAF and KSC are about 90% run by the same organizations that staff ULA I see little advantage in destroying $12 billion dollars of heavy lift infrastructure because of non-effective senior NASA management.
What is it that makes the “heavy-lift infrastructure” worth $12B?
I should add that if we can’t do better than $4000/lb (at least for propellant), and at least an order of magnitude better, we don’t have any business wasting the taxpayers’ money on a manned civil space program, particularly beyond earth orbit.
so if the Ares V can push 120 tons of propellant into space and the cost is 4000 dollars a pound that would make the Ares V launch costs stand at about 10.5 billion dollars a launch plus the cost of fuel payload, I have not seen those kind of numbers being tossed around at NASA.
“I would also suggest that given that MAF and KSC are about 90% run by the same organizations that staff ULA”
Not true. LM runs MAF and USA runs Shuttle ops at KSC. They are all separate companies. There is no synergism between them. Each has its own processes and are no longer interchangeable. LM and Boeing could develop new technology/processes and they are not available to ULA.
Each has its own people and movement between them is not an “officially sanctioned” process. One would have to quit from organization and be hired by another. There is no transfer of benefits, pay, seniority or title/position.
Anon;
You miss my point. These are private commercial companies owned by the same parent organizations and directed by the same board of directors. ULA is under a similar arrangement. Plus there are a number of private sub-contractor companies under these organizations as well.
A significant “commercialization†of Space will not happen by simply replacing USA with ULA or ULA with SpaceX. At present the Space industry is largely supported by government money the world over. Because of this politics will play a very important role in what happens with NASA being used as an extension of the America’s soft power projection and the DOD hard power.
The only way to truly commercialize/privatize the Space industry is to provide a product or service to the private sector from Space that has a unique or competitive advantage over anything we can do on Earth. The ability to move power to any location on Earth at price that is locality/time competitive (i.e. Space Based Solar Power for example) could be an example of this.
Given how large the energy sector is, if this could be done profitably this expansion in the commercialization of Space would dwarf anything the DOD/NASA or existing private satellite communication/remote sensing companies do. At which point the DOD/NASA could truly just procure COTS services as envisioned by the COTS program. Until that happens COTS is just a mechanism to get ULA to lower their prices and fights that breakout between ULA vs USA will be moderated by their respective boards.
so if the Ares V can push 120 tons of propellant into space and the cost is 4000 dollars a pound that would make the Ares V launch costs stand at about 10.5 billion dollars a launch plus the cost of fuel payload, I have not seen those kind of numbers being tossed around at NASA.
$4000/lb for a pound of payload, not a pound of propellant. I think Rand was saying that chemical rockets can’t do much better anytime soon.
I know, I was just saying on top of the basic launch cost you also have to pay for the payload, if the payload is propellant you would also have to add the cost of that propellant. So the cost is 10.5 billion @ 4000 a pound plus the cost of the propellant that is going up as cargo.
I think Rand was saying that chemical rockets can’t do much better anytime soon.
No, I was just saying that we won’t do much better with new large expendable launchers. There’s a lot of room for cost improvement with chemically combusted rockets.
Rand, have you seen any numbers on what the estimated launch costs are for the Ares V ? I have seen 550 million to 1.2 billion per launch for the ARES V is that a reasonable range or just vapor estimates?
Rand, have you seen any numbers on what the estimated launch costs are for the Ares V ? I have seen 550 million to 1.2 billion per launch for the ARES V is that a reasonable range or just vapor estimates?
That’s probably low, if you include development costs…
VLADISLAW: I have seen 550 million to 1.2 billion per launch for the ARES V is that a reasonable range or just vapor estimates?
Those are almost certainly “marginal cost” per flight estimates.
You then need to add in all the other costs of a flight to the Moon. I have heard that the marginal cost/flight to the Moon exceeds $2 Billion. Since the plan is to flights/year, that is >$4 Billion per year.
You then need to add in the cost of the hardware that you will put on the Moon, plus the cost of lunar operations.
LUNAR HARDWARE COSTS: Assume the cost of the ISS hardware as a starting point (I am not sure what the latest numbers are, but I believe they were in the range of $40 Billion) for a minimal lunar base.
LUNAR OPERATIONS COSTS: Assume ISS operations costs as a starting point. ISS operations exceed $1 Billion/year, but this number does not include most of JSC’s MOD and Engineering support costs (which are mostly allocated to the Shuttle program.) JSC is not going to lay off all of mission control, or their engineers, so several thousand salaries will be applied to lunar operations costs.
A NASA version of a lunar base gets very expensive real fast.
– Al
[…] NASA and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Those tensions were illuminated last week when the Orlando Sentinel reported on the leaked email from NASA administrator Mike Griffin where Griffin complained of a “jihad” for retiring the shuttle by OMB and the Office of […]