As you probably have already heard, the White House announced Friday afternoon that the Bush Administration will nominate Michael Griffin as the next NASA Administrator. I’ll have more to say later (I’m writing this right now at Cape Canaveral, having just watched an Atlas 5 launch!) but in the meantime you can review his bio. From what I understand he’s expected to be well received by the Senate, which may confirm him in a a matter of a few weeks.
Griffin is mentioned in several Space Review articles:
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/226/1
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/115/1
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/106/2
“In early 1991 Truly named Michael Griffin as the new Associate Administrator for Exploration. Griffin came to NASA after a successful stint in SDIO, which for a period during the late 1980s and early 1990s had essentially been running its own small space program. But although Griffin brought a new approach to SEI, a ‘smaller, faster, cheaper’ approach, he had a hard time selling that approach to Congress for numerous reasons, including the fact that by 1991 Congress no longer trusted NASA or the White House with anything having to do with further human space exploration beyond the projects already funded.”
Griffin on the need for a heavy-lift launch vehicle:
http://www.space.com/news/griffin_nasa_050311.html
“Griffin has said that returning to the Moon will require the United States to build a new heavy-lift launch vehicle. He told the House Science Committee in October 2003 during a hearing on the future of human space flight that “it may not be impossible to consider returning to the Moon or going to Mars without a robust heavy-lift launch capability, but it is certainly silly.”
Griffin has also stated his preference that United States use existing space shuttle hardware, such as the main engines, solid rocket booster, and external tank, as the foundation for building the new heavy lift launcher NASA may need to return to the Moon.
Worden, who replaced Griffin as the technology deputy at the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization in the late 1980s, said he does not think Griffin would let his stated preferences for a shuttle-derived heavy-lifter interfere with NASA’s effort to reach an honest conclusion about the best way to go.
“I think he is going to be very open to whatever the best solution is,” Worden said. “He is a superb engineer and he listens to people.”
But even as NASA administrator, the decision would not be Griffin’s to make. The National Space Transportation Policy, updated by the White House late last year, decreed that any heavy-lift launcher decision would be made by the president after hearing the joint recommendation of the NASA administrator and the Defense secretary.
That policy also says the preference should be given to heavy-lift launch designs based on the Atlas 5 and Delta 4 evolved expendable launch vehicles.”
It seems that he is a good choice to head NASA…
Mike Griffin is probably the best qualified NASA Administrator since Apollo ended.
An engineer in charge of an engineering project, how novel.
Griffin is more than an engineer. He is also a scientist and a manager. He managed several SDIO projects in the 1980s such as Delta 180 and Delta Star that were low cost space missions that essentially proved that it was possible to do low cost space missions. These were essentially the predecessors to Faster Cheaper Better. See the link below for information on one of them:
http://www.aero.org/publications/crosslink/summer2001/03.html
His work there brought him to the attention of the National Space Council a few years later. He then moved to NASA to head the exploration office. That was a bit of a thankless task, as NASA’s Space Exploration Initiative had essentially been stillborn and dead for several years. He tried to come up with some low cost ways of starting the initial portions of it. He also tried to dramatically bring down the cost of lunar exploration by working on the First Lunar Outpost proposal. But Congress kept zeroing out the exploration budget and Griffin had nothing to do there. Eventually he left NASA. But some of the credit for initiating Faster Cheaper Better at NASA belongs to him.
“Thank you Mr. Griffin, we senators hereby confirm you. Now about that hubble space telescope and the space center in or near my district…how you got a moment or two, son? Forget all that booklearnen of yours … lets talk politics.
If Mr. Griffen brings his desire for a SDV to life instead of allowing the private sector to spiral develop the EELVs into larger vehicles as the need arises, we can forget about exploring anything in a manner that results in a sustainable infrastructure.
Mr. Walker, I fully agree. I couldn’t have put it better myself, but I would add that we could forget about any exploration at all. There is barely enough money to do either exploration or a new launch vehicle; there is not a snowball’s chance in hell that we can do both at once.
— Donald
I believe that heavy lift must be looked at very carefully as it could very well be the most economical way to proceed with the VSE. Heavy lift should not be dismissed in a shortsighted attempt to cut costs in the near term, only to end up costing more in the long term.
What is Griffin’s position on saving hubble?
But, Mr. Dogsbd, exactly the same argument could be made about any technology. Antigravity would make it much cheaper to return to the moon in the long run, therefore we should put our efforts into developing antigravity. The problem with that argument is, without going to the moon, there’s no reason to develop antigravity.
The issue now is not how to get there cheapest; that will be the issue once we are ready to embark on rudimentary trade, which is at least one generation of visits in the future. The issue now is getting there at all and emplacing early infrastructure, which involves focussed concentration on the issue at hand.
Moon first, HLV and antigravity later.
— Donald
I think the point is that with a relitively small investment we can have HLV using existing shuttle tech. I can’t see throwing away perfetly good existing tech like we did with the Saturn series of launchers.
Donald, the issue =IS= how to build the first mining colony or hotel as cheaply as possible. What other goal is there?
Delta IV will not evolve or spiral into an alt-space RLV. Never.
alt-space needs a destination, meaning a hotel in LEO or a lunar mining facility. Creating private sector demand will beat prizes, hands down.
In the meantime, to paraphrase Rumsfeld, we gotta find a way to make money with the rockets we have, not those we lust after.
What is the least expensive way to toss 100 MT of LH2 and/or methane to LEO – – or giant lunar regolith processors to the Moon? That =is= the question. As Taylor Dinerman wrote, breaking down bulldozers into small pieces will consume valuable astronaut assembly time, on the Moon.
Dear Mr. Earl and Mr. White,
I agree, the issue _is_ how to build the mining colony or hotel, but we cannot develop it all at once. If there is any lesson from the fiascos of the last thirty years, it is that we must increment this job. Starting with the smallest possible increment that gets a measurable reasult is the only way this will actually happen, and that involves getting something on Earth’s moon that builds toward the future with existing technology ASAP.
I am not opposed to a Shuttle-derived vehicle, if it doesn’t cost much, although doing that would remove most of the savings from Shutting down the Shuttle. If we do that, we should probably try to keep the Shuttle flying. (Just before the Columbia loss, I was preparing to write an article about using spare Shuttle capacity to start a lunar base.)
If, on the other hand, we are to realize savings from shutting down the Shuttle program, than we have to do that. The EELVs will be flying anyway, so it makes sense to use them, and I think we’re all underestimating the benefits of economies of scale (look at the Russians). There is an article in a recent AvWeek, which I haven’t yet read and don’t have with me, discussing incremental upgrades to Delta-IV. Are these enough to make a difference?
My only real concern is that we don’t develop something new, whether it be derived from the Shuttle or not.
— Donald
“Antigravity” equals HLV is a specious argument, I’d expect better from you Donald. As Mr. Earl points out all of the main components of a shuttle based HLV exist today, I believe it would be foolish to throw away the potential that represents. If we attempt to build any sort of large scale space infrastructure (Moonbase, Lagrange point stations etc.) at 20 tons or less per launch the time required to do so will increase the chances of a future congress getting cold feet and killing the entire program. Congress will not sit around and watch dozens of 250 million dollar EELVs launched while seeing very little progress being made as a result of a majority of those launches being mundane transfer stages and/or fueling missions. They will want to see early and continuous progress.
Building public support is mision-critical. EELV supported sortie missions or scout missions without the capability to deploy a more permanent presence will not generate that support.
As for alt-space promotion, I would propose that Congress fund and NASA launch a Bigelow style LEO hotel by a single throw of HLLV and then offer free room and board to the first two dozen guests who can get themselves up there by private launch contractor originating within the United States.
Thereafter, auction off the hotel to the highest bidder and repay the US Treasury.
One large SDV launch would be sufficient and might increase the continuing launch manifest if other hotel chains decided to buy additioanl hotels.
ISS is a perfect example of trying to create large infrastructure without heavy lift. ISS has been under construction since 1997 and is nowhere near complete, still inching along toward completion 20 tons or so at a time. Costs have spiraled completely out of control, though the reasons for that are numerous. ISS has dodged being killed by the narrowest of margins on a number of occasions. But had a true heavy lift (100 plus tons) capability existed a completed, full-size, ISS could have been in orbit years ago, reducing the changes of cancellation due to being drawn out over several years.
With true HLLV, and Bigelow inflatables, perhaps a new station could be launched to 28 degrees inclination for far less than the $60 billion set aside for ISS completion and operation.
With the cost of HLLV development included within that $60 billion.
I have little doubt that you are indeed correct in that estimation Bill.
I just want to post my support for what Mr. White and Mr. Dogsbd are posting. We need HLLV first. Reusing the exsiting shuttle infrastructure seems like a useful idea as long as new technology is not permanently shelved. Space exploration needs NASA to take on high risk projects that are considerd too risky for the privet sector. We can’t keep using 50 year old rocket technology forever. It’s not safe or efficiant enough to get what we all seem to want – Real space infrastructure.
Sorry it’s taken me so long to reply; they wanted me to work at work this week!
Dogsbd, I stand by my analogy. We’ve spent decades failing to develop HLV; throwing more money after bad, in this case, is a lot like chasing after antigravity.
That said, I think I am not being clear. I am _not_ against developing an HLV. What I am against is developing an HLV _first_, before we do anything else.
In the LEO model, what I am advocating is a lot like Salyut. Salyut was developed in a couple of years using the shell from an abandoned project and a launch vehicle developed for something else. It was done quick-and-dirty and far-from-optimized, but it led directly to Mir. Sure, the Russians could have developed a new launcher to fly Mir as one module — like we did — but who learned how to really operate in space at reasonable cost first?
What we need to do if we really want to go to the moon is take some Space Station module, fill it with supplies, get it on the moon with some quick-and-dirty adaptation of an existing launcher, then do the same thing with a crew. _Then_ we can build an HLV to optimize the process _while_ we are actually flying crews to the moon.
— Donald
Donald: I stand by my analogy. We’ve spent decades failing to develop HLV;
We had a HLV in 1969; we’ve never had antigravity so I that is where the analogy fails. I also don’t know of any effort since then to develop something that would give us that capability again. Shuttle C came the closest, but it was never very seriously considered so I wouldn’t say “decades” were spent on it before it ultimately failed to come to be. What we’ve spent decades trying to develop is a wholly reusable, SSTO vehicle to replace the shuttle, that isn’t analogous to a “simple” STS derived HLV.
As for Salyut; that analogy of the Soviets using some on hand hardware to create something new sounds like what I propose for STS hardware that is on hand and proven.
Donald: the Russians could have developed a new launcher to fly Mir as one module — like we did –
No we developed the Saturn V to go to the Moon, it was used to launch Skylab because it existed. If the Soviet N1 had succeeded it is certain they would have used it to launch their own “Skylab”. And had the Soviet/Russian economy not fallen apart they would now have the HLV we should have, the Energia.
Donald: but who learned how to really operate in space at reasonable cost first?
That is more a function of their society / economy than as a result of the superiority of their method. You can bet that the workers who build Soyuz launchers don’t make anything near the salary of a LockMart or Boeing worker.
I agree with Mike Griffin (about many things) including this:
It may not be impossible to consider returning to the moon, or going to Mars, without a robust heavy-lift launch capability, but it is certainly silly.
I guess we’ll have to agree to disagree on this. However, here,
Donald: the Russians could have developed a new launcher to fly Mir as one module — like we did –
No we developed the Saturn V to go to the Moon, …
I was referring to the development of the Shuttle.
If you can keep this Shuttle-derived vehicle under a billion dollars, you’ve got my blessing. But, mark my words, if we spend much more than that on launch vehicles before we actually launch something, we will not return to Earth’s moon in the foreseeable future.
— Donald
>> I was referring to the development of the Shuttle.
Then I just don’t understand that analogy either; since the Shuttle couldn’t fly Mir as one module either.
There are a number of points that must be considered in the heavy lift discussions.
A SDV does not does not equate to a more economical way to obtain heavy lift capability. Reconfiguring shuttle based hardware into another launch vehicle negates all system flight history gained from the shuttle program. The loads will not be the same, the vibes will not be the same, etc. A number of SDV designs entail enlarging the current configuration and also require the need to develop an alternative to the expensive SSME. Additionally, the current shuttle launch infrastructure would need to be modified to support the SDV.
SDV statements pertaining to the amount of mass to orbit is not based on a circular orbit as it is with the EELVs. SDV generally states mass to orbit with an orbit of ~30 X 200 at 28.5 and places the responsibility of circularization on the payload. A 30 X 200 is not an orbit, it is a ballistic trajectory.
The EELVs state a mass to orbit with a circular, stable orbit.
The argument for SDV always revolves around the use of the present infrastructure and the present shuttle workforce. The shuttle infrastructure is expensive and a large percentage of the shuttle workforce will be eligible for retirement before the VSE really gets going.
With the reported cost of maintaining the shuttle infrastructure (whether it flies or not) at ~$2-billion/year, one can judge with a decent certainty that the SDV infrastructure will not be economical to maintain.
Any pad mods for a new launch vehicle are instantly in the tens of millions of dollars and new pads are in the hundreds of millions.
The shuttle costs between $750 million to $1 billion per launch. Does anyone really think that with an estimated heavy launch rate of 3-5 per year that number will go down?
The entire EELV program cost the tax payers ~$3-billion.
Technologically, the EELVs are more advanced than the shuttle.
The contractors designed the EELVs to launch 24-30 vehicles per year (both contractors combined) while working one shift per day, five days a week. Imagine around the clock processing.
How many present EELVs can be launched for the cost of 28 shuttle missions?
The argument between SDV and EELV always seems to revolve around the mass to orbit with present EELVs. Do comparisons between the SDV and the spiral developed EELVs.
-Mr. Walker
On the other hand, EELV folks like to compare Delta IV enhanced with base line shuttle C:
For example,
Start with a triple barrel Delta IV;
Add 6 GEM solid rocket boosters;
Supplement with an RL-60 upper stage;
Tweak with lithium alloy tanks;
Use slushed hydrogen and a low trajectory launch;
Okay, 45-50MT is feasible. For $200 million? Perhaps, perhaps not.
Now, take SDV which is 77MT base line (77,000 kg):
Add 5 segment SRBs;
Perhaps use four 5 segment SRBs;
Let Michoud use lithium alloy as well;
Stick an RL-60 upper stage on top of an inline SDV – – heck start with an 2x RS-68 2nd stage and go with an RL-60 THIRD stage (wink);
What if the SRBs were tweaked to include less dry mass?
Today they are 85% fuel & 15% dry mass using 1980s metallurgy. Tweak the SRB (using composites) to 90/10 fuel/dry mass ratio and you can add 30MT – 40MT to your SDV 2nd stage baseline.
A tricked out inline SDV might well carry 150MT + to LEO, 3x the tricked out EELV.
= = =
A tricked out Delta IV crushes a 1991 design shuttle C – – hey even I agree with that!