Reason magazine has published an excellent interview with Burt Rutan that focuses squarely on regulatory issues involved with commercial human spaceflight. Rutan, as many readers know, is not a big fan of the FAA’s Office of Commercial Space Transportation, and has made it clear on a number of occasions that he would prefer to have vehicles like SpaceShipOne regulated as aircraft, through a certification process, rather than licensed like launch vehicles. (A view that puts him at odds with much of the rest of the nascent suborbital industry.) As Rutan puts it:
…we actually are asking for more regulation than the new legislation edicts. We do feel that the FAA needs to be accepting or proving the safety of the ship as it pertains to the passengers that get flown. Whereas their focus has been on only protecting the non-involved public who live on the ground below. We think that the industry will prosper only if there is some acceptance of [responsibility for] the safety of the ship as it pertains to the passengers.
Many industry advocates have argued that people should be allowed to take risks and fly in licensed vehicles to help open markets that promise to lower the cost of space access. Rutan doesn’t agree:
Now I don’t believe that it’s right to say, listen, we’ll let people take risks and we’ll go and build the kind of systems that have been used historically for manned space flight, and somehow solve the affordability problem, and that’s the only problem. We strongly feel that the biggest problem is the safety problem, not the affordability problem. If you fly dozens of people every day, you’ll get affordability with almost any kind of system. The safety problem is the biggie, and that’s why we think the most significant thing that came out of the SpaceShipOne program was not just showing that the little guy can fly above a hundred kilometers, without government assistance, and government technology, and government funds.
Rutan adds that although he disagrees with the current emphasis on the safety of the uninvolved public over passengers, he supports the other aspects of the Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act, although he would like more specifics for the experimental permit authority granted in the legislation “to force FAA to regulate these tests more like airplane research rather than like they did our program.” Be sure to read the whole interview: Rutan provides a number of interesting insights into regulatory issues, flight testing, and related matters.
In my opinion, if you read what he said, he puts much emphasis on “safety”. Again just my opinion, but the goal is not safety – the goal is actually “survival”.
The objective is not necessarily to get the person to and from LEO, just like if you go to work and back, if you have a bad accident and total your car, but walk away, you have met the only objective. You can buy another car, and tell your boss why you missed the meeting.
Thus the “breakthrough” technology is the technology of survival, escape, and rescue – escape systems. Second is controlling production cost. Third eliminating the plague pre-flight review that has stagnated NASA and become a utilitarian tradition.
> Now I don’t believe that it’s right to say, listen, we’ll let people take risks and
> we’ll go and build the kind of systems
> that have been used historically for manned space flight
The key words here are “the kind of systems that have been used historically.”
> just like if you go to work and back, if you have a bad accident and total your car,
> but walk away, you have met the only objective.
And you’ll be bankrupt within a month, if you don’t die in one of the accidents first.
> Thus the “breakthrough” technology is the technology of survival,
> escape, and rescue – escape systems. Second is controlling production
> cost.
Production costs for launch vehicles are not really much higher than those of aircraft. The problem is not production costs, it’s amortization. An airplane flies many thousands of times. A conventional launch vehicle flies only once. Real cost reductions require aircraft-like operations, which means getting away from “devil may care” attitudes about safety. Operators can’t afford to replace aircraft every week any more than you can afford to buy a new car every week.
Escape systems are not the magic panacea seen on tv. “Successful” ejections often leave pilots with long-term medical problems. Pilots call ejection “attempted suicide to avoid certain death.” Ejection is the last resort, not the first resort, when something goes wrong. The missile mafia never understood that, because they don’t strap themselves into a cockpit and hang it on the line every day. The belief that reliability and safety don’t matter if you just have an escape system is why there’s been so little progress since the 1960’s.
>…ejections often leave pilots with long-term medical problems…
This is true. However, the abort/escape systems envisioned for launch vehicles do not approach the same g-loads as those seen in military ejection systems.
Most military systems are designed for g-loads in the mid-twenty g area. Launch vehicle escape systems are substantially less. Depending on the system, you are looking at gs in the mid-teens.
Colonel Vladimir Titov (ret) successfully escaped from the Soyuz T-10 in 1983. He and his fellow crew member were subjected to 15-17 gs, sustained no injuries, and went on to fly a number of missions on MIR, shuttle and station.
NASA has had g-loading limits in place for a number of years. Depending on the direction and length of time, astronauts can withstand well over 30 gs.
> Most military systems are designed for g-loads in the mid-twenty g area. Launch
> vehicle escape systems are substantially less. Depending on the system, you are
> looking at gs in the mid-teens.
The launch escape system on Gemini *was* a military ejection seat.
Those high gee loads are not there just to make military pilots look macho. There’s a reason for them. When you need to get out of a vehicle, you usually need to get out *fast*.
Mike Griffin and the Planetary Society are talking about flying CEV on top of a Shuttle SRB. If something goes wrong, they can’t shut down the SRB, so the escape tower will have to outrun a solid rocket motor that’s already accelerating at several gees. That will *not* be a gentle ride.
> Colonel Vladimir Titov (ret) successfully escaped from the Soyuz T-10
> in 1983. He and his fellow crew member were subjected to 15-17 gs,
> sustained no injuries,
If you look at the Apollo escape system, they couldn’t launch when the winds were in the wrong direction because if there was an abort and the wind blew the capsule back over land, the astronauts would break their backs on impact.
You’re reasoning from a single data point. Just because you got away with something once doesn’t mean you will get away with it every time. “The o-rings nearly burned through before, and it was no problem….”
This is the difference in attitude Burt Rutan is talking about. Aircraft guys worry a lot about safety because they fly every day and know that sooner or later, the numbers will catch up with them. ELV guys just trust in the fact that they’ll never have very many flights and hope the program will be cancelled before they kill someone. Of course, they also assume it’s acceptable to throw away a multi-hundred million dollar vehicle on every flight, because Congress is paying for it and spaceflight is supposed to be expensive. Aircraft guys worry about the safety of the paylod, the crew, *and* the vehicle. It’s what makes them professionals.
More to come on this topic of survival, escape, and rescue, but for now thank you for some more insight, Mr. Walker.
But Mr. Edward Wright – the production cost of a space shuttle was 2 plus billion dollars … that is more than the avg. military aircraft, correct?
More to come, but let me ask a question: if you drive to work, and total your car, say a front end collision that would have killed the typical passenger 60 years ago, but walk away today, and the auto insurance covers your car, is that a success or a failure?
The next human vehicle to and from LEO needs no cargo. No EVA. No science experiments. Nothing. Just the equivalent of an air bag and seat belt. Just like lowest crust Earth orbit in their little commuter cars, bravely exploring ways to get to work and back on a daily basis. No more 18 wheelers for humans to LEO work and back.
>…Gemini *was* a military ejection seat.
Yes, Gemini used ejection seats. My subject was existing and planned systems.
>Those high gee loads are not there just to make military pilots look macho. There’s a reason for them. When you need to get out of a vehicle, you usually need to get out *fast*.
Really? What a concept. Getting out of a failing vehicle quickly. Imagine that.
The main reason the LV escape systems are a lower acceleration is that it is a great deal more difficult to design a tractor system to match the g-load on a military ejection seat system (a lot more mass to design around).
> …they can’t shut down the SRB, so the escape tower will have to outrun a solid rocket motor that’s already accelerating at several gees. That will *not* be a gentle ride.
At the current LV acceleration levels, the current/planned tractor systems will be able to outrun the LV without permanently damaging the crew. Also, if the requirement comes to shut down the booster engine(s) (and I hope it does not), the solids do not have sufficient thrust to continue accelerating the stack.
>…and the wind blew the capsule back over land, the astronauts would break their backs on impact.
I’m sorry, that is incorrect. If the wind was blowing in the wrong direction and an abort was called that resulted in activating the esape system, the crew ran a risk of landing back in the middle of a deflagrating launch vehicle.
>…You’re reasoning from a single data point. Just …
Um, I believe it is the only instance of a launch vehicle escape system being activated during a mission?
I was making the point that certain g-levels do not neccessarily leave a human permanently damaged and those g-levels are higher than most realize.
>ELV guys just trust in the fact that they’ll never have very many flights and hope the program will be cancelled before they kill someone.
Riiiight. ELV guys hope they never have very many flights? And they hope a program gets cancelled before they kill someone? I’m sorry, but that is incorrect. The ELV guys are very confident they can support VSE and they have the engineering and the history to prove it. The reliability of ELV (Atlas II, Atlas V, Delta II, Delta III, Delta IV) is 0.979 (shuttle is 0.982, at what expense?). With that kind of ELV reliability, the addition of an escape system (which the shuttle does not have) will only aid in the LOC calculations.
>…it’s acceptable to throw away a multi-hundred million dollar vehicle on every flight…
I think you are a little high. Of course, the actual costs are proprietary, but according to the International Reference Guide to Space Launch Systems, Fourth Edition the costs of the EELV’s launch services are $78 million to $160 million depending on the vehicle needed.
>…Congress is paying for it and spaceflight is supposed to be expensive…
The EELVs are a *commercial* launch service. Anyone that wishes to contract with them is welcome. And if they conduct a block buy, they can get a good discount. Space does not have to be expensive. But, try telling that to the shuttle mafia.
>…worry about the safety of the paylod, the crew, *and* the vehicle. It’s what makes them professionals.
Tell the people that build ELVs that they are not professional and they do not worry about their vehicle, the payloads, and the future crews. Do it face-to-face, and I’ll send a get-well card.
> Riiiight. ELV guys hope they never have very many flights? And they hope a program gets cancelled before
> they kill someone? I’m sorry, but that is incorrect. The ELV guys are very confident they can support VSE
VSE — three whole flights to the Moon, in an entire year. I rest my case. You’re talking about trivial flight rates.
> I was making the point that certain g-levels do not neccessarily leave a human permanently
> damaged and those g-levels are higher than most realize.
Won’t “necessarily” leave a human permanently damaged?
Well, that’s reassuring. I’m sure the crew will be glad to hear that. Just like Apollo 1 wouldn’t necessarily have a fire and Challenger wouldn’t necessarily have a burn-through?
> The reliability of ELV (Atlas II, Atlas V, Delta II, Delta III, Delta IV) is 0.979
Overlooking the loss rate for vehicles, which is 100% — even the 2,1% loss rate for payloads is apalling. If aircraft had that kind of “reliability,” there would be hundreds of airliners crashing every day.
> The EELVs are a *commercial* launch service. Anyone that wishes to contract with them is welcome.
The EELVs are kept afloat by government handouts that cover all of their fixed costs, which will continue for the foresseable future. They’re about as commercial as the US Post Office (but much more expensive and nor nearly as reliable).
> Tell the people that build ELVs that they are not professional and they do not worry about their vehicle,
> the payloads, and the future crews. Do it face-to-face, and I’ll send a get-well card
When you produce an EELV that’s better than 99.99% reliable, that operates for three times the cost of propellant instead of 100 times, then you can brag about how professional you are.
As for the threats — oh, please! I haven’t been threatened since high school.
> the production cost of a space shuttle was 2 plus billion dollars … that is more than the avg. military aircraft, correct?
B-2 bombers are in that price range, but the Air Force doesn’t deliberately crash them after every flight. Like other aircraft, they’re operated as safely as possible. They don’t kid themselves that safety doesn’t matter because they have cool ejection seats. The only people who think that are people who’ve never sat in an ejection seat.
> if you drive to work, and total your car, say a front end collision that would have killed the
> typical passenger 60 years ago, but walk away today, and the auto insurance covers your car, is
> that a success or a failure?
Do you drive a car? If so, how does your insurance company feel about that devil-may-care attitude? How many “successes” are they willing to pay for before they cancel your policy?
>VSE — three whole flights to the Moon, in an entire year. I rest my case. You’re talking about trivial flight rates.
VSE flights are much more than the expected 3-4 crewed flights (per year) to the moon.
>…apalling. If aircraft had that kind of “reliability,” there would be hundreds of airliners crashing…
That statement was meant to show that the reliability of the ELVs are statistically equivalent (within the error band) to that of the current manned program.
>…When you produce an EELV that’s better than 99.99% reliable, that …
Produce *any* LV with a reliabilty greater than 99.99%, and you will have a wonderful thing.
While the EELVs have not been around long enough to demonstrate a statistical reliability greater than 99.99%, the ancestor of the Atlas V did. The Atlas II had a 100% demonstrated reliability.
>…As for the threats…
I’m sorry if I made myself misunderstood. I in no way meant to imply that.
I gather that you believe I work for one of the EELV contractors. I do not. However, I do know them (and the shuttle folks) very well and am quite certain they would take issue with their professional integrity being questioned.
Forget the car analogy – let’s say a human space flight mission is a complete flop, but the crew lives – would that be a success, or failure, accoring to the People? Does it matter if I am referring to Apollo 13, or a vehicle going to and from LEO? If history repeats itself, a Challenger or Columbia crew surviving would have been in the “S” category.
It seems first NASA needs to understand the concept of success, and the concept of failure, and the customer.
Must testing and proving awaits this breakthrough technology of survival, escape, and rescue. It is as big as the French putting the rudder in the back while the Wright Brothers floundered around with the rudder up front. What started with Apollo regarding this technology should have continued, not ended. Perhaps if the Apollo 13 mishap had occured after LM and CM separation… a more humble NASA would have …
> VSE flights are much more than the expected 3-4 crewed flights (per year) to the moon.
Yes, there are some unmanned flights as well. That’s more, but not “much more.” If you’re excited by spending billions to launch a few robots, it’s understandable that you’re excited by EELV.
> That statement was meant to show that the reliability of the ELVs are
> statistically equivalent (within the error band) to that of the current
> manned program.
“The” current manned program? Do you think there’s only one? The fact that a manned space program based on expendable (or semi-“reusable) technology has reliabile equivalent to another expendable is hardly surprising. The fact that past systems had crappy reliability and horrendous costs does not mean such things are inevitable (or acceptable).
> Produce *any* LV with a reliabilty greater than 99.99%, and you will have
> a wonderful thing.
Your point is…? It’s better to continue down the less-than-wonderful path of the last 40 years?
> The Atlas II had a 100% demonstrated reliability.
Over fewer than 70 flights. A single accident would drop that figure would drop to 98.4%.
The AV-8 Harrier is the most dangerous aircraft in US military service, with an accident rate of 11.4 per 100,000 flight hours. You can find plenty of Harriers that have flown 1,000 times without a mishap, but that does not mean reliability is 100%.
Try telling a Harrier pilot you want to reduce that reliability by two orders of magnitude and it’s okay because he has an ejection seat. See what he says.
> I do know them (and the shuttle folks) very well and am quite certain
> they would take issue with their professional integrity being questioned.
That’s nice. They took issue with Scott Crossfield when he told them not to run a test on the Apollo command module with 17 psi of pure oxygen. What was the result?
> let’s say a human space flight mission is a complete flop, but the crew
> lives – would that be a success, or failure, accoring to the People?
People who operate transportation systems for a living expect to bring back the crew, the payload, and the vehicle. Nothing less is considered successful, regardless of how you try to spin it. Southwest Airlines doesn’t think it’s acceptable to lose an airplane even if the crew and passengers survive.