NASA administrator Michael Griffin continued his tour of NASA’s field centers on Monday, visiting Glenn Research Center. Griffin sought to ease fears there that the center might be closed, but made it clear the future will be a little difficult, according to a Cleveland Plain Dealer article:
“Research centers are not going out of business… not on my watch… We should not confuse that, however, with the need to change the mission. We cannot view the research centers as being frozen in time and continuing forevermore to work on the same things.”
For Glenn, and also for Langley (which Griffin visited Friday), that means less of an emphasis on aeronautics, despite the protestations of aviation industry officials and some members of Congress:
“Aeronautics isn’t going away, but it has been reduced,” he said. “We are changing the definition of what NASA does. The changes can’t take effect instantly, and they can’t take effect, frankly, without some dislocation and without some pain.”
It sounds like they plan to cut bread-and-butter, small-grant aeronautics that (1) isn’t particularly expensive, and (2) is too basic to fit the model of proprietary research. If they cut that for the sake of human spaceflight, then they will be punishing success and rewarding failure.
Well, it appears that the Aldridge Report is also dead. So why again did everyone recommend Griffin? So far I’m seeing more Goldin-esque stuff out of him than anything.
“So why again did everyone recommend Griffin?”
He wants to see results.
He’s technically adept.
He wants NASA to fulfill multiple roles.
He’s committed to building a vehicle to replace the shuttle.
“He wants to see results.” This is a throw away statement. Who doesn’t want to see results? Is someone going to say “I’m not here to see results. I just want to spend gobs of money on spinning my wheels”?
“He’s technically adept”. Engineers generally make bad managers. Being technically adept does not make one an automatic good choice to run an organization that large. By all accounts Bill Gates was a horrible coder. Did Andy Grove become CEO of Intel because he actually made the chips? Sure, its a nice thing if your manager vaguely understand the business, but it isn’t required. And lots of times it gets in the way of doing business and making correct decisions.
“He wants NASA to fulfill multiple roles”. But is this what President Bush and the Vision need? This isn’t about what Mike Griffin wants. I don’t think you’re suggesting that NASA direction and policy be the sole discretion of whoever happens to be Administrator do you? So far that’s what it seems to be…
“He’s committed to building a vehicle to replace the Shuttle”. That’s fine if he’s also commmitted to the best solution for the Vision and not “Mike’s Favorite Rocket Design”. Administrators should not have preconceived notions about which technology is the best or not. Administrators are about process, not tech.
So far all I’ve seen is “Wheee! I get to build Apollo all over again and this time I get to use these cool solid boosters that I’ve always wanted to just strap on random stuff and see what happens!”
I have yet to see any public discussions on sustainable processes for NASA or for anything related to building an industry which is an integral part of the Vision. The only thing I’ve seen is “Stay tuned”. That’s not giving me any warm fuzzies….
Michael Mealing wrote:
“Well, it appears that the Aldridge Report is also dead.”
You linked to an article that Space Politics mentioned here yesterday (NASAWatch is behind the curve):
http://www.dailypress.com/news/local/dp-16741sy0may14,0,6036011.story?coll=dp-news-local-final
That Daily Press article states:
“Griffin said he’s received no directive from Bush to carry out the recommendation of last year’s Aldridge Commission, which suggested turning NASA research centers into privately run institutions like the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in California.”
So if the White House is not backing its own Presidential Commission, why should Griffin follow it?
In fact, there are a number of recommendations in the Aldridge report that nobody has bothered with. Where is the National Space Council that they recommended? Bush could have created that with an executive order, but has not.
Michael Mealing wrote:
“So why again did everyone recommend Griffin? So far I’m seeing more Goldin-esque stuff out of him than anything.”
This makes little sense. You have problems with the fact that Griffin is not following a recommendation in a report that has also been ignored by both the White House and his predecessor. Have you complained about this issue before?
As for the recommendation of turning NASA centers in to FFRDCs, the Aldridge report did a poor job of explaining why this is a good idea. They made some assertions that they did not back with any data. When that recommendation was made, a lot of commentators considered it dead in the water. Some criticised it as a way of avoiding recommending closing a center or two. Others noted that it had little chance of getting through Congress.
Maybe NASA should spend less money on aviontics and more on space exploration like it is suppose to do!
“This makes little sense. You have problems with the fact that Griffin is not following a recommendation in a report that has also been ignored by both the White House and his predecessor. Have you complained about this issue before?”
Yes, but not recently since O’Keefe was at least paying some lip service to the processes and goals Aldridge outlined and I’ve been busy building a startup company. And yes, I have a problem with the Whitehouse picking an Administrator that seems to be using his own Vision instead of the one everyone assumed we were working toward.
Michael Mealing wrote:
“Yes, but not recently since O’Keefe was at least paying some lip service to the processes and goals Aldridge outlined”
He was not doing anything about FFRDCs, which is the subject at hand.
Michael Mealing wrote:
“I have a problem with the Whitehouse picking an Administrator that seems to be using his own Vision instead of the one everyone assumed we were working toward.”
This makes no sense. The White House established the policy. They have now picked somebody who is implementing their policy. He’s there because they want him there.
What makes no sense? The Whitehouse’s Vision announcement was accompanied by very small amounts of information in the form of some powerpoint and a speech. They then said that details of the plan would be worked out by the Aldridge Commission and that NASA would then run with that. When that report came out it looked like something that could be implemented and that would leave an industry behind that could do things on its own.
The Whitehouse publicized a policy and a process that its appointees, with its apparent support, have ignored. So yea, I have a problem with the apparent bait and switch.
I wanted the Aldridge Commission report implemented in its entirety. That’s what I based my support of the Vision on. And if that recommendation is now dead, then so is my support for this Vision…
If it were in iron rule, written on stone tablets, that every recommendation of a Presidential Commission must be followed to the letter, people would have explored Mars twenty years ago, since that was a recommendation made in 1969.
Mark,
I don’t get the point of that remark. Are you calling me naive? That may be true but it isn’t clear that’s what you’re saying. Or are you suggesting that there shouldn’t have been one and that I should just support Griffin and be done with it?
“They then said that details of the plan would be worked out by the Aldridge Commission…”
That was NEVER said.
Charter Of the President’s Commission on Implementation of United States Space Exploration Policy:
“The mission of the Commission shall be to provide recommendations to the President on implementation of the vision outlined in the President’s policy….”
“The Commission shall examine and make recommendations to the President…”
” The Board will provide advice and recommendations only.”
See the theme?
“recommendations”
Cecil,
What is your point? That I shouldn’t be upset that those recommendations are being ignored? That I shouldn’t be surprised? That I should have ignored it to begin with? I liked its recommendations and at the time it was released the rhetoric from O’Keefe and the Whitehouse was in support of it. So now that its been tossed completely in the garbage (as opposed to just bits and pieces of it) I’m supposed to respond with “Great! Wonderful! Let’s go build a Saturn V!”?
I still don’t get what you, Mark and everyone are getting at. You almost sound like your gloating that the report is being ignored. Or are you just enjoying the “I told you so!”?
No, Michael, I am only suggesting that such recommendations should be evaluated on their merits and not automatically accepted.
But I didn’t automatically accept it. I went to the hearings myself and commented on the process quite a bit. I read the entire thing (several times) and pretty much agreed with 90% of it (I disagreed with the “manned spaceflight is the sole purview of NASA” bit, for example). So I evaluated it on its merits and found it worth accepting based on that. And those recommendations are what I based my support of the President’s vision on.
If you didn’t agree with the Commission’s report then that’s a different discussion than the one I think we’re having.
> He’s committed to building a vehicle to replace the shuttle.
Why does NASA need a new shuttle?
And why do the taxpayers need to pay tens of billions so NASA can build a new shuttle?
Just so human spaceflight can “remain the province the government” for another generation?
“Cecil, What is your point? ”
The point is that you overstated the case with your declaration that “details of the plan would be worked out by the Aldridge Commission”, that is not true.
The Aldridge Commission was in a purely advisory position, the President/NASA could inact 100%, 50% or none of its recommendations.
I wish there were some things NASA would do that they’re not going to, and they will do some things that I wish they wouldn’t. But I still support the VSE.
If by not making the Aldridge Commision findings the “VSE Bible” NASA looses your support for VSE, that’s just too bad. But don’t use that as an excuse to claim that the purpose of the Aldridge Commision was something that it most certainly was not.
“He wants to see results.”
The means are important, but the ends are more important than the means.
See also this guy’s blog: http://spacepragmatism.blogspot.com/
I think everyone wants results; NASA has spent a lot of money to go nowhere so I think it’s about time they focus on a national goal. Of course congress really needs to be the one to set the national goals. How many here think we don’t need a shuttle replacement before its retired? Either way you need to give him some time, I think July would be a better time for debating his plans. Right now he is setting expectations so if he is doing it correctly, the cuts won’t be as bad as we think.
my2cents:
I don’t think he is dropping the whole report. Just the part about the FFRDCs, which frankly I don’t know enough about to debate. I am just happy we have some kind of focus. As long as it doesn’t take away from the private sector, go Vision…
I appreciate the ad
Mark, Cecil,
I have to support Michael on this one. It isn’t just the FFDRCs bit, but most of the good suggestions from the Aldridge report are being ignored. But that isn’t what is most important. The problem is that the VSE was only worth supporting if it actually had a chance of spurring the creation of a real and thriving cislunar economy. The Aldridge report was far from perfect, and in fact had many problems with it. The problem is that the approach Griffin at least appears to be taking is even worse! It may very well lead to a technical success that is a complete and utter failure from all other perspectives. I don’t want to see another repeat of Apollo. Haven’t you guys learned a thing in all these years? Without the market, space development will remain at the pathetic level that it has been at since the end of Apollo.
There are still some ways that this could be salvaged, but I think that criticism and skepticism are due here. What Griffin has been saying and doing so far has *not* been promising, and if he doesn’t change, this VSE will end up as another Apollo at best.
~Jon
> Of course congress really needs to be the one to set the national goals. How many here think
> we don’t need a shuttle replacement before its retired?
How many think we do need a shuttle replacement — and why?
If we “need” a shuttle replacement, how have we survived without it since Columbia?
What is the Shuttle doing that’s worth spending billions of dollars a year on it?
If the Federal government is going to spend money on space, why not spend it on something useful instead of replacing a dead-end system that should never have been built in the first place?
Why is it better to repeat failed programs like Shuttle and Apollo than to try something new? Fear of change?
Jon,
Good post. I want a cislunar economy too, and the suborbital economy will be a step towards getting there.
Edward,
Vehicle needed because don’t want to rely on Russia for access to the ISS.
My original support of FFRDCs was based upon the assumption that they are a means to get rid of the dead wood management layers that tend to accumulate over time and are strangling everything the NASA engineers are trying to achieve.
Since the Aldridge report was published others have suggested that JPL does well relative to the other NASA centers for reasons other than their FFRDC status. Indeed, I’ve had anecodotal experiences suggesting that JPL has plenty of cowardly bureaucrats and managers the are unable or unwilling to fire, despite their status. As others have already suggested hard data is, and perhaps always was, needed to make the case for FFRDCs.
So, I don’t blame Griffin for ruling out FFRDCs, but what I’m anxious to hear now is a plan of how he will eliminate the layer of management and accounting Vogons at each and every field center (including HQ).
The US needs access to space, should we wait for Scaled Composite or another company to develop an orbital craft? Scaled Composite is a long way from replacing the capabilities of the Shuttle and I don’t think the big aerospace companies are going to hand over their people, knowlege and equipment for free. After all Boeing and Lockheed are private companies looking for a profit.
Apollo a failure, I don’t think so. However it was a bad long term goal set out by the President (get to the moon as fast as we can at any cost).
We have limped along for the last two years dependent on the Russians, who would have thought of that 20 years ago. It would be nice to be able to fully man IIS with a host of international astronauts and experiments and we can’t do that without a 6 to 7 person vehicle and a similar escape pod.
The shuttle system has done a lot in over 100 flights the least of which is keep Hubble alive, if Hubble had been a simply satellite it would have been DOA.
Don’t get me wrong, I think the billions could have been used better and I’m hoping Griffin and the CEV contractor don’t repeat the mistakes of the past. I think it’s important to remind Griffin and Congress of those mistakes and not to depend on their own memory. American’s expect things to go the best way without any action other than voting (how many did that anyway?).
The biggest problem I saw with the Aldrigde report and process was that Nasa expects you to go to them with what you can do, wade though mountains of paper work and expect only a contract in return. I found that alot of the testimony stated that all nasa needs to do is look and it would find what it is needing.
Then the next biggest problem was that it was not in a continual revisit mode a once only process not ment to further flesh out other issues that are affecting nasa.
John M,
> The US needs access to space, should we wait for
> Scaled Composite or another company to develop
> an orbital craft? Scaled Composite is a long way
> from replacing the capabilities of the Shuttle
> and I don’t think the big aerospace companies
> are going to hand over their people, knowlege
> and equipment for free. After all Boeing and
> Lockheed are private companies looking for a
> profit.
The problem here is that you are begging the question. You state that the US needs access to space (I assume you mean manned access to orbit by that). But the question is what for? Why do we need to replace the capabilities of the Shuttle? Are you so sure that’s really the best way of doing things?
As for Scaled, Burt has already stated specifically that he’s not going after orbital projects until he’s made sure that there is a robust suborbital spaceflight market. That said, Burt isn’t the only guy out there that can design a spacecraft. Even if Griffin manages to pull-off his fasttracking plans, there very well may be commercial orbital access before CEV flies. There are already plenty of boosters out there. With SpaceX potentially bringing their Falcon I and Falcon Vs online in the next year or so (they are planning on doing their full-duration Falcon I hold-down test sometime within the next week or so, and should have their first launch later this year), all that is really needed is a decent spacecraft to put on top. And I happen to know at least one company directly going after that goal, whose founder is a good friend of mine. There is after all a $50M prize coupled with up to $1B worth of potential follow-on contracts for doing
something that is pretty darned similar to what NASA will be doing for the CEV program (but better in many ways).
The important thing is that even if they aren’t willing to wait for private industry (which may beat them anyway), they need to leave open a clear door so they can take advantage of such systems if they do come on-line. I mean something crystal clear that leaves NASA no wiggle-room that if some private company comes up with a vehicle capable of handling the earth-to-orbit delivery of people and cargo that they *must* buy from them. Something like that would give added urgency to the big boys to actually deliver and delivery fast, while leaving the door open for the rest of us.
> Apollo a failure, I don’t think so. However it
> was a bad long term goal set out by the
> President (get to the moon as fast as we can at
> any cost).
If you don’t consider the sorry and useless state of space development over the past 3 decades to be a failure, I’m not sure what would qualify as such in your book. Apollo more or less set back private space development by decades. For the longest time it was impossible to get any serious amount of cash for private space projects due to the whole “well it cost NASA billions of dollars, and required tons of really smart PhDs to do what they did, why do you think you can do it for less? Aren’t they smar people” kind of garbage. Had Apollo never happened, and had space development not been such a nationalized process throughout the world, there’s no reason why we shouldn’t have inexpensive, reliable, and frequent access to space by now. Most of the main technologies needed have been around for decades. The mentalities fostered by the Apollo program are a large chunk of what has been ailing the system.
> We have limped along for the last two years
> dependent on the Russians, who would have
> thought of that 20 years ago. It would be nice
> to be able to fully man ISS with a host of
> international astronauts and experiments and we
> can’t do that without a 6 to 7 person vehicle
> and a similar escape pod.
I’m sure sending two 3-4 person vehicles up at the same time would be quite impossible. Of course, even if you are fixated on very large vehicles that fly infrequently, the vehicles being developed for America’s Space Prize have to fly at least 5-6 people, so I wouldn’t be surprised if that capability was commercially available within the next 5 years.
> Don’t get me wrong, I think the billions could
> have been used better and I’m hoping Griffin and
> the CEV contractor don’t repeat the mistakes of
> the past.
The problem is that it is a lot harder to not repeat the mistakes of the past when you insist on setting the same type of goals and running things in the same manner.
> I think it’s important to remind Griffin and
> Congress of those mistakes and not to depend on
> their own memory.
That’s what Michael and I have been trying to do here. The problem is that most of the potential for major efficiency improvement come from how you setup the process in the first place, and that is not looking very promising.
~Jon