One of the often overlooked, but significant, provisions of the new space transportation policy is that NASA must cooperate with the Defense Department and submit a joint recommendation to the President on the development of any new heavy-lift vehicle to meet potential exploration-unique requirements.” The provision is interesting because the DOD is widely perceived as having a preference for an EELV-derived system, as a way to provide additional support for EELV manufacturers Boeing and Lockheed Martin and take some of the load of supporting the two companies off the Pentagon. New NASA administrator Michael Griffin, on the other hand, has stated a preference in public for using a shuttle-derived heavy-lift vehicle. Space News reports this week that Griffin and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld are scheduled to meet by the end of this month and “the agenda is devoted to that very issue.” One potential compromise, the article suggests, is a mixed-fleet approach with a shuttle-derived heavy-lift vehicle and a EELV-derived human-rated CEV vehicle, but any decision will likely not come easily.
The problem with both Steidle’s “fly off” idea and this new “mixed fleet” proposal is that it will require NASA to do twice what it has enough trouble doing once. One of the CAIB recommendations — that they should prepare a rescue orbiter for each shuttle flight — is in the same spirit. These practices contribute to a larger picture of a human spaceflight program slowly collapsing under its own weight.
On the other hand Burt Rutan is great. He has gotten people to applaud subortibal flights again. This is a very healthy lowering of expectations.
Yes Rutan could be the catalyst in all this. If (BIG) he can get the backing for the CVX privately (t/Space talk about less than one $billion), he could be knocking at the ISS hatch by 2008 with a working oxygen generator as a present. Now that would seriously change attitudes and reality.
In the meantime, pigs will fly…
I hope T/Space does something cool, but I’m more concerned with the DoD’s involvement in deciding heavy lift. The EELV is designed solely to put DoD satellites in space. The program is a disaster and the boosters’ real names, Atlas and Delta, are proof that the USAF is uninterested in moving beyond ballistic missiles. NASA I think is far more visionary and responsible with regards to heavy lift. The DoD is focused too much on satellites and too little on expanding space capabilities. Human rating a cluster of solid rockets would be challenging to say the least. And the USAF is too focused on saving Boeing and LockMart to make a decent decision based on operational merit.
I don’t think it will be a big deal. NASA needs a heavy launch vehicle – something in the Saturn V class. Neither the Titan nor Delta will do the job, whereas NASA can do a Shuttle-C type of vehicle and use the existing main tank (Lockheed) and solids (Thiokol), and do a new contract for the cargo vehicle and engines. It’s mostly status quo, so it should keep the good ol’ boy network happy.
Sure we could do better, but I’d just be happy to get back to where we were in the ’60s right now.
There is no need for “heavy lift”, as defined now (100+t to LEO, or ‘the bigger the better’) assuming the costs involved. Except, all of the job programs and the gravy that is associated with it which will bend the congressmen’s ears. The SRB ‘light’ ‘man rated’ ‘stick’ is madness altogether.
I must be getting old. I remember a day when we sized vehicles according to their mission.
With only one East Coast launch pad for Delta and one for Atlas, can EELV sortie sufficient mass to LEO to actually do anything useful?
We will need three or four EELVs to do a Moon mission, right? How long will it take to place 4 EELVs on orbit using only Pad 37? Modular only works IF we achieve high flight rates and we cannot achieve high flight rates with a pad choke point.
Building new Delta pads will cost big $$$ and merely move the standing army from one unit to another rather like carrying cannon balls across the yard.
Excellent points Bill. Points that no one ever seems to consider in the rush to embrace multiple launch EELV scenarios, where a single SDV would sufice.
“… in the rush to embrace multiple launch EELV scenarios, where a single SDV would sufice.”
EELVs exist now. The SDV does not.
The ISS was designed around what vehical we had available, The Shuttle. (Mainly for political reasons to justify the shuttle’s existance) If we had a vehical that could put up 100T, we could of had the station in alot less launches.
Now we have a mission. Well more of a goal. We do not know yet how much of what we need for the goal. But we got a pretty good idea. One of those things we need is Fuel, and lots of it. The problem with multiple small launches to put fuel up in a depot is that in Space, the most effcient fuel source Liq OX/Hy boils off even in space. So we will need to use alot of mass in insulation.
But if we put the extended mission pod with the fuel needed for the mission then send up the CEV with crew (or without if t/space succeds with CXV) then dock the CEV to the mission configuration there will be less boil off.
Admittedly there is not enough of a private market for a heavy launch, which is why the government needs to do it for there own missions. Eventually we will not need a heavy lifter from earth at all as we would be mining the solarsystem for fuel. But first we need to bootstrap it. If left up to private industry it will be smaller launchers unless there are regular private trips to Moon/Mars/Asteroids using conventual chemical rockets.
It would probably be better for all concerned if NASA focused on the big vehicles and let private companies handle the small stuff. It would get NASA out of the way of the private companies and put them back on the leading edge, where they belong if they are going to be of any value at all.
I like that approach, Dfens, because smaller lifters also seem to be a DoD specialty. There are many DARPA and USAF contracts helping the startups along for the cheap, small, reliable, responsive microsat class LV’s. I fear that because the DoD is into the smaller lifters they’ll kill HLV programs through indifference (not because they wouldn’t want them, but because they wouldn’t care enough to lift a finger to help). NASA has done well with heavy boosters before, and I think some of the shuttle derived boosters could be very valuable. 10 core Atlas V’s tied together with a string just doesn’t sit right with me.
Matthew Brown, you said that someday we will not need an HLV because we’ll be mining the Solar System. I can’t help wondering why we’re waiting.
Develop a miniature automated factory that can process loose regolith and produce oxygen, and launch it with one or more EELVs. Right off the bat, you’ve got most of the mass of your return-flight “fuel.”. What does that do to your HLV requirement?
If you have reusable cis-Lunar vehicles, maybe you can ship more O2 back on the empty return flights. Next, add H2 from the poles, or possibly from the solar wind. If we really want to get out into the Solar System, this, or something like it, is what we should be spending our money on, not new launch vehicles.
So, my timeline would be something like,
Start o2 factory development immediately.
Develop and test fly trans-lunar infrastructure designed for either one-way or two-way flight (two stage?). The return stage is designed to be fueled on the moon but uses fuel from Earth for early flight testing.
Land factory on the moon and generate O2 (a la Zubrin’s Mars-direct ideas), while simultaneously testing lunar lander.
Fly multiple one-way cargo flights with equipment and habitats.
Start first two-way flights with crews and possibly returning oxygen for vehicles and to supply the Space Station.
I am not qualified to do the mass analysis, but if something like this could be made to work, instead of spending $5-10 billion on an HLV, you get “fuel” production on the moon and the beginnings of trade. These two things would allow partial living off the land and supply an economic reason for the lunar base to exist.
With the HLV, you may get cheaper transport if the thing ever gets developed (which is where my faith fails me), but you’ve spent your money without learning any new skills or producing useful products.
I do look forward to your comments.
— Donald
Serris: “EELVs exist now. The SDV does not.”
The launch pads required to orbit 100 tons via EELV within a week or even a MONTH do not exist. The SDV launch pad that can orbit 100 tons on one DAY does.
Good morning, Cecil. I suspect that, even before cost overruns, building an extra EELV launch pad (or three or five) will be small potatoes compared to developing even a Shuttle-derived HLV. Perhaps, you might not even have to duplicate the entire launch infrastructure, but just the pad. I admit that is an argument neither for nor against developing an HLV, but I don’t think launch pads should be the major determinant of the decision.
— Donald
Donald,
Bootstraping, most of the automatic factories (given that they are flawless and working, which i think is 20 years out for the moon as its harder to turn rock into Liq O2 then gass into O2) to be relaible and redunant would be huge, so you need to have the HLV to launch it in the first place, and size of a good tank for storage. A HLV not only allows us larger Mass to send up but a larger volume.
Local lunar materials for a storage tank is too porus and boils off too much. And inflatable materials become too brittle at the temps needed to store Liquid O2. The Artemis Society has alot of info for moon resources and insitu use of such. Dunno if any of it archived on the web somewhere.
For a Cis lunar transport, you could only worry about making the O2 on the moon and carry the H2 from earth, that should reduce the need for HLV for the fuel requirements. Boil off of the H2 would still be an issue but since the mass ratio is less.
IMHO HLVs are alot more feasible today then the automatied factories. And are about 30 years away. even at the Large mass and volume elements for Moon and asteroids. Granted this is barring any signifgant advances in Nanotechnology. For these long range goals I look at whats possible today and not what might be. Incremental steps as opposed to paradigm shifts.
Fuel wise if Nuclear engines are allowed we won’t need HLV for Solar system trips. So i don’t count on that.
I also dislike on orbit construction this early, We will need it within 30 years and need some practice. But if we take our time we can learn it at a much safer pace. but in the mean time we will need to be able to send large structures into orbit and elsewhere in the solar system. Power Sats for example, whould be much cheaper if we can through something large up in one shot then have on orbit construction. Which then in turn makes it more attractive for private companies to invest in and do.
It does seem a waste to design something fly it for 10 years or so then never use the capibility again but without it we won’t be doing it fast enonough. The world has given us a deadline. HLVs should help us meet that deadline.
Thanks, Matthew,
I’m torn. You and Cecil present pretty convincing technical arguments. But, I still fear if we go this route it will be a political disaster. To survive politically, this project _has_ to stay within NASA’s current budget, it has to avoid too much opposition from those whose oxes are gored (Greg, et al), and it has to show real measurable results real fast. I’m convinced that there is not money in the potentially available budget for both deploying something useful and developing the ideal launch vehicle — something we’ve been failing to do for my entire politically aware lifetime. If we start out by developing a new rocket, Congress will see this (correctly) as more of the same ol’ same ol’, and, I fear, that will give Greg, et al, their political chance. All my political instincts tell me that this project doesn’t have a chance unless it’s well on the way to launching human-related payloads before the current President leaves office. Maybe we better start figuring out how we _are_ going to miniturize that exygen plant and get it on the moon in four years.
Impossible? We did Apollo, which _did_ involve developing a new launch vehicle in only twice that time. Still impossible? Then maybe this whole project is politically impossible.
— Donald
Donald: “To survive politically, this project _has_ to stay within NASA’s current budget, it has to avoid too much opposition from those whose oxes are gored”
“Budget”: I can’t imagine why a shuttle derived HLV would cost anymore than half as much to launch as does the current srb/et/manned orbiter combo. Why? Because the largest contingent of the current srb/et/orbiter cost lies with the turn around of the manned orbiter, or so I am told. Most people seem to assume that an SDV will have the same per launch cost as the current shuttle, but if you do away with the orbiter turn around funds you’re left with a much more affordable heavy lift system.
Compare it finacially to an EELV, most estimates for a Delta IV heavy run around 250 million per launch. To get 100 tons in orbit will cost at least 1 billion. Even if 3-4 new EELV capable pads were somehow obtained free. Surely an unmanned shuttle derive HLV can launch 100 tons for less.
“Oxen gored”: How many congressional ozen will be gored when you stop the manufacture of SRB,s, ET’s and the other components that would go into an SDV? I personally don’t like such decisions being made on politcal grounds, but in this case the politics also favors the SDV as much if not more than the EELV.
I don’t consider a shuttle derived HLV as a “new” vehicle. If we don’t have the technological wherewithall to take the shuttle hardware and build an affordable HLV in the same manner as we designed and built upon previous rockets time and time again in the 50’s and 60’s, well maybe we should just stay on this rock.
It’s certainly conceivable that a Shuttle-derived HLV would be cheaper to launch than four EELVs, or even, say, two upgraded EELVs (AvWeek discussed upgrades to the Delta-IV that could push it to 50 tones). It’s getting from here to there that worries me.
Meanwhile, the EELVs are there for the taking, already developed and flying. I also think you’re ignoring the fact that the EELVs were designed for relatively high launch rates and to take advantages of economies of scale. I think that is especially so for the Delta-IV. It’s possible that higher launch rates would reduce costs. That’s something that’s unlikely for an HLV.
Reduced EELV costs would benefit everyone; an HLV benefits only the moon-Mars initiative, at least in the short term. More frequent EELV launches might be a way to bring scientists and others on board.
Finally, I’ve never argued that we should never build an HLV. What I am arguing is that we should use what we have to get started, _then_, once a rudimentary lunar base is there and needing supplied, we have a reason to develop the HLV (at least if Matthew is wrong re. extra-terrestrial mining).
It seems to me that both sides are quoting the numbers that benefit their position.
— Donald
Resource mining of the Moon is a natural goal or even consequence of any permanent base there. The reason we need a heavy lift vehicle is to get the base materials to their destination in reasonable quantities. A vehicle that lifts 40,000 only puts ~5,000 of that on the Moon. That’s not a lot of material to work with.
I’d say it makes sense to develop your resource mining technology and heavy lift vehicle in parallel. The key is, success breeds success, and heavy lift has served us well in the past, whereas what we have now is clearly not working.
As for whether any vehicle is buildable, as long as NASA continues to reward contractors for doing poor work and dragging things out for as long as possible, the contractors will continue to exhibit the behavior for which they are rewarded. They’re like dogs or rats that way. NASA needs to get out of bed with these companies and go back to having a customer-supplier relationship.
Donald: “It’s getting from here to there that worries me.”
That worries me as well, to a degree. My point is that I believe it is possible to do within budgetary constraints, and the changes in planning and leadership being undertaken by Griffin now gives me more hope in that.
Donald: “I also think you’re ignoring the fact that the EELVs were designed for relatively high launch rates and to take advantages of economies of scale.”
Designed for high launch rates true, but the ability has never been demonstrated.
Donald: “Finally, I’ve never argued that we should never build an HLV. What I am arguing is that we should use what we have to get started, _then_, once a rudimentary lunar base is there and needing supplied, we have a reason to develop the HLV (at least if Matthew is wrong re. extra-terrestrial mining).”
Sorry, but that seems backwards to me. An HLV would be most beneficial in getting a lunar base in place; which could then be more easily supported by medium lift after it is completed. And the HLV has the advantage of getting the lunar base in place quicker, and once it is in place it is tougher for politicians to kill. If the construction of a partially completed lunar base is halted because of one EELV launch going bad there will be many political voices calling for it to stop right there. Especially if the portion already constructed is behind schedule and over budget (ISS?). The most dangerous period, from the standpoint of cancellation on political grounds, is passed through much more quickly using HLV to get the lunar base in place.
Donald: “It seems to me that both sides are quoting the numbers that benefit their position.”
That is only natural
.
But I do TRY to avoid that. I am not a hardcore HLV fanatic, even if I do sound that way. For a while I was mostly sold on the EELV idea, but the more I study the idea and compare it to ISS construction using the same methods I am 95 % convinced that an HLV is the way to go.
I am trying to avoid only showing favorable numbers to my point of view. As the Sci-Fi book i intended to write is turning into a non fiction book and it must not be looked on as proporganda. (My entended audience is Eviromentalists and Money Grubbing companies ;))
I’m only a proponant of HLVs as its the best way to beat what I see is an inverse point of no return. Which is where we will not have the reasources avaible to exsist must less get into space. If my desires come true, sometime late this century or early next the only thing we will be lifting to Space is people. And all construction of space hardware is done elsewhere in the solarsystem.
But my goal is to make sure we can import reasources from space so that we can thrive on earth without needs of removing personal liberties. But thats getting off topic
It is a shame your book isn’t space history rather than science fiction. Who would have guessed in the ’60s and ’70s our access to space in the 21st Century would be so limited? It sounds as if you have some very interesting thoughts on the future of space exploration.
Cecil: Sorry, but that seems backwards to me. An HLV would be most beneficial in getting a lunar base in place; which could then be more easily supported by medium lift after it is completed. And the HLV has the advantage of getting the lunar base in place quicker, and once it is in place it is tougher for politicians to kill. If the construction of a partially completed lunar base is halted because of one EELV launch going bad there will be many political voices calling for it to stop right there. Especially if the portion already constructed is behind schedule and over budget (ISS?).
There’s not a word here I disagree with.
Cecil: The most dangerous period, from the standpoint of cancellation on political grounds, is passed through much more quickly using HLV to get the lunar base in place.
Here is where I disagree. _I_ think the most dangerous period of cancelation is somewhere in the middle of HLV development, say, when Mr. Bush leaves office or when funding for the HLV and lunar base development peak at the same time, before either project has anything to show for the money spent. The second most dangerous period is the inevitable (we are talking real world here) period when HLV is running late and over budget, we’ve got large budgets involved in developing the lunar base, and there is nothing on the moon to show for it.
However, if somebody can convince me that we can do both projects at once without increasing NASA’s budget or delaying that first payload on the moon, I’m sold.
I don’t think that’s possible. That’s why my compromise suggestion: get some sort of experimental oxygen generation plant on the moon before you ramp up too much funding in either the HLV or the base — so you’ve got a success to point to during these periods. If you’re producing LOX on the moon and using it to fuel, say, a polar sample return mission, you’re demonstrating that all of this can really work and that the money being invested in the HLV and the lunar base lead somewhere. . . .
Results soon. That’s all I want!
— Donald
Donald: “Here is where I disagree. _I_ think the most dangerous period of cancellation is somewhere in the middle of HLV development, say, when Mr. Bush leaves office…”
That is a concern, but I believe Mr. Griffin plans on getting the ball rolling on HLV development to a “critical mass” point so that by January 2009 it will be very difficult to kill. There again is where the srb/et etc. constituencies come into play.
I don’t believe developing a shuttle derived HLV has to be as expensive as you believe it will be. And I think Griffin is the one man who can pull it off in an economical manner.
Yeah cost is the issue, but lets hope Griffin does the HLV on a fixed cost contract instead of cost plus. This should bring the cost down.
(I can dream can’t I?)
Matthew: Yup, your dreaming. A quick read of any AvWeek in the last couple of years should show that fixed cost contracts are largely fiction. As soon as the contractor gets in trouble, the Air Force declares the project essential and coughs up the cash. (In fact, the Air Force reminds me quite a lot of my cats. They insist on eating grass from the garden, and, with the regularity of a cost overrun, immediately throw it all up onto the rug. They, like the Air Force, never learn.)
Cecile: “And I think Griffin is the one man who can pull it off in an economical manner.”
I guess we’re on a roll here, I think I agree with you on this one, too. Which doesn’t mean I think it can be done — I don’t — but if it can, Griffin is probably the man.
— Donald
Good, analogy. If the contractor looks bad, the DoD or NASA program office looks bad. Instead of looking out for the taxpayer, the program office looks out for the contractor. It doesn’t really matter if it’s cost plus, or firm fixed. If the contractor is overrunning, the contracting office has Congress “punish” them by not fully funding the contract for the next fiscal year. The unplanned lack of funds forces a program rephase, and the contractor gets put back on schedule and budget in resulting contractual change.
We did that for years on space station. That was the impetus behind all of the baseline changes too. They needed their big, annual contract change so they could get well from the cost overruns. The schedule would always slide years to the right, the final cost would go through the roof, and the capability would decrease.
I’m hoping t/space gets funding and succeeds on the CXV, it will probly be the exception that proves the rule. But may become the first nail in COst-plus coffin though.
I know cost plus has a role. Any X program needs to be cost plus as they develop wholy new technolgies. As is most Big Military programs.
The CEV, CXV and a Shuttle Dereived HLV are all incremental technologies. (CXV is the more complex of these with more incremental steps then the other two. And with the drop tests succeded all new tech as been reasearched the rest is incremental and issues of scale, IIRC )
Though it is disheartening that the CXV is not designed for 5 crew members. If it were it could contend for Bigalow’s American Space Prize, if it got private funding. Though, if no one else meets the deadline, t/space may get the servicing contract from Bigalow. That may force Lockheed and Boeing to take internal incentives to reduce cost so they can compete in the private market. With Cost plus there is no incentive to reduce costs.
I dunno, maybe i need to look at a timeline that meats the deadline that doesn’t require the government. (I hope there is one)
There is an incentive to reduce costs with cost plus. The contractor doesn’t make any profit on the over run amount in a cost plus contract. That’s why I said what I did about there not really being any difference between firm fixed and cost plus. If NASA is going to allow annual changes to the contract, effectively preventing the contractor from ever over running, either type of contract is a gravy train. The key to cost effectiveness is not in the type of contract, it is in the structure of NASA itself.
The programs have too much power. The way it is now the director of the shuttle program has more power than Mike Griffin. That’s why Griffin wants the shuttle to die. It is the only way he can get enough control of NASA to build its replacement.
Back in the old days, the head of NASA had most of the power. Congressmen hated that, because they had to kiss up to him to get the pork they wanted allocated to their states.
The way it is now, they have the program directors who kiss up to them directly for their operating budget. Once a congressman gets that pork program started in their district or state, they can count on their program guy to try to milk that sucker for as long as possible. It doesn’t matter if it makes sense for the space program or for the US, as long as it is good for the the congressman’s district, that’s all that matters. Effectively this is congress’ way of usurping the powers of the Executive branch. It really sucks for us as taxpayers.