In the Space Review article I wrote just yesterday, I noted that the disruption caused by Hurricane Katrina could further delay the next shuttle mission by at least two months, while the cost of the disaster would far exceed what Congress has appropriated for it, with potential consequences for NASA. Both of those are coming true very quickly. Writing for MSNBC, James Oberg reveals that, according to an internal NASA memo, “Launch dates before the fall of 2006 may not be credible.” (Only part of that slip, if it does come to pass, would be caused by the hurricane, since NASA still has to figure out how to stop foam shedding from the external tank.)
Meanwhile, President Bush has submitted to Congress a request for a $51.8-billion supplemental funding bill for hurricane relief. With the cost of the disaster now pegged at up to $150 billion, there will be more bills that the federal government will pave to pay in the months and years to come. Right now Congress and the President appear willing to simply fund the bills without any tax increases and/or cuts to other programs (like NASA), although there are a few in Congress who would prefer not to finance the relief and reconstruction with debt:
“Everybody in America is going to have to sacrifice to help us rebuild the Gulf Coast,” said Sen. Tom Coburn, R-Okla., a stout fiscal conservative. “Every government program, every individual, we are all going to have to sacrifice.”
Not many, though, agree with Sen. Coburn at the moment.
They’re going to have to launch a Shuttle without any further external modifications to the External Tank.
If NASA waits another year or more to send another Shuttle aloft, I predict that Congress and the general public are going to turn their backs to the Shuttle/Space Transportation System.
NASA is going to have to develop a grittier, more realistic, and more heroic attitude about Shuttle flights, and launch in early 2006.
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9241242/page/2/
…
As a result, Hale concludes, removing the ramps “is not considered a serious next-flight option.” And even if the flight data could be obtained, he adds, the timeline his team had developed showed that a “non-PAL ramp tank could be made available in the October 2006 time frame” — it would take three or four months after that date before a launch could occur.
…
What, it will be over a year before they launch the shuttle again. Who would have guessed? Well, ok, I would have. Did I not also tell you the flow between the tank and the orbiter was “unsteady”? I guess I called it transient. Ironically, no one I know who can analyze such flow works for NASA. They could go to the consultant team of Davis and Jones, and there’s one other guy, Stamper, he was a configurator for Lockheed on HSCT, who could possibly analyze that kind of flow and tell them how to fix that kludged up mess. I’d be amazed if there were half a dozen more than that left in the whole world who could make sense of that area between the orbiter and tank.
A riddle for our times: What is the difference in Washington between socialism and leadership? If it has a regular budget paid for with taxes, for example FEMA, then it’s socialism. But if it’s emergency spending covered by borrowing, like Hurricane Katrina relief, then it’s leadership. Or if it’s a commitment for office-holders of the distant future, like the VSE, then it’s also leadership.
Anyway, I’m glad that Jeff Foust noted that they will have spent three years and $12 billion for just one shuttle flight.
We’re very near the point where everyone, not just shuttle critics, will be forced to admit that the shuttles should now become museumware. It’s a shame we had to drop billions of dollars on a futile and pointless RTF effort.
RTF = “retire the fiasco”
Paul: “We’re very near the point where everyone, not just shuttle critics, will be forced to admit that the shuttles should now become museumware.”
Nobody, in the past, has been a greater defender of the Shuttle program than I. But you are right. Enough is enough and it is time to move on. It is very hard to write these words, but there it is: The Shuttle should never fly again.
— Donald
Donald: “The Shuttle should never fly again.”
I thought you were in favor of completing ISS?
Let’s just agree that the space station is complete. They can even brag that they finished it five years ahead of schedule.
I am, Cecil. And, until the latest fiasco, I was in favor of using the Shuttle. But I try real hard to live in the real world, unlike, I increasingly fear, the new NASA Administrator.
Also, I did my research and found that all of the modules weigh approximately half of what the Delta-IV Heavy can lift to the Station’s orbit, and all but one (the Japanese external platform) will fit inside the largest currently marketed shroud. We ought to be able to get these items into orbit on EELVs for a (probably small) fraction of what RTF redux is going to cost.
So, Plan A is to launch the existing modules on EELVs. If that can’t be done with the Lockheed solar arrays, buy some commercial arrasy off-the-shelf and stick them on some rigged up mounting — this is a human Space Station after all, with a crew to fix things.
Plan B is to use the Station as is, which would serve my purposes of providing a market for SpaceX, et al. Or, possibly buy a Proton launched Zarya module or three with their attached solar arrays.
It sounds like most of the people on this list — with all their diverse opinions about everything else — are agreed on at least the basic outline of how to go forward. To wit, abandon the Shuttle now, complete the station with EELVs or declare it finished, and get out of LEO. Now, we only need some leadership from NASA or the Administration.
Despite my post earlier this morning I remain hopeful that somebody at OMB can talk some political sense into Mr. Griffin, but I’m not holding my breath.
— Donald
Donald: I don’t think that you’re being fair to Griffin. He is a trained engineer and he certainly seems to want to live in the real world. He has said many times, if not exactly in these words, that he hates the space shuttle and the space station.
The problem is that Congress and the White House do not live in the real world. They live in a synthetic world of patronage and photo ops, a world in which the space shuttle is the heart and soul of NASA. Griffin has to humor them to keep his job.
Donald: “until the latest fiasco”
Not sure what you’re referring to. I think the latest hold ups to a shuttle launch are related to the hurricane, how was that a “fiasco” that NASA was to blame for? Or am I missing something?
Donald: “I was in favor of using the Shuttle. But I try real hard to live in the real world, unlike, I increasingly fear, the new NASA Administrator.”
On this count Dr Griffin is based more in reality than you I believe. The Shuttle is required to complete ISS.
Donald: “Also, I did my research and found that all of the modules weigh approximately half of what the Delta-IV Heavy can lift to the Station’s orbit…”
Getting modules into orbit is not the same as getting them attached to the ISS complex and functioning as intended. Also most if not all the remaining to be launched modules were designed to be launched supported/cradled in the shuttle cargo bay. To replicate that launch environment in another vehicle would be no easy or cheap task.
Cecil, the latest fiasco I was referring to was the tank shedding incident. But the hurricane will cost money, lots of it, and that will have long-term baring on what we and NASA can afford. It cannot be ignored strictly for engineering convenience.
Regarding the EELVs, you’ve got a mass pad of fifty-percent; the Shuttle launches vertically so they’re capable of circa three-gee vertical loads; and the launch environment when the SRBs are firing is not all that benign. I’m not in a position now to quantify any of that, but shutting the down the Shuttle program would free up billions. That would pay for a lot of difficult EELV and module engineering.
“On this count Dr Griffin is based more in reality than you I believe. The Shuttle is required to complete ISS.”
Okay, here’s what we’ve got:
1. Shuttle to complete the Space Station and repair Hubble.
2 and 3. The EELVs to keep the Air Force happy.
4 and 5. David’s count of the medium-class launchers Mr. Griffin wants.
6. The HLV that you and Mr. Griffin want.
Even half that number is political and economic insanity. It’s probably technical insanity. We as a nation have to make some hard decisions and choose, at most, two of these vehicles.
If we don’t, I feel very confident in predicting that we are going nowhere. These are decisions that, obviously, cannot be made by engineers. The engineers can give us the choice, but somebody at the Administration has to care enough to make the decision.
Somebody made some very tough calls a couple of years ago when the VSE outline was decided. Now, somebody needs to make some even tougher calls and (I do not say this happily) it is becoming increasingly clear to me that Mr. Griffin is not the one to make them.
— Donald
Greg, believe me, I wish your statements were true, but you’ve got them backword. The “real world” that NASA lives in, as a government agency paid for with tax dollars, is the political world that Congress and the White House create, reflecting (whether we like what the mirror shows us or not) the people who elected them. Mr. Griffin needs to live in that world, as well as his engineering world. His _job_ is to reconcyle those two worlds and to do it successfully. Unfortunately, it looks to me like Mr. Griffin is ignoring the former world to cater to his friends in the latter.
I think that, right now, after the latest problems and with the new RTF bills looking bad, killing the Shuttle is a politically achievable goal, but Mr. Griffin probably has a very narrow political window. If he can propose something as grand as the Shuttle, that would employ as many people and cost no more, than he’s got a shot.
Unfortunately, he appears to want to blow his wad building new launch vehicles, which, whatever the technical “realities,” I believe will be a political mistake of historic proportions.
I believe he’s got to use that political capital on a lunar base or something comparable now — which he can patch up with better launch vehicles later.
— Donald
Donald: “Cecil, the latest fiasco I was referring to was the tank shedding incident.”
Ah, well yes that is a problem. I would not call it a fiasco. I agree with Dr. Griffin that Discoverys flight was for the most part a success. We’ve never examined a shuttle launch so closely and from so many angles, it is no wonder that we found things that are happening that we never realized. The PAL ramp was overlooked, that was a mistake. A big one, but hopefully it will now be fixed. The suggestion that fixing the PAL will cost as much as has already been spent on 18 months of RTF is, IMHO, an extreme exaggeration.
Donald:
1. Shuttle to complete the Space Station and repair Hubble.
2 and 3. The EELVs to keep the Air Force happy.
4 and 5. David’s count of the medium-class launchers Mr. Griffin wants.
6. The HLV that you and Mr. Griffin want.
Even half that number is political and economic insanity. It’s probably technical insanity. We as a nation have to make some hard decisions and choose, at most, two of these vehicles.
Well let me see, where do I start…. You’re counting the Shuttle along with the HLV, but Shuttle will be retired before the HLV comes online. Launch vehicle count is then down to 5. I’m not aware of two medium-class launchers that Dr. Griffin wants, only one: the “stick” SRB launcher for the CEV. Launch vehicle count is then down to 4. The EELV’s will likely be pared down to only one. Launch vehicle count is then down to 3.
Three launch vehicles is a good minimum number. “At most two” is certainly not enough, “at most two” suggests we could get by with only one launch vehicle for all our needs and that is simply not true.
What’s wrong with one EELV for human transport and one HLV for cargo transport? You get maximum launch frequency out of the former, and the latter does not need to be particularly safe. You get additional economies of scale by adapting the latter out of the former, e.g., LM’s proposal or similar ones from Boeing, but I can be talked out of that. I can’t think of any reason for the SRB-derived; it only duplicates what we already have at additional expense.
— Donald
I agree, I’m not particularly found of the SRB stick launcher. That’s my “gut feel” on it anyway.
When you look at it purely from a factual standpoint, things change however. The SRB stick is said to have a 20-25 ton to LEO capacity, one configuration I saw was about 29 ton. The nearest EELV equivalent is the Delta IV Heavy, at about 20 tons to LEO. I don’t know what an SRB stick launcher would cost, but the 3 core Delta IV heavy is about 600-800 million I think. I’ve seen $250 million per CBC quoted; don’t know how accurate that is. I’d bet good money it would be at least 500 million, and for less lift capacity. You’d think the SRB launcher would be cheaper than that, or at least I think it should be.
And if you’re going to keep the SRB factory open, since the HLV uses SRBs, maybe it does make sense to use the SRB to launch the CEV. I don’t have all the figures to determine that. But the guys who’ve decided that’s the way to go do have the figures, and they’re not dummies. Not saying I trust them 100%, but I don’t have enough facts (as opposed to opinions, or “gut feelings”) to say they’re wrong either.
BTW, I am also not very “fond” of the SRB idea either
But that ignores several political facts.
The cost to adapt the SRB. (That may be a wash with the cost to adapt the EELV.)
The cost of infrastructure, both manufacturing and launching.
The EELV has a much wider market and will be kept in business by the DOD whether NASA uses it or not.
Economies of scale and reliability in using the same launch vehicle frequently. Your EELV costs assume current launch rates. Both vehicles were designed for maximum economies from building large numbers of nearly identical components. If we go with Shuttle-derived, we’re throwing all of that away, at least as far as the VSE is concerned.
Every penny spent adapting or developing or maintaining an additional launch vehicle is a penny not spent on the VSE. The goal has to be to maintain the absolute minimum launch infrastructure we can get by with, at least in the near term.
We do need to think about the other stakeholders in the government space program. If you can make a case that the existence of the VSE will reduce the cost of launching applications, military, and science satellites, you have a much wider political base of support. The goal, to the degree possible, should be an integrated space program with the VSE creating markets that benefit everyone.
Finally, I have to ask, why is NASA developing any of this stuff. Everything we’re discussing is very mature technology. Just say that NASA will be buying, say, ten HLV-sized payloads in the next decade. That should provide enough market for Boeing, LM, and United Space Alliance, and others, to adapt their own vehicles to the HLV role. Let the plan that can get their vehicle to market soonest and / or cheapest win.
— Donald
This piece
from December 2004 indicates that EELV’s were under consideration for CEV launches. Dr Griffin took offfice last spring. Plans have changed.
The article also says:
The Delta 4-Heavy is capable of delivering 48,000 pounds of cargo into low-Earth orbits, including that of the International Space Station, 28,000 pounds into geosynchronous transfer orbit used by communications satellites, 22,000 pounds for Trans Lunar Injection routes to the moon and 17,600 pounds on Mars-bound trajectories.
…
Lockheed Martin, which had skipped plans to field its version of the Atlas 5-Heavy, changed course and is developing the vehicle that will resemble the Delta 4-Heavy with three booster cores tied together
…
Oops, try this:
http://www.spaceflightnow.com/delta/d310/041207preview.html
Cecil: “The SRB stick is said to have a 20-25 ton to LEO capacity, one configuration I saw was about 29 ton. The nearest EELV equivalent is the Delta IV Heavy, at about 20 tons to LEO. I don’t know what an SRB stick launcher would cost, but the 3 core Delta IV heavy is about 600-800 million I think.”
You’d think that NASA would scale down the arbitrarily-chosen CEV crew size so that CEV fits onto an EELV.
Instead, CEV mass has become a rigid requirement for no good reason that drives NASA to need a new launcher… perhaps that was the point. Maybe they’re using the same requirements methodology that was used for the Space Shuttle?
And of course MSFC’s cost models put the stick as infinitesimally cheaper than EELV (though what’s the difference in programmatic risk?). We now know the whole man-rating argument was a lie, so if anyone out there still thinks there is a _valid_ reason for the stick, name it!
I’m not so cynical as to think the CEV crew size was chosen arbitrarily, and I have no idea what FACTS would lead you to believe that either. I suppose we could have a crew of 3 just so we can use an EELV, or should we cut it down to a crew of 2? Gemini to the Moon anyone?
I don’t know what MSFC’s claims are as to the SRB being “infinitesimally cheaper than EELV” I only stated that it seems to me that they would be cheaper. Again, do you have any facts to prove otherwise?
And since we’re back on the subject of SRBs, I finally found real evidence that NASA has indeed test fired a 5 segment SRB.
Building a Better Booster
On the SRB vs EELV argument, don’t forget launch pad availability.
If we use EELV for some cargo and SRB sticks for CEV we have three operational pads in Florida, four if we use Delta IVH and Atlas. All EELV and we have two if CEV is designed to fit Delta IVH and Atlas V.
Part of why DoD signed off on “the stick” was worries that a delayed launch of a NASA CEV sitting on Pad 37 might preclude a necessary launch of a Defense EELV from Pad 37.
Delays happen. That is why Musk cannot launch his Falcon as it must pass over a Titan delayed at Vandenburg.
An all EELV VSE creates very real bottlenecks with the launch pads as well as sacrifices the infrastructure (Pad 39, VAB, crawler) needed for follow on HLLV.
> Also, I did my research and found that all of the
> modules weigh approximately half of what the
> Delta-IV Heavy can lift to the Station’s orbit
I don’t know where you did your “research”, but that’s not correct. The P3/P4, S3/S4, S6, Node 2, and JEM PM are all over half – some over two-thirds – the D4H LEO capacity.
> Shuttle launches vertically so they’re capable
> of circa three-gee vertical loads; and the
> launch environment when the SRBs are firing is
> not all that benign.
You’re neglecting a lot. The load *paths* are different – ISS modules are designed to absorb loads through the longeron trunnion pins while ELV payloads absorb them through the base.
> We ought to be able to get these items into
> orbit on EELVs for a (probably small) fraction
> of what RTF redux is going to cost.
You can get them into orbit, but you can’t get them to ISS – not for the price you think, anyway. Many ISS modules require “keep-alive” power that is currently supplied by the orbiter. Many ISS modules have thermal constraints that restrict how long they can be out of the shuttle’s payload bay on that keep-alive power before they get full power from ISS. Finally, the D4H itself is incapable of rendezvous, prox ops, and docking with ISS. You’ll need a new space tug (either launched with the D4H or based at ISS) to do that, neither of which can be made ready until after 2010.
In summary, it’s not impossible to complete ISS via ELV, but it will require either a redesign/rebuild of the already-built ISS modules on the ground (a redesign comparable to, if not even more drastic, than the SSF-to-ISS redesign) or development of a fancy space tug that can faithfully replicate the environment the ISS modules are designed for until the modules are delivered to ISS.
I predict that if the shuttle never flies again, none of the ISS modules stored in the SSPF at KSC (with the possible exception of Columbus, which is small enough for and was designed for compatibility with Ariane 5) will ever find their way to ISS.
In a practical sense, abandonment of the shuttle goes hand-in-hand with abandonment of ISS (though the program may twitch a few years on inertia afterwards). For ISS opponents like Greg that’s a no-brainer. But those who pretend they can have a meaningful ISS without the shuttle really need to think again.
> You’d think that NASA would scale down the
> arbitrarily-chosen CEV crew size so that CEV fits
> onto an EELV.
> Instead, CEV mass has become a rigid requirement
> for no good reason that drives NASA to need a new
> launcher
The requirement is driven by Griffin’s belief that CEV will not end up lighter than the 33-ton Apollo CSM.
Semi off topic, but there’s big news from SpaceX:
SpaceX
Cecil, that’s really cool, but I’ll be more impressed when they successfully fly their first vehicle. I’m impressed that they are being careful, and I recognize that the latter delays are mostly not their doing, but this is getting rediculous. Also, since you are not interested in EELV-class rockets, what does it matter?
Nemo: “I don’t know where you did your “research”, but that’s not correct. The P3/P4, S3/S4, S6, Node 2, and JEM PM are all over half – some over two-thirds – the D4H LEO capacity.”
You’re looking at the Shuttle launch mass. The Web sites for both the European and Japanese modules also give “empty” masses, and that is what I was using. I expect you would want to launch them empty even if you had plenty of excess lift to reduce asymetic loads and other complications. And, even if it is two-thirds, my point still stands.
If they can make the Shuttle actually launch the rest of the modules, that would be great. But it’s costing too much money and, more importantly, taking too much time and attention. I’m increasingly of the opinion that we need to go with my Plan-B of yesterday.
I was thinking about all of this last night and I’m even more worried than I sounded yesterday. We’re nearly two years in, nothing of significance has been accomplished, and what little has been is now being thrown out for a new plan. With no hardware built, we are already in the midst of our first major redesign (shades of the Space Station) whilst Mr. Giffin plays hatchet man at NASA. This is in addition to all of my earlier concerns about the VSE turning into a development program, rather than an expedition program. And now the hurricane has swallowed any money an already cash-strapped government might have had for this.
I am willing to give Mr. Griffin more time, but I’m worried, very worried.
— Donald
Donald: “Also, since you are not interested in EELV-class rockets, what does it matter?”
I never said I wasn’t interested, only that it seems to me that EELV’s are not as cost effective as other options. No one has showed me anything to change my mind on that. But if the Falcon family of vehicles lives up to even half of Musks claims it will change the situation drastically.
Time will tell. Meantime, I’m willing to bet the Space Station, et al, on SpaceX, et al. But not the wider VSE.
— Donald
[ An all EELV VSE creates very real bottlenecks with the launch pads as well as sacrifices the infrastructure (Pad 39, VAB, crawler) needed for follow on HLLV. ]
Three points against what you say:
(1) If neither Atlas nor Delta is used for manned launches, then there will be excess Atlas and Delta launch capacity at Kennedy. Keep in mind that most mil. launches are from Vandenberg. Can you think of a scenario in which DOD has to launch both Atlas and Delta from Kennedy at the same time? I can’t.
(2) If EELV’s are used to launch the new crew spacecraft to LEO, then the new launch missile with a single SRB first stage NEED NOT be developed, so a launch pad for the “corndog missile” — skinny single SRB first stage, fatter second stage and payload — will not be needed. Therefore, a launch pad will not be needed for this nonexistent missile.
(3) If EELV’s are used to launch the new spacecraft to LEO, then it makes sense to evolve one of the EELV’s, probably Delta IV, into an HLV. Thus the current Delta launch pad might also be used as the HLV launch facility.
Or, the increased utilization might justify another EELV pad, instead of the SRB pad. The former, possibly adapted to both EELVs (though it would need two fuel systems), could be used for everything while the latter would only be useful for VSE.
— Donald
We’re going on about what would be the best hardware with absolutely no idea what the mission is! Wouldn’t the mission dictate the hardware?
I could have missed it but I don’t remember NASA saying what the capabilities of the CEV should be and sticking to them.
Are we looking for permanent settlement on the moon or just individual missions?
(If we’re just going to redo Apollo what’s the point?)
Is each flight to the moon going to use expendable equipment or will we build an infrastructure of lunar transfer stages and landers that can be used multiple times?
If we decide to build the infrastructure is a space station needed in Earth orbit; in lunar orbit? Can the present space station be used in its present orbit? If not can it be moved or is a new station in order and can we start it with the pieces we haven’t launched for the old one yet?
All these questions need to be addressed before we decide what launchers we’ll need and in what quantities.
Personally, I’d like to see the infrastructure built. The HLV’s and EELV’s are all fine and will be necessary for any plan, but we need the space tugs, the lunar transfer stages, the lunar landers and the permanent bases to keep space exploration moving forward. Seeing what happened after Apollo taught me that it’s to easy to just cancel the next flight. I’m hoping that it’s much harder to abandon things that are already there.
“Wouldn’t the mission dictate the hardware? ”
Precisely. And that’s why the CEV crew size choice is arbitrary. We do know it can be done with 3 – Apollo showed that…
With regard to the launch site for the stick, does one currently exist? How much would it cost relative to a new EELV launch site?
“I’m hoping that it’s much harder to abandon things that are already there.”
Sure it is. Just look at the space station.
MrEarl, much of what you ask has been addressed if not outright answered. Mostly in “leaked” information rather than officially released information, but it is information nonetheless.
Here is some info that was released, excuse me I should say “leaked”, just a few days ago:
NASA Exploration Systems Architecture Study Overview Charts
The above goes into some detail as to the mission and the expected capabilities of the CEV as well as some mention of moon base infrastructure. And on the subject of CEV capabilities I think there is some good evidence contained there that the crew size and other aspects of the CEV are not just arbitrary.
That leads me to more of Mr. Parkers points (accusations may be is a better word). Yes we do know that “it can be done with 3” but I also thought one of the criteria (unofficially at least) for the VSE was to not just repeat Apollo. Are you saying the CEV should have a crew of 3 simply because Apollo had a crew of 3? Isn’t that pretty arbitrary in itself? And as MrEarl stated above “If we’re just going to redo Apollo what’s the point?”
Mr. Parker is correct in stating there is no current launch site for the “stick”. As for the cost for constructing one compared to the construction a new EELV launch site I would guess that would pretty much be a wash. The big difference is (IMHO) that a new EELV launch pad would be for a 20 ton to LEO vehicle (DIVH) as compared to a 25-30 ton vehicle with the SRB stick. And as the documents I referenced above indicate there is good “non-arbitrary” reason to believe that the CEV launch vehicle will need to have a greater LEO capacity than 20 ton.
One final thought on a point raised above by Mr. Davenport on a Delta derivative HLV. It seems to me that it is largely the same people who say a Shuttle derived HLV would be too expensive that say a Delta derived HLV would be a good thing. It also seems to me that strapping (yes I know that is an oversimplification) 7 or more Delta CBC’s together is as difficult a proposition development expense wise as swapping a payload pod for the Orbiter or creating an inline craft using the ET, SSME, and SRB’s. And even at the very best cost estimate for a high production rate of CBCs of around $150 million each an HLV consisting of 7 CBCs would cost at least a billion dollars. And that doesn’t include any sort of upper stages.
> You’re looking at the Shuttle launch mass. The Web
> sites for both the European and Japanese modules
> also give “empty” masses, and that is what I was
> using.
You’re still neglecting the P3/4, S3/4, and S6, and still ignoring the difficulty and expense of the space tug required to get all the modules to ISS once the ELV has delivered them to LEO.
My prediction stands.
… space station in lunar orbit? Can the present space station be used in its present orbit? If not can it be moved or is a new station in order and can we start it with the pieces we haven’t launched for the old one yet? …
Moving the ISS is technically possible but is impractical. Some have suggested moving the ISS to an inclination angle closer to 28 degrees so as to make it easier for us and harder for the Rooskies to launch to the International Space Station, ha ha ha.
Additional space stations? Not likely. There have been suggestions to put a small space station, perhaps an inflatable, at libration point L1 near the Moon.
My suggestion is construct and maintain a rather robust, re-fuelable lunar orbit to lunar surface spacecraft. This craft would be able to carry three or four humans at a time to the lunar surface, or robotically load, land, and unload several tons of cargo. This lunar lander also be used for suborbital point to point lunar travel. I suppose you could think of this fancy lunar excursion vehicle as the core of a de facto lunar space station.
The HLV’s and EELV’s are all fine and will be necessary for any plan, but we need the space tugs, the lunar transfer stages, the lunar landers and the permanent bases to keep space exploration moving forward.
I agree on the space tug, the lunar lander, and the pressurized Moon shack. However, one point we are debating is whether or not an HLV would be needed to accomplish this, defining an HLV as a missile that can lift at least 100 metric tones to LEO.
“Transfer stages”? Do you mean the crewed spacecraft or the Earth-orbit-to-escape-velocity and-return propulsion module?
I’ll define “transfer stage” as the latter, envisioning a design in which the trans-lunar propulsion module and the crewed spacecraft are separate vehicles which join together in Earth orbit.
Regarding the transfer stage, I envision a propulsion and orbital maneuvering module that might initially be a one-shot vehicle.
This transfer/propulsion module would need to be able to effect lunar spacecraft orbital inclination angle changes to place the lunar spacecraft at the Moon’s south pole, then return to Edwards or Kennedy or maybe to the ISS. Maybe lunar travelers would want to take an ISS to the Moon leg. This is a requirement that differs from Apollo.
The transfer stage might evolve into a re-fuelable Earth to trans-lunar space tug that would stay in space. Note that a very capable space tug that could push 50,000 pound cargos from low Earth orbit to the Moon somewhat obviates the need for an HLV.
Are you saying the CEV should have a crew of 3 simply because Apollo had a crew of 3? Isn’t that pretty arbitrary in itself? And as MrEarl stated above “If we’re just going to redo Apollo what’s the point?”
The current ESAS study referenced above specifies “four Crew to the Moon plus 500 kg of cargo.” Four is not a whole lot bigger headcount than Apollo’s two or three, in my opinion. Also, I don’t think an HLV is an absolute necessity to send four astronauts to lunar orbit.
My concept of operations to “top” Apollo is to send no more than three or four astronauts at a time to the Moon, but stay for longer and longer visits. The first new lunar expedition will have a pressurized habitat — a Moon shack — with which to remain on the Moon for 7-10 days. Subsequent Moon visits could stay longer or overlap so as to have perhaps eight astronauts on the Moon. Continuously manned Moon base? Yes.
Caution: one thing that’s gone wrong with the both the Shuttle as well as the ISS is specifying that it must have a crew of six or seven or eight at time in order to function. It seems to me that astronaut population explosions imply larger and more troublesome spacecraft. … What’s the real agenda here, to build HLV’s that can lift six man capsules or to return to the Moon sooner?
You’re still neglecting the P3/4, S3/4, and S6, and still ignoring the difficulty and expense of the space tug required to get all the modules to ISS once the ELV has delivered them to LEO.
Here’s a suggestion for completing the ISS: Use EELV’s to launch cargos to fly in formation with the space station. Then launch a Shuttle. Use the Shuttle as a space tug to gather the payloads and mate them with the ISS.
Cecil: “The above goes into some detail as to the mission and the expected capabilities of the CEV as well as some mention of moon base infrastructure. And on the subject of CEV capabilities I think there is some good evidence contained there that the crew size and other aspects of the CEV are not just arbitrary.”
!!!???
All I see is bullet point engineering (an inferior subset of PowerPoint engineering). It is one step up from a work of fiction.
There’s no way to assess whether or not the morsels of data they deal out have been properly studied at all. This data could all be the opinion of a few engineers at Marshall and you’d have no way to tell the difference between that and a real study.
The bullet points do say:
* CEV accomodates up to 6 crew for ISS missions, up to 4 crew to the lunar surface, and up to 6 crew for Mars return
However that is listed under technical _groundrules_ and _assumptions_.
The rest appears to be a restatement of those assumptions in the context of whatever limited analysis they did conduct.
Given the Shuttle and the Space Station experiences, don’t you think the burden of proof should be on NASA to prove they aren’t fiddling their technical requirements for pork-related ends?
PS. my name is Parkin, not Parker.
I’ve also looked at the leaked/released/fell off the truck/… slides posted at http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html?pid=18001
… and I see no mention of the mission objectives. It’s got an outline of the requirements for the *means of transport* of 4 humans and/or 15Mt of cargo to the moon. What is the 15Mt, and how much will it cost? What will 4 astronauts do there? What is it all for? (In situ regolith processing, a base with a telescope, a Motel-6 with saunas, U-Haul trucks… take your pick) Besides, 7 days on the moon a year is kind of short, isn’t it (for all these gigadollars)? What exactly can be done during this short time in terms of the “infrastructure”? What *is* this infrastructure? (nuclear stations, golf courses, what???!) Nothing. Just a brief notion of “will support 4 humans for seven days… To recap what is it all for? What *is* the mission of the 4 NASA people spending 7 days a year on the moon?
p.s. btw, here’s another slide from that presentation (apparently, judging by the time-stamps) re: budget http://images.spaceref.com/news/2005/06.04.05.esas.budget.lrg.jpg
… and I see no mention of the mission objectives.
Hasn’t that been the problem with the VSE since Day 1? The purpose has always been vague, and has always substituted means for ends. But then, that was the trouble with the station and (to some extent) the shuttle also.
> Here’s a suggestion for completing the ISS: Use
> EELV’s to launch cargos to fly in formation with
> the space station. Then launch a Shuttle. Use the
> Shuttle as a space tug to gather the payloads and
> mate them with the ISS.
This was analyzed in 1990 using Shuttle-C in place of EELV. It was found to be impractical due to the large number of shuttle rendezvous required.
Each additional module delivered in this manner requires two rendezvous (one to get the module, the second to deliver it to ISS). If you assume the shuttle is launched full and goes to ISS first to drop off its first module, that’s a total of three rendezvous for two modules, five rendezvous for three modules.
Current propellant budgets for shuttle-ISS flights can support two rendezvous reliably; three is a stretch.
Throw in the issues with module survivability in free space with no power or thermal control, plus the EVA training issue (each module requires multiple EVAs for assembly), and this becomes a non-starter.
…. Throw in the issues with module survivability in free space with no power or thermal control, plus the EVA training issue (each module requires multiple EVAs for assembly), and this becomes a non-starter.
NASA may be faced with a stark either/or, the choice of either abandoning the International Space Station or getting heroic and creative with the three remaining Shuttles and with the EELV’s.
“… plus the EVA training issue (each module requires multiple EVAs for assembly…” you say?
I reply that NASA is either going to have become truly gritty and heroic and do stuff that is NOT BUSINESS AS USUAL, or else America will end up abandoning the jolly ship ISS.
What are the other problems?
(1) Some shuttle payloads attach along their side;
(2) Some payloads need electrical power en route;
(3) The payloads lack the orbital maenuvering capability to place themselves with reach of the ISS’s robot arm.
How to deal with (1) and (2)? The Delta IV heavy version is advertised to be able to lift 48,000 lbm. to the ISS and to have a 5 m. diameter fairing available. None of the ISS modules are that heavy. There might be enough mass margin available to build a payload cradle to adapt the payload load path to fit inside a 5 meter diameter fairing.
We’ll also improvise an electrical power supply supply that will fit inside a disposable EELV shroud for these payloads . One assumes that the adapter cradles and electrical power packs could be removed manually upon arrival at the ISS.
What do these ISS modules need en route electrical power for, anyway? Is electricity only needed to support Built In Test, or do some modules have to maintain ISS cabin pressure and temperature while en route, or what?
… Current propellant budgets for shuttle-ISS flights can support two rendezvous reliably; three is a stretch. …
Suggested fix: refuel a Shuttle’s Orbital Maneuvering System at the space station. Yes, I know that the OMS uses dangerous, nasty hypergolic propellants. But heroic deeds, instead of NASA BUSINESS AS USUAL may be needed if the International Space Station is to be completed.
Oh, someone is going to ask, why fool around with launching space station modules on EELV’s? The answer is, to minimize the number of additional Shuttle round trips needed to complete the ISS.
And in reply to the question, don’t we have to wait until we have a further improved External Tank avilable to launch any more Space Shuttles? My opinion is, no, we have to keep on launching Space Shuttles, even with the External Tanks we have now. Otherwise, NASA manned spaceflight is going to grind to a halt under an ignominious cloud of failure.
I think the public might accept the loss of another Shuttle if the Shuttle’s crew were perceived as trying to do genuinely heroic deeds, as opposed to another Mickey Mouse Club STS mission in which a crew of seven astronauts once again proves that soy beans will sprout in microgravity, whereas humans do indeed get kinda dizzy if spun around in a swivel chair while in orbit.
besides, if we lose another Shuttle, then we’ll know that it’s definitely time to retire the Shuttle program. This will simplify future decision-making. :]
… This was analyzed in 1990 using Shuttle-C in place of EELV. …
Space engineering is sort of an archeological endeavor. It moves at a slow, historical pace, like eons of ancient history. All macro-scale space engineering thoughts have already been thought, decades ago, and we dig these old bones and fossils up again.