Right now it appears that NASA’s supporters will have to fight hard to avoid budget cuts, if not this year then in 2007 and beyond, given the emerging fiscal environment. Now, as Florida Today reports today, NASA actually needs more money than currently planned to carry out everything: on the order of $5 billion through 2010. The problem is that the budget estimates compiled in 2004 assumed the cost of the shuttle program, currently about $4.5 billion a year, would drop roughly in half by the time the shuttle is retired in 2010. Those cost savings have not materialized, hence the need for extra funding. Without that money NASA will be faced with some hard decisions about how many of the 19 shuttle flights currently planned it can afford to carry out. It will also probably trigger renewed debate on whether any more shuttle flights should be flown: an extreme position, to be certain, but not as unlikely an outcome as it once might have been.
Let me ask this question; why can’t NASA lay a lot of people off and still maintain its two-shift schedule of Shuttle refurbishing?
I anticipate that some poster will say, “Oh, obviously NASA could not get the same amount of work done with fewer workers.”
My reply is, “How do you know that? For example, the Japanese and South Koreans have found ways to build cars with fewer man-hours of labor than Ford or GM incurs.”
It gets down to the question of what or whom “NASA supporters” ( a jockstrap with the familiar meatball and circle logo?) are supporting — progress in space flight or a bloated payroll.
“My reply is, “How do you know that? For example, the Japanese and South Koreans have found ways to build cars with fewer man-hours of labor than Ford or GM incurs.”
These are mass produced items and the comparison is not apt to the unique and hand built shuttles. Besides, you are comparing manufacturing to inspection and refurburishment. The Japanese and the SK’s make heavy use of automation, heavier than GM’s unions will allow.
This is one reason that the Vision for Space Exploration should really be called the Delusion of Space Exploration. One common way to polish up a vision, any vision, is to blithely curve the cost projections. In the future (so the VSE/DSE goes), the shuttle will be cheaper, the CEV won’t cost all that much either, and most NASA engineers will whistle while they work.
It should have given space fans pause that a main architect of the VSE quit before the first moment of truth, the return to flight of the shuttle.
Some people saw through it all along, and one of them was Alex Roland. Just two weeks after the VSE was unveiled, Roland predicted:
It is coming to pass.
If you lay all those people off , the congreess in those districts will not get re-elected, so the congress will fight the layoffs.
Doesn’t matter if its technically the right thing to do, all that matters is if it is politically the right thing to do.
I have said all along that the VSE must stay within its projected budget if it is to survive, politically, and that future budget battles will only get harder before they get easier. That is why the multi-launch vehicle plan is politically insane, no matter how much it may make sense technologically. I do agree with Greg at my disappointment that Mr. O’Keefe abandoned ship. Even though I support that basic concept behind Mr. O’Keefe’s version of this plan, his leaving for a larger paycheck does give great pause. If that’s all the commitment the personnel of this Administration have — and I’ve seen little evidence for much commitment by almost anyone outside of NASA — we have a tough row to hoe.
Alex Roland, like Greg, has a larger agenda that has nothing to do with the VSE itself. Their analysis of the future, or otherwise, of the VSE are suspect at best.
— Donald
Donald: You’re emphasizing O’Keefe’s lack of commitment to NASA itself, while at the same time demanding that NASA keep the VSE with projected costs. Which should surely mean both halves of the VSE — both the VSE phase-out of the space shuttle and space station, and the VSE plan for the next thing.
But what does it say about the cost projections if their author, Sean O’Keefe, chose not to be answerable for them? Say that the contractor who wrote the cost sheet for your home renovation quit before any work started. Would you still demand that the new crew stick to the old cost estimates?
This is going to play out even larger in 2010. As Roland emphasized, it’s the Bush vision, but Bush will be gone before we see any deliverables of that vision.
Say that the contractor who wrote the cost sheet for your home renovation quit before any work started. Would you still demand that the new crew stick to the old cost estimates?
Not precisely, but I would probably expect the ballpark to be of a similar size. I would also expect the new crew to use as much as possible of the old crew’s work. If they declined, I might find someone else in the old crew to manage the project and continue the original design. I would not throw up my hands, say the project is impossible, and give up my house, which seems to be your solution.
but Bush will be gone before we see any deliverables of that vision.
So what? That is an inevitable consequence of taking on a large project. Are you saying that every project humanity (or the United States) undertakes must be accomplished in eight years? Or are you saying that all human projects that took or will take longer (nuclear fusion, the freeway network, developing practical jet transports, any great city) should never be attempted?
In and of itself, the fact that Mr. Bush will not be around when the VSE shows a usable result is meaningless.
— Donald
Donald: But if the old crew never picked up a hammer, all of their work on paper could be unrealistic and should be thrown out. Even if I believed that human spaceflight here and now is a good idea, I would not understand why so many of its fans lauded O’Keefe, the bureaucrat, and now slam Griffin, the rocket engineer. It seems to me that O’Keefe didn’t care whether NASA’s plans were realistic, and that the only reason that anyone liked him is that he freely promised a rosy far future. (Or freely embraced Bush’s vision of the same.)
Certainly not every presidential plan should be completed within eight years. That’s overstating the point. I do argue that you should either deeply trust the president, or demand some hard deliverables within eight years. Not necessarily the whole home renovation, but at least a very good kitchen. Do you deeply trust Bush on this? If not, how do you know that he’s not leading you down the garden path?
Since you mention it, fusion and freeways are two contrasting examples of my point. Controlled fusion isn’t and should be a grand White House vision at this time. If Bush offered a Vision for Fusion Energy (VFE) in which he embraced ITER or an American alternative, it would probably be bad news.
Freeways, on the other hand, were immediately realistic when Eisenhower endorsed interstates. You don’t have to have the whole vast interstate network to see benefits. Instead, you can build the first several and expand from there if the plan is working.
I would not understand why so many of its fans lauded O’Keefe,
At least in my case, the answer to this is easy. Mr. O’Keefe presented a plan that, unlike any prior plan NASA has proposed, was politically realistic first, and technically realistic second. Your critique of it on technical grounds, while remarkably lacking and specifics and featuring rather too many personal attacks, may well have merit. However, I believe that my criticism of Dr. Griffin’s plans on political grounds have equal merit.
Mr. O’Keefe started out from first principles. What can we afford? Answer: NASA’s current budget. Is there a way we can go forward using NASA’s current human spaceflight budget or close to it? Answer: Maybe, by phasing out the current program as quickly as politically expedient, using existing launch vehicles, making the payloads (CEV, etc.) fit within that envelope and use as much current technology as possible, and defer new launchers and new technology until after the program starts. This strikes me, and others, as an eminently realistic approach, indeed the only approach that has even a chance to succeed.
Dr. Griffin’s approach is essentially the traditional NASA approach. What do we need to get back to the moon? Not what can we afford, but what do we need?
I would argue that Mr. O’Keefe’s approach is far closer to how you would renovate your house. You don’t ask, what do I need to make the perfect, efficient roof designed to last forever and with no chance of anyone getting hurt building it? You ask, what roof can I afford, or borrow enough money to invest in, and give your contractor their marching orders. You don’t tell your contractor to build a roof, full-stop. You ask them, what kind of roof can you build me for X dollars, and then make your decision based on the answers. You don’t necessarily start with the expert — the carpenter — you start with your banker (Mr. O’Keefe), then you go talk to your carpenter (or his boss).
O’Keefe’s plans may well have been technically impractical, though I have heard almost no one(including you) say that. But I, and apparently many others, believe they were a better approach than Dr. Griffin’s pay-whatever-it-takes approach.
I suspect that Mr. O’Keefe wanted to shut down the Shuttle and Station projects right away, and was vetoed by the President (for reasons that I don’t clearly understand since this President isn’t known for caring what other countries think and he probably had the political capital after Columbia). Given the political requirement to fly out the Shuttle and Space Station programs, Mr. O’Keefe and Dr. Griffin have both done the best they can to get started quickly. The decision, right or wrong, was undoubtedly made above their pay scales.
— Donald
It’s not that O’Keefe’s plans were or are technically impractical. It’s worse than that: they were technically blank. There was no technical plan from O’Keefe, nor endorsed by O’Keefe. So, politically, there was nothing to criticize, at least not while O’Keefe was still working at NASA.
On the other hand, some other people at NASA did start to fill in the technical void with their own assertions. That was when the plan started to look either impossible, or self-contradictory, or a sham (depending on interpretation). Gerstenmaier said 28 more shuttle flights. Steidle said that NASA did not need heavy lift for many years. If you have 28 more shuttle flights, and you’re not developing heavy lift, how exactly is that going to the moon? O’Keefe never explained that one. Instead, he quit.
I really don’t see the value of a “politically realistic” proposal which is technically blank. If it were home renovation, it would almost be a comedy routine:
Client: “We have a great vision for our kitchen. We want marble surfaces, more room, artistic designs, and a completely new layout.”
Contractor: “Ordinarily that would cost you $20,000.”
Client: “I’m sorry but that’s not politically realistic. We can only spare $5,000.”
Contractor: “Okay, then it will cost $5,000.”
So the contractor makes a contract and some blueprints, then draws a month of pay and quits. His replacement raises the cost estimate to $10,000 and that annoys the clients.
You may not like Mr. O’Keefe’s plan, but to say he didn’t have one is grossly inaccurate. As I understand it, that plan was:
1. Use the EELVs, and possibly Ariane.
2. Build the CEV to fly on any EELV-sized launch vehicle for maximum flexibility and to avoid ever again being dependent on a single rocket. This was the cheif lesson learned from Columbia, which we appear already to have forgotton.
3. Complete the Station using the Shuttle. (My guess is that this was added over O’Keefe’s head and is unrealistic now, but it probably did not appear so then.)
4. Use the CEV to support the Station once the Shuttle is retired.
5. Launch a version of the CEV on upper stages launched by separate, uprated EELV(s) to the moon.
6. Launch a future version of the CEV on an HLV to be developed in the future to go to Mars.
So, what, specifically, is “technically unrealistic” or “blank” about this plan?
I didn’t like O’Keefe at first for many of the reasons that you don’t now, but I think that’s a great plan and it is what turned my thinking about him around. It’s what you get when you take a fresh look at something from a perspective outside of the usual suspects.
Then NASA got hold of the plan and turned it into a launch vehicle development plan, and that, most likely, was the end of the VSE.
— Donald
O’Keefe could not have had a set plan to “use the EELVs, and possibly Ariane”, because Steidle said, on the contrary:
Almost everything in your 6 points is just conjecture, or just an option. In 18 months they never even drew a likely picture of the crucial CEV. That is indeed technically blank.
And technically ignorant too, to refer to both an LEO vehicle to service the space station and vehicles to travel to the moon and Mars as “the CEV”. That’s like referring to a river ferry, a coastal yacht, and a trans-Atlantic cruiser as “the boat”. It makes no sense to say “the” for three completely different things.
It should have given space fans pause that a main architect of the VSE quit before the first moment of truth, the return to flight of the shuttle.
Who dat?
3. Complete the Station using the Shuttle. (My guess is that this was added over O’Keefe’s head and is unrealistic now, but it probably did not appear so then.)
You’re projecting. Even before the VSE was announced, O’Keefe was on record on the importance of returning the shuttle to flight.