NASA administrator Michael Griffin, speaking at the American Astronautical Society’s annual conference Tuesday in Houston, took some time to discuss his plans to involve the private sector in the exploration architecture, the Houston Chronicle reports. He covered some familiar ground about commercial ISS cargo and crew transport, but also added that, down the road, “NASA would purchase propellant from commercially operated fuel stations in Earth orbit.” An interesting idea, to be certain, but on-orbit fuel depots don’t seem to fit into the current exploration architecture, which relies on heavy-lift vehicles to launch fully-fueled spacecraft and upper stages for carrying out human lunar missions—unless, perhaps, NASA is planning for the case where the heavy-lift capacity currently envisioned doesn’t materialize or is insufficient to carry out planned missions.
One thing Griffin does not address, at least in this article, is the overlapping roles of CEV and commercial transport providers for servicing the station. If, by the time the CEV enters service around 2012, NASA has already contracted with commercial providers for crew and cargo transport to the station, what does the CEV do: elbow out the commercial transport companies or find another mission to do?
I’ve been asking myself that question for a while now as well. Griffin keeps saying that he can’t afford to put these startup space companies in his critical path. Well, that’s fine, but is putting the still undeveloped shuttle derived launch vehicles in his critical path make any more sense?
From his statements, one might presume that he’d rather use the CEV’s to get on with the lunar exploration missions rather than wasting them on ISS resupply missions. Again, that’s fine, but if the rest of the architecture is not scheduled to come online until 2018 (because we’re waiting for the HLV), then what good will it do us to have this nice and shiny CEV sitting around with no other lunar hardware ready to support its mission?
From his statements, one might presume that he’d rather use the CEV’s to get on with the lunar exploration missions rather than wasting them on ISS resupply missions. Again, that’s fine, but if the rest of the architecture is not scheduled to come online until 2018 (because we’re waiting for the HLV), then what good will it do us to have this nice and shiny CEV sitting around with no other lunar hardware ready to support its mission?
It all makes sense if you say to yourself, “The CEV is about as likely to actually be built as the OSP.”
My interpretation of this sort of statements from Dr. Griffin is that he’s starting to cool on the CEV Apollo on steroids architecture. At least I hope this is the case.
Jeff, here’s an interesting item:
NASA Considering Two Options For 2010 Lunar Lander
By Jefferson Morris
11/15/2005 08:29:26 AM
NASA’s Ames Research Center in California is considering two mission architectures for the first lander mission in the upcoming Robotic Lunar Exploration Program, according to RLEP Program Architect Sylvia Cox.
Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Ala., has primary responsibility for executing the 2010 lander mission, informally dubbed “RLEP 2″ because it is the second in the proposed series of robotic lunar explorers that will precede the return of astronauts in 2018. …
http://www.aviationnow.com/
avnow/news/channel_aerospacedaily_story.jsp?
id=news/LUNA11155.xml
Jeff,
The most important decision Mike Griffin could make regarding creating a government market at ISS he has already made: the Space Shuttle will be retired in 2010, and the remaining flights will be focused on element assembly, not logistics. That creates an immediate demand, to quote Alan Lindenmoyer the new CCC Program Manager at JSC: We would buy it today if we could.
Since NASA has also stated that they cannot afford to use the CEV+CLV system to resupply ISS if there is another capability exists (with the easy stipulation that it be cheaper than the CEV+CLV marginal cost, estimated today at over $400m per flight), then the market would seem to continue through the life of ISS, i.e. 2016 or longer if ISS becomes cheaper to utilize than envisaged today. It also turns out that NASA may not be able to afford the development cost of an unpressurized cargo variant of the CEV, thus making that market even more likely to stay in place.
There are challenges: First, the old chicken and egg problem exists, in that no one has actually touched station except using a government-developed and owned vehicle. But Mike Griffin has made it clear he wants commercial ISS servicing (crew and cargo) capabilities enough that he is investing $500 million in demonstrations of those capabilities over the next four years. So he’s putting his money where his mouth is.
I am much more worried about Congress’ willingness to cut the funds available for these demonstrations and related services. If you read the FY2006 Appropriations Conference Report, you will see that they imply that NASA has $198m to spend on Soyuz/Progress missions + commercial service demonstrations in FY2006. Except they don’t, really, because NASA had to borrow $85m of its $98m in FY2005 carryover for Katrina expenses, which aren’t being repaid by the smaller supplemental NASA is getting. Meanwhile, you will see several plus-ups for specific CEV/CLV-related infrastructure or acquisition efforts.
This is why I have said for four months now that the NewSpace community needs to focus on ensuring that Griffin really can deliver this market opportunity to us, and on our delivering for NASA, and not get distracted with fights over CEV/CLV/HLLV.
There is an important object lesson from a decade ago in NASA procurement. Once Spacehab actually flew and demonstrated their capability, Spacelab died. The government system didn’t die quietly, but it died. Flying something always beats talking. We have to focus on getting the chance to fly *several* somethings over the next few years, and then we can have a very different conversation with Congress and the NASA Administrator of 2011 about how often the CEV+CLV really needs to fly to ISS.
– Jim Muncy
P.S. The above is a statement of my professional opinion, but is not approved or sanctioned by any of my clients.
So, then, what happens to CEV if there’s commercial ISS transport in 2012 (or whenever CEV is ready to fly)? There’s no reason and/or no money to send it to ISS, but the heavy-lifter needed for the lunar missions won’t be ready yet. Does NASA take it on free-flight joyrides in LEO? Let it collect dust in a hangar at KSC? It’d be ironic to accelerate the CEV development (cutting other programs in the process) only to find there’s no mission ready for it when it’s completed…
AJ,
I think that would be a problem that Congress would like to have. I suspect they would either mothball it or canabalize it for parts for the stuff that happens beyond cislunar. The fact that several parts of the Federal Government are seriously considering never flying another Shuttle at all means they really don’t have a problem cutting their losses when its appropriate.
I also completely support what Jim said. My version:
Just fly. The rest will follow….
Al, I believe the CEV is seen as necessary for a crew rescue capability, requiring two flights per year and a six month storage time (which, I suspect, is where the six month lunar mission number came from). Since NASA believes the Station needs six CEV-class logistics flights a year, that leaves four for the commercial folks while preserving a purpose for the CEV until lunar flights commence. It’s not elegant, but it does kinda make sense.
Jim Muncy, I agree with you one-hundred percent. The alt.space crowd has always been too focused on NASA’s perceived failings and not enough on their own. They have markets now (tourists, potentially the Space Station, plus all the traditional ones inadequate though they are; SpaceX even has several contracts). Now is the time to stop complaining, execute, and let NASA dig their own hole.
If they can’t execute, they can complain about NASA until hell freezes over without ever getting a single contract.
— Donald
Once Spacehab actually flew and demonstrated their capability, Spacelab died.
?
Please explain.
This is why I have said for four months now that the NewSpace community needs to focus on ensuring that Griffin really can deliver this market opportunity to us, and on our delivering for NASA, and not get distracted with fights over CEV/CLV/HLLV.
You miss the following point: if all that stuff flops, Congress and the public may disdain funding
alt.space projects as well. When you say, “manned space,” Congress and the US public paint with a very broad mental brush.
I believe that Jim means once the private Spacehab module was flown, the high-cost Spacelab module the European’s contributed to the Shuttle program went out-of-favor. It hasn’t been flown for many years.
— Donald
David,
Donald is correct about my Spacelab/SpaceHAB point. During the development of the Shuttle, the European Space Agency funded development of the Spacelab, a research facility that could be carried inside the payload bay. As per agreement, NASA bought a second module from Europe. Each agency used their module for several research missions during the 1980s and early 1990s.
Flash forward to around 1990. SpaceHAB, a private company founded by Bob Citron in Seattle in the 1980s, secures an agreement from NASA to buy a Commercial Middeck Augmentation Module service. NASA did not initially want to buy such a service, since it had the Spacelab. But given pressure from policymakers, and that the CEO of Spacelab (at this time) was a former NASA Administrator and the COO was a former Shuttle official, NASA did commit to acquire the service and SpaceHAB completed their first module.
Once that module flew, its capabilities were so much better, and cheaper to support, than the ESA-developed Spacelab, that by the mid-late 1990s no more Spacelab missions were planned.
The lesson here is twofold: 1) It is incredibly hard for NASA to buy something commercially, because there are always entrenched interests, even if those interests are hurting themselves by holding onto the status quo. 2) It has to work, and work better, and be cheaper, and be proven to do so… and you have to keep fighting to make sure that common sense metrics like price/schedule/utility actually do determine whether NASA keeps buying.
As to the other issue, NASA may indeed use the CEV as a “Crew Rescue Vehicle” for ISS. It will also certainly use the CEV to do test missions in low Earth orbit, just as Apollo 7 and 9 preceded Apollos 8 and 10/11… I also assume that HLLV will fly to orbit earlier than the first scheduled lunar return in 2018.
The irony of your statement about HLLV is this: if NASA uses CEV+CLV to service station, NASA cannot afford HLLV development during the 2012-2016/17/18 timeframe. So NASA has a choice: use a capsule to keep going around in circles in LEO, or use a capsule to go to the Moon. I suspect most folks in NASA will prefer the latter.
But again, that’s an issue for 2010 and beyond. Today we have to make sure we actually get the opportunity Griffin is trying to provide. It is NOT a given that Congress will support this two-track strategy. And we will certainly need to help NASA succeed in partnering with us. My argument is that it will be easier for us to “win” these battles if we are not simultaneously beating the crap out of Griffin/NASA for the mainline government transportation architecture.
– Jim
if all that stuff flops, Congress and the public may disdain funding alt.space projects as well. When you say, “manned space,” Congress and the US public paint with a very broad mental brush.
Then we need to do what it takes from a PR/Marketing standpoint to drive the point home that they’re not the same thing. For all of Burt’s bluster it does create a very sharp distinction in people’s minds between what he is doing and what NASA does. They can’t exactly verbalize it, but they know there’s a difference and that one could potentially be way more important than the other.
My argument is that it will be easier for us to “win” these battles if we are not simultaneously beating the crap out of Griffin/NASA for the mainline government transportation architecture.
This point cannot be over-emphasized, IMHO.
By the way, I close my eyes and I can hear Jim Muncy saying this, in his own voice.
Regarding beating the crap out of Dr. Griffin, I do try to walk a careful path. I do believe that Dr. Griffin made a critical mistake in not using the EELVs and follow-on commercial vehicles, one that may well cost us the whole VSE, but I also recongize the decision has been made. Now is the time to present a united front on the “vision” as a whole, while trying to get as much as possible for alt.space out of the architecture Dr. Griffin has given us. If we continue to fight that architecture, I fear we’ll lose the whole thing.
We can win still important battles that will lay foundations for the future even if the immediate war is lost.
— Donald
Look at this! Jim Muncy writes:
The most important decision Mike Griffin could make regarding creating a government market at ISS he has already made: the Space Shuttle will be retired in 2010, and the remaining flights will be focused on element assembly, not logistics. That creates an immediate demand, to quote Alan Lindenmoyer the new CCC Program Manager at JSC: We would buy it today if we could.
Now, on 16 November 2005 SpaceDev announces plans to build DreamChaser, an HL-20 derived crew vehicle apparently to be lifted to LEO by Delta IV. Apparently, it will be built with private money seeking profit from tourism (suborbital and orbital) and NASA contracts to ferry crew to ISS on a price per seat basis.
Now, if NASA hgad announcved a government order for a low cost crew lift vehicle and funded the R&D with tax dollars and if that NASA funded vehicle was financially competitive, there isn’t anyway a private investor will fund this project at SpaceDev.
Because CEV is too expensive for routine ISS crew transfer (but necessary for lunar missions) a market niche is created for SpaceDev & t/Space.
Why compete with NASA?
Since CEV+CLV at $400 million per launch CANNOT compete with commercial Earth-to-LEO systems either for tourism or ISS crew transfer, this leaves an open playing field for private sector players to compete with each other.
Genuis!
Jeff Foust asks this question:
One thing Griffin does not address, at least in this article, is the overlapping roles of CEV and commercial transport providers for servicing the station. If, by the time the CEV enters service around 2012, NASA has already contracted with commercial providers for crew and cargo transport to the station, what does the CEV do: elbow out the commercial transport companies or find another mission to do?
What if CEV+CLV never flies to ISS because SpaceDev and t/Space get there first? Is that bad?
Maybe CEV is like those mechanical rabbits used to start greyhound races. It’s not supposed to win the race, but set a benchmark the private sector can beat, allowing Griffin to go to Congress and say, “Hey look, I can save money with Benson or Gump!”
Maybe CEV is like those mechanical rabbits used to start greyhound races. It’s not supposed to win the race, but set a benchmark the private sector can beat, allowing Griffin to go to Congress and say, “Hey look, I can save money with Benson or Gump!”
Heh! To follow up my own post.
If NewSpace fails to fulfill the challenge, Griffin will still have CEV+CLV (and preserves the industrial base for the HLLV he covets). NASA gets to the Moon (expensive, but successfully).
If SpaceDev or t/Space or whoever do succeed, perhaps CEV is never really used for ISS missions and is modified into a stay-on-orbit heavy vessel that uses light stuff like SpaceDev or t/Space to ferry crew to CEV – – just like small boats ferried crews to sailing frigates at anchor in deep water.
In that case, CEV+CLV development has preserved the HLLV industrial base; gives NASA a vehicle capable of deep space missions AND fills the pork needs which are vital for getting Congress to say okay.
Think mechanical greyhound to get the dogs off and running.