No, there’s no connection between the two (at least for the purposes of this post), but they are both policy-related subjects of articles in this week’s issue of The Space Review. Ryan Zelnio examines the effect stringent satellite export controls have had on US manufacturers; by his estimates these companies have lost several billion dollars in sales. In some cases US companies have simply declined to bid on proposals from foreign companies out of concerns of export control hassles. His analysis is limited to only a relatively mature part of the space industry—the manufacture of commercial GEO communications satellites—but the same concerns apply to other facets of the industry as well.
Dwayne Day digs into the historical archives to look at the decision the Nixon Administration made in the summer of 1971 to fund the final two Apollo missions (16 and 17; 18 through 20 had been previously cancelled). A major part of the decision weighed on what Dr. Day calls “negative symbolism”: ending the human spaceflight program would have a far higher political cost for the country than the money spent to maintain it. He argues that the same argument holds true today, even long after the end of the Cold War, because now both Russia and China have their own human spaceflight efforts. This is particularly timely because there has been concern among some space activists about the entry into the race for House Majority Leader by Rep. John Shadegg (R-AZ). Until he threw his hat into the ring late last week Shadegg led the Republican Study Committee, which last year proposed cutting NASA’s exploration program as part of its “Operation Offset” proposal to pay for hurricane relief. Shadegg’s ascendency to the majority leadership post, these activists worry, could spell doom (or at least trouble) for the Vision. For the reasons above, though (not to mention continued support from other members of Congress and the Bush Administration) Shadegg himself would not necessarily be able to do much even if elected Majority Leader.
Edward David, science advisor to President Nixon, added a few more details to understanding the final Apollo years and decision making under Nixon here:
http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/prometheus/archives/space_policy/000622politics_apollo_ed.html
The proposal was somewhat controversial, even among members of the House Study Committee. It was never seriously considered, of course, and did not make it into the fifty billion spending cut bill.
Is there any indication about how Shadegg personally feels about VSE?
On the other hand, Shadegg is very big on forbidding earmarks, something which would help NASA’s budget quite a bit.
A major part of the decision weighed on what Dr. Day calls “negative symbolism”: ending the human spaceflight program would have a far higher political cost for the country than the money spent to maintain it.
Liekwise, until another manned American spacecraft is operating, we HAVE TO keep the Shuttle flying, perhaps at an infrequent launch rate, as long as the Rooskies and the Chinese are flying people to low orbit.