A few articles of note from this week’s issue of The Space Review:
- I recap a lot of the hubbub regarding a space race with China, and the comments made last week by Chinese space official Luo Ge in Washington. In particular, I note that while building up a space race with China could yield some benefits in the near term in the form of additional funding for NASA, it could have some adverse long-term events should the race actually not materialize, which is the most likely outcome given China’s announced plans and capabilities.
- Chris Carberry provides a primer on how space advocates can effectively lobby Congress in support of space policy. Noting how many people decline to get involved, he writes, “Interestingly, the refusal to take part in political outreach is often not so much about hating politics as it is about fearing politics.” He goes through the various options, from writing letters to meeting with staffers.
- Wayne Eleazer offers a stinging critique of past efforts by the federal government, particularly the Air Force, to commercialize launch services, as perhaps best exemplified with the EELV program. He cites a lack of cost savings, as well as some reliability problems, as the primary reasons that the Air Force is going back to a model of more government oversight.
An excellent article by Dr. Foust on China’s space program. Those who have claimed that China is “racing” the United States to the Moon have based this upon a mistaken belief that the 2017 lunar landing is a manned mission. It is now very clear that this is a robotic probe. Thus, that claim is refuted and the proponents are left with the statement that China _could be_ racing the United States to the Moon. But they also concede that they have no evidence to prove this.
But I thought that this statement in Dr. Foust’s article was very insightful: “…if the Vision for Space Exploration becomes associated, in the eyes of Congress or the public, as NASA’s instrument in a space race with China, the Vision itself could become threatened down the road when that race does not take shape.”
Congress also pays attention to profitable businesses. A profitable suborbital spaceflight business would herald in a new age of new space. Play http://www.space-shot.com for $3.50 instead of hoofing it to DC.
The Carberry article was a useful primer on political action for people who haven’t been involved before.
Let me add one idea that could make a huge difference. In 2004, after hearing a talk by a professional lobbyist who mentioned that professional lobbyists did volunteer work in campaigns, I decided to do just that. Since I live in Maryland, I volunteered for first the Mikulski reelection campaign and then the Hoyer campaign. Since then I’ve stayed somewhat involved in Democratic Party politics locally. For not that many hours of work and attendance at some political events, people will listen to me about topics of particular interest to me.
Writing letters and visiting Congressional offices is one thing. Showing up at political events gets you much more noticed. Last Wednesday I led AIAA’s Team Maryland around Congress for their Congressional Visits Day. Next week I’ll be attending a local Democratic Party event. Doing things like this greatly increases the time I am able to influence the political sector. It also increases significantly the impact of whatever I do say.
So, in addition to letter writing and Congressional visits, let me suggest that people get more involved in mainstream politics. I recommend becoming active in a major party.
An interesting critique by Wayne Eleazer, that has some useful and thoughtful information. However, it only tells one part of the story, has some serious holes, and provides an apologist stance on a very dangerous policy direction.
It would be useful for other knoweldgeable experts in our community to take the same facts, add in some facts that Eleazer fails to mention (or may not know), and put together a different interpretation of the failures.
Examples of missing parts that others might fill in:
1) The DoD was exempted from both the Launch Services Purchase Act of 1990 and the Commercial Space Act of 1998 (which contains a revised version of LSPA.) It sounded like Eleazer was going to mention this, but he then went off on a tangent about sounding rocket vouchers.
2) No serious commercial space advocate has ever suggested that the PARTIAL privatization of the Shuttle was ever an effective model of “space launch commercialization”. Taking a government-designed system, which was never designed for low operational costs, and attempting to privatize it, was destined for failure. The costs were already locked into the system, by its government design. This was never a serious commercialization approach, although it was shocking in its audacity when Newt Gingrich first publicly proposed it in March of 1995..
3) Dr. Griffin was at the SDIO when the SDIO did the commercial Delta launch acquisition that Eleazer references. Evidence suggests that Griffin thinks this Delta II acquisition was a success.
Why? Because Griffin hired his SDIO procurment specialist who led the Delta II procurement, William McNally, to come work for him at NASA. It would be interesting to hear Griffin’s or McNally’s opinion on Eleazer’s position.
4) Eleazer says nothing about the fact that SMC’s recent EELV decision may go well beyond the EELV. What will happen when SMC tries to force SpaceX, or Microcosm, or AirLaunch into the cost-plus high-government-oversight model?
Does Eleazer (or anybody else) think that would be effective?
5) Eleazer makes statements about commercial launches having much higher failure rates than government oversight launches, but does not back it up facts. Then he lumps Titan IV launches into the mix (as if they were commercial), with some new LV versions that were commercial, as a list of failures.
But there are other ways to interpret the causes of these failures (I have no doubt that the SMC is saying that the reason for the failures was that they were commercial.)
If you look at the history, there is always a high failure rate on launches of new LVs. Maybe that had something to do with it? (This is an area that analysis would be useful.)
Separately, other analysts have suggested that one reason for the failures of the Titan IV in the mid-1990s was the loss of good people as the best engineers could see the writing on the wall and left these programs for greener pastures (e.g., the EELV). This loss of expertise created technical problems, which predictably impacted the Titan IV.
6) Eleazer somehow fails to mention that SMC has almost zero credibility on “cost management” within the U.S. government these days. The SMC is directly responsible for the HUGE cost growth in Air Force space acquisition programs, and has been continually in the news for the last 5 years for its failures. Eleazer fails to mention that fact.
So, who here would trust SMC’s ability to effectively manage the cost of launch vehicles? Does Eleazer believe that SMC, with its recent track record, will succeed?
7) Eleazer also fails to mention that in real commercial markets, failures are allowed to die. (Ever heard of “creative destruction”?) If the EELV was a truly “commercial initiative” then the Delta IV or Atlas V would have been allowed to die. For obvious reasons (“assured access”), that was never a serious possibility.
The fact that the DoD is compelled for policy reasons to prop up both systems does not mean that commercial markets failed.
The fact that both Boeing and Lockheed almost certainly knew that the DoD would come in to save their behinds, if things got bad, means that they never were truly subject to the full productive force of real commercial incentives.
Because “commercial incentives” and “feedback” was substantially cut off, the EELV was never really a serious commercialization initiative.
At least, this is another valid way to interpret the facts.
– Al
Just to emphasize the point — a counter-example of some narrow analysis, that easily suggests a different conclusion.
NASA, whose acquisition of launch services is subject to the provisions of the LSPA and the Commercial Space Act of 1990 has had a 100% success rate since the LSPA was enacted into law in 1990.
The DoD, whose acquisition of launch services is NOT subject to the LSPA or the Commercial Space Act of 1990, has an awful track record compared to NASA.
At first glance, this might suggest that there is not enough commercialization at the DoD.
NOTE: NASA has bought all its launch services on proven LVs since 1990. Which goes back to the source of failures being “new LVs”, which has nothing to do with “commercialization”. LV track record has much more to do with failure rates than acquisition practices.
All this being said, the Air Force nomenclatura is going to be out in full force trying to justify their decision. The SMC (as Eleazer points out) never liked the commercialization aspects of the EELV program. Expect the SMC to vigorously defend their decision.
– Al
While I agree that it would be a mistake to closely tie the VSE to a purported space race with China, I still think the fact that China has a human space capability is a net good — both for the VSE and for the eventual human expansion into a multi-planet species. It is important, however, not to oversell this.
— Donald
I don’t agree with Dr. Foust. I seem to remember a time when the Soviets were supposedly not racing us to the Moon… or so they and the Dr. Foust’s of the 1960s would of had us believe. You have to wonder why Dr. Foust is against competition. China is a rising power, and if current economic projections play out, will rival the United States economically within 20 years. That sounds like competition to me. And either we recognize and do something about it, or we sit around talking about cooperating with them. I’m curious, what does China bring to the table to “cooperate” with the United States in exploring and developing space right now. It sounds suspiciously like another “let’s use space as a foreign policy ploy” to me. We already had one of those with the Russians in the 1990s. Not interested in doing that again.
Jim: I’m curious, what does China bring to the table to “cooperate” with the United States in exploring and developing space right now.
How about a light CEV that is known to work and is derived from a vehicle that was originally designed to go to the moon? Sounds like rather a lot to a citizen of a country that cannot seem even to develop an Apollo-derived capsule to specified weight, cost, and budget.
— Donald
“I seem to remember a time when the Soviets were supposedly not racing us to the Moon… or so they and the Dr. Foust’s of the 1960s would of had us believe.”
First, let’s not resort to personalizing this. Deal with the analysis and don’t take shots at the person doing the writing. Start from a position of respect and people will treat you from a position of respect. Or maybe not, the internet is such a cesspool these days.
Second, if you are interested in the issue of the Moon race and what the U.S. knew about Soviet intentions and capabilities during the 1960s, I would point you in the direction of some of the things I have written on this subject. The best ones are not on the web, but I suggest reading my post here:
http://www.spacepolitics.com/archives/000903.html
Or search for the article I wrote for Air Force magazine in July 2004.
If we can move beyond ad hominem arguments, there is a good question in your post. And some assertions that need to be challenged.
“China is a rising power, and if current economic projections play out, will rival the United States economically within 20 years.”
Rival how? One could argue that China already rivals the United States now because they already sell far more goods to the United States than they buy from the United States. This, one could argue, gives them significant power over the U.S. (alternatively, one could argue that it gives the U.S. significant power over China–of course, slapping tariffs on Chinese goods could bankrupt Wal-Mart and hurt the American economy).
If one claims that China’s GDP will equal or surpass the United States’ GDP at some point, we should ask why this matters. What will it mean? Will it change everything? Will it change anything? American preeminence in the world is based upon many things, and one of them is the ability to turn that large GDP into things. China might have a large GDP in the future, but they will also likely inherit their very inefficient ways of organizing their economy. Their government bureaucracy, for instance, is sclerotic and bloated. So even if they could theoretically collect as much money in taxes, they would waste it with an inefficient government. So why, exactly, does it matter if their GDP someday equals the United States’ GDP?
Also, why should we believe any projection out to 20 years? Many of the best economists in the world work for the U.S. Office of Management and Budget and the Congressional Budget Office, and they have proven remarkably incapable of projecting U.S. federal budgets out beyond even two years. The U.S. federal budget is a fraction of the total U.S. GDP and a fraction of the total global GDP and yet it is impossible to predict. So why should anybody believe that it is possible to make accurate predictions about _far larger_ GDP budget figures over even greater timeframes?
“That sounds like competition to me. And either we recognize and do something about it, or we sit around talking about cooperating with them.”
Or, we actually _cooperate_ with them, not just talk about it.
Note also that there are other economies in the world that right now are bigger than China’s and we cooperate with them. So it is not _merely_ the size of an economy that determines whether or not we cooperate. In fact, when you think about it, the United States has for the past five decades actually cooperated far more with the largest economies of the world than it has “competed” with them. Britain, France, Japan, Germany, Italy are the next largest economies compared to the United States, and all are considered America’s political partners in many ways even while they remain economic rivals in other ways.
Which leads to the next question–what do we mean by “compete”? Compete for markets? We already do that (and one could argue that China won). Compete militarily? Compete for political influence?
So then we get back to what is meant by “cooperate.” There are many forms of cooperation in space. In fact, there are already rumors that the United States government has helped China out by providing them certain tracking information to prevent them from launching satellites into orbits that are already occupied by other satellites. That’s pretty low-level cooperation and it benefits both us and them (by preventing satellite collisions). Another form of cooperation could be the sharing of science data. For the most part that could be mutually beneficial with no significant downsides. (Although there are two possible downsides: the revelation of technology data in the release of the science data, and the prestige that China could gain from being treated as a scientific partner.)
At the farther end of the spectrum of cooperation are such things as flying a Chinese astronaut on a U.S. shuttle mission to ISS, flying a Shenzhou mission to the ISS, or including China in the Vision for Space Exploration in some way. We can bound this spectrum by stating that China is not going to get better cooperative terms than America’s longtime ISS partners.
But that also raises another point: As of 1991 or so, it was totally unthinkable that Russia was going to ever be treated better than America’s longtime space station partners. And yet here we are, with Russia (a “rival” to the United States in many ways, not the least of which is their hundreds of ICBMs pointed at North America) as a bigger partner in ISS than longtime allies like Germany, Italy, Japan, France, and even (gasp) Great Britain.
So, to pose a provocative question–if we can “cooperate” with Russia in space, then why should we not cooperate with China?
“I’m curious, what does China bring to the table to “cooperate” with the United States in exploring and developing space right now?”
I think that this question above would be the response to my earlier question about why we cooperate with Russia–that Russia brings something to the table, so there are benefits to cooperation with Russia, whereas China brings nothing to the table, so there is no reason to cooperate with China.
There are a couple of problems with this assertion. One is that it is limited to technology. There are things that one can get from a cooperative partnership that are not simply technology, such as political leverage, insights into technology, etc.
The other problem is that we also cooperate with Brazil on the ISS. What does Brazil bring to the table? Nothing in terms of technology. We cooperate for other reasons.
“It sounds suspiciously like another ‘let’s use space as a foreign policy ploy’ to me. We already had one of those with the Russians in the 1990s.”
Space has ALWAYS been a “foreign policy ploy.” Let’s replace “ploy” with “tool,” which is a more useful word. The United States started its civilian space program as a way of having foreign policy influence throughout the world. It flew foreign astronauts on the space shuttle for the same reason. And the U.S. government invited Western countries such as France, Germany, Italy, Canada and also Japan to participate in the space station program for foreign policy reasons. These have always, to some extent, been an attempt to exert influence upon these countries by including them in an American-led program.
Which then brings us back to China. What could the U.S. _gain_ from some form of cooperation with China? Technologically, probably nothing. Except the U.S. could gain better access to their scientists and engineers (read: espionage opportunities). Politically, there may be many benefits, although their value is hard to evaluate. One benefit would be potential influence over China, a carrot which we could use to entice them to do or not do specific things. Most foreign policy relationships that the United States enters into with partners involve both carrots and sticks–do this and you get a cookie, do that and you don’t get a cookie, do THAT and you get the stick. Right now the United States has some carrots to use to influence China, but does it have enough? Should it try to add some more? Or should it only focus on acquiring sticks?
Example: China is clearly selling anti-ship missiles to Iran. We do not want them to do this. How do we get them to stop? One way is to offer them something in return, like access to a different U.S. market, or potential cooperation with the U.S. in space: “Stop selling anti-ship missiles to Iran and we will invite you to fly Shenzhou 12 to the ISS in 2012, but if we catch you selling missiles, then the mission is canceled.”
Another benefit (and I have argued this before) is that every yuan that China spends on human spaceflight is a yuan that China _does not_ spend on missiles pointed at Taiwan. Of course, we could gain this benefit either by encouraging them to spend more through cooperation with the United States, or encouraging them to spend more through _competition_ with the United States. I’m agnostic about which one is better, although I think that we probably exert more influence over their behavior by offering carrots and cookies, not throwing sticks for them to chase.
Now you can debate the value of these offers. You can also come up with some potential downsides, such as:
-China gains prestige
-China gains access to U.S. technology and operational data
-China gains a lever (such as propaganda) over the United States
But don’t dismiss the idea out of hand. It is worth thoughtful consideration. The United States regularly cooperates with countries far more economically mighty than China (Britain), and also countries that are at least as brutal towards their own citizens as China (Saudi Arabia).
Finally, I would add that the current U.S. position of non-cooperation may have a price, which is that China appears to be scoring some propaganda points against the U.S. on this issue. Their spokesman Luo Ge has recently proposed cooperation with the United States in space, and they will probably keep proposing it. The United States is the country that is refusing the cooperation, not China. So they’re looking open and accomodating.
Dwayne,
I am glad you are asking these questions, and you have made a number of good points. But let me focus on the “moose on the table” issue, which you ask about.
>>>
A good reason to NOT cooperate with China on space programs, and to NOT invite them to participate in ISS, is they are NOT a democracy.
Every other nation in ISS is a democracy (some are more democratic than others). In fact, I would argue that the ISS is the most exclusive club of free democratic nations in the world.
This is a good thing.
We should offer to let China join the exclusive ISS partnership, when China makes the transition to becoming a freely elected democracy.
FACT: We invited Russia to join the U.S. and our other space station partners AFTER the wall fell; and after Yeltsin stood up to the tyranny on the steps of their congressional building, and won.
FACT: Brazil, France, Germany, Japan, Canada, etc. are all democracies.
We should China to join ISS *after* their dictatorship falls.
This is a completely legitimate position, both politically and policy-wise.
Based on the current politics on Capitol Hill, IMO, there is almost ZERO chance that China will be invited to join the ISS for the foreseable future. I do not know of any serious politician who is suggesting that we invite China into the ISS or the VSE.
But I may be misinformed. If you know of somebody, please share who they are.
– Al
Dwayne, first let me thank you for adding a much needed dose of sanity to the whole “China Space Race” debate. It is clear that the capabilities and intentions of China in space have been subject to a great deal of mistranslation and misinterpretation that makes it into the press. It is also clear that those misinterpretations are being perpetuated by people with a vested interest in hyping a space race with China.
That said, I believe you are being dangerously naive about space cooperation with China.
But that also raises another point: As of 1991 or so, it was totally unthinkable that Russia was going to ever be treated better than America’s longtime space station partners.
Certainly it was totally unthinkable as of this point in 1991. The August Putsch and the subsequent fall of the USSR were still months in the future.
So, to pose a provocative question–if we can “cooperate” with Russia in space, then why should we not cooperate with China?
And to reply with a provocative answer: because China has not yet undergone the kind of “regime change” that the USSR underwent in 1991, and without which cooperation with “Russia” would have been impossible, since “Russia” was not a nation yet.
I still find it unthinkable that we could cooperate with the People’s Republic of China to the same extent we do with Russia now. I suppose it’s always possible there will be an August Putsch and subsequent breakup of the PRC, and subsequent US cooperation with the successor Republic of China, but I’m not holding my breath. The Chinese oligarchs appear to have learned well from the mistakes of Gorbachev.
Example: China is clearly selling anti-ship missiles to Iran. We do not want them to do this. How do we get them to stop? One way is to offer them something in return, like access to a different U.S. market, or potential cooperation with the U.S. in space: “Stop selling anti-ship missiles to Iran and we will invite you to fly Shenzhou 12 to the ISS in 2012, but if we catch you selling missiles, then the mission is canceled.”
If we did this, it would be proof positive that the US never learns from its mistakes. We tried the same thing with Russia in 1993 (and over the same issue – military sales to “rogue states” like Iran) and it has utterly failed. The Russians learned that they could have it both ways: participate in ISS and continue their lucrative sales to Iran. Our “leverage” with ISS got us nothing. In 2000 we tried the stick – the Iran Nonproliferation Act – and it failed. The Russians waited us out until, humiliated, we amended the INA late last year. We have funded 75% of ISS so that Russia can have a tourist hotel. Russia even went so far as to provide military intelligence to Iraq after the war began, secure in the knowledge that even if they were discovered, the US could do nothing meaningful about it. Some “leverage.”
“Stop selling anti-ship missiles to Iran and we will invite you to fly Shenzhou 12 to the ISS in 2012, but if we catch you selling missiles, then the mission is canceled.”
Dwayne, have you really thought this scenario through? I don’t think so. If the US tried to cancel the mission, Russia would sell China a probe-and-drogue docking mechanism and invite them to dock Shenzhou to the Russian segment. It’s win-win for them: China gets to rebuff the US and dock to ISS, while Russia gets to remind the world (again) who really controls ISS. And the US, having already given away the carrots, will be humiliated once again by having its sticks revealed to be impotent.
I don’t deny your other points about the benefits of cooperation, but the downsides far outweigh them, in my view.
“A good reason to NOT cooperate with China on space programs, and to NOT invite them to participate in ISS, is they are NOT a democracy.”
Russia was not a democracy when we conducted Apollo-Soyuz. Saudi Arabia was not a democracy when we flew their prince aboard the Space Shuttle. China was not a democracy when Nixon flew there and enlisted them in opposing the Soviets.
“We should China to join ISS *after* their dictatorship falls.”
There are different degrees of cooperation. Flying a single Shenzhou to ISS is not the same as an invitation to “join ISS.” Any cooperation would be graduated, starting small and working upwards based upon their behavior.
“This is a completely legitimate position, both politically and policy-wise.”
Yes, but should we consider kicking the Russians out because of their recent politics?
“Based on the current politics on Capitol Hill, IMO, there is almost ZERO chance that China will be invited to join the ISS for the foreseable future. I do not know of any serious politician who is suggesting that we invite China into the ISS or the VSE.”
If a US President proposed it, it’s unlikely that Congress would oppose it.
“But I may be misinformed. If you know of somebody, please share who they are.”
You seem to have played a clever trick there–you have essentially stated that the only politicians who could propose such an idea are inherently non-serious. This is like the old “when did you stop beating your wife?” question.
But let’s drop the issue of “seriousness” and just ask if _any_ politicians have proposed it. The answer is no. But so what? Does that make it an illegitimate idea unworthy of discussion? Are US-Chinese relations on an inevitable path toward a new Cold War, followed by conflict, followed by World War III and the destruction of the entire universe as we know it? Or is it possible that politics could shift?
People tend to have short memories, but it is worth remembering that current attitudes toward China in Congress and the White House are a relatively recent thing. Just look back a little further:
-1998 and the Cox Report leads to the current “China = bad” attitude
-early-mid 1990s China was launching western comsats into orbit
-mid-1980s China was buying US military equipment (yes, true, look it up)
-1970s China was allied with US against Russia
And keep in mind that although China is not a democracy, this does not prevent us from buying billions of dollars worth of their goods, much of it produced with near-slave labor. It also does not prevent us from allowing them to buy our Treasury Bonds and prop up our spendthrift habits. So we are supposed to keep space pristine and clear and not muddy ourselves by inviting China to our space station, but it is perfectly fine to allow them to do the dirty work of propping up our government by selling them T-Bonds.
Which raises a really interesting counterpoint to your observation that only democracies participate in ISS. Is there a value in repeating the rapprochement with China in the early 1970s and engaging China in order to enlist it against an increasingly hostile Russia?
Or,
Is there a value in dangling the possibility of Shenzhou flights to ISS in order to encourage the Russians to not extort the US for Soyuz missions?
There are values to cooperation with China that have not been explored. I’m simply proposing that they should be. And I’m pointing out that none of this is black and white, right or wrong. We live in a world where our government allies itself with reprehensible regimes to achieve certain ends (fighting al Qaeda being an obvious example, fighting drugs being another). China is not unique in these respects, so it’s worth asking if there is anything to gain from engaging them.
“That said, I believe you are being dangerously naive about space cooperation with China.”
Thank you. I prefer being called “dangerously naive” instead of stupid. I’m assuming you meant to write stupid, right? And perhaps it has not occurred to you that I was engaging in a gedanken experiment here, posing questions and theoretical scenarios in order to elicit thought. As I stated, I’m pretty much agnostic on the issue, but I think it is worth considering. But if you want to consider me dangerously naive, for whatever reason you have, continue to do so.
“I still find it unthinkable that we could cooperate with the People’s Republic of China to the same extent we do with Russia now.”
So do I. But who proposed that? I don’t see anybody proposing that.
“Dwayne, have you really thought this scenario through?”
I don’t like it when people I have never met refer to me by my first name. In fact, I don’t like it when people I don’t consider friends or colleagues do that either. I prefer the formalities because they’re so rare these days. Keeps things civilized. But, chalk me up as dangerously naive.
Dwayne,
You seem desperate to reach out to China, and appear to want to ignore geopolitical realities. Yes, there are many many options to build bridges. But the “space bridge” is not a very effective one, for the reasons laid out by Nemo in his post.
Apollo-Soyuz is another bad example, The situation with the Soviet Union in the 1970s was much different than the situation today with China. There were real reasons today to build a bridge with the Soviets (for “peace”). It was a welcome break from the constant threat of WWIII.
Nobody today is suggesting that we are on the verge of a hot war with China.
With regards to the Saudi Arabian prince, there are people who think we are too close to the Saudi Arabian kingdom, and that we (as a nation) are two-faced about our foreign policy. More voices are suggesting that we should apply the democracy test to Saudi Arabia. But back to the point about China – a fact of life is that if the Saudi Royal Family was seen on TV driving tanks down the streets of their major cities to squelch a democracy movement, our policy stance towards Saudi Arabia would change almost instantly. This happened in China for the whole world to see. It has not happened in Saudi Arabia.
In summary, there is very little upside to the U.S. foreign policy to do anything with China in space, and plenty of downside.
If you disagre, please explain “Why” you think this is in the U.S. foreign policy interests, maybe there would be something to discuss.
– Al
I am curious how the EELV system would have changed if the government, instead of “bailing out” the two contractors, simply bought a number of launch vehicles equal to the amount of the bailout.
The additionally-purchased rockets would be scheduled for flight on a certain date, with any payload that was ready to fly on them.
Idealistic, to be sure, but it would have been an economic experiment in aerospace unlike any other in the past.
I prefer being called “dangerously naive” instead of stupid. I’m assuming you meant to write stupid, right?
Absolutely not. There is no shortage of intelligent people I nonetheless would not turn to for foreign policy advice due to their naivete. I can’t think of any prominent living examples right now, but Carl Sagan would have been one example. I presume you’re not insulted to be categorized with him.
And perhaps it has not occurred to you that I was engaging in a gedanken experiment here, posing questions and theoretical scenarios in order to elicit thought.
You guessed correctly; the possibility that you were engaging in gedanken escaped me. My apologies: it was the gedanken that was naive, not you personally.
I don’t like it when people I don’t consider friends or colleagues do that either. I prefer the formalities because they’re so rare these days. Keeps things civilized.
Very well, Dr. Day. In the future you may address me as “Captain”.
In the meantime, it has not escaped my notice that your reply focused entirely on the first word in my paragraph and not on the rest; namely, my assertion that it would be unwise for the US to use ISS as a “carrot” for China because it is, quite simply, no longer our carrot to offer, and that Russia has not just the means but the motivation to negate any attempt by us to use it as such. Humiliating the US over ISS is not just sport for them; it’s their way of reminding the world (and themselves) that Russia is more than just a third world country with nukes.
And keep in mind that although China is not a democracy, this does not prevent us from buying billions of dollars worth of their goods, much of it produced with near-slave labor. It also does not prevent us from allowing them to buy our Treasury Bonds and prop up our spendthrift habits.
I think Mr. Day has hit a nail on the head here. Why is it okay to send the Chinese billions of American dollars because it is convenient for American consumers, but it is not okay to cooperate with the Chinese if it might help us achieve some wider strategic or economic goal? We are willing to use what amounts to slave labor and put less-educated Americans out of their only possible jobs and leave them homeless on the streets, for no better reasons than to fulfill an ideological ideal of a “free market” and to keep consumer prices low, but we’re not willing to give China a carrot on the Space Station.
At the very least, I sense a double-standard. We do far more the enable the Chinese dictatorship through trade than we would through cooperating in space. (However, lest I am misunderstood, I am not opposed to trading with China. I do think there should be far more controls on it. I do object to Americans being put out of jobs by slave labor, and, if China wants to trade with the United States, we should insist that they meet certain labor standards, among them, yes, a certain level of democracy.)
— Donald
How about a light CEV that is known to work and is derived from a vehicle that was originally designed to go to the moon?
This is grossly premature. Shenzhou hasn’t demonstrated any of the capabilities required, and besides, it wasn’t derived from the lunar Soyuz, but from an evolved Soyuz that has been repeatedly optimized as a LEO space station ferry to the point where any remaining lunar capability is purely vestigal.
Besides, it would run counter to one of the unstated (but most important) purposes of CEV: to rebuild the US expertise and experience base in manned spacecraft design that has eroded over time.
Donald,
I asked above “why (do) you think this is in the U.S. foreign policy interests” to allow China to come to the ISS.
Nobody has answered my question.
I can answer the parallel question for “why it is in the US interest” for free trade with China. There are MAJOR upsides to the U.S.
Every dollar that Americans save from spending on basic bulk necessities is a dollar that these American citizens now can spend on luxury goods, and services, which are highly likely to be developed right in here in the U.S. It is the growth in these industries that is driving the American economy, and why we have a low unemployment rate.
In summary, free trade lowers U.S. inflation, increases discretionary income for services, creates higher-paying “service jobs” right here in the U.S., and increases the standard of living of the American people.
Second, free trade is perhaps the greatest “peace maker” of all time. Civilizations which are freely trading with each other, in large volumes, tend to find “war” to be extremely unprofitable. They tend to find even the discussion of war to be unprofitable.
Also the downsides are less than you imply. First of all, suggesting “slavery” in China is slightly over the top. (If I am wrong about this, please give source.) Chinese people are fleeing the drudgery of working on the farm in the tens-of-millions to work in the factories to have a better life. Do we begrudge them the opportunity to work hard so they can have a better life?
Next, considering the U.S. unemployment rate, your assertion that they are stealing American jobs is not really backed up by the facts. It is more accurate to say that China is stealing “bulk low paying” jobs, and entree-level technology/manufacturing jobs, from Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, and Mexico. The jobs that China is getting have already left the U.S.
Obviously, there are real downsides to free trade with China too, including making dicators look good by helping their economy expand. Nobody argues with that.
But there are major upsides.
Whether the upsides outweight the downsides is a legitimate debate. Whether we should insist on labor and environmental standards is also something to debate. Congress (and the American people) have had major debates on this, and generally has voted in favor of the upsides of free trade.
I am just asking somebody to make a real case for why China should be allowed by the U.S. to come to the ISS. We can then have a real debate on the substance.
– Al
Okay, Al, How about this?
If it succeeds over the long haul, the Space Station, or its eventual replacement, is likely to become a center for international research, and potentially even trade. Already, European countries are prepared to pay high political and financial prices — and to try to force us to keep our promises to do the same — not to write off their investments in the Space Station. There is a long and successful history of government bases on Earth slowly growing into sites of commerce. Already, the existance of the Space Station is forcing the nations of the world to keep certain launch vehicles and spacecraft alive, and to encourage commercial companies to develop new ones. It seems at least possible that, if we do deploy a polar lunar base and use skipping polar reentries, a high-latitude LEO base may yet prove important for future deep-space expeditions.
I know that my “vision” here — based more on my archaeological and historial backgrounds, than on a technical one — is not widely subscribed. However, for the sake of arguement, let’s assume that I am right.
If so, than the case for inviting China becomes much the same as that for free trade with China. If the Space Station becomes a truly international place — which it seems well on the way to becoming — than having them involved could provide many of the “upsides” that you list.
It is popular to denigrate Mr. Clinton’s invetation to Russia to join the Space Station on technical grounds, but we forget he did that as part of an attempt to tie them into the larger world economy. It worked. Russia has avoided significant conflict with us, and it seems likely that their involvement in the Space Station has contributed in a small way to that. It has certainly tied their aerospace industry into the Western economy far more than would have been the case otherwise. They’ve kept the project afloat with their simple and effective transportation system. A Chinese copy of that system provides greater flexibility, security (in the economic sense), and an alternative the next time we’re unhappy with the Russians.
You say that free trade may be the greatest peacemaker of all time, and I don’t disagree with that. Providing China with economic reasons to tie their aerospace industry closer to ours strikes me as a good lever to that end. Encouraging the Space Station to become a place for international commerce, while making China a part of that, strikes me as two net goods.
— Donald
Mr. Fansome wrote:
“You seem desperate to reach out to China, and appear to want to ignore geopolitical realities.”
Previously I was labeled “dangerously naive.” Why is it necessary to resort to insults? Why is it even necessary to visit my intentions? Why isn’t it possible to disagree with somebody without denigrating them?
I have tried to make it a rule to not respond to people who don’t address the issues, but instead choose to attack the writer. It’s one of the primary reasons why I find blog commentary sections of limited utility. I’d rather waste my time more productively.
Dr. Day,
It was not my intention to insult you. My apologies for “appearing” to insult you.
Anyways, it appears that you are changing the subject (and making this one sentence the topic instead of responding to my core points. Even by your stringent standards, well over 95% of my response was of a non-insulting and substantive nature.
Do you want to debate and discuss the substance of the issue?
– Al
>>>
Donald,
I personally hope the ISS will some day become a “center for international trade”. Perhaps the best spokesperson for this “vision” was Rick Tumlinson of the Space Frontier Foundation when he introduced the “AlphaTown” concept in the mid-1990s. IMO, the privatization of the supply chain to ISS (via COTS) is perhaps the most important initiative taking place at NASA these days. I would suggest it is more important than the VSE.
As I said, “I hope”.
That being said, the ISS is not an international center of trade right now, so your suggestion that we using the ISS as a free trade-like tool will not work. If ISS was a center of international trade, and there were lots of profits to be made (on both sides), this might be a different case. Some day in the future this may happen. If so, that will be a good day.
The real benefits of joining ISS these days are primarily about “national prestige”. They have to do with diplomacy and being allowed to join an exclusive club of democratic nations. They are not economic. They are not scientific.
Also, since free trade on Earth is working so well at creating the “peace dividend” benefit, there is little chance of a hot war between the U.S. and China in the near future (excepting a bad day in Taiwan). Therefore, we don’t need to allow China to ISS for a diplomatic peace-benefit with China, like we generated in Apollo-Soyuz.
Finally, Nemo separately mentioned how using ISS as a diplomatic tool has failed. From both the left and the right. The Clinton Administration theory was that adding Russia into ISS would reduce the demand for Russian scientists and engineers to work for rogue states on ballistic missiles and WMD. The problem is that we have demonstrable proof that it did not work, or at least was not sufficient. Russia has thumbed its nose at the U.S., both in Iraq, and Iran, because both of those countries were willing to do billions in trade with Russia. A little space station deal does not make a difference. The “ISS diplimacy” deal failed on the right from the Iran Non-proliferation Act (INA). The Republicans in Congress passed INA in 2000, thinking they could do the job better than the Clinton Administration, and 5 years later Russia was still dealing with Iran.
The truth is that space station foreign policy deals are a VERY WEAK and ineffective response to issues dealing with economics and foreign policy. Recent history has proven this. We need much stronger tools.
For example, Russia would probably listen a lot more to the U.s. about Iran if we threatened to block their joining the WTO.
The same goes with China. If we want something from China, like them to stop sending missiles to other countries, space is a very weak bargaining chip.
– Al
If it succeeds over the long haul, the Space Station, or its eventual replacement, is likely to become a center for international research, and potentially even trade.
The likelihood of ISS “succeeding over the long haul,” give its bastard origins and fundamental design features (including its location) are vanishingly small.
Nemo wrote:
“Very well, Dr. Day. In the future you may address me as “Captain”.”
“Dr.” ain’t necessary, as I cannot write prescriptions. I was going to call you “Finding.”
But this discussion isn’t worth continuing. I’ll take my (desperate, dangerously naive, ignorant) comments elsewhere.
I negelected to respond to one part of Mr. Rohrich’s comment above that has been largely ignored in the resulting conversation:
You have to wonder why Dr. Foust is against competition.
I’m not against competition in general. The problem is that the best example of competition in space—the Space Race between the US and USSR in the 1960s—had long-term negative consequences that have arguably outweighed the positive short-term benefits from racing to the Moon. As I noted in an article nearly three years ago, in an earlier bubble of US-China space race hysteria:
Sorry, I don’t believe the Chinese bring anything to the table that helps the United States get to the Moon more quickly. Going back to my first post… the competition (Soviet Union) didn’t disappear after we landed on the Moon. Nor did it disappear after our last manned mission to the Moon in Dec 1972. What went away, in my opinion, was a lack of resolve politically on our part. We chose not to compete. We had the means… but not the will. Von Braun outlined a plan to have Americans on Mars by 1982. If followed, another “Apollo” type program would of worked getting us to Mars. We’ve had 30 years of sitting around after a “space race”. And you’re wondering why were not going anywhere in space?
Jim: ‘will’ is not an independent variable. It’s a consequence of the costs and benefits of a policy. We don’t have any great will to go back to the moon because for most people it has no compelling justification.
Jim,
Considering that this site is called “Space Politics”, I thought that most of the people here understand that the core underlying reason for Apollo was about “national security” and “politics” and had almost nothing to do with a “space objective.”
After we beat the Soviets to the Moon, we had achieved the overriding purpose. Which was to demonstrate that countries based on democracy & capitalism was superior to those based on communism. (There are books written with this as the core theme.)
FYI, once Apollo’s political purpose was complete, it was IRRELEVANT that it was technically feasible to put humans on Mars by 1982.
Many engineers tend to forget that space is fundamentally political at its core. As they say “politics always wins”.
– Al
PS — If you don’t like this reality, great, join the rest of us. This is one more good reason for supporting a much stronger commercial space agenda. A profitable and triving commercial space industry is the best way to eliminate the need to ask politicians, year in and year out, for taxpayer funds.