The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued a brief analysis of the NASA budget, focusing on the changes in out-year projections for the agency’s budget through the end of the decade. Those projections are significantly lower in the FY07 budget proposal than the one two years ago, which was released immediately after the unveiling of the Vision for Space Exploration. These reductions, as well as increases in shuttle cost projections since two years ago, have put a crunch much of the agency. Worse, the $2.3 billion added to the shuttle program in 2007-2010 in the FY07 projection versus FY06 won’t be enough:
But even with this $2.3 billion increase in shuttle funding, there will still be a shortfall of as much as $3.7 billion, if the ISS is to be completed. Perhaps, the reduction of the number of shuttle flights from 19 to 16 based on the elimination of two contingency logistical flights, the cancellation of the HST servicing mission, the retirement of the shuttle Atlantis in 2008, and the extension of shuttle flights through 2010 will be enough to provide sufficient resources to complete the ISS.
I’m not sure what the CSIS means by the “cancellation of the HST servicing mission”; to the best of my knowledge NASA has made no decision yet whether to reinstate the mission, although the agency has appeared to be leaning heavily in favor of flying that mission.
The report concludes with a warning about cutting science programs, and its effects on international cooperation in carrying out the VSE: cut too much science—which has benefited from strong international cooperation—then potential partners might be driven away; cut too little, and there won’t be enough money available to carry out the Vision. “As we have seen previously with ESA,” the report warns, “if the scientific community becomes a sufficiently large constituency, then it becomes very difficult indeed to focus any effort on the human component of space exploration.”
Dr. Griffin has said numerous times that, as a matter of law, he has to fly a mission to Hubble as long as it is technically feasible. The big concern is whether Shuttle will return to flight in time to launch a repair mission before HST’s batteries fail.
The big concern is whether Shuttle will return to flight in time to launch a repair mission before HST’s batteries fail.
The other big concern is the OBSS Structural Dynamics DTO on STS-121. This will determine if the OBSS can be used as a standalone TPS repair platform, to conform with CAIB R6.4-1. If this DTO fails, an HST mission will not conform to the CAIB recommendations.
The problem with reducing the Shuttle’s flight rate while retaining the 2010 retirement is that it doesn’t save money. The Shuttle’s costs are largely fixed and independent of how often you fly it. Retaining the flight rate — if possible — while bringing forward the retirement date would save much more money.
— Donald
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If NASA proves that it has substantially reduced the “likelihood” of needing to do a TPS repair on-orbit, by all the other actions it has taken to date, what is the chance that NASA will decide it does not need to conform with CAIB R6.4-1?
– Al
Donald said “The problem with reducing the Shuttle’s flight rate while retaining the 2010 retirement is that it doesn’t save money. The Shuttle’s costs are largely fixed and independent of how often you fly it. Retaining the flight rate — if possible — while bringing forward the retirement date would save much more money.”
This is true, but is unlikely to happen. Not for technical reasons. As they say, “politics always wins”.
The NASA institution has developed a plan to fly to 2010, and if it can fly the baseline missions earlier, it clearly wants to add flights, not shorten the schedule. For example, right now the last two Shuttle flights on the manifest, for unpressurized cargo, are being held as “contingency”.
It is pretty clear that the White House forced these flights into the “contingency” designation and that SOMD was kicking and screaming every step of the way. If you carefully read what the 2006 White House budget says, what Griffin says, and what Gerstenmeier and SOMD say on the same subject, you will note interesting differences.
It is clear that the NASA institution is playing a waiting game. They know that Griffin is likely to be gone in January 2009; and that whoever is the next President (and the next NASA Administrator) will actually decide if the Shuttle retires in 2010, or if SOMD is allowed to add “a couple more flights” for unpressurized cargo or other purposes.
It is pretty obvious that SOMD will have their arguments well prepared for that date in 2009 for “just a couple more flights please!”
Taking this one step further, for similar bureaucratic-political reasons I think it is unlikely that the Shuttle manifest will be redesigned to put the European and Japanese elements up earlier.
If there are continued Shuttle delays (which is likely), the strongest argument for extending retirement beyond 2010 is “we have to launch the partner elements … we just need to extend retirement to 2011″. It is much harder to argue with an extension proposal if the last flight on the manifest is a foreign partner element. The NASA bureaucracy will absolutely use the one lever they have that has saved shuttle from being outright cancelled, for the purpose of extending its life.
The obvious counter is to re-order the shuttle manifest, and put the foreign partner elements earlier. Many have already suggested this. For example, there are stories that the foreign partners have been urging NASA to put up their elements earlier. But there is little indication that this will happen.
Personally, even if it is technically feasible, I believe the shuttle manifest will not change if only because the shuttle and station programs know it is in their political/institutional interest to keep the manifest as it is.
It is extremely hard for White House officials to argue with station and shuttle officials about the order of the Shuttle manifest. Since it is beyond the White House’s ability to argue with the shuttle and station programs about technical issues, these programs will likely continue to state technical reasons to take advantage of the political leverage.
The biggest variable here is Griffin. If the Shuttle continues to slip to the right over the next couple years, Griffin has enough technical knowledge, and credibility with the WH and Congress, to call SOMD’s bluff if he so decides, and to force a re-ordering of the shuttle manifest so that it can be shortened and stay within the 2010 date.
Even if Griffin resigns in January 2009, it will be much harder for the NASA institution to re-organize the shuttle manifest back to such a pre-Griffin mandated manifest. By this time, the Griffin ordered manifest is likely to be the baseline, and if the partner elements are already up, it may be much harder for SOMD to persuade the WH and Congress to give them a few more flights.
The interesting question to me is what Griffin will decide to do if the shuttle keeps slipping to the right.
Will he sit there and watch it happen, or
Will he order a new (and shorter) shuttle manifest in order to save his precious ESAS architecture/plan, or
Will he order that the NASA Science budget/program take even more hits in the post-2010 time frame to pay for delays in shuttle retirement?
or some combination?
– Al
If NASA proves that it has substantially reduced the “likelihood” of needing to do a TPS repair on-orbit, by all the other actions it has taken to date, what is the chance that NASA will decide it does not need to conform with CAIB R6.4-1?
Fairly high. I think Griffin wants to do the HST mission. He’d like to do it in conformance with the CAIB if he can, but he’ll most likely fly anyway if he can’t. I think he understands, in a way that O’Keefe did not, that this mission is a gut-check: if we’re not willing to risk a shuttle mission to HST – something we have done successfully several times already – there is no way we can risk a lunar return.
Taking this one step further, for similar bureaucratic-political reasons I think it is unlikely that the Shuttle manifest will be redesigned to put the European and Japanese elements up earlier.
NASA has already done so. They have slipped 1E, 1J/A, 1J, and a hypothetical HST SM-04 ahead of 15A and ULF-2. OTOH, they have taken some of the more radical options off the table, such as the ULF-1.1/12A/10A/13A/1E sequence that was floating around earlier.
The biggest variable here is Griffin. If the Shuttle continues to slip to the right over the next couple years, Griffin has enough technical knowledge, and credibility with the WH and Congress, to call SOMD’s bluff if he so decides, and to force a re-ordering of the shuttle manifest so that it can be shortened and stay within the 2010 date.
He won’t. He is quite aware of what has been going on re: IP acceleration and knows the tradeoffs that have been considered WRT all the options, and that the current option (which moves 1E, 1J/A, and 1J up to flights 7, 8, and 9 of the 19-flight sequence) is the most aggressive one that is feasible.
Al, I don’t disagree with your view of the politics. However, even if you are right, reducing the flight rate or retiring an orbiter makes little or no sense. However long you do or don’t keep the Shuttle, you get the most out of the program by flying as often as possible. (Conversely, you get the least out of the program by spending $5 billion a year flying one mission ever three years.)
I have already come out in favor of the most radical solution of all: stop the Shuttle now and find another way forward using the EELVs and or the Exploration infrastructure that Dr. Griffin is developing.
— Donald
Nemo,
Thanks for the information. I missed that re-ordering of the manifest.
IMO, NASA is right on the edge, with just a few more slips in the Shuttle schedule, of not being able to fly all of the remaining 19 Shuttle flights by the White House’s stated date for Shuttle retirement, which is the end of FY 2010 (September 30, 2010.) Some of my sources in NASA suggest that NASA is being optimistic that they can complete these 19 flights right now, without any further slips.
Nemo, if you disagree with this, please say so.
Since this future appears to be “likely”, I am trying to figure out what shoe will drop when the Shuttle encounters several more schedule slips.
The options (as far as I can see them) include:
1) Break through the September 2010 deadline, and impact the budgets for either the VSE, or Science, or both in the post-2010 timeframe.
2) Eliminate Shuttle flights. In this case, which flights do you eliminate?
A) The “contingency” unpressurized cargo flights? (Since the WH has put the word “contingency” on these flights, the decision about which flights to cut first may have already been made.)
B) Some of the pressurized cargo flights that are interspersed into the first 16 flights (if you go look at the manifest, you will see lots of MPLMs and SpaceHab cargo missions.)
3) Cancel the HST servicing mission
The biggest variable is “who makes the decision”. If Griffin makes the decision, pre-Jan. 2009, the decision will be different than if made by the next Administrator in the post-Jan. 2009 time frame.
Donald — I agree with you that you get the most out of the program by flying as often as possible. I may be wrong, but I believe that NASA is making decisions now that basically eliminate the ability to fly more than 19 missions. You have to order long-lead items on lots of little things for each mission. Since NASA is now scraping for savings, I believe the long lead items for missions 20+ are being cut for the savings involved.
It would be interesting to get this confirmed.
– Al
Some of my sources in NASA suggest that NASA is being optimistic that they can complete these 19 flights right now, without any further slips.
Nemo, if you disagree with this, please say so.
I think 19 flights is possible but unlikely. The pace of flights is not onerous (it’s below NASA’s historical average with a three-orbiter fleet), and the current schedule still has some pad in it, but the current spate of problems must be overcome. NASA will also face some difficult decisions if 121 slips past July. Current rules require 121 and 115 to launch in daylight and the last good daylight window this year is September, with the next one not until March. So a 2-month slip for 121 could turn into a 6-month slip for 115. After 115 things get easier because the daylight restriction goes away and launch scheduling gets much more flexible.
The options (as far as I can see them) include:
1) Break through the September 2010 deadline, and impact the budgets for either the VSE, or Science, or both in the post-2010 timeframe.
This depends on whether Griffin (or his successor) considers CAIB R9.2-1 to be a hard constraint. The 2010 recertification recommendation was the original rationale behind the 2010 retirement date. It also depends on whether Bush’s successor considers the 2020 lunar landing deadline a hard constraint. Delaying shuttle retirement also delays the availability of shuttle funding for development of the CaLV, LSAM, and the other lunar/Mars elements of the VSE. However, it would probably not affect CEV/CLV much if Bush’s successor decides to truncate the VSE to LEO-only.
2) Eliminate Shuttle flights. In this case, which flights do you eliminate?
A) The “contingency” unpressurized cargo flights? (Since the WH has put the word “contingency” on these flights, the decision about which flights to cut first may have already been made.)
That is probably a good guess.
B) Some of the pressurized cargo flights that are interspersed into the first 16 flights (if you go look at the manifest, you will see lots of MPLMs and SpaceHab cargo missions.)
That is somewhat deceptive since some of those MPLM missions are really assembly flights; shuttle performance and timeline constraints dictate that some of the modules launch only partially outfitted, with the balance coming up on an MPLM later (or even some prep work on an earlier flight).
To make sure we’re singing from the same sheet of music, here’s the latest manifest info I have:
121/ULF-1.1 (MPLM, ICC, LMC)
115/12A (ITS P3/P4)
116/12A.1 (Spacehab, ITS P5, ICC)
117/13A (ITS S3/S4)
118/13A.1 (Spacehab, ITS S5, ESP3)
120/10A (Node 2)
122/1E (Columbus, MPESS)
123/1J/A (ELM-PS, SLP-D1/Dextre)
124/1J (JEM PM)
125/HST SM-04
119/15A (ITS S6)
126/ULF-2 (MPLM, LMC)
127/2J/A (JEM-EF, ELM ES, SLP-D2)
128/17A (MPLM, LMC)
129/ULF-3 (ELC-1, ELC-2)
130/19A (MPLM, LMC)
131/ULF-4 (ELC-3, ELC-4)
132/20A (Node 3, Cupola)
133/ULF-5 (ELC-5, ELC-1)
(Nothing double-secret about this; it’s the schedule on NASA Human Spaceflight; all that’s changed since then has been the STS numbers and the placement of the HST flight.)
The two “contingency” flights are ULF-4 and 5; those will obviously be the first to go. This also has the beneficial side-effect of moving 20A from Discovery to Endeavour – that flight will need all the performance it can get.
After that the choices get tougher, and the answers depend on what options are available then. 19A carries an MPLM but is really a JAXA outfitting/Node 3 prep flight. I’d delete ULF-3 before 19A, but that’s an MLM outfitting flight and cancelling it may piss off the Russians. 17A is the flight that gets ISS up to six-crew capability and will piss everybody if we cancel it. ULF-2 is the last pure resupply flight in the manifest, but early enough in the manifest that there aren’t any good alternatives if it’s cancelled.
So probably the answer is a little of 1) and a little of 2). Cancel ULF flights one-by-one until you hit the meat of the assembly sequence, then start extending the 2010 deadline.
3) Cancel the HST servicing mission
Depends on the outcome of the 121 DTO, and when the “crisis” hits, if it does. HST SM-04 is early enough that it’s sitting fairly pretty as long as the technical problems look tractable.
The biggest variable is “who makes the decision”. If Griffin makes the decision, pre-Jan. 2009, the decision will be different than if made by the next Administrator in the post-Jan. 2009 time frame.
Absolutely true. And that, in turn, will depend on timing. If 121 and 115 fly this year, the launch schedule will most likely slip gradually after that, and the current schedule has enough pad that it will be quite a while before the cumulative effect forces hard decisions to be made. OTOH, if 121 slips to September and pushes 115 to March, it could force some decisions fairly soon.
I may be wrong, but I believe that NASA is making decisions now that basically eliminate the ability to fly more than 19 missions.
It may not eliminate the ability, but it would make extending the program a very expensive decision for Bush’s successor, and that alone will probably suffice.