During a briefing after President Bush’s meeting with Chinese President Hu, Dennis Wilder, Acting Senior Director for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council, threw in a few words at the end of his opening statement about US-China space cooperation:
The President, in the area of trying to deepen the relationship between our two societies and our two cultures, offered to send the NASA Administrator to China to begin to talk about lunar exploration with the Chinese, to talk about some of the things we need to do in space — for example, debris avoidance and other subjects. There are some things that the Chinese also have in terms of sensor technologies and information that we are interested in, in terms of global climate and other issues. So the NASA Administrator will probably go to China later on this year to begin to consult on the subject of space exploration and where we might have common interests and where we might begin to work together as the two nations on the Earth with the most ambitious space programs in the 21st century at this point.
This statement got a little bit of media coverage, including Reuters, SPACE.com, and the Houston Chronicle, which is probably about all that it deserved. China had already offered to host a visit by Griffin, and reportedly the US has already provided orbital debris tracking support for China for its manned Shenzhou missions. The lunar exploration cooperation is a little more interesting, but it remains to be seen how that will play out, particularly given the limited flight opportunities in the near term: it may be too late to fly US instruments on Chang’e 1 (China’s lunar orbiter) or Chinese instruments on LRO, even if both sides agreed to it today.
This is interesting because it signals a shift on the part of the U.S. position from one of “no cooperation” (although some has already taken place in secret), to “cooperation is possible.” Contrast this to what happened three years ago when a Chinese space official visited NASA and his offers of cooperation were completely ignored by the White House. Clearly the administration changed policies.
We’ll probably never know why the administration made this shift. However, Joan Johnson-Freese speculated a few weeks ago that the Chinese had shifted their own position in order to score propaganda points against the U.S. She suggested that China had decided to openly propose cooperation with the United States in order to score propaganda points, making it clear that the United States was the country that was being obstinate. I’m not sure that I accept that interpretation, because the offers of cooperation by the Chinese were made in public, but in a relatively low-key manner. For instance, when Mr. Luo Ge spoke in Washington he did not raise the issue of cooperation in his formal talk, but in response to a question from the audience. If nobody had asked that (obvious) question, then he might never have raised the topic there, although he undoubtedly raised it in his meeting with Griffin.
There is actually a pretty broad spectrum of possible cooperative activities, and one naturally expects that any cooperation would start at the low end. The most obvious option is sharing data from lunar spacecraft. That can be done without much concern about technology transfer and without much symbolism. Flying instruments on each others’ spacecraft would be a step up from that in involvement and symbolism. A Shenzhou mission to ISS would obviously be at the far end of the spectrum (much interaction, significant symbolism). But there are intermediate steps before that, such as flying a Chinese taikonaut aboard the shuttle, that could have less interaction and different symbolism.
This is a tremendously good thing. I do hope some useful cooperation comes of it. With environmental sentiment the way it is in DC and NPOESS on its current (terminal?) trajectory, we could really use some help with climate studies.
The Administration needs to be very careful about space cooperation with what amounts to a fascist dictatorship. We have been down this road before, with the Soviets. The Apollo-Soyuz test flight was supposed to presage a new era of Soviet-American space cooperation. Except for testing out a common docking system (a sensible thing), nothing came of it as the Cold War chilled up in the late seventies.
Imagine a scenario which has a Shenzhou visiting ISS. A new era of space cooperation is hailed. Then the Chinese do something nasty (like invade Taiwan or roll tanks over a bunch of student dissidents) and all that is forgotten.
Finally, one notes that the Russians became a full partner in space exploration only after the fall of communism.
What struck me the most out of this was the comment “as the two nations on the Earth with the most ambitious space programs in the 21st century at this point.”
I was just thinking that if I am the Russians, or the Europeans, I am a little miffed. It appears that China has already left us in the dustbins of history in the minds of the Americans.
I was also thinking that a modern-day equivalent of Soyuz-Apollo might be appropriate. What about docking a CEV to a Shenzou in LEO, and then shaking hands in orbit?
This would allow U.S. to make a positive diplomatic message, and a symbolic comparison to the U.S. does in space with “communist dictatorships”. It would be highly visible, positive, (satisfying those who want us to do something in space with China), and based on foreign policy precedent.
There is also a practical reason for this — establishing a common docking standard for human spacecraft increases the safety of space travelers of all nations in orbit, and can be justified under international treaties related to astronaut rescue.
Does anybody know what (if anything) it would take to dock an CEV (with APAS) to a Shenzou (which is an evolution of Soyuz)?
– Al
I am guessing we will have to wait to see what kind of system China has developed for their Shennzhou 8, 9, and 10 docking mission.
I know that the current Soyuz design uses the probe and drogue system. For Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, the APAS-75 system was developed between the Soviet Union and the U.S.
Incidently, the APAS-89 system (also known as APDS) used by the shuttles is simply an update of APAS-75. It was originally going to go on the Buran shuttles but eventually ended up on the shuttles as part of the Orbital Docking System (ODS) used for shuttle/Mir and now ISS. RSC Energia sold the docking hardware to the U.S.
There were 1 (or 2?) modified Soyuz with the APAS-89 system, instead of probe/drogue, that docked with Mir to test out the system in the early 1990s.
The CEV will also use the APDS (the hardware will again come from RSC Energia). It looks like Clipper will use the probe and drogue system (although I am not 100% sure).
If any standardized docking system is established, it will come from Russia (the U.S. stopped making their version of the APAS with ASTP).
I want to expand on two political-based reasons that a repeat of Apollo-Soyuz might be pursued. As most here understand, the primary driver of any deal with China will be political.
1) By following a precident of what the U.S. previously did with the *communist* Soviet Union (and NOT letting the Chinese come to ISS), this will significantly mute the attacks on Capitol Hill from the opponents of a closer relationship with the Chinese dictatorship. (Since Bush is much weaker in the polls these days, the WH can’t take congressional support for granted. The administration is unlikely to do anything that will be immediately shot down by their conservative allies in Congress. Since there are political benefits to being tough on China, the WH will be careful.)
2) There is a political upside to cutting this deal to those inside NASA who are CEV champions. By cutting a foreign policy deal that requires that the CEV fly in the post 2012 time frame, this increases the political support in Congress and the long-term sustainability of CEV. This political support may be critical for those rainy days when the CEV will come under attack for delays and cost overruns.
Remember, foreign policy deals saved the ISS in the 1990s, and are saving the Shuttle from immediate retirement right now.
If I was a betting man, I would bet that the NASA institution will soon come to this conclusion, if they have not come to it already, and start advocating it within the Administration. (If I worked for Mike Griffin, I would propose this option to him.) The biggest uncertainty is whether the WH will let them cut this deal with China. I am guessing that the WH will say “Yes” if the WH gets what the want from China.
– Al
Al: There is a political upside to cutting this deal to those inside NASA who are CEV champions. By cutting a foreign policy deal that requires that the CEV fly in the post 2012 time frame, this increases the political support in Congress and the long-term sustainability of CEV. This political support may be critical for those rainy days when the CEV will come under attack for delays and cost overruns. Remember, foreign policy deals saved the ISS in the 1990s, and are saving the Shuttle from immediate retirement right now.
Excellent points, and I think you have convinced me. I had been thinking of China-in-space being a good thing in the abstract, i.e., the more nations involved in human spaceflight, the more likely at least one will be moving forward at any given time. However, you have pointed out an immediate practical advantage to NASA. It should have been obvious and I’m embarrassed to say that I didn’t think of it myself!
— Donald