NASA

CEV, COTS, and the gap

NASA’s Crew Exploration Vehicle program, a cornerstone of the Vision for Space Exploration, is now facing criticism from two sides. On Tuesday the Space Frontier Foundation released a white paper calling the agency’s CEV development plans “unaffordable and unsustainable”. The Foundation is particularly critical of the “Block 1″ CEV, designed for low Earth orbit operations, noting that in its rush to get the vehicle ready to serve the ISS it is making design decisions on issues like docking adaptors and thruster systems that will not carry over to the Block 2 version intended for lunar missions. (The Foundation is also critical of the Ares 1, née CLV, development strategy.) The Foundation argues that NASA should go directly to the Block 2 CEV and use the “many billions” saved on additional COTS funding.

Just a day later, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report on NASA’s CEV program that is hardly any more complementary. The GAO concludes that “NASA’s current acquisition strategy for the CEV places the project at risk of significant cost overruns, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls because it commits the government to a long-term product development effort before establishing a sound business case.” The report also recommends that “Congress should consider restricting annual appropriations and limiting NASA’s obligations for the CEV project” to key support activities until the program is better defined.

After reading the Foundation paper, one concern I had is that they did not define, beyond “many billions”, how much money would be saved by going directly to the Block 2 CEV. The GAO report suggests that no one, not even NASA, would be able to answer that right now. This issue will get Congressional scrutiny; the House Science Committee issued a press release with committee chairman Sherwood Boehlert saying he plans to hold a hearing about the GAO report after the summer recess.

There is, however, a deeper issue not touched upon in either the Foundation or GAO reports. A big reason for the current CEV development schedule, and the whole Block 1 CEV design, is to minimize the “gap” in US government human space access after the shuttle is retired in 2010. NASA, under the watchful eye of at least some members of Congress, is trying to minimize that gap; even the Foundation report notes that, through additional COTS funding, NASA increases the odds of shortening the gap by funding more ventures, thus making it more likely one or more companies will develop a viable cargo and crew transportation solution.

Here’s the problem, though: while a gap in human space access is not desirable, in ideal circumstances, it’s not clear just how bad such a gap would be. Any missions in the post-2010 time frame would be limited to ISS missions, until the CEV and other ESAS vehicle systems are ready for lunar missions. And the US current plans call for ending support for the ISS in 2016, while the agency is already considering suspending all US research there for a year or more because of funding issues. NASA will still be able to purchase Soyuz flights to ISS at least until 2012 under current law, regardless of the status of other vehicles. “National security” is often trotted out as a reason for minimizing the gap, but if you’re in Congress and worried about national security in space, you’d be better off keeping watch on the problems with various Air Force space programs instead. Moreover, we seemed to have survived the nearly six-year gap caused by the Apollo-Shuttle interregnum between 1975 and 1981. Those who worry about a gap of a few years between shuttle and CEV need to be more explicit in the explanations why it’s so undesirable, or else we should re-think the overall CEV (and ESAS) procurement strategies.

41 comments to CEV, COTS, and the gap

  • anonymous

    … noting that in its rush to get the vehicle ready to serve the ISS it is making design decisions on issues like docking adaptors and thruster systems that will not carry over to the Block 2 version intended for lunar missions.

    Not all of this is true. There is more going on inside NASA than the SFF is aware of – some of these decisions are not final.

  • changehappens

    NASA’s behavior is troubling which isn’t unusual when engineering is married to politics. The first really big mistake in my opinion was christening the CEV systems as “Shuttle Derived”. Made politicians happy because JOBS were saved and it sounded like it would be ready sooner, minimizing that Gap. Sounded good for engineering because hey, its “tried and true and what we already have in production”.

    Exactly what in the CEV systems is now shuttle derived? Nothing, including the brand new SRB is shuttle derived. This key assumption was wrong, yet NASA is continuing with the SRB as a part of the new systems.

    Of course there would be funding problems, no matter what the state of the federal budget, NASA always has “funding problems”. That is why NASA must make the early decisions on launchers and mission objectives correctly.

    Since the Stick was picked because it’s shuttle derived, why is it still the preferred approach when the stick is no longer shuttle derived?

    The CEV mission was to be a long duration craft able to do L1 missions, Lunar Missions and other long range objectives. Now we hear that the SM is being shrunk by 50% so it can get to orbit on the Stick. What exactly is the mission for the CEV?

    These questions still linger 2.5 years after NASA got wind in its sail to flesh out a new approach. These questions should have been answered over a year ago.

  • I’m not sure what to make of a lot of this without more information. However,

    Changehappens: These questions still linger 2.5 years after NASA got wind in its sail to flesh out a new approach. These questions should have been answered over a year ago.

    This is 100% correct. I think Dr. Griffin made a political mistake in changing Mr. O’Keefe’s initial small-capsule-on-all-medium-launch-vehicles ideas, and the indecision now is even more damaging. Politically, we need to pick a strategy, stick to it, and go. The indecision is only giving critics — and there will always be critics no matter what the strategy — opportunities to initiate the death-of-a-hundred-cuts that is the VSE’s greatest risk.

    This is quickly turning into another Space Station — only worse.

    — Donald

  • Jake McGuire

    Moreover, we seemed to have survived the nearly six-year gap caused by the Apollo-Shuttle interregnum between 1975 and 1981

    But at the end of that gap we were expecting to have dirt-cheap and routine access to space, which is OK to wait a few years for. At the end of the gap we’re facing now, we will have less frequent, more expensive, and less capable access to space than we have now. It’s a different and much more dangerous situation.

  • Dave Renholder

    The SFF needs better writers if they want people to take their policy papers seriously. You don’t convince people that you’re smarter than NASA by citing Wikipedia articles in your footnotes.

  • Frank Johnson

    Unfortunately, I think the most likely course of action will be to push back the 2010 retirement date for the shuttle. There will be considerable pressure from the international partners to finish the ISS. The CEV Block I, whatever the chosen design, will likely be behind schedule. Indeed, we might *still* be arguing over the design in 2010. The temptation to raid the COTS budget to pay for space science, aeronautics, and shuttle safety might be too great for NASA to resist.

    Keeping the shuttle flying past 2010 would certainly make the congressional delegations from the aerospace states happy, always important in an election year. Even better if more money has to be spent to restart production of ET’s and SRB’s.

    Usually it the path of least resistance that is followed. We might see something similar in the near-term with reconsideration of using an EELV as a CLV. And all it would take to move the 2010 retirement date is the signature of the President, whoever that turns out to be.

  • .

    The main problem of the entire ESAS plan is the 5-segments SRB.

    I think that the new 5-segments SRB planned for the Ares-I and Ares-V can’t work because it can’t give more burning time nor more thrust (or a little more than a 4-segments version) but only more internal pressure and up to 140 mT of extra dry mass!

    I explain in detail the reasons of my opinion in this article: http://www.gaetanomarano.it/articles/011srb5.html

    Not “the better” but the ONLY choice for the Ares-I and Ares-V is the (standard) 4-segments SRB with (also) the great advantage that it is ready available NOW!

    .

  • Dave Renholder

    One of the things that I find odd about the SFF white paper is the random underlining of words. Why the heck do they do this? Random underlining and capitalization is the kind of thing that you see in crackpot letters.

  • Al Fansome

    ANONYMOUS noted above:

    “Not all of this is true. There is more going on inside NASA than the SFF is aware of – some of these decisions are not final.”

    This is an accurate statement by “anonymous”. But any outside “citizen” or “citizens group” — which includes Congress — can only assess the information that is publicly available.

    If you read the white paper, the SFF has documented and referenced NASA’s (and Griffin’s) own documents and statements in coming to their conclusions. Although some have been critical of their conclusion, I have not seen anybody point to some specific fact they got wrong, and then supplied the public source to back it up. In fact, considering the complexity of this kind of issue, I am surprised that nobody has brought up a “gotcha”.

    This kind of white paper is about the limit of what an outside group can do, using only public information. It is out of place to criticize the SFF (or Congress) for coming to faulty conclusions based on that limited information.

    It is incumbent on NASA to disclose its plans to spend the many many BILLIONS in taxpayer funds. Ultimately, NASA needs to answer to Congress, and the taxpayer, about how it plans to spend the funds. The song “just trust us” does not work any more.

    BTW, I am betting that NASA will eventually go back to Methane/LOX engines in the CEV. Most probably because Griffin understands what a strategically poor choice this was, and is knocking a few heads together right now.

    The docking port issue is a little tougher if you want the CEV to go to ISS.

    Anyways, the conclusions to the white paper make a lot of sense, given the information that is publicly available. Don is right “This is quickly turning into another Space Station — only worse.”

    – Al

  • Al Fansome

    >>>

    Dave,

    Since you posted this criticism, I went and checked. There were 4 Wikipedia references. They are:

    1) Some basic background facts about the J2 engine.

    2) Some basic facts about who “James Buchanan” was (a nobel prize winning economist)

    3) Some basic facts about who “George Stigler” was (another nobel prize winning economist)

    These all seemed to be pretty basic. Something more authoritative was not really needed.

    But I agree with you on the 4th wikipedia reference, which deals with the Shuttle Launch complexes. They should have found a more authoritative source for this issue. And it would be stronger if they did

    But, that being said, was the SFF point paper wrong in what its says about SLC 39A or SLC 39B? Can any of the readers here provide better information?

    Dave, since you brought it up as an issue, do you have better information?

    – AL

    BTW — this is a really MINOR issue in the white paper. If that is the biggest criticism of the SFF position paper that anybody can come up with, then NASA is in big trouble.

  • Al Fansome

    DAVE RENHOLDER: “One of the things that I find odd about the SFF white paper is the random underlining of words. Why the heck do they do this? Random underlining and capitalization is the kind of thing that you see in crackpot letters.”

    Dave,

    I found that a little annoying also. I also found their tone a little “off putting”, but once I got beyond that, the facts were pretty hard to ignore.

    BTW, if your major criticism of an 18-page white paper is the “underlining” and “capitalization”, and not the content, facts, or problems it describes, then NASA is in big trouble.

    Those who don’t like the SFF paper’s conclusions, should attack its underlying premises, its facts, its logic, and back it up.

    I have seen a lot of heated rhetoric on the web about the paper … but nobody (at least that I have seen) has been able to show that any of their facts are wrong. Nor have I seen anybody suggest an alternative solution.

    This is what the world wide web is all about. Glenn Reynolds of Instapundit.com, one of my favorite bloggers, has popularized a phrase I think applies here — “we can fact check your ass”.

    So go to it people. Those who want to protect/defend NASA, can do so best by arguing the facts.

    BTW, I think there are some at NASA who will read the white paper, and seriously consider the facts. In fact, Dr. Griffin, who says “Just call me Spock”, may be one of them. Instead of emotionally reacting to the conclusion (as some do), I am betting Griffin will take a look at the facts and (as Spock says) the “logic.”

    But maybe I am too much of an optimist. The political constraints that Griffin is under are not necessarily “logical”.

    – Al

  • Here’s the problem, though: while a gap in human space access is not desirable, in ideal circumstances, it’s not clear just how bad such a gap would be.

    Shh….

    don’t point out the emperor has no clothes, or they might figure out that the manned space program has no purpose.

  • Both SF and the GAO accountants are living in a world that doesn’t exist.

    It think that the reason Griffin plans to go ahead dispite the GAO recommendations and SF report is definitely because of the gap. Which I think is unacceptable.

    Mike griffin is most likely hedging his bet on the following scerenios in the next 5 to 10 years.

    1) at least a perception if not a reallity of a advancing Chinese Military space program.

    2) Increasing tensions between the US and Russia, this I believe is also the reason that Griffin is totally throwing out any COTS contracts that involve equipment not launching from us soil. Its not inconceivable that US access to the ISS could become contrained by international tension.

    3) and most importantly, setting the stage to make it extremely difficult for a future administration to scuttle the project. If you remove the ISS resupply from the equation ie. the SF proposal than it becomes a Lunar only plan, which would be much easier for a future congress to kill. Remember the driving factor for support so far is unfortunately the Columbia disaster dictating the need to move away from the shuttle and not shutting out US access to leo.

  • or they might figure out that the manned space program has no purpose.

    We need to send robots out into the universe to explore the cosmos, so that we can find a way for robots to live sustainably on the Earth.

  • SFFally

    The reaction of the NASA bureaucrats and NASA cheerleaders to the SFF white paper is quite illuminating. And predictable.

    If you look at the criticism of the NASA cheerleaders — they almost universally avoid debating the substantive case laid out by the Foundation in the white paper. As such, it appears that NASA’s cheerleaders have conceded the core facts of the Foundation’s argument.

    I assert that this is why they are attacking the Foundation itself, or whining about the style of the white paper (Dave Renholder above complains about “random underlining”. Before that Renholder complains about the quality of the references, even though he does not apparantly disagree with the accuracy of the reference. “Anonymous” appears to concede the facts of the case too — the best “anonymous” can do is say (sic) “We at NASA have new facts that the SFF does not know, because we have not told you about it yet.”

    Meanwhile, over on transterrestrial musings, Renholder has taken to attacking the President of the Foundation because he used to have a ponytail.

    Haha!

    Trying to change the subject Dave?

    Let’s go back to the facts, inconvenient as they may be.

    The NASA cheerleaders appear to have conceded that NASA “appears” to be ignoring White House policy about “economic”, “security” and “science” being the “fundamental goals” of the VSE. As the Foundation paper points out (page 4), the White House Science Advisor, Dr. John Marburger, has publicly clarified the White House policy “subordinates space exploration to the primary goals of scientific, security, and economic interests.” (Is there anything wrong with that reference?)

    Does anybody disagree with the SFF paper’s contention (backed up by specific references) that NASA appears to be doing the opposite – and subordinating “scientific, security, and economic” interests to NASA’s space exploration goals?

    Why hasn’t anybody argued with this?

    Because it is hard to argue with the facts that NASA is reducing the amount of funding in the 5-year science budget. It is hard to argue with the fact that NASA eliminated much of the new technology investment portfolio that was started under Administrator O’Keefe. In fact, Griffin has publicly admitted (on Capitol Hill) he is doing all of these, because they are less important than eliminating the gap in human spaceflight.

    Does anybody here disagree with the white paper’s contention (backed up by specific references) that NASA is ignoring key recommendations of the Aldridge Commission?

    It is hard to argue with this, as the facts are pretty clear. The best that can be done is to argue that we should ignore the Aldridge Commission. Yet, down that path lies death for NASA. The Aldridge Commission’s statements about “affordability”, “sustainability”, and “credibility” live on today, and will increasingly haunt NASA if it tries to ignore them.

    Does anybody here disagree with the white paper’s contention (backed up by facts) that NASA is making the CEV more costly, complex and risky because of NASA’s desire to have the CEV go to ISS?

    Does anybody here disagree with the white paper’s contention that NASA killed off the EELV options for CLV, using the “Safe, Simple, Soon” mantra and a 4-segment SRB, and then within a few months changed the CLV baseline to a 5-segment SRB with an effectively brand new J2-X engine, making it much less “safe”, “simple” and “soon”?

    Does anybody here disagree with the white paper’s contention that one potentially effective way, which NASA has never tried, is to mitigate risk is by investing in a much larger portfolio of innovative commercial space initiatives, based on the standard practice of high risk investment funds?

    Does anybody here disagree with the white paper’s contention that ISRU is very important to long-term affordability, that it was generally a bad idea to eliminate LOX-methane from the CEV, and that the only reason that NASA is doing this is because of the schedule pressure created by the rush to send the CEV to ISS?

    I now expect that the NASA cheerleaders among you will all go back to attacking the “person” of the Foundation, or the “style” of the white paper, or even me. But that does not change the 18-pages of referenced facts that are described in the white paper.

    It only means that you are trying to change the subject … and that you have conceded the key points of the Foundation white paper.

    – Ally of the Space Frontier Foundation

  • anon

    But any outside “citizen” or “citizens group” — which includes Congress — can only assess the information that is publicly available.

    NASA has the problem that releasing detailed info to the public is not possible during a procurement, such as the CEV procurement. Heck, they were not informing the CEV contractor teams of requirements changes unitl the final proposals were in.

    Does anybody here disagree with the white paper’s contention (backed up by facts) that NASA is making the CEV more costly, complex and risky because of NASA’s desire to have the CEV go to ISS?

    Yes. For one thing, the only current differences between a Block I CEV and a Block II CEV is the docking adaptor, the number of crew seats, the consumables load, and the mission software (it’s a subset).

    NASA has made a point of requiring the vehicles to be essentially interchangable.

  • SFFally

    Anon said:

    {Yes. For one thing, the only current differences between a Block I CEV and a Block II CEV is the docking adaptor, the number of crew seats, the consumables load, and the mission software (it’s a subset).}

    I don’t know any official at NASA who has stood up, and stated that these “differences” would not have a cost impact, or increase the technical risk.

    Please show me a public document from NASA which says that these “differences” have no impact on cost or risk, and do not make the CEV more complex.

    In fact, what you will find is an almost total lack of cost information. (Yes, there is a competitive situation, but that does not stop NASA from justifying “how it is structuring” a multi-billion-dollar program that will be managed over nearly 20 years. In fact, this is one of the GAO’s primary points – that NASA has not justified some of its key decisions.)

    Also, by what you said, it appears that the “current” CEV block 2 will not use LOX/methane.

    Do you agree or disagree with the Foundation white paper’s assertion that using ISRU is key to long-term affordability?

    Does NASA agree or disagree?

    Where is NASA’s written justification for eliminating LOX/methane from the CEV that goes to the Moon?

    Does the NASA “business plan” which NASA says exists, but which the GAO says does not, contain the justification for not using LOX/methane in it?

    Does NASA disagree with Dr. John Marburger, the White House science advisor, who said this last March that lunar oxygen was a critical resource for economic reasons?

    Or is NASA just going to ignore the “affordability” issue, and hope nobody notices?

    – SFF ally

  • SFFally

    Anon said:

    {{NASA has the problem that releasing detailed info to the public is not possible during a procurement, such as the CEV procurement. Heck, they were not informing the CEV contractor teams of requirements changes unitl the final proposals were in.}}

    I believe that one of the GAO’s points was that NASA was rushing to pick a final contractor, before it had even settled on requirements. And that it should delay the down-select for this reason.

    NASA has “officially” non-concurred with the GAO on this point.

    Now, here is what appears to be NASA person, stating that the CEV contractors were not given all the requirements until after their bids were in.

    Sounds like “Anon” is agreeing with the GAO.

    – SFF ally

  • Dave Renholder

    “I assert that this is why they are attacking the Foundation itself, or whining about the style of the white paper”

    Whining? I was criticizing it.

    But you ask why I criticize the presentation of the white paper rather than its argument. Because presentation matters. How it looks, how it sounds (tone), what information it cites, how it presents its argument, who writes it, how credible the writers are, are all important factors that provide an indication of whether or not we should even _consider_ its argument. If you look at white papers that are issued by organizations and think tanks in Washington, you will notice certain characteristics. They strive for credibility. The SFF paper does not seem to be trying to achieve this credibility.

    For instance, who wrote it? No authors are listed. Often a think tank that issues a white paper will include the names of the people who wrote it and they must have some credibility within their field–academic degrees (usually Ph.D.’s), demonstrated experience in government, industry or academia, and name recognition.

    Why is the tone and editing so poor? If the white paper was filled with spelling errors would you still insist that what matters is the argument and not the presentation? So why is the unusual formatting and odd underlining acceptable? Doesn’t it undercut their message?

    The sources are not only weak, they’re really weak and unreliable, and they will be interpreted that way by a professional reader. Here the SFF is arguing for changing the expenditure of billions of dollars and they are relying on Wikipedia as a source? They’re relying upon blogs and activist groups as sources? Don’t they have objective, solid, primary sources with numbers and statistics and facts that can be checked? Can they point to studies or documents to make their case? (And here’s the big problem with Wikipedia–anybody can change it at any time. If I wanted to, I could go to every one of those Wikipedia entries and I could delete all of the text and insert frozen dessert recipes instead. There’s no way to know who wrote that information or how reliable it is. At the very least they should have cited a more credible source, such as RAND reports or analyses conducted by Aerospace Corp. or the NAS, or articles in peer-reviewed journals.)

    Presentation matters because it indicates the professionalism and intellectual capabilities of the author to make a coherent and credible argument. Before the reader even gets to the argument they see the presentation of the material. If the presentation is sloppy, then there is a good chance that the argument is sloppy as well. Yes, Nobel Prize winners can be awful spellers, but we’re not discussing individuals here, but a group effort and if the group produces a sloppy product, then chances are that they are also producing a sloppy argument. If SFF cannot produce a product that looks professional, that is written by a team of Ph.D.’s and ex-government and industry professionals, and that relies upon credible sources, then we have no reason to trust that their argument will be any better.

    And I have pointed to a key flaw in their argument, which is that the paper is heavily based upon a dead policy document, the president’s commission report of two years ago. That report was not implemented and in fact was obviously dead on arrival. If the president’s report did not convince the decision-makers two years ago, then why expect arguments that are based upon it to convince anybody now? Why base your argument upon a source that is uninfluential? It’s a weak approach and a serious flaw in the argument. They would have been better to build their argument up from scratch.

    There’s other flaws in the white paper, but I don’t feel a need to explain each and every one of them because it seems rather pointless. The document is not written in a professional manner and will therefore not have influence. So it fails of its own accord.

  • Perhaps they don’t have a large staff of eager civil servants eager to serve them.

  • ken murphy

    You know, I’m sitting here looking at the sources, and I’m seeing things like:
    5. whitehouse.gov
    6. ostp.gov
    7. nasa.gov
    8. spaceref.gov
    9. planetary.org
    10. house.gov
    11. flightglobal.com
    13. safesimplesoon.com
    17. nasawatch.com
    19. nasa.gov
    21. thespacereview.com
    thenewatlantis.com
    22. fti.neep.wisc.edu
    24. msnbc.msn.com
    25. newscientistspace.com
    27. nasa.gov
    29. astronautix.com
    30. nasa.gov
    32. ssi.org
    35. marssociety.org
    37. prod.nais.nasa.gov
    39. econolib.org
    43. space.com

    and yes, wikipedia. I’d say that is a pretty well sourced set of references. The weakness I would cite would be the lack of printed references.

    As for the lack of ‘list of writers’, perhaps Mr. Renholder is unfamiliar with some of the practices of not-for-profit groups. I’ve contributed on more than one occasion to papers for which no author was cited . Not that it’s always done that way, but if it’s a policy paper of the SFF then it is the organization’s document, not any particular individuals or their egos.

    Is the report a bit strident in its approach? Yes, but this is an important topic and if they have to try to emphasize things a bit then so be it. It’s as if NASA has never read these documents. I’ve read them, and nothing I’m seeing at NASA really jibes with what is laid out both in the VSE and the President’s Moon, Mars & Beyond commission. It’s as if they picked what they wanted to do and went with that.

    Which is why I was not surprised when O’Keefe left, though I think he was needed where he was for at least 1-2 more years, and the President should have asked him to stay. I sure wouldn’t want to try to manage that rabble, especially after the Hubble mutiny.

    So instead the President has to pick someone that the NASA corps is more likely to listen to, and lo and behold Dr. Griffin happens to be available, and look, we just so happen to have a complete shuttle-derived architecture we can use (dating to at least Aug 2004, about the time the first round of O’Keefe EELV studies were submitted), making the transition process easy and politically palatable.

    Though of course we’ve seen that the slick and glossy, professionally-produced SDV HLLV architecture got a little mangled after NASA had to wrestle that square peg into the round NASA hole. We’re still seeing the consequences, though more often in leaked bad data designed to make the critics look bad than in fair and reliable reports that the public can have confidence in.

    See, at least under O’Keefe there was some degree of openness about the process. I was at both an MM&B meeting, in NYC, and the Lunar Human & Robotic Exploration thingamajig in Houston in Jan 05. They were frustrating, but it was an open and competitive competition of ideas.

    This report is another example of that free and open competition of ideas. I found that it made some very good points, and the fact that its deriders and critics can’t argue with such fundamental questions as “Why is our government insurance policy so much more than the imvestment?” but rather with its ‘style’ or ‘tone’ or ‘referencing’ or ‘use of weird underlining’ speaks truth to the basic points of the White Paper.

  • SFFally

    RENHOLDT said: {{The sources are not only weak, they’re really weak and unreliable, and they will be interpreted that way by a professional reader. Here the SFF is arguing for changing the expenditure of billions of dollars and they are relying on Wikipedia as a source?}}

    Actually, this is disingenuous. The key “sources” that the Foundation cites, in the key arguments are

    1) White House space policy,

    2) Public statements by Mike Griffin, before and after he was NASA Administrator

    3) The recommendations of the President’s Commission (a.ka. the Aldridge Commission0

    4) NASA documents, such as the ESAS Final report, published in November 2005.

    Your assertions that the White Paper depends upon Wikipedia references is unsubstantiated. Al Fansome previously showed here that the Wikipedia sources were more “informational” in nature, and were not critical to the argument.

    The professional reader you cite will note that your claims are not backed up by the facts, and are disingenuous.

    RENHOLDT said: {{They’re relying upon blogs and activist groups as sources? Don’t they have objective, solid, primary sources with numbers and statistics and facts that can be checked? }}

    Is the White House a solid primary source? I assume you mean the Planetary Society, when you say activist group — but the context is that Mike Griffin was the Co-chairman of the report. Are you saying that a Mike Griffin co-chaired study report is not a primary source?

    How about the ESAS report? How about Administrator Griffin’s public statements? How about Marburger’s?

    Be that as it may, you can’t just toss out the entire argument because they cite some blogs and activist groups. Without any references or even an affirmative argument on your side — their references win. Something beats nothing.

    Better yet –> cite the specific reference of the activist group and/or blog you have a problem with, and then provide a reason that the *substance* of the argument is weak. That is a substantive way to proceed.

    That is what will convince the professional reader.

    RENHOLDT said: {{Can they point to studies or documents to make their case? }}

    Last time I checked, the GAO was a pretty credible organization, and the GAO came to the same conclusion.

    But some of this is common knowledge, and publicly available information, and I wonder why you suddenly ask for “studies or documents” to make their case.

    QUESTION: Do I need to quote you a study when I say that NASA promised that the Space Station would cost $8 Billion, would be in orbit within a decade, and would do just about everything for everybody? Do you remember the dual keel design?

    QUESTION: Do I need to quote you a study when I say that NASA promised that the Space Shuttle would fly 50 times per year for $10 million per flight?

    There is an issue of credibility here — but the credibility gap is with NASA.

    RENHOLDT said: {{And here’s the big problem with Wikipedia–anybody can change it at any time. If I wanted to, I could go to every one of those Wikipedia entries and I could delete all of the text and insert frozen dessert recipes instead.}}

    Are asserting that the Wikipedia sources are wrong? If not, then you are just wasting our time. These are easily checked.

    Again, are you asserting that ANY of the cited references are wrong?

    If so, say which ones, and provide your own (better) sources to back you up.

    Otherwise you are just making non-substantive claims again.

    RENHOLDT said: {{Presentation matters because it indicates the professionalism and intellectual capabilities of the author to make a coherent and credible argument. }}

    Actually, the most important part of making a coherent and credible argument is to make a coherent and credible argument.

    Nothing you have asserted, so far, is coherent or credible.

    A well presented, but non-substantive argument, is a non-substantive argument.

    RENHOLDT said: {{If SFF cannot produce a product that looks professional, that is written by a team of Ph.D.’s and ex-government and industry professionals, and that relies upon credible sources, then we have no reason to trust that their argument will be any better.}}

    Is that the royal “we”? You should speak for yourself.

    You can “say” that the White House, and the President’s Commission, the NASA ESAS final report, and Mike Griffin’s and John Marburger’s public statements are not credible until the cows come home. But that does not make it true.

    RENHOLDT said: {{And I have pointed to a key flaw in their argument, which is that the paper is heavily based upon a dead policy document, the president’s commission report of two years ago. That report was not implemented and in fact was obviously dead on arrival. If the president’s report did not convince the decision-makers two years ago, then why expect arguments that are based upon it to convince anybody now? Why base your argument upon a source that is uninfluential? It’s a weak approach and a serious flaw in the argument. They would have been better to build their argument up from scratch.}}

    First, thank you for making your first attempt at a substantive argument.

    Second, let me agree that SOME parts of the Aldridge Commission report were dead soon after the Commission report was published. Specifically, the recommendations dealing with turning every center into an FFRDC were pretty much dead on arrival.

    But I have seen nothing to suggest that other parts of the report are dead. In fact, there are signs that the “Three imperatives” of “affordability” and “sustainability” and “credibility” are living on in many ways. They existed before, but the Aldridge Commission report distilled them into a crisp, easy to understand, statement.

    When I talk to people at NASA, they are very scared about “sustainability” issues, even though they don’t have a very good sense about “how” to sustain the program. Affordability is a term that is used, repeatedly, in Congress. The GAO report was all about “credibility”, “sustainability” and “affordability”.

    When I talk to staff in the White House OSTP and OMB, they are clearly focused on affordability and sustainability.

    All of the recommendations dealing with transforming the relationship with the commercial sector are living on, because this idea was alive and well before the Aldridge Commission even existed. The idea of commercial transformation did not come from the Commission — it came from the testimony they received from across the country. It lives on in the White House, in Congress, in industry, and in select people inside NASA. It lives on in all the New Space companies. And, yes, it lives on in organizations like the Space Frontier Foundation, Space Access Society, ProSpace, XPrize Foundation, and in parts of the National Space Society and Mars Society.

    RENHOLDT said: {{There’s other flaws in the white paper, but I don’t feel a need to explain each and every one of them because it seems rather pointless. The document is not written in a professional manner and will therefore not have influence. So it fails of its own accord.}}

    Haha!

    Your actions speak louder than your words. If “it fails of its own accord”, then why are you putting all this energy into attacking its credibility?

    The reason is that you are worried that it WILL have influence.

    The reason is that there is a LOT of substance in the paper, which you keep trying avoid talking about.

    The real reason you have not tried to refute the substantive arguments in the white paper, with the exception of one argument about the Presidential Commission, is that you don’t have any substantive counter arguments to make.

    Again, something (e.g., a substantive argument, even if poorly presented*) beats nothing.

    The professional reader can tell the difference.

    – SFF ally

    • I think the SFF paper is well presented, using their personal voice, which is admittedly quite passionate. But it has always been that way. It would be inauthentic for them to do it any other way.

  • Sam Hoffman

    Earth to the GAO, SFF, et al:

    Designing a spacecraft is hard; designing a manned spacecraft is harder.

    Building a manned spacecraft is even harder.

    Building a manned spacecraft to meet a deadline – proposed by the president but approved by Congress through the budgetary process – makes it even harder.

    That being said, if the deadline for the Connie is IOC in time to replace the shuttle, and the deadline for shuttle retirement is no later than the fourth quarter of 2010, then how many quarters are available to do the detailed design and systems engineering work, cut metal, integrate the system, and test it?

    Hint: We’re in the third quarter of 2006 right now. IF NASA makes it selection in September, whoever gets the job has three months in 2006, 12 in 2007, 12 in 2008, 12 in 2009, and 12 in 2010 to accomplish the equivalent of Apollo 7 and then some – a manned LEO mission in a new spacecraft, on a new launch vehicle, that includes a rendezvous and docking with ISS, crew/cargo transfer, detachment, and safe return – and all in 51 months.

    This compares, interestingly enough, with the period between Apollo CSM source selection (Nov. 28, 1961) and Apollo 7 (Oct. 11, 1968), a total (approximately) of 86 months.

    Now, the situations do not track exactly in terms of existing infrastructure, organization, politics, or economics, of course, but it does show the reality of what NASA has been asked to do by the elected leadership – both the executive and legislative branches.

    Nobody ever said manned spaceflight was easy.

    If it were, there would be more than three countries in history that have accomplished it.

    Ad Astra per Ardua

  • Mr Earl

    The SFF makes a very good argument for NASA moving directly to the Block II design. I don’t think that increasing COTS funding is the best way to minimize the gap between the shuttle and alternative transportation to the ISS. What NASA needs to do is guarantee the winners of the COTS contracts a minimum purchase of 20 flights of each type of space craft over 10 years with the first 4 flights paid in advance. This contract should also be non-exclusive so they can peddle their services to other interested parties.

    As for the CEV and Aries program…..

    According to an article in NASASPACEFLIGHT.com NASA is already looking into an alternative to Aries I a.k.a “the stick” now being called “stumpy”. http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/content/?cid=4670 It uses two 3 segment SRBs a modified ET and two J2X engines. This seems to solve a lot of the problems associated with the original Aries I design and requires R & D and launch facilities modifications. I would also much more easily support a heavier CEV than the stick.

  • As for the CEV and Aries program…..

    Please, tell me it isn’t so. Am I in some kind of bad dream here?

  • A rare moment of agreement with Mr. Elifritz, please tell me it ain’t so. Stop redisigning (shades of the Space Station’s sad history), and build and fly the damn thing, even if it isn’t optimized or perfect.

    That said, the alternative might look good as a second generation upgrade to an initial stick. Any architecture that is supposed to last for many decades — especially a non-reusable one — can and should evolve over time.

    — Donald

  • Sam Hoffman

    Actually, considering that no one other than the Chinese (and that’s arguable) has designed and built a new blunt body reentry vehicle-type manned spacecraft since the 1960s, the Block I/Block II approach is attractive simply to burn down the risk and get the all the subsystem TRLs well into the green in LEO, rather than farther out.

    Add the deadline pressure and US strategic interest, and Connie-A-to-Connie-B is a reasonable way to go; COTS, however, is nothing more than good money after bad – unless it is used to man-rate one or both of the EELVs (with, of course, a US-built RD-180 for the Atlas) and build a CEV-based CDV.

    The CLV launch vehicle picture should become pretty clear as the upper stage RFP comes forward.

    Again, accomplishing all this in 51 months, rather than 86, is not simple, despite the desires of the altspace types.

  • Good points, Sam, except for COTS. The latter is the most important element of the entire VSE, because it is the one element that might get us to commercial orbital spaceflight. The latter is a prerequisit to, and the first step toward, a truly spacefaring civilization.

    — Donald

  • Sam Hoffman

    Donald –

    The impression I got from reading the COTS RFP was that it pretty heavily skewed toward a group of small and generally poorly-capitalized companies, none of which have any operational experience in LEO spaceflight at all, much less HSF.

    In the US, other than the Big 3, the only company with any real track record is Orbital, and none of the four got a contract, as far as I know.

    The current COTS approach looks a lot like an earmark to me, which does not strike me as increasing the odds for success.

    I would have liked to have seen the Big 3 and Orbital bid, either entirely separately or in 2-3 teams, and see what they came up with – perhaps even structure a Phase 2 COTS as fly-before-buy, if the business case could close.

    That sort of approach MIGHT lead to commercial orbital spaceflight, although the odds against it are still high, I think.

  • Sam, I strongly disagree with you here. First, NASA has not yet awarded anything; that should happen sometime in the next month. Secondly, the “big three” are bidding — for the CEV. COTS should be for something completely different. If any of the big three were to win COTS, many people (including me) would be furious because it removes the opportunity for new ideas and new teams. (Now that Orbital has teamed with Kistler / Rocketplane, I don’t include them amongst the “big three.” Also, keep in mind that Orbital got their second wind through a very COTS-like program, when DARPA awarded them the contracts that led to the Pegasus. While Pegasus did not achieve all of DARPA’s goals, it was innovative and it did work. It is exactly what we should be trying to duplicate now with COTS.)

    Kistler/Rocketplane/Orbital, Air Launch, SpaceX, and possibly SpaceHab and SpaceDev, all have probably-viable concepts. Winning COTS should help with some of the capitalization issues, or at least we’d better hope it does.

    We may get reliable transportation out of the big three and the CEV; we will not get lower cost transportation or (at least in the near term) a viable commercial transportation industry to LEO or diversity in transportation — all of which we despirately need. Nothing is guaranteed in the real world, but we may get some of that with COTS. It’s worth a $500 million gamble.

    — Donald

  • Sam Hoffman

    Donald –

    I respect your opinion, but my point is that the Big 3 – in their current incarnation for CEV as the Big 2 (or 2.5?) – are much better placed to utilize the ISS-COTS funding.

    As examples, to bring the EELV(s) up to par (or their TRLs down?) in terms of unmanned and (ultimately) manned launch vehicles for LEO; and/or to develop a stripped down CEV-based vehicle for the CDV mission.

    Orbital is an excellent company with some very talented people, but the other smaller companies are borderline in a lot of ways, from what I can tell…I don’t fault their enthusiasm, but from what I can tell, that’s about all they have…

    Personally I’d have set up COTS with the goal of yielding – at least – a potential “AAS” type running mate for the CEV/CLV architecture. The EELV(s) and a CDV/CEV Jr. would seem to offer the simplest path to that goal…

    If the taxpayer is dropping $500 million on what I think we both agree is a risky endeavor, I’d like to see the money at least going to companies that have a track record in the field.

    I don’t see SpaceX and the rest having that, by a long shot.

    I’m trying to think of an aircraft procurement where the responders did not include companies that had designed, built, and flown an airplane before, but I can’t…

  • Sam, I don’t disagree with much of what you’ve said here, but I stand by what I said. I think the point re. Orbital is that they started where many of these COTS-bidders are, and look at where Orbital is today. I guess we’ll have to agree to disagree.

    The idea of an EELV-launched vehicle in competition with Dr. Griffin’s CLV-launched capsule is a good one, but I think that is what Spacehab (hardly a fly-by-night operation) is proposing.

    As to your last question, I don’t know enough about the histories of the companies, but what about General Atomics and Scaled Composites?

    — Donald

  • sam hoffman

    Fair enough on the agree-to-disagree; but I come from an aircraft background, so my focus is always on the mission and operational reliability; CEV and COTS are both supposed to be operational vehicles, not technology demonstrators…it is the difference between an X-15 and a C-130 – and neither one of those were designed and built by three guys in a shed in Mojave.

    I wasn’t aware that Spacehab’s offering used an EELV; which one? Atlas V?

    I’m betraying my background here, but General Atomics builds drones (to be blunt about it), which in terms of reliability requirements do not even come close to a manned aircraft…

    And has Scaled Composites ever built anything but one-offs and prototypes for home-builts? Rutan is an interesting individual, but then so was Robert Hall…

  • Al Fansome

    Sam Hoffman said:

    [[Fair enough on the agree-to-disagree; but I come from an aircraft background, so my focus is always on the mission and operational reliability; CEV and COTS are both supposed to be operational vehicles, not technology demonstrators…it is the difference between an X-15 and a C-130 – and neither one of those were designed and built by three guys in a shed in Mojave.]]

    Sam,

    You are incorrect on this point.

    Please read the COTS announcement. COTS is about *demonstrating* a new capability. If fact, it is illegal for NASA to buy an operational good or service using the COTS procurement mechanism of “other transactions authority”.

    I also agree with Donald, that COTS is the most important part of the VSE.

    At the same time, I happen to agree with you that COTS is unlikely to succeed with the current level of funding. It may succeed (and I hope it does) but it is quite risky. Riskier than it needs to be.

    The Foundation has proposed one solution — to adopt a best practice from private venture capital markets — a portfolio investment strategy. This approach mitigates risk in a different way. It may not be the perfect solution, and some may not like it, but it works in the commercial world, and NASA has not tried it before.

    Also, NASA is taking additional risk mitigation steps that you probably do not know about. If you talk to the COTS finalists in private, you will quickly find out that one of the most important requirements is the “skin in the game” requirement.

    This requirement was created by Griffin about a year ago. Those who can put more skin in the game — in the form of private investment are more likely to win a COTS agreement. This means they will be putting significant private capital at risk, which addresses one of the points you made.

    This is why SpaceX is on almost everybody’s list as one of the likely COTS winners. Elon has significant private money in hand to commit to the deal. (Although, as I have written before on http://www.spacepolitics.com, Elon is doing this as a philanthropist, and not demanding an adequate risk-adjusted ROI on his original investment that is in the form of revenue streams.)

    In essence, COTS has turned into a “cooperative agreement”, with both government and private funds thrown in, to develop and demonstrate new high risk capabilities, using NASA’s “other transactions” authority.

    By the way, which is the six COTS finalists is proposing to build their system with “3 guys in a shed in Mojave”?

    – Al

  • Al Fansome

    Sam Hoffman said:

    [[I’m trying to think of an aircraft procurement where the responders did not include companies that had designed, built, and flown an airplane before, but I can’t…]]

    Sam,

    If you read the COTS announcement, they focus on the capability and experience of the *people* as opposed to the *companies*.

    This is appropriate.

    Although the big 3 have people who built spacecraft 30 or 40 years ago, that does not mean you will get them on this program. In fact, most of those people have retired.

    HINT: The COTS finalists are hiring a LOT of those retirees. (Who do you think designed the Kistler K1? Who do you think Elon is hiring? Who do you think really founded Andrews Space & Technology?)

    – Al

    PS — With respect to CEV, the people who really are designing the spacecraft are NASA civil servant engineers, who have not designed, developed and built an operational spacecraft in their lifetime. Again, the people who designed and developed the Shuttle in the 1970s, were veterans of the Apollo program, are now retired. A key part of Griffin’s strategy is to return NASA to the Apollo days when NASA did design and build new spacecraft. This is a non-trivial task, as it requires retraining engineers to do something different than they have done for most of their careers.

  • al Fansome

    Sam Hoffman said:

    [[That being said, if the deadline for the Connie is IOC in time to replace the shuttle, and the deadline for shuttle retirement is no later than the fourth quarter of 2010, then how many quarters are available to do the detailed design and systems engineering work, cut metal, integrate the system, and test it?

    Hint: We’re in the third quarter of 2006 right now. IF NASA makes it selection in September, whoever gets the job has three months in 2006, 12 in 2007, 12 in 2008, 12 in 2009, and 12 in 2010 to accomplish the equivalent of Apollo 7 and then some – a manned LEO mission in a new spacecraft, on a new launch vehicle, that includes a rendezvous and docking with ISS, crew/cargo transfer, detachment, and safe return – and all in 51 months.]]

    Sam,

    I know of no requirement to create a replacement for the Shuttle in 51 months. If you know of such a requirement from either NASA, Congress or the White House, please share.

    There is a stated objective, by the White House, to fly the CEV by 2014. But that need not be to the ISS. It easily could be CEV Block 2, instead of Block 1.

    There is also a stated desire, by some Members of Congress, to “minimize the gap” in U.S. human spaceflight, and to fly the CEV earlier than 2014. One of the leaders of this line of thinking is Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison of TX. But Mike Griffin has made it clear to her that this is increasingly unlikely to happen. This appears to be one of the reasons that Sen. Hutchison has recently started talking about COTS as “minimizing the gap”.

    Separately, Sen. Bill Nelson of Florida has proposed that the “human spaceflight gap” is a national security issue. Those in the national security community consider this to be a joke. I expect that Sen. Nelson will stop saying this, unless he wants to be laughed at.

    If you recall, Jeff Foust started off this discussiong by questioning the logic of the entire line of thinking that we need to “minimize the gap”.

    I agree with Jeff. I understand the instinctual desire to go “faster” and to minimize the gap. The desire is fine. Basically, you (and many others) are proposing that “faster” is a top priority.

    But the law of “unintended consequences” suggests we think about this first, before doing something we will regret later.

    Lets revisit one of the lessons learned from the Goldin era. We now know that you can pick 2 of the following 3 objectives: better, faster, or cheaper.

    If you pick “faster”, which seems to be the suggestion of your thread, you need to eliminate either the “better” or “cheaper” objective.

    Which of these two objectives do you suggest we eliminate, in order to go “faster”?

    – Al

  • Al, I would eliminate the “better.” Seeking “better” is how we got the Shuttle fiasco. We know how to send astronauts to the moon. We should use the techniques we know to work to establish an initial base, then use that market to justify better launch vehicles and deep space transportation.

    Thus, my priorities would be: “faster” and “cheaper,” in that order, with “better” being a very distant third at this point in time.

    Sam: I wasn’t aware that Spacehab’s offering used an EELV; which one? Atlas V?

    SpaceHab have released very little information about their design, but it appears to be a ballistic capsule designed to launch on any medium-class launch vehicle, providing the greatest possible flexibility and competition. That strikes me as a very wise way to go.

    [However, truth in advertising requires that I state that I am a small shareholder in SpaceHab, as well as the two other COTS-proposers that are public companies.]

    — Donald

  • Sam Hoffman

    Al –

    On one or both or the two “Big 2″ CEV teams are the following:

    1) The shuttle designers, builders, maintainers, and operators;

    2) The ISS (US/Western elements) pressurized vessel designers, builders, maintainers, and operators;

    3) The EELV and SRB designers, builders, maintainers, and operators;

    4) The three largest US satellite designers, builders, maintainers, and operators;

    5) The three largest US high performance aircraft designers, builders, maintainers, and operators, plus the largest Western European company doing the same sort of engineering;

    6) The designers, builders, maintainers, and operators – or their legacies – of X-15, Mercury, Gemini, Apollo CSM, Apollo LM, and Skylab;

    And, at least based on my experience, the teams have brought aboard the best of the legacy personnel available, both on the design and production side and the operations side.

    And against those realities, as far as I can tell, altspace offers enthusiasm and a lot of organizations that, for the most part, have yet to put anything in orbit – and if they have, they have used non-US-built launch vehicles to do it.

    As far as the deadline goes, one may wish to consider the competitive realities that face the businesses, politicians, organizations, and nation-states involved in the current endeavor.

    Finally, I like affordable, sustainable, and operationally reliable, rather than faster, better, cheaper, but that’s me…I come from abackground where the birds had to be ready to go, and went, on a regular – and often irregular – basis.

  • Sam Hoffman wrote:

    “the COTS RFP was that it pretty heavily skewed toward a group of small and generally poorly-capitalized companies, none of which have any operational experience in LEO spaceflight at all, much less HSF.”

    and

    “altspace offers enthusiasm and a lot of organizations that, for the most part, have yet to put anything in orbit”

    Unfortunately, there are a lot of misconceptions about the COTS program held by people who are not directly involved. By my probably incomplete take, here are the “experienced” aerospace companies who are on one of the 6 COTS finalist teams:

    Aerospace Corp.
    Alenia
    ARES
    BAE Systems
    Ball
    Lockheed
    MDA
    Oceaneering
    Orbital

    [I also believe that Emergent Space Technologies, on one of the teams, was involved in the recent SPHERES experiment at ISS, although I don’t know their total role in the flight program.]

    Although CSI was not selected as a finalist, for our COTS proposal our vehicle and operations teammates would add Barrios, L3-Titan and RSC Energia to that list.

    Additionally, last I checked both SpaceHab (SPAB) and SpaceDev have been able to “put anything in orbit” as Primes.

    In talking of the CEV teams: “And, at least based on my experience, the teams have brought aboard the best of the legacy personnel available, both on the design and production side and the operations side.”

    True, but that does not mean that the COTS competitors did not do the same. I won’t speak for the other teams, but for our COTS proposal, CSI’s design, producti0on, and operations teammates included:

    * ARES (ISS Program Integration and Control (PI&C) contractor & winner of 2004 JSC Small Business Prime Contractor of the Year award),

    * Barrios Technology (25 years of Human Spaceflight experience, including the ISS Mission Integration Prime Contract).

    * Lockheed Martin Space Systems (Atlas series first launched in 1957),

    * Oceaneering Space Systems (numerous STS & ISS hardware products for NASA since 1988),

    * Odyssey Space Research (Prime contract for Rendezvous, Proximity Operations and Capture (RPOC) support to JSC, including ATV & HTV spacecraft), and

    * RSC Energia (builder and operator of Sputnik, Vostok, Soyuz, Progress, Salyut, Mir, ISS, etc.),

    * and limited support from L3-Titan (George M. Low Award winner that’s provided systems engineering services to NASA for > 20 years)

    Additionally, the technical and management team CSI put together for our program has extensive experience in the industry on projects at companies and organizations such as NASA, USAF, Fairchild, Astrotech, Inmarsat, Astrium, Grumman, Rockwell, Hughes, and RSC Energia.

    “and if they have, they have used non-US-built launch vehicles to do it.”

    I doubt’s any of the COTS competitors bid a non-US launcher, as they were prohibited from doing that for this contract. CSI’s launch vehicle for our COTS proposal was the Atlas V. For NASA’s previous Alternate Access to Station (AAS) program, CSI’s baseline launcher was the Delta II, with options for the K-1 and HMX-refurbished Titans. CSI also told NASA that we are compatible with other current and future US launch vehicles.

  • Al Fansome

    Donald Robertson said:

    [[Al, I would eliminate the “better.” Seeking “better” is how we got the Shuttle fiasco. We know how to send astronauts to the moon. We should use the techniques we know to work to establish an initial base, then use that market to justify better launch vehicles and deep space transportation.

    Thus, my priorities would be: “faster” and “cheaper,” in that order, with “better” being a very distant third at this point in time.]]

    Donald,

    I would like to talk about this. In fact, I am not convinced (yet) that you really mean it. Let me explain.

    You have repeatedly stated that you thought the right approach to going to the Moon was to use the upgraded EELVs. I agreed with you (and still agree).

    If you think about it, basing a lunar transportation system off of upgrading the EELVs is not “cheaper” or “faster”. But it is “better”.

    Because it forces you to buy missions from the U.S. commercial industry, and in chunks that are addressable by new commercial entrants. It is better, because it creates a market (ala air mail) that justifies additional investments in private space transportation. It is better because it will force us to create technology in on-orbit assembly, and on-orbit fuel transfer, and on-orbit fuel storage — all of which are extremely useful technologies for many other applications.

    Yes, I am “interpreting” your previous support for EELVs as a vote for “better”.

    But you may have other reasons. Please share.

    – Al

  • Al, we’re talking past each other.

    As you define “better,” than yes, I agree with every single word you say in your message above.

    I was not referring to the EELVs when I said “better.” The EELVs are an existing technology, and any required improvements are well within the existing skill set. Likewise, Dr. Griffin’s current plan is not “better.” I prefer the EELV approach for all the reasons you state, but in the sense I was discussing, Dr. Griffin’s plan and the EELV approach are essentially one and the same. They use our existing skills to get the job done quickly, but without a lot of improvement in cost or capability at this time.

    This is one of the reasons why I am willing to support Dr. Griffin’s plan, rather than risk losing the whole thing by quibbling over that or EELVs. Yes, the EELVs would have been a better way to go, but in the bigger picture, we’re arguing over angels dancing on the head of a pin. The big question is whether to do it quick-and-dirty with what we’ve got, or to continue trying to greatly lower the cost of getting to LEO.

    When I say we should avoid “better,” I mean substantial investments in improving transport to LEO with, say, new-generation reusable space planes. The market needs to exist first, before we can successfully develop new-technology launch vehicles. And, I believe we need to create the market with what we have now.

    The rennaissance in new ideas and investment in transport to LEO engendered by the existance of the Space Station tells me that the “start it by establishing a lunar base with what we’ve got, and save ‘better’ for later,” strategy is the correct one.

    — Donald