I noted here an article two weeks ago by James Oberg that took on the issue of space weapons and arms control, noting the problems of verification and definition regarding such systems. This week’s issue features an article by Nader Elhefnawy of the University of Miami that takes a different look at the same issue. He calls ruling out arms control in space “a diplomatic and political error, unnecessarily provocative to other states that already view US policy with alarm.” Refusing to engage in such discussions, he argues, may actually undermine US foreign policy in the long run, empowering other nations like Russia and China. Rather than reusing to negotiate on the issue, the US should instead engage other nations to find some level of compromise that would still allow the US to deploy missile defense systems and “active measures to protect US satellites”.
Of course it’s not a revelation. On the very first page of the Executive summary of the ESAS report is written its purpose, namely to:
“Define the top-level requirements and configurations for crew and cargo launch systems to support the lunar and Mars exploration programs;”
How much clearer can it be?