Remember when NASA administrator Mike Griffin got into a bit of hot water when he told USA Today that the shuttle program had not put NASA on “the right path”? Griffin, apparently chastened to some degree by the reaction, clarified his remarks in a memo a short time later. However, in today’s New York Times Griffin makes it clear that that he is still critical, if not of the shuttle and ISS programs themselves, but of the decisions that led to them. Griffin: “Viewed from the point of history several decades out… the period where the United States retreated from the Moon and quite deliberately focused only on low Earth orbit will be seen, to me, a mistake.”
Griffin, perhaps forestalling another round of internal criticism, said that the problem was not with the agency itself. “The space shuttle is a response to a policy mistake – it isn’t the mistake. The mistake was tearing up all the infrastructure that we built for Apollo and saying, ‘let’s just focus on low Earth orbit.'”
Could another President of Congress make the same mistake? Griffin doesn’t seem to be worried about it, even as Democrats take control of Congress: “Unless you believe that a future U.S. president or a future U.S. Congress actually wants to cancel the U.S. spaceflight program, then I actually do not perceive a big threat from changing administrations and changing Congresses.” (One could see, though, a future administration preserving a manned spaceflight program but twisting it in another direction, as Nixon did in 1972.)
The only Congressional reaction to Griffin’s remarks came from Congressman Bart Gordon, the incoming chairman of the House Science Committee, through his spokesperson: “I would rather focus on where we go from here. I support human exploration beyond low Earth orbit. However, it’s got to be paid for.” More interesting would have been the reaction from another Democrat and a strong supporter of the shuttle, like Sen. Bill Nelson of Florida.
Griffin has taken the wrong lessons from history. The Nixon Administration shed the Apollo infrastructure because it could not afford a human exploration effort requiring resources on that scale in the face of the mounting costs of the Vietnam War and the Great Society. Instead of taking the opportunity to rescale its human space exploration infrastructure to be more affordable, NASA replaced it instead with a less capable and less safe but equally expensive infrastructure (Shuttle). The lesson is to build affordable and flexible human space exploration programs that can survive the vagaries of the U.S. budget — not to maintain the nation’s unaffordable human space flight infrastructure at any cost.
The next Administration after Bush will be given a choice similar to the Nixon Administration. With only a couple Ares I tests completed at that time, funding for the vast majority of Constellation costs, including nearly all of Ares V, will still lie ahead in future budgets. The next Administration will also find that the costs of Ares I and V leave few dollars on the table to do anything of use or interest on the Moon (not even rovers according to Shana Dale’s presentation from earlier this week). With ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, another domestic budget buster in opening waves of the baby boomer retirement, and historically high debt and deficits, I’d bet sizable money that the next Administration will cancel Ares V and the rest of the lunar effort in its ESAS incarnation. NASA will get to finish Ares I, Shuttle will be shut down, the Administration will pocket the difference for other budgetary need, and that will be it unless the agency has the guts to adopt even a marginally innovative approach that does not require maintenance of the huge Apollo/Shuttle infrastructure.
Until NASA divests itself of the enormously expensive Apollo/Shuttle infrastructure, it will forever be unable to afford a sustainable human space exploration effort. Griffin had a golden opportunity to do that when setting up the requirements and groundrules for ESAS, and he threw it away.
AMEN!!!!
Griffin and ESAS just can’t seem to figure out that giant rockets aren’t affordable and sustaining a lunar campaign has to be based on affordable transportation.
NASA may have screwed up their attempts to make spaceflight cheap over and over again (X-33, X-34, SLI) but that doesn’t mean the goal was incorrect–just the approach.
Until NASA divests itself of the enormously expensive Apollo/Shuttle infrastructure, it will forever be unable to afford a sustainable human space exploration effort. Griffin had a golden opportunity to do that when setting up the requirements and groundrules for ESAS, and he threw it away.
The problem is, much of the reason he did that was due to pressure from the Hill. Congress says it wants space accomplishments, but what it really wants is job preservation.
Actually, by 1970 we were starting to wind down the Vietnam War. The problem was that the political establishment was so fixated on the “space vrs poverty programs” syndrome that it was very lucky that any space effort survived. Mixon’s idea, supported by NASA at the time, that a big project to lower the cost of space travel and hence make things like travel to the Moon and Mars and big space stations more affordable seemed to be a good one at the time. But the execution of it was, to put it mildly, dysfunctional.
Cantellya wrote:
“Griffin and ESAS just can’t seem to figure out that giant rockets aren’t affordable”
Just to be clear, heavy lift is not necessarily a bad thing, IMO. A heavy lift vehicle that did one or more of the following things:
— Directly leveraged Shuttle components and infrastructure for rapid and low-cost development (Direct).
— Leveraged prior military and commercial investments to lower development (EELV evolution)
— Spread future operational costs across military and/or commercial customers by using common LVs or major systems (EELV evolution)
— Was technologically or commercially innovative in its own right (Falcon X, etc.)
Would be vastly superior to the path ESAS has put the VSE on. Any of these things would help NASA divest itself of its massive Saturn/Shuttle infrastructure and help turn NASA human space flight activities into a timely, inspiring, and effective government-sponsored research, development, and exploration effort, instead of an unbelievably inefficient, slow, bloated, and outdated government-subsidized transportation company.
Unfortunately, Ares V (and Ares I):
— Require massive reengineering, redevelopment, and testing of considerably altered Shuttle components and infrastructure;
— Make little use of substantial prior investments made outside of NASA by the military and commercial sectors;
— Are unique to NASA human space flight activities and require NASA’s budget to carry the entire operational burden;
— Do nothing to leverage or improve LV technology or commercial space transportation.
Because Griffin set the requirements and evaluation criteria for ESAS such that the recommended architecture maintains the metastizing NASA-unique human space flight workforce, facilities, and systems inherited from Saturn/Shuttle, NASA is now on a path to:
— Likely (according to most reports) suffer a fatal design flaw in its human LV that (hopefully) reveals itself in testing and throws the whole effort into a tizzy about the same time that the next Administration takes office (Potentially Technically Infeasible)
— Maybe (if budgets and the technical aspects hold) repeat the first Apollo flight at the end of the second term of the Administration that will follow the Administration that follows the current one (Politically Unsustainable)
— Definitely (assuming a landing is achieved) have practically no budget left after Ares I, Ares V, and associated elements of the transportation architecture (CEV, lander, insertion stage, etc.) are developed and in operation to pursue actual exploration infrastructure (lunar rovers, habitat modules, power, processing, etc.), commercially and scientifically useful activities (ISRU, observatories, etc.), or even more than two Apollo-equivalent missions per year. (Budgetarily Unattractive)
Honestly, I could care less whether its early HLV development, better use of Shuttle/EELV/commercial systems, Wall Street’s $50 billion prize, or anti-gravity flying saucers that saves the VSE, but NASA needs to come up with a Plan B before the next Administration takes office. Dollars to donuts, looking at the unattractive mess created by ESAS and subsequent NASA/Griffin/Horowitz decisions –and with other massive demands on the federal budget — the new Administration, Democrat or Republican, will kill Ares V and associated Constellation elements as fast as they can. An affordable and effective human space exploration plan that produces real results in reasonable timeframes will be desperately needed to fill the gap, or we’ll be stuck with Ares I/CEV still flying to ISS and no government-sponsored space exploration effort long after my grandchildren are born.
Again, as enamored as some of us (myself included) may be of on-orbit fueling and small RLVs, none of the above is a knock against heavy lift.
Let’s just do it intelligently — in a politically timely, technically and commercially effective, and budgetarily sustainable way.
Is that too much to ask for my tax dollars?
Mr. Simberg wrote:
“The problem is, much of the reason he did that was due to pressure from the Hill.”
To give Griffin the benefit of the doubt, I don’t know if that’s entirely true. If you read the Doug Stanley (ESAS leader) threads over on NASASpaceFlight, Stanley earnestly believes that Griffin placed no pressure on him to come up with a (more or less) politically palatable recommendation. As some level, we have to take Stanley at his word.
That said, Stanley may be kidding himself on another level…
“Congress says it wants space accomplishments, but what it really wants is job preservation.”
No doubt about that. And if you look carefully at the ESAS requirements and evaluation criteria, it’s obvious that they were driving solutions towards a Saturn/Shuttle infrastructure sustainment solution. If Stanley is worth his salt as a systems evaluator, he should have pushed back and looked at sensitivities to things like crew size (which has a huge influence on the viability of an EELV solution). But instead, Stanley blindly accepted the “customer’s” requirement of four crew and similar criteria. Whether that “customer” was some random White House staffer (as claimed by Griffin, according to Stanley’s threads, which I find weak since Griffin should be able to push back on a mere staffer), members of Congress Griffin felt beholden to (more likely), or Griffin himself (out of some other motive), we’ll probably never know.
In the long history of the human space flight program, I can’t think of a 60-90 day study that ever produced a technically solid and budgetarily sustainable recommendation. (The ISS blue ribbon study comes to mind as another particularly bad result.) NASA needs to forever banish such quick-fix studies and stick to tried-and-true systems engineering methods and procurement competitions to make these huge technical decisions at more informed points in time later in the development cycle. Rome was not built (or designed) in a day.
That said, it would be very interesting for an independent but technically competent organization (Aerospace Corporation comes to mind) to revisit ESAS, including architectures never examined, requirements sensitivities never considered, and criteria never evaluated (national benefit outside the civil sector comes to mind). It would be especially useful in creating a Plan B for when the next Administration asks for it.
Mr. Whittington wrote:
“Mixon’s idea, supported by NASA at the time, that a big project to lower the cost of space travel and hence make things like travel to the Moon and Mars and big space stations more affordable seemed to be a good one at the time.”
Actually, I’d argue that NASA did not support the “Shuttle-only” option for human space flight, certainly not initially. NASA wanted to press on to Mars and there was considerable back and forth between NASA and the Nixon White House, until NASA was finally negotiated down to a vehicle-only agreement (Shuttle) and no clear destination.
I’d argue that what NASA should have done is re-engineered its lunar activities (and Mars ambitions) to fit the resources being offered by the Nixon Administration. Negotiating on pieces of a human space exploration program was a slippery slope that just backed NASA into the transport-only corner of Shuttle.
“But the execution of it was, to put it mildly, dysfunctional.”
No doubt about that. Even with just the transport piece, Shuttle could have turned out magnitudes better if operational ambitions had been scaled back, heavy lift had been abandoned, military payload dimension requirements left off, a testable development approach implemented, etc.
But the best option, IMO, would have been to retain a real destination and use a little ingenuity and innovation to create a post-Saturn system and infrastructure that reflected Nixon-era budget realities. Lunar-sooner/cheaper studies are a dime-a-dozen. There’s little reason NASA could not have developed and implemented such a plan at that time.
Such are the laments of history…
Being British, I am somewhat confused about the political system over the pond. Are the Democrats typically wary of spending space dollars, i.e. do they hold more of a realist position when it comes to funding America’s space program? And…if that is the case, is the Republican position the opposite, i.e. a casual approach to space funds?
I hope some of you can provide some enlightenment for me!
Michael: There’s a commonly-held perception that Republicans are more pro-NASA than Democrats. In reality, it’s more complicated: you’ll find plenty of pro-NASA Republicans and Democrats, particularly those who represent states or districts with NASA or major aerospace facilities. For example, Republican Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison, the outgoing chair of the Senate Commerce Committee’s space subcommittee, and Democratic Sen. Bill Nelson, her likely successor as subcommittee chair, have almost identical NASA philosophies. Hutchison, of course, represents Texas and Nelson, Florida.
You will find some Democrats who are opposed to manned spaceflight in particular. The most powerful one to worry about in that respect is Rep. David Obey, the incoming chairman of the House Appropriations Committee. However, it was the Republican Study Committee, a group of fiscal conservatives, who in the last couple of years proposed cutting funding for NASA’s “Moon-Mars program” as part of a bigger package of budget cuts.
The key item that you are all missing is that, without the Shuttle compromises, particularly the military one of large crossrange, the political coalition that allowed the Shuttle never could have been built or sustained. An “optimal Shuttle” was not on the table and had no chance, so all this second guessing is a complete waste of time (especially on a political site).
Mixon’s idea, supported by NASA at the time, that a big project to lower the cost of space travel and hence make things like travel to the Moon and Mars and big space stations more affordable seemed to be a good one at the time. But the execution of it was, to put it mildly, dysfunctional.
So rather than create a market in the Space Station model — which has worked so far — you all want to duplicate this failure of the past by going for some sort space transportation fueled by political unobtainium.
This is not a good political strategy, whatever its technical or economic benefits. And, unfortunately, until a lot more markets like the Space Station exist, the space program is and will remain a political animal.
The solution is to support Orion for now and try to get it moved to an upgraded EELV in the next Administration. Attacking the whole project is political suicide.
— Donald
We cover one solution to this problem in our AIAA Space 2006 Paper downloadable here.
http://www.teamvisioninc.com/services-consulting-space-exploration-optimization.htm
Mr. Robertson wrote:
“The key item that you are all missing is that, without the Shuttle compromises, particularly the military one of large crossrange, the political coalition that allowed the Shuttle never could have been built or sustained.”
It’s true that the White House drank the Shuttle Kool-Aid and forced the military to transfer some payloads to the Shuttle and shrink DOD’s ELV stable. That said, the military on balance was a detractor of Shuttle (thank gawd or there would have been no ELVs left in the stable to take up the slack after the Challenger accident), and military support was never a pre-requisite to building the Shuttle (or some variation thereon). This is especially true from a political/Congressional point-of-view, which is primarily concerned about jobs — not requirements and efficiencies in the overall national launch infrastructure.
“So rather than create a market in the Space Station model — which has worked so far — you all want to duplicate this failure of the past by going for some sort space transportation fueled by political unobtainium.”
Two points:
One, to be brutally honest, it remains to be seen whether COTS will be successful. To claim that a program has “worked so far” is a worthless statement when the program has only been existence for a little over a year, one of the two companies selected (Rocketplane-Kistler) have yet to raise the necessary private funding, no significant hardware has been built (nevertheless tested or flown), and the customer (NASA) is still building what is essentially a heavily and fully government-subsidized, in-house competitor (Ares I/CEV).
When the first Dragon or K-1 upper-stage cargo module docks with the ISS, then we can call COTS modestly successful. When the first crewed Dragon or K-1 upper-stage lands safely back on Earth, then we can call COTS wildly successful.
Until then, it’s just one in a long string of commercial space infrastructure initiatives (ISF, Conestoga microgravity payloads, X-33/34, etc.), all of which NASA has intentionally killed or bungled before getting to flight.
Two, even though it will be some time until COTS proves itself, no one has stated that they want to replace COTS with some unspecified “unobtanium”. Quite the contrary, COTS is a very promising approach and I think I most posters (myself included) would prefer to see the program expanded at the expense of the ESAS/Constellation architecture. Unfortunately, I and many others, including the Aviation Week editors in this week’s editorial,:
“fear is that the commercial component [i.e., COTS] will be just an add-on [to the ESAS/Constellation architecture].”
If NASA was serious about commercial markets, it would not wait until a lunar base is built in 2024 (nearly two decades from now and that assumes budgets and technical issues hold) to start turning over other responsibilities to industry and creating commercial space services and markets. Instead of building Ares I/V, NASA could:
— Turn over all medium-lift ISS cargo transport to the commercial market. Stop building a fully government-subsidized in-house competitior; kill the CEV cargo variants; expand COTS development co-funding and future services contracts; and let competition sort out whether Atlas, Falcon 9, K-1, or something else is the best provider. Even if it appears riskier and takes a couple years longer than building the CEV cargo variants, so what? NASA can still shut down Shuttle after ISS is built and just buy a few more Progresses from the Ruskies in the interim.
— Turn over all medium lift LEO crew transport (including ISS, lunar, and future exploration) to the commercial market. Stop building a fully government-subsidized in-house competitior; kill the CEV and Ares I outright, expand COTS development co-funding and future services contracts, and let competition sort out whether Atlas/Bigelow, Benson’s HL-20 derivative, Falcon 9/Dragon, K-1 evolution, or something else is the best provider. Even if it appears riskier and takes a few years longer than building Ares I/CEV, so what? NASA can still shut down Shuttle after ISS is built and just buy more Soyuzes from the Ruskies in the interim.
— Develop a lunar architecture that avoids NASA-unique heavy lift requirement altogether. Invest heavily in American on-orbit propellant storage capabilities (the Ruskies have done it for decades), pre-deploy unfueled lunar hardware in LEO using one or two of the most reliable medium-lift commercial vehicles, and compete the on-orbit fueling amongst commercial medium and small launch vehicles.
I hope the examples above make it clear that the ESAS/Constellation architecture is not helping space commercialization — it’s actually hindering it. There is no good reason NASA should spend the next decade-and-a-half building a hugely expensive, technically crippled space transportation architecture that has no customers besides NASA and that requires two decades to deploy the bare beginnings of a lunar base. If NASA is serious about commercialization, it should kill Ares I/V and CEV now and let commercial industry step fully into the gap. No X-33-like “unobtainium” required.
If you’re really serious about commercial markets (as Mr. Robertson claims to be), don’t wait until a lunar base is built 20 years from now and then hope that NASA will throw some resupply scraps to industry. Stop drinking the ESAS/Constellation Kool-Aid and support building a sustainable, commercial space transportation infrastructure now.
A lot of people seem to be focused right now on giving Congress an alternative approach. This way, if they want to nix it, they have an alternative to choose. Well guess what? If they don’t make one, Congress will find one. We could very well see ourselves welcoming the ISS back to our budget! The ISS could do very well if just Soyuz and Orion capsules. Shuttle is only needed for construction!
Regarding the shuttle, while I agree that the military was never enthusiastic about the idea, the political coalition that made it possible was dependent on meeting the military requirements.
Note that I did not say COTS, I said a market. The existance of the Space Station was a prerequisit for the political approval of COTS. Without the former, we would not have got even this far. However, the “market” is far broader than COTS. The station is also keeping in business Soyuz, and it may soon help Ariane and the Japanese H vehicles, and yes, Dr. Griffin’s vehicles if they make it that far. Once the Shuttle is retired, that will become even more the case.
The “market” is lift to orbit, not any particular way of achieving that. Take all the mass that must be delivered to orbit in the next decade or two, and the station is likely to dominate it. If ESAS and the existing vehicles really can be undercut by new generation vehicles, the latter are ultimately likely to displace them, in much the same way the events ultimately forced expendables to displace the Shuttle.
I would not be opposed to any of your alternatives. They do not have political approval, and I don’t think they’re very likely to get it; Constelation has a political coalition behind it. Get me a political coalition representing a large fraction of the various interests in government and the aerospace industry behind one of your alternatives, and get it approved by an Administration and Congress and then I’ll vote for killing ESAS — but not the other way around. I am not prepared to give up an existing political coalition for a dream, especially when I doubt it is politically possible to take the government out of lift to LEO except gradually over time as commercial space demonstrates their wares in operation. Note that Mr. free market Bush didn’t even try. . . .
— Donald
I nominate “Anonymous” to be the next NASA Administrator.
DON SAID: I am not prepared to give up an existing political coalition for a dream, especially when I doubt it is politically possible to take the government out of lift to LEO except gradually over time as commercial space demonstrates their wares in operation. Note that Mr. free market Bush didn’t even try. . . .
Don,
Considering that Bush has effectively cancelled the Shuttle program, and created the “ISS crew/cargo service program”, I don’t think you can say “Mr. free market Bush didn’t even try”.
FWIW, the White House policy statement on the VSE does NOT say that the CEV (now Orion) should go to ISS. That was a NASA decision. However, it would be fair to say “Bush did not stop NASA from sending the CEV to ISS.” I think Bush would have, if he had taken the time to personally understand what was at stake (and had somebody explain the issue like anonymous did above), but I think other distractions have consumed his attention the last few years.
– Al
Spacebull wrote:
“A lot of people seem to be focused right now on giving Congress an alternative approach. This way, if they want to nix it, they have an alternative to choose.”
Congress really isn’t the issue. To a certain extent, Congressmen are like sheep — show them that you’re spending money in their district or state and they’ll follow, largely regardless of whether the money is being spent wisely. Spend money in enough districts and our form of representative democracy will sustain stupendous expenditures on stupendously stupid programs for stunningly long periods of time.
The issue is the Executive Branch, which does not always have to answer to the “all politics is local” syndrome and must implement its programs in a somewhat rationale and minimally effective way.
Ares I is unlikely to meet that minimal bar when the next Administration takes office. From inadequate power that places CEV in an “orbit” that intersects the Earth’s mantle, to a reversed CG/CM, to dangerous mass loads being transmitted through the interfaces between the solid rocket motor segments, to expensive flight tests that don’t reflect the new 5-segment booster, there’s a pretty good chance that Ares I will be technically dead upon on the arrival of the new White House team.
Add to that a very expensive and NASA-unique heavy booster development in Ares V that is just ramping up in funding as the new White House team arrives, an ESAS/Constellation budget that leaves almost no funding for actual lunar exploration or space infrastructure development beyond the transportation system, and a timeline that won’t produce any results beyond what Apollo achieved until the second term of the second President after the current Bush Administration… Well, even if Ares I is still limping along technically, Ares V/Constellation/ESAS will be budgetarily and politically dead upon the arrival of the next Administration.
The main question is what the new White House does with those dollars. When ESAS/Constellation/Ares V get cancelled (and maybe Ares I with them), does NASA lose those dollars intended for the VSE? Or is there a viable alternative?
From higher-leverage R&D investments (nanotech, biotech, infotech), to ongoing wars in the Muslim world, to the burgeoning Medicare and Social Security impact of the baby boomer retirement, I think it’s very likely that the budget intended for the VSE, and the VSE itself, will be lost. In the face of so many huge, near-term budgetary demands, a new White House with nothing invested in the VSE will not continue to fund a long-term space exploration program with so many drawbacks and issues and such low, non-specific returns and lengthy timeframes. Things may stumble along for a year or two on Texas and Florida earmarks, but like major military development programs, if the White House thinks it’s a stupid expenditure, the ESAS/Constellation/Ares implementation of the VSE will die sooner rather than later.
It’s just a question of whether anyone can convince the new White House that there are effective alternatives to ESAS/Constellation/Ares so NASA can retain those dollars. If so, the VSE can be sustained in another form. If not, we can kiss U.S. government-sponsored space exploration goodbye for another generation.
And who knows… if NASA can’t do any better than ESAS/Constellation/Ares, that may be a good thing in the long-run.
Al, your second paragraph is speculation. However, in this,
Considering that Bush has effectively cancelled the Shuttle program, and created the “ISS crew/cargo service program”, I don’t think you can say “Mr. free market Bush didn’t even try”.
I stand corrected. You are one-hundred precent right.
— Donald
Anonymous: From higher-leverage R&D investments (nanotech, biotech, infotech), to ongoing wars in the Muslim world, to the burgeoning Medicare and Social Security impact of the baby boomer retirement, I think it’s very likely that the budget intended for the VSE, and the VSE itself, will be lost.
Well, Anonymous, it sounds like you actually agree with me, that there is not a politically realistic alternative to going forward with ESAS. While you may be correct in your analysis of what the next Administration will do, I suspect (and hope) that the desire not to withdraw from human spaceflight plus the lack of easy (reading low-up-front-cost) alternatives will keep things going forward.
I think we all agree that Ares-1 was a mistake, but that’s where we are. Politically, we’ve got to make it work, then substitute a better launch vehicle later on, once there is a reason for it to exist.
— Donald
Mr. Robertson wrote:
“The existance of the Space Station was a prerequisit for the political approval of COTS.”
No, it wasn’t. NASA has purchased commercial services (ELV launches) for its robotic spacecraft for almost two decades now. The human space flight program could have adopted that approach, even for a portion of its requirements, years ago. It just never had the incentive, in the face of a huge and entrenched Shuttle workforce and bureaucracy, to do so.
What finally forced NASA to experiment with commercial services for the human space flight program was the loss of Columbia. Faced with the clear inferiority of the crippled Shuttle design, and looking at the prospect of a Presidentally mandated 2010 retirement with no timely transportation alternatives in sight, NASA finally had a strong enough incentive to overcome decades of Shuttle entrenchment.
Whether the ISS existed only in CAD drawings or on orbit is really immaterial to NASA making this decision. There would have been a U.S. human space flight program regardless. ISS needs give specificity to the commercial service requirements, but those requirements and specifics could easily have been for some other human space flight activity. What was vastly more important to the decision was the existence (or projected non-existence) of the in-house government human space transportation vehicle (the Space Shuttle).
This is even more true for a human lunar base, which does not need the kinds of lengthy, complex, on-orbit assembly that the ISS requires. Although one could weakly argue that the Shuttle supplies certain unique capabilities that were necessary to build ISS, the same does not hold true for lunar base buildup (or for a properly designed space station, which is another story). A lunar base (or a rationale space station) can be designed simply from the get-go to leverage existing or developing commercial transportation capabilities. That way NASA can focus on what government does best — research and exploration, not building and running cost-effective infrastructure.
Again, there’s no reason that NASA has to build a lunar base (or a smartly designed space station) before it starts turning transportation responsibilities over to the private sector. In fact, Government 101 tells us that the proper division of labor in any taxpayer-supported endeavour is to contract with the private sector to cost-effectively meet routine needs and let government agencies focus on the dangerous, the cutting-edge, or the general welfare that is not congruent with market needs or private sector capabilities.
“If ESAS and the existing vehicles really can be undercut by new generation vehicles, the latter are ultimately likely to displace them, in much the same way the events ultimately forced expendables to displace the Shuttle.”
But again, why wait two decades for this to happen? Why not start killing CEV variants and Ares now, completely shift ISS to commercial vehicles, and rethink the lunar architecture to leverage commercial capabilities from the start?
“I would not be opposed to any of your alternatives. They do not have political approval, and I don’t think they’re very likely to get it; Constelation has a political coalition behind it. Get me a political coalition representing a large fraction of the various interests in government and the aerospace industry behind one of your alternatives, and get it approved by an Administration and Congress and then I’ll vote for killing ESAS — but not the other way around. I am not prepared to give up an existing political coalition for a dream, especially when I doubt it is politically possible to take the government out of lift to LEO except gradually over time as commercial space demonstrates their wares in operation.”
The problem with this kind of logic is that it accepts a patently bad situation and advocates no prescription for change, in the hope that the situation will get better. I don’t mean to get political, but that’s what we’ve done in Iraq for the past several years.
Unlike a war, which a White House or Congress cannot easily disengage from, when you undertake a massive, multi-year, non-military, discretionary government program, you have to get it right from the start. Because they are discretionary and subject to new White House budget proposals every year, they are very easy to kill, even with the support of a self-interested Congressional coalition. (Witness the Superconducting Supercollider.)
Per my response to Spacebull, we are almost certainly facing that situation when the next White House takes office. I would argue that the ESAS/VSE/Ares lunar return effort is already dead due to a large number of defects in its technical details, budgetary approach, and timeframe vice the political process.
I’d rather stand on the side of “better” now and hope that I and my fellows can present the next Administration with an attractive alternative for keeping the VSE alive than face our own Iraq-like debacle and retreat a couple years from now.
Even better, I’d like to see NASA and Griffin come to their senses now, even if they lose a little face (better than being remembered as another Rumsfeld). NASA doesn’t have to turn everything in human space flight over the private sector now… just more. Kill Ares I and CEV, put another half-billion on COTS to make sure there is a domestic ISS transport system, and use the remaining billions to accelerate Ares V (or some better HLV a la Direct) so the NASA workforce has something to do and we’re locked into actual lunar hardware by the time the next Administration arrives. That’s an affordable, effective, and politically viable (in terms of both acceptable timeframe and preserving NASA jobs) human space exploration program.
With the way the program is headed now, we’ll be lucky if we get Ares I after the next White House is through with us…
Mr. Fansome wrote:
“I nominate “Anonymous” to be the next NASA Administrator.”
Thanks for the high compliments.
Who knows? Maybe I’m Mike Griffin’s actual persona, unconstrained by the Florida and Texas politicians that got him confirmed? Or maybe I’m a regretful Sean O’Keefe, wishing I had stayed at the NASA helm a little longer? Or, Dan Goldin, wishing that I could have gotten the human space flight program to work a little better-faster-cheaper like JPL’s robotic missions?
Or, the best of all options…
a reformed George Abbey!
The betting can start now…
Mr. Robertson wrote:
“Well, Anonymous, it sounds like you actually agree with me, that there is not a politically realistic alternative to going forward with ESAS.”
No, I disagree with that. See the recommendation at the end of my last response to your earlier posts.
If you get rid of Ares I, shift all of NASA’s medium-lift LEO requirements to private sector vehicles, and accelerate Ares V (or Direct or some other in-house NASA HLV build), you can have the best of all worlds (continued NASA jobs and coalition, larger commercial markets, and an accelerated lunar campaign).
But you have to kill Ares I.
“I think we all agree that Ares-1 was a mistake”
Absolutely. But unlike you, I would kill it in a heartbeat for the proposal above (or anything remotely similar).
“While you may be correct in your analysis of what the next Administration will do, I suspect (and hope) that the desire not to withdraw from human spaceflight”
It’s not a question of whether the next Administration will withdraw from human space flight. They’ll still have the ISS (and maybe Ares I) to “show the flag” and “fly the eagle” on.
In fact, the continued existence of ISS makes it easier for the next Administration to junk the lunar program or any other exploration effort. They can point to the ISS to satisfy national pride regarding human space flight, talk about all its supposed “benefits”, while trashing the Bush’s lunar debacle as “too expensive” and putting the VSE dollars to use outside NASA.
“Politically, we’ve got to make it work, then substitute a better launch vehicle later on, once there is a reason for it to exist.”
No, politically you have to get it right from the start.
As with SEI, there will be no second chance for at least another decade, probably more in the absence of another stimulus like Columbia.
ANONYMOUS SAID: Who knows? Maybe I’m Mike Griffin’s actual persona, unconstrained by the Florida and Texas politicians that got him confirmed? Or maybe I’m a regretful Sean O’Keefe, wishing I had stayed at the NASA helm a little longer? Or, Dan Goldin, wishing that I could have gotten the human space flight program to work a little better-faster-cheaper like JPL’s robotic missions?
Or, the best of all options…
a reformed George Abbey!
The betting can start now…
My bet would be that you are a friend of Mike’s, and that you have already told Mike this, but he is not listening (at least not yet).
All indications are that he is pretty hard over on his commitment to Ares 1.
– Al
Anonymous: No, politically you have to get it right from the start.
That would have been nice — and, if you go back to the archives, you’ll note that I argued for pretty much exactly your plan, and was ridiculed for it. The majority of the participants in this forum at that time insisted that the “stick” was the only way to go.
Here and now, if we can evolve in the direction of your plan, without appearing to stop and start over, I would support it even now. The EELVs (and real authentic commercial vehicles) were and are a better choice for a whole host of reasons. . . .
But, that isn’t what happened and that’s not where we are. It’s like saying we shouldn’t have faught the Iraq war. Maybe so, but we can’t go back and un-fight it now, we have to deal with the mess we’ve created, however messy it is.
As with SEI, there will be no second chance for at least another decade, probably more in the absence of another stimulus like Columbia.
I agree one-hundred percent. Which is exactly why we have to go forward. SEI died not solely because of its cost; it died because it did not have a large political coalition behind it. The VSE does, or did, but — for the best of reasons — people like you are doing their very best to erode it.
The political coalition is far more important than any technical decisions, and a combination of the selection of the Ares-1, Dr. Griffin picking unnecessary fights with people who should be neutral if not his friends, and a thousand nibbles from people supporting alternative plans, are well on the way to destroying the effort. I think we can survive the first bad decision; we may be able to survive Dr. Griffin; but there is no chance we will survive if the nibbling continues forever. Remember: even if you win, and somehow get a new plan this decade, the nibbling will only start again from another quarter from all those who insist that the stick (or their own third-party plan) was the only possible way to go.
— Donald
Mr. Robertson wrote:
“if you go back to the archives, you’ll note that I argued for pretty much exactly your plan, and was ridiculed for it. The majority of the participants in this forum at that time insisted that the “stick” was the only way to go.”
I find that surprising. From where I sit, Ares I (or even the ESAS/Constellation implementation plan) has never enjoyed support beyond certain senior NASA managers (Griffin and Horowitz, of course), ATK and the Utah delegation, and Senators Hutchison and Nelson (and they’re only interested from a Florida/Texas CEV jobs point-of-view).
You use the term “political coalition” a lot, but we need to be specific about what this presumed coalition is actually supporting. We especially need to differentiate between support for the VSE as originally articulated by the Bush Administration and O’Keefe and support for the ESAS/Constellation implementation plan as developed and executed by Griffin and NASA since O’Keefe’s departure.
Based on the passage of the last NASA authorization bill, one could argue that there is (or at least was) broad political support (whether it was a formal coalition or not) for the VSE. I won’t argue with that.
But I don’t see much evidence of a coalition for Ares I or even for the ESAS/Constellation plan. The authorization bill was not specific to ESAS/Constellation/Ares I. IIRC, only VSE and CEV (both O’Keefe acronyms) were mentioned in the bill, and the bill was passed before Griffin rolled out ESAS. Since then, there have been no new NASA authorization bills. Worse, on the appropriations side, the new Congress appears to be unwilling to fund the $700 million increase necessary in FY 2007 to keep the ESAS/Constellation implementation plan and the Ares I/CEV developments on schedule and under budget. If anything, that’s indicative of impotent or absent coalition for ESAS/Constellation/Ares I/CEV.
So, to sum up, although you could argue that there was a political coalition supportive of the VSE, there is little evidence in the Congressional record of a coalition specifically supportive of the ESAS/Constellation plan. And even if we assume there was a successful ESAS/Constellation coalition at one time, the FY 2007 budget debacle indicates that this coalition is now gone or has been rendered impotent.
The key question in my mind is whether the Congressional goodwill that enabled the passage of the last NASA authorization bill and its endorsement of the VSE can be salvaged. The FY 2007 budget debacle indicates “no”, but I am hopeful that the event forces Griffin & Co. to come forward with a revised and more sustainable implementation plan for the VSE.
If Griffin and Co. don’t take this opportunity, then Ares I/CEV will limp along on level or declining funding until the new President comes into power, at which point Ares V and the rest of ESAS/Constellation will get the axe. Then the question will become whether the new NASA Administrator is allowed to come forward with an exploration plan that allows the agency to retain most of the VSE budget, or whether those dollars will go elsewhere and NASA’s budget starts heading downward and exploration is again put on hold (as under Clinton).
“It’s like saying we shouldn’t have faught the Iraq war.”
Although I brought it up, I think you’re taking the wrong lessons from the the Iraq analogy.
Both Iraq and ESAS were rapidly and poorly planned.
But a war (or a police action or what have you) is very different from a discretionary development program in terms of how easily a new President or Congress can stop it.
It’s not easy at all for a new President or Congress to extricate the U.S. from military action once its started. Witness Vietnam or even our continuing military presence in S. Korea, the Pacific, and Europe.
But a discretionary development program is very easy to de-fund and bring to a halt. That’s exactly what the Clinton Administration did to the Superconducting Supercollider, and that program was much further along than NASA’s lunar return will be when Bush II leaves office. In fact, it’s also what Congress almost did to Space Station Freedom before Gore brought the Russians into the program.
No amount of ESAS/Constellation support from us is going to make a lick of difference when President Clinton II, Guiliani, McCain, or Obama take office. They will have no vested interest in ESAS, will see no return from ESAS until the second term of their successor, will see a huge payment still to be made on Ares V and the rest of Constellation, and will have much higher priority budget problems to fund. Worse, dollars to donuts, NASA is also going to hand the new President a technically crippled, unsafe, over-budget, and behind-schedule Ares I/CEV program.
It’s unavoidable — we are already looking at another Superconducting Supercollider situation when the new President takes office. Unlike Iraq, which the new President will have to deal with, it will be very easy for the new White house to cut Constellation’s purse strings, and they will have every possible incentive to do so.
Again, the only question in my mind is whether Griffin & Co. manage to change course before then or, if not, whether there will still be an opportunity for the new NASA Administrator to salvage some of the VSE funding.
“we have to deal with the mess we’ve created, however messy it is.”
I guess it depends on what your definition of “mess” is.
If Ares I was just suboptimal in one or more ways or merely inferior to other options, I’d agree with you and say “press on”. No design is ever perfect, and optimizing between safety, performance, cost, and schedule necessitates compromises on one or more of those criteria.
But Ares I not just suboptimal or inferior. Ares I is downright dangerous to CEV flight crews. Whether it’s the reversed centers of gravity and mass during ascent, the dangerous loads being transmitted through the lower solid rocket motor interfaces and seals from the mass of the CEV and 5th segment, or the combination of underpowered initial orbit with a perigee that lies inside the Earth and an orbit circularization motor that must perform multiple burns but is not designed to do so, we already know that Ares I possesses several fatal flight safety flaws. Unlike Shuttle, where the deadly combination of fragile TPS and side-mount configuration was not discovered until after the Columbia accident, we know that these Ares I flaws exist now, that they are endemic to the design, and that we have no other choice but to pursue a different vehicle unless we want to kill astronauts at higher rates than what the Shuttle has done. (And that assumes Ares I survives testing, which I find doubtful).
So from a technical standpoint alone, it’s time for NASA to cut its losses. Except to save face for Mike Griffin, there’s no reason to wait until there’s a new President and a new NASA Administrator to change course.
In fact, if we want to salvage the VSE budget, we have a better chance of doing so now under a President that’s vested in the program than under a new President that has no vested interest in the program.
“SEI died not solely because of its cost; it died because it did not have a large political coalition behind it.”
I disagree with that interpretation of history. SEI never achieved a political coalition (large or otherwise) because of its price tag. (More precisely, SEI’s price tag was too high relative to its low returns and the long timeframe for those returns.) So SEI did “die” because of its price tag (and, to a lesser extent, NASA infighting and partisan politics).
“The political coalition is far more important than any technical decisions”
Again, I would agree with you if the technical issues were ones of optimization within the design or inferiority to other designs.
But technical decisions do (and should) trump politics when a design contains fatal flight safety flaws and there is no way to avoid those flaws without switching to another design.
“Dr. Griffin picking unnecessary fights with people who should be neutral if not his friends, and a thousand nibbles from people supporting alternative plans, are well on the way to destroying the effort.”
Again, per my text and prior posts above, Griffin’s lack of political sensitivity or scores of blogosphere critiques are not going to influence one iota what happens when the new White House takes office. Even if Ares I/CEV development miraculously succeeds, Griffin & Co. have given NASA’s ESAS/Constellation implementation plan such an expensive, long, and low-return structure that it will be extremely tempting and extremely easy for the new President to terminate the VSE well before the first metal for Ares V is cut.
Better that folks with the ears of influential NASA managers, Congressional aides, and White House staffers try to fix things now.
Hoping for the best (especially in the face of overwhelming odds) is not a strategy for success.