Congress, NASA

More NASA budget reaction

Some more reaction to the proposed FY08 NASA budget, on and off the Hill:

Sen. Barbara Mikulski (D-MD) says she is “disappointed” that NASA is getting only a 3 percent increase in FY08 over its FY07 proposal while other R&D agencies, like the NSF, are getting much larger increases. “I fought to have NASA included in the American Competitiveness Initiative, but the White House refused. NASA’s work should be the hallmark of any national program to promote America’s competitiveness,” she said. She adds that she plans to introduce a version of the “Mikulski Miracle”—a billion-dollar increase in NASA’s FY07 budget that won approval in the Senate Appropriations Committee but died when the full Senate failed to take up the overall spending bill—either in the FY08 budget or a potential FY07 supplemental spending bill.

Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX), who worked with Mikulski on the budget amendment last year, expressed her concern that the planned budget increase in FY08 “could be consumed” by the cut in NASA money in the FY07 joint funding resolution. Hutchison urged the Senate to restore full funding for NASA when it takes up the funding resolution this month.

Those FY07 cuts actually got something of an endorsement from the Space Frontier Foundation, whose leaders were pleased that the cuts were concentrated on the exploration program, an effort that includes “unaffordable and unsustainable boondoggle rocket plans”. “It is time for the agency to re-think how it puts people and payloads into space,” said Bob Werb, chairman of the board of the Foundation. “It is time for the agency to trust the power of free enterprise.” Of particular concern to the organization are NASA plans to fly the Orion spacecraft to the ISS even as private ventures, including some with NASA support, are developing vehicles to carry out the same task. More from Werb: “The Democratic Party appears to understand that the taxpayers of this nation just aren’t interested in supporting what they see as business as usual at NASA. We are hoping that the Republicans join them soon.”

53 comments to More NASA budget reaction

  • Mark R Whittington

    SFF seems to have once again jumped the shark. If anything, the complaints from key members of Congress seem to be that the FY2008 budget request is too low. And if Bob Werb thinks that David Obey gives a fig about commercial space or the American tax payer, he needs to rethink that position.

  • anon2

    Mr. Whittington,

    You are ignoring (perhaps intentionally) the key point. It does not really matter whether Obey “gives a fig about commercial space”, it is highly unlikely that he will give NASA the 6.8% budget increase that the WH is asking for. Instead, the Democratic-controlled Congress is going to put the increases into things they think are higher priorities, such as “environmental remote sensing, EPA, NSF, aids research, NIST, etc.”

    This is pretty obvious. And NASA loses once this becomes the debate.

    Everybody here in the community can now run around saying “the sky is falling, the sky is falling”. After the dramatics are over, some members of this community will sit down and say “OK, given a flat budget, and that we will not be allowed to cut aeronautics, or space science, or Mission to Planet Earth, or other protected priorities within the NASA budget, to pay for sending people to the Moon, what should our strategy be?”

    You can do this now, or you can do this later.

    What do you think the strategy should be under those circumstances?

    – Anon2

  • CSS

    One obvious move should be to reassess the results of ESAS in light of these budget realities and the design changes to Ares I. If NASA is really serious about going back to the Moon, it should reopen the trade space to existing launchers for Shuttle replacement.

    Tweak Orion design to make it compatible with Atlas/Delta. I don’t think COTS is going to be there in time. But then again, is it really that important to minimize the U.S. crew gap between Shuttle retirement and its replacement? The only justification for this has been to keep the Shuttle workforce intact…pretty weak.

  • richardb

    Nasa can get the budget growth it needs with the existing cast of characters. Nasa of course needs presidential momentum so Bush needs to fight for the money. There are many democrats in the Senate and House who want Nasa funding for the CLV, CEV & Upper stage. Then there are the prime contractors and their very effective lobbying organizations. Nasa’s budget is far from a lost cause.

    One of the reasons to minimize the gap is this: The ISS is now a national lab and the US shouldn’t depend upon Putin’s good graces for a lift to this national asset. If Putin will cut energy supplies to Europe in the dead of winter, I imagine he could be difficult about getting US access to space.

  • anon2

    Nasa of course needs presidential momentum so Bush needs to fight for the money.

    I agree that NASA does need presidential momentum to execute the current strategy, but what evidence do you see that the President will use any of his political influence to fight to increase NASA’s budget?

    Last time I checked the news, Bush had many other budget priorities that he was willing to fight for. Do you disagree?

    Also, last time I checked, NASA’s budget did not even make the laundry list of domestic items in the Station of the Union address.

    To think this will change is wishful thinking.

    There are many democrats in the Senate and House who want Nasa funding for the CLV, CEV & Upper stage. Then there are the prime contractors and their very effective lobbying organizations. Nasa’s budget is far from a lost cause.

    You are not saying anything new here. The supporters of NASA’s budget are from both parties, and are basically limited to the representatives of NASA’s centers. These representatives have been fighting for parochial interests for the last 40+ years. NASA has muddled by in this strategy, except when confronted by tight budgetary times. The predictable results of this political strategy — of building your lobbying strategy around the limited number of Members from FL, TX and AL *plus* their lobbyists — are pretty clear. NASA’s budget is probably going to stay relatively flat, and is likely to decline (after you adjust for inflation.)

    One of the reasons to minimize the gap is this: The ISS is now a national lab

    It is an empty national lab, which is doing zero research because Griffin killed it. I have not even heard Ralph Hall make an argument (recently) about how ISS research will cure cancer or produce some other miracle.

    and the US shouldn’t depend upon Putin’s good graces for a lift to this national asset. If Putin will cut energy supplies to Europe in the dead of winter, I imagine he could be difficult about getting US access to space.

    There is more than one way to solve this problem.

    OPTION 1: NASA could put more $$ into MANY additional COTS efforts.

    OPTION 2: For the same amount of money, NASA might be able to accelerate sending the CEV to ISS by about 6 months.

    NOTE: The FY08 NASA budget document does not even provide the funding in the 5-year ESMD spend plan that is needed to pay for the options in SpaceX’s or RkP’s space act agreements for them to send humans to the ISS. If Griffin cared about ISS, and what Putin might do, you think he would at least put funding in the 5-year plan for one of them.

    (NOTE: Page ESMD 42 says “Currently, there is no acquisition strategy for COTS Projects Phase I Capability D, crew transportation and for the Operational Phase (Phase II). However, NASA will begin developing those plans for the FY 2009 budget submit.

    What this means is that something else will have to give in ESMD’s budget, in order to provide room for funding for COTS Capability D.

    This is already a tight budget that has no strategic margin, no backup plans, and no room for slippage, error, or technical hiccups.

    NASA’s budget future will look much different soon. The new Congress will put their inprint on NASA’s spending priorities.

    My prediction is that “global warming” will be one of the leading wedge issues in this coming year, leading in to the 2008 Presidential campaign which is already starting, and that NASA will find that its Mission to Planet Earth budget will be significantly increased. The Democrats will be hoping & praying that the Republicans try to pick a fight between human exploration of the Moon vs. global warming.

    I bet even you can guess which side of this fight that Senator Mikulski (D, Goddard) will take.

    – Anon2

  • John Malkin

    I think Bush should stay out of it. Let NASA and the space community fight for itself, one good thing about the big aerospace companies is they have a lot of clout in Washington and they employ a lot of people all over the nation. If Bush pushes VSE the Democrats will turn it into a political issue. Congress has already agreed that manned spaceflight is important, it’s now a matter of national priorities. I think the lobbing efforts this year will be very important also the community as a whole should start whispering into future presidential candidates’ ears.

    I’m not really worried about Orion or Ares I technical specifications since they are still in development, I’m more worried about NASA staying in budget. Of course it’s these kinds of varible budgets that cause cost overruns.

  • anon2

    To back up my assertion that NASA will NOT be a priority in the upcoming budget fight for either party, I recommend reading the two front page stories on the budget in today’s Washington Post (URLs below). NASA is not even mentioned.

    I then suggest reading the blog of the Washington Post reporter who covers Congress (URL also below) and is closely tracking the budgetary debates on the Hill. He reports that the Bush budget proposal is “essentially dead on arrival”, and that “Democrats will take the spending blueprint and largely toss it aside”.

    Do you want to make any wagers what the Democrat’s priorities, within a flatline NASA budget, will be?

    – Anon2

    ******************

    Bush Plan Reins In Domestic Spending
    Proposal Aims to Balance Budget And Fund Wars

    ******************

    Bush’s Defense Budget Biggest Since Reagan Era
    Iraq, Afghanistan Spending Top Vietnam War

    ******************

    The Budget Dance Begins

    The annual budget proposal landed in Washington today with its traditional pomp and circumstance, yet the Democratic takeover of Congress makes the $2.9 trillion White House plan essentially dead on arrival.

    Democrats will take the spending blueprint and largely toss it aside, crafting their own version as they try for the first time in 13 years to pass the budget by the statutory deadline of April 15.

    “Today’s budget from the president is just more of the same fiscal irresponsibility and misplaced priorities; it takes our country in the wrong direction,” House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) said.

    “Its priorities are disconnected from the needs of middle class Americans,” said Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.).

  • Mark R Whittington

    “Anon2″ (One wishes that people who make bald assertions would have the courage to do so under an actual name) seems to be reading too much into the House bill. If NASA is going down the drain because of the Democrats, then one wonders why Senators Mukulski and Hutchison are about to try to attach their billion dollar supplemental to a farm bill this month. The process is not over by any means and is likely to play out in unpredictable ways.

  • anon2

    Mr. Whittington,

    I happen to be in the industry, and do not disclose my name for very good (and obvious) reasons.

    Senator Mikulski may be able to pull off a miracle — I am not saying it is impossible — but considering all the other agencies that were gorged in the CR — many of which have much more political support on the Hill — it is highly unlikely. If the new congressional leadership caved in on NASA’s budget, then every other special interest in the nation will be saying “me too”. If the new leadership starts making exceptions for lower priorities like NASA, the new leadership’s judgement would be questioned, and there will be an avalanche of demands. That is why I predict they will hold the line.

    Again, if your wishful thinking does not come true, what do you suggest that NASA do?

    Keep to its guns on the exact same strategy that is not working? Or do something different?

    Or is this something you would prefer to not think about (yet)?

    – Anon2

  • anonymous

    “Nasa can get the budget growth it needs with the existing cast of characters.”

    These are the same Congressional characters that (at least in the House) reduced NASA’s topline budget by about $500 million in 2007, with an impact to exploration of about $600 million.

    Only 40 of those Congressional characters signed a letter in support of NASA against this cut — about what you’d expect when you add up the congressmen with parochial interests in NASA. Not exactly an overwhelming vote of support. With the Democratic takeover and increasing budget pressures, the cast of characters supporting NASA has shrunk greatly (almost overnight), a marked contrast to the support NASA enjoyed during the spendthrift days of the Republican-controlled Congress.

    “Congress has already agreed that manned spaceflight is important,”

    It was the Republican-controlled Congress that passed the NASA authorization that explicitely endorsed the VSE. That Congress is gone. It will be interesting to see what a Democrat-controlled Congress does with a Republican White House’s human space exploration initiative. From the reductions in the 2007 budget, it doesn’t look like they will give it the same level of support as the prior Congress.

    “it’s now a matter of national priorities.”

    And the Democrats, at least in the House, indicated that NASA’s human space flight programs are a low priority by not giving them an exception to the flat-funding rule in the 2007 budget resolution, resulting in that $5-600 million cut to NASA/exploration. More than that, they forbade NASA from transferring funds from other programs to exploration, a strong indication that science, aeronautics, and other programs are higher priorities at NASA than exploration for the new Congress.

    I’m not trying to pick a fight. I just want to point out that the evidence is weighing heavily against political and budgetary support for Constellation going forward. Things could change, but the trend is strong and hard to ignore

    I would agree with the general thrust of Anon2’s comments — NASA needs to deal with the massive political shift and emerging budget reality sooner rather than later. And I think CSS’s comments — shrink Orion, go with a single-stick EELV, and cancel Ares I in favor of getting actual lunar hardware underway before the next election — are generally the right plan to deal with the new reality. But I would not bet on Griffin & Co. to do so given how much they’ve invested in their chosen ESAS plan.

    “Of course it’s these kinds of varible budgets that cause cost overruns.”

    Agreed. If the 2007 reduction stands (and/or if more of the same occurs in 2008), the total development costs for Ares and Orion will almost certainly increase as the marching orders for their development armies are stretched out a year or more.

  • Mark R Whittington

    “Anon2″ We have your word on who and what you are. Naturally that can’t be verified. Then again anyone can claim to be anything on the Internet. I can only wonder at the credibility of someone who makes bald statements and is afraid to give his name. I know that Rand Simberg–for example–works in the aerospace industry and, while I have disagreed with him in the past, I can grant him that he has never been afraid to give his honest opinion under his own name.

    Your question is a bit loaded and has assumptions that are not necessarily true. What do you mean by “strategy that is not working?” The current approach seems to be working just fine, despite the rumors some people like to spread on the Internet.

    Now if Congress chooses to cut funding, then I rather think that going to a “commercial approach” is not going to work, even if there was a viable “commercial approach”, which there is not. The problem in that eventuallity is not the method of going to the Moon, but going to the Moon. People like David Obey and company do not care about how we go back to the Moon; they tend to be against it no matter what.

    The only option will be to slip the schedule and articulate what the consequences of that will be. It would be the least bad of several bad alternatives.

  • anonymous

    “If NASA is going down the drain because of the Democrats, then one wonders why Senators Mukulski and Hutchison are about to try to attach their billion dollar supplemental to a farm bill this month.”

    Assuming Mikulski and Hutchison are able to pull off the self-described “Mikulski miracle” (they weren’t last year), what that would mean for specific NASA programs depends highly on how they direct the funding. With Goddard and APL in her state, Mikulski will want to support science programs. (I would not be surprised to see yet another Hubble servicing mission get its nose under the tent.) And Hutchison (and Nelson) talk mainly about extending Shuttle operations and enhancing ISS, with only moderate support for Shuttle successor systems, which will have to have a smaller workforce in these Senators’ states if they’re going to succeed operationally. None of these Senators seem to put the exploration programs on the front burner so it’s far from guaranteed that they’ll benefit much (or at all) from a “Mikulski miracle”.

    For what it’s worth…

  • Mark R Whittington

    By the way, the House passed bill is a very poor indicator of what the overall additude toward NASA is in the new Congress. It was essentially developed by David Obey and Robert Byrd and rammed through the House with no amendments allowed. But the process is not over yet and things are likely to play out in unexpected ways.

  • anonymous

    “By the way, the House passed bill is a very poor indicator of what the overall additude toward NASA is in the new Congress.”

    Even if you dismiss the House resolution, only 40 congressmen signed the letter in support of NASA and against the cut. That’s another indicator to go by.

    “It was essentially developed by David Obey and Robert Byrd and rammed through the House with no amendments allowed.”

    That’s true, but the Senate appropriations leaders still say that they are going to pass few changes to the House version.

    “But the process is not over yet and things are likely to play out in unexpected ways.”

    It could happen, but I think such a position is more wishful thinking than critical assessment.

    Time will tell…

  • Mark R Whittington

    “Anonymous”–whoever you are or claim to be–my sense is that the Hutchison/Mukulski Bill had a pretty good chance of passing had the last Congress not punted most of the budget to this Congress. It did get through the Appropriations Committee, after all.

    Since most of the comment on the FY08 request is that it’s too low, I think it might have a good chance of passing in this Congress. It will primarily pay for shuttle return to flight costs which, while not benefiting other accounts directly, will do so indirectly as they will not have to be curtailed to pay for that expense.

  • Mark R Whittington

    “Anonymous” It was you (or at least someone using your handle) who suggested that the FY08 budget request would severly cut the exploration account. That didn’t happen. Now I submit, who is engaging is “wishful thinking.”

  • anonymous

    ““Anonymous”–whoever you are or claim to be”

    Sorry, I know it’s frustrating, but I have a day job I have to protect, too.

    “Since most of the comment on the FY08 request is that it’s too low, I think it might have a good chance of passing in this Congress.”

    It’s a $1 billion plus increase over the 2007 request — that’s an increase of over 6 percent — in a budget where nearly all non-military, discretionary departments and agencies are only seeing increases of 1 percent or less. That makes NASA’s budget a huge target in 2008. When you add in a Congress no longer controlled by the President’s own party, I just don’t see good odds for NASA to get that relatively huge increase in 2008.

    Even if the full increase to the NASA topline is passed in 2008, that’s no guarantee that the exploration projects will get their increases. NASA’s science and aeronautics communities will be looking to make up for the cuts Griffin made to their budgets last year. The House voted to increase Earth science and aeronautics priorities over exploration in 2007, with the likely slip to the Ares 1/Orion schedule. We could see that scenario play out again in 2008, with yet another slip to the Ares 1/Orion schedule.

    My 2 cents… discount as you see fit.

  • anonymous

    ““Anonymous” It was you (or at least someone using your handle) who suggested that the FY08 budget request would severly cut the exploration account. That didn’t happen. Now I submit, who is engaging is “wishful thinking.””

    That was based on an early look at the topline numbers for NASA’s budget accounts. I’ll note that in the case of exploration, the topline numbers did go down from the 2007 request to the 2008 request.

    Not wishful thinking — no one wishes NASA ill — just reading budget tables.

  • Edward Wright

    > “Anon2″ We have your word on who and what you are. Naturally that can’t be verified. Then again
    > anyone can claim to be anything on the Internet.

    Er, yes, Mark. You have claimed to be a professional novelist, a journalist, and a space policy analyst. None of those claims stand up to scrutiny.

    I don’t think you’re in any position to demand that other people disclose their identities to you.

    > I rather think that going to a “commercial approach” is not going to work, even if there was a viable “commercial approach”, which there is not.

    That’s your opinion. No commercial approach is ever viable, according to you, and no evidence or arguments will ever change your mind.

    As someone commented, you’re like the Soviet defector standing outside the American supermarket. All those promises of abundance can’t be real because the Soviet system never produced anything like that. Oranges that are fresh, not spoiled??? For 79 cents a pound??? Reduce the cost of access to space??? It has to be fake!!!

  • anon2

    ****
    WHITTINGTON: Your question is a bit loaded and has assumptions that are not necessarily true. What do you mean by “strategy that is not working?”
    ****

    Mr. Whittington,

    I am quite willing to have a reasoned debate based on facts. You don’t need to know my name in order for us to have such a discussion. So, let me try.

    Griffin has stated a number of rationale’s and objectives for his strategy.

    “Minimize the gap” was one very clearly stated strategic objective. As little as 6 months ago, Griffin was talking about the CEV showing up to ISS as soon as 2012.

    Now Griffin is talking about a slip beyond 2014.

    Based on the facts, that Griffin’s strategy of “minimizing the gap” is not working. If Griffin really wanted to “minimize” the gap, he would make a small shift in the requirements for the CEV (to a slightly smaller CEV), make some upgrades to EELVs, and the gap would be minimized.

    The fact that Griffin is not willing to make this small & obvious tweaks to his ESAS plan (so far) suggests that he does not really care about minimizing the gap in human spaceflight.

    Next, Griffin has had the clear objective of generating political support for his ESAS plans. Although the Congress voted overwhelmingly in support of the VSE — this vote took place well before ESAS. The recent House vote to reduce the ESMD budget by $567M in FY07 is in many ways the first real vote on Griffin’s ESAS plans.

    The House vote provides real data that Griffin’s political strategy is not working. (Now to be fair, Griffin has not had much time to adjust his strategy since the turnover in control of Congress. I am just saying he will be better off the earlier he makes the adjustment.)

    Third, part of the strategy has been to rally the loyal troops from TX, FL and AL, plus the corporate supporters. For those who have been in the industry for some time, the level of corporate financial support for lobbying on the Hill — and for marketing the ESAS plan — appears to be remarkably small compared to similar industry marketing & lobbying efforts by the NASA contractors in the 1970s and 1980s. In the 1980s there was much more money poured into lobbying for the Space Station, and many millions spent on advertising and marketing. Meanwhile the “Coalition for Space Exploration” has a hard time getting their act together on a website. Now I don’t have hard numbers to make comparisons, but it appears that even the baseline industry lobbying strategy is not working well. As long as they had Tom Delay, they were probably all right, but the combination of losing Delay, the Democrats taking control, the small level of corporate support, and the politics of the day means this strategy is no longer sufficient.

    Fourth, Griffin will be gone in January 2009. He needs to put his overall strategy in place — so that it is sustained beyond January 2009. “Anonymous” has separately made a very good case that Griffin’s strategy to put tons of near-term $$ into a new LV which mostly duplicates existing capabilities — and very little current funding into the real lunar parts of the architecture (the Ares 5 and the LSAM) — is poorly thought out because of the January 2009 deadline. This part of the strategy is not working either.

    It is on these 4 points, and the previous information I have provided on the budgetary battles on the Hill, that I make the “bald statement” that Griffin’s “strategy is not working”.

    ****
    WHITTINGTON: The current approach seems to be working just fine, despite the rumors some people like to spread on the Internet.
    ****

    ???

    Please explain why you think “The current approach seems to be working just fine”.

    As you have requested, I have separately explained why I think it is not working.

    I now request the same level of substantive backup for your “bald statement”.

    ****
    WHITTINGTON: Now if Congress chooses to cut funding, then I rather think that going to a “commercial approach” is not going to work, even if there was a viable “commercial approach”, which there is not.
    ****

    Does this mean that you completely disagreed with the ESMD plans by the previous Administrator under Admiral Steidle?

    Because Steidle appeard to think there were viable commercial approaches.

    ****
    WHITTINGTON: The problem in that eventuallity is not the method of going to the Moon, but going to the Moon. People like David Obey and company do not care about how we go back to the Moon; they tend to be against it no matter what.
    ****

    So what?

    A rock is hard, water is wet, and “David Obey and company do not care about how we go back to the Moon”.

    This is life.

    Now the question is “What do we do?”

    ****
    WHITTINGTON: The only option will be to slip the schedule and articulate what the consequences of that will be. It would be the least bad of several bad alternatives.
    ****

    OK, we will just have to agree to disagree.

    – Anon2

  • anonymous

    Oy vey! This has little to do with the budget debate, but what a string of bad luck for the agency on top of the 2007 budget:

    Astronaut to Face Attempted Murder Count
    http://www.space.com/news/ap_070206_nowak_updt.html

    Ares 1 Parachute Test Fails
    http://www.nasawatch.com

    When it rains, it pours…

  • richardb

    Over the years Nasa has proven adept at getting what it wants. Shuttle and ISS were almost killed but weren’t. The question in all of this isn’t what hardware is used, its doing those tasks outlined in VSE. If the money isn’t there for Ares I because Congress cuts funding growth, Nasa will try some other way like was done for Shuttle and ISS. Boeing and Lockheed prosper if EELV is used for instance. If the prime’s lobbying is so feeble as was claimed, why does F-22, F-35, C130-J, LCS and so many others survive despite ridiculous cost growth? Prima facie because those primes have clout on the hill.

  • anonymous

    “Over the years Nasa has proven adept at getting what it wants.”

    Not necessarily. NASA didn’t get to keep Saturn under the Johnson White House, didn’t get a space station or Mars program under the Nixon White House, and didn’t get SEI under the Bush I White House.

    “Shuttle and ISS were almost killed but weren’t.”

    Not sure what you’re referring to on Shuttle, but ISS was saved by the Clinton White House (Gore specifically) bringing the Russians into the partnership. There does not appear to be a similar foreign policy rationale emerging for NASA’s human lunar plans.

    “If the money isn’t there for Ares I because Congress cuts funding growth, Nasa will try some other way like was done for Shuttle and ISS. Boeing and Lockheed prosper if EELV is used for instance.”

    One would hope that the NASA leadership would do this, but it will be hard for them because they have a vested interest in Ares I.

    The key is to change course before losing the projected savings from Shuttle’s retirement, a strong possibility after the 2008 election. But again, I don’t see Griffin & Co. doing this given their vested interests in the ESAS plan.

    “If the prime’s lobbying is so feeble as was claimed, why does F-22, F-35, C130-J, LCS and so many others survive despite ridiculous cost growth?”

    Partly because they’re critical path defense programs, not highly optional, non-defense, discretionary programs, which is the category of spending that NASA falls into.

    But also because they are huge programs with large implications for the bottom lines of the companies those lobbyists work for. The same is not true of Orion or the Ares I upper stage, which are relatively small projects in comparison. In fact, Shuttle contracts make up a bigger portion of the business of these companies than Orion or Ares I. So technically, if anything, they’re incentivized to lobby against Shuttle’s replacement. I’m not saying these companies are doing that, but they don’t have a strong incentive to send in their lobbying A-team or spend lots of lobbying dollars on their Constellation contracts. Exploration is just not as important to these companies as their other government contracts.

    “Prima facie because those primes have clout on the hill.”

    Sure, they have clout, but it depends on where they want to allocate it. If I was in the leadership of one of these companies, I’d put my best and a lot more lobbying resources into the military programs you listed than anything at NASA.

    And based on the almost non-existent and very subpar performance of the Coalition for Space Exploration, NASA exploration does appear to be getting the B-team when it comes to contractor lobbying. (Maybe even the C-team…)

  • Ferris Valyn

    anonymous,

    Your comments
    But also because they are huge programs with large implications for the bottom lines of the companies those lobbyists work for. The same is not true of Orion or the Ares I upper stage, which are relatively small projects in comparison. In fact, Shuttle contracts make up a bigger portion of the business of these companies than Orion or Ares I. So technically, if anything, they’re incentivized to lobby against Shuttle’s replacement. I’m not saying these companies are doing that, but they don’t have a strong incentive to send in their lobbying A-team or spend lots of lobbying dollars on their Constellation contracts. Exploration is just not as important to these companies as their other government contracts.
    kind of make me think about Taylor Dinerman’s recent piece over at Space Reivew. While I normally don’t agree with Dinerman’s pieces (espcially his recent pieces against ASAT treaties), his point about the separation of aerospace (or rather, IMHO, a return to the aeronautics and astronautics vs aerospace), would help to deal with some of the problems you stated.

  • richardb

    “Partly because they’re critical path defense programs, not highly optional, non-defense, discretionary programs, which is the category of spending that NASA falls into.”

    Joking now aren’t you? C-22 and C-130J, programs even the DOD tried to kill at various times and couldn’t because of Congress and prime lobbying.

    “but they don’t have a strong incentive to send in their lobbying A-team or spend lots of lobbying dollars on their Constellation contracts.” Who says Congress needs the “A-Team” to be lobbied successfully? I doubt your estimate of these contract too. CEV was estimated at almost 4 billion thru 2013 then production money of a couple billion a year for probably a couple decades. LockMart will fight for that kind of money.

    Nasa wants to have a mission that will keep it around for decades and getting out of earth orbit will accomplish that. Nasa will do whatever it takes to take this gift from Bush and find a way to fund it. If they have to ditch CLV for something else, they’ll do it. If they have to shrink CEV, so be it. But right now, with a nice budget increase from Bush, Nasa will not give the slightest opening to critics over COTS, EELV or another re-design of its chosen hardware.

  • anonymous

    “C-22 and C-130J, programs even the DOD tried to kill at various times and couldn’t because of Congress and prime lobbying.”

    Sorry, I stopped reading after F-22, F-35, and C-130. Either the Raptor or the Lightning is a necessary expenditure (but maybe not both) and the Hercules has long been a workhorse. Based on that, I would generically say that these are critical programs for the U.S. military, making them much higher national priorities in the eyes of Congress (or anyone else) than a discretionary exploration program for the nation’s civil space agency.

    I freely admit I have no clue on C-22 or what’s in the the J variant of the Hercules and didn’t bother to nitpick through all the examples offered.

    This statement:

    “If they have to ditch CLV for something else, they’ll do it.”

    Contradicts this statement:

    “Nasa will not give the slightest opening to critics over COTS, EELV or another re-design of its chosen hardware.”

    It’s not clear to me which argument you’re making. Do you think NASA should/will reconsider Ares 1 or should/will stick (no pun intended) by Ares?

    FWIW, independent of how bad the budget gets (or doesn’t), I don’t think NASA’s leadership will reconsider Ares 1. They are just too heavily vested in the vehicle. The next NASA Administrator could reconsider Ares 1 circa 2010, but by then it will probably be too late and costly to reverse course on Ares 1.

    But funding decisions on the rest of the exploration effort, especially the lunar-specific elements like Ares V and LSAM, can be made independently of funding decisions on Ares 1. And because those lunar-specific elements will not be well underway until 2011, I think NASA’s human lunar return plans stand a high chance of getting cancelled after the next election, even if Ares I and Orion are built and operated without a hitch.

  • anonymous

    “CEV was estimated at almost 4 billion thru 2013″

    That averages out to a little more than a half-billion per year, starting with the contract award in 2006.

    The Shuttle contractor workforce is about 16,000 people. Assuming $100K per worker, that’s $1.6 billion in pay and benefits alone, most of it run through USA. Divide it between LockMart and Boeing, and that’s $800 million per company, maybe $6-700 million after taking out ATK’s share and any non-integrated subcontractors. It’s a WAG, but it’s conservative — just pay and benefits and it still easily beats the annual take from CEV development.

    “then production money of a couple billion a year for probably a couple decades.”

    Boy, I hope that’s not right. (It can’t be right.) Shuttle annual budget is $5-6 billion per year. If 30-50% of that is taken up with Orion production, and even more to build Ares launch vehicles, there won’t be much for Ares V, LSAM, and the actual lunar hardware, even after Shuttle is retired.

    Something more to look into…

  • CSS

    FWIW, independent of how bad the budget gets (or doesn’t), I don’t think NASA’s leadership will reconsider Ares 1. They are just too heavily vested in the vehicle. The next NASA Administrator could reconsider Ares 1 circa 2010, but by then it will probably be too late and costly to reverse course on Ares 1.

    Yeah right. It could be canceled in a heartbeat, and probably will. The only thing that keeps it alive is Griffin’s personal interest in the program. Although the Marshall folks will fight desparately to keep it alive once he leaves, it will probably have little hope of surviving. Remember X-33 et al?

    The Alabama delegation doesn’t give a flip what pumps $ into Marshall. As long as it preserves jobs…that’s all that counts.

  • NASA didn’t get to keep Saturn under the Johnson White House, didn’t get a space station or Mars program under the Nixon White House, and didn’t get SEI under the Bush I White House.

    NASA didn’t want SEI. It killed it. Truly actually sent is legislative AA over to lobby against it on the Hill.

  • anonymous

    “Truly actually sent is legislative AA over to lobby against it on the Hill.”

    I have heard the story about Truly ordering a doubling (tripling?, quadrupling?) of the cost estimates for SEI, and even seen some paperwork that purports to prove it true.

    But Truly sending legislative staff/heads to the Hill to lobby against a WH initiative is a new one to me.

  • But Truly sending legislative staff/heads to the Hill to lobby against a WH initiative is a new one to me.

    One of the (many) reasons he got canned by Bush 41.

  • John Malkin

    X-33 was only experimental and never really fit into any goal of NASA, Congress or the President; It’s different this time because NASA has a clear goal, replace the shuttle never mind beyond. After Challenger Reagan should have stated a replacement for the Shuttle instead of building the Space Station but most everyone was in denial.

    If Congress should choose to not fund a replacement for the Shuttle than they will also need to change NASA’s goal of replacing the Shuttle. In the case of the X-33 that didn’t matter. Of course that’s not to say that Congress won’t keep the goal and cancel the program. Sorta like the future Iraq War appropriations.

  • anonymous

    “Yeah right. It could be canceled in a heartbeat, and probably will. The only thing that keeps it alive is Griffin’s personal interest in the program.”

    I think we’re in violent agreement. While I don’t see Ares 1 getting cancelled as long as Griffin is at the helm, if he was magically replaced by a different Administrator tomorrow, I agree that Ares 1 and the current Orion design could be in trouble just based on the lack of design and development (not performance) margin at this early stage in the program. Add in the political landscape and a new NASA Administrator with no vested interest in Ares 1, and there would be little incentive not to rapidly shift gears away from Ares 1.

    But Griffin is not going to be magically replaced tomorrow, and by the time he does leave, Ares 1 will probably be too far along to cancel.

    “Although the Marshall folks will fight desparately to keep it alive once he leaves, it will probably have little hope of surviving. Remember X-33 et al?

    The Alabama delegation doesn’t give a flip what pumps $ into Marshall. As long as it preserves jobs…that’s all that counts.”

    My concern with MSFC is their recent (past decade or so) track record of poor project/program management. You mentioned X-33, and I won’t repeat the details here. But even their science projects (GP-B, Chandra) have suffered enormous overruns (e.g., GP-B went from $300 million to $800 million) and very questionable management practices (putting a university in charge of day-to-day development on GP-B) over the past decade or two. In the 90s, even MSFC management agreed that they lack good project/program management experience down in the ranks and invented an expensive project (the Fastrac engine) to give their folks that experience (and, of course, no one uses the Fastrac engine today).

    Although MSFC is historically NASA’s rocket development center, if I were in Griffin’s shoes, I would have had serious reservations about giving that field center management responsibility for Ares 1 or V. At a minimum, some heads should have changed and some checks and balances should have been put in place, similar to what happened at JSC after Abbey’s $5 billion ISS overrun. Unfortunately, the same X-33, Spaceliner 100, Fastrac crowd (Cook, Davis, etc.) is running the Ares 1 show today.

    My 2 cents… FWIW.

  • anonymous

    “X-33 was only experimental and never really fit into any goal”

    I don’t think that’s true, but it’s not really the point anyway. Even if a program doesn’t fit into some larger strategy, the manager should be able to formulate that program, select the contractors or other performers for the program, and execute the program such that technical success is achieved within the resources provided. Without going into all the myriad details, on that simple measure, I would argue that MSFC (and NASA) management failed on X-33.

    Again, just my 2 cents. Your mileage may vary.

  • John Malkin

    Well both the Shuttle and the Space Station are examples of that thinking, neither had long range goals unlike the moon mission. The problem with the moon mission is long term affordability which was never taken into consideration and it was quickly canceled as other priorities took its money. Thus began the many years in LEO: Apollo-Soyuz, Skylab, Space Shuttle and Space Station. All these projects had Managers that formulated a program, selected contractors (mostly big aerospace) and perform the missions as specified. My point in general and not specific to your comment is Congress needs to have parallelism between funding and goal/objective. Actually X-33 is in a long list of programs that went absolutely nowhere boy those were frustrating times and I’m sure its not completely over.

  • My concern with MSFC is their recent (past decade or so) track record of poor project/program management. You mentioned X-33, and I won’t repeat the details here.

    It goes back farther than that (e.g., OMV).

  • Edward Wright

    > Well both the Shuttle and the Space Station are examples of that thinking, neither had long range goals unlike the moon mission.

    The Space Station had a long-term goal: to house several NASA astronauts doing Cool Things in Earth orbit.

    The Moon mission has a long-term goal: to house several NASA astronauts doing Cool Things on the Moon.

    How are these goals “unlike” each other?

    > Thus began the many years in LEO

    So? The Pilgrims landed on Plymouth Rock in the 1600’s. Thus began many years in New England.

    Would England have been better off if the British Crown had abandoned Massachusetts after a few quick trips, so that it could send a handful of explorers further and further West, never stopping in any one place or establishing anything of permanence?

    Even if you believe the conventional wisdom that America’s goal in space should a series of touch-and-go missions to increasingly distant destinations, do you think things would be much different if Apollo hadn’t been cancelled? We would probably hear whining about NASA being “stuck on the Moon” instead of “stuck in LEO.” If NASA does return to the Moon, how long do you think it will be before we hear that NASA needs to “get off the Moon” and “go someplace”? (They haven’t even reached the Moon, and Zubrin is saying that already.)

  • Edward Wright

    > Unfortunately, the same X-33, Spaceliner
    > 100, Fastrac crowd (Cook, Davis, etc.) is running the Ares 1 show today.

    Don’t forget the former chief technology officer at Orbital Sciences, who sold X-34 to Congress, is now running NASA.

  • John Malkin

    I was being generous about the Moon being a long term goal. It was more in the spirit of Kennedy, if he had lived I think it would have been different, maybe.

    Zubrin is saying that because he wants to go to Mars but if we can’t go to the Moon how are we going to get to Mars. Anyway they are talk NEAR objects too which is better than LEO. I don’t know about you, but I don’t like LEO, no challenge. Yes, there is no Guarantee, we won’t get stuck on the moon. My point is Congress should set a goal and fund it, period.

    I’m hoping we will have a well defined list of experimence and equipment that would be used on the moon before they start building hardware. Orion doesn’t count for me because it’s just a Shuttle replacement with future ability to support other missions such as moon or mars. I do like the space station, it the first space hotel for really rich people. Too bad we don’t have any space to take rich people up on the shuttle.

  • LetsGet

    Although MSFC is historically NASA’s rocket development center, if I were in Griffin’s shoes, I would have had serious reservations about giving that field center management responsibility for Ares 1 or V. At a minimum, some heads should have changed and some checks and balances should have been put in place, similar to what happened at JSC after Abbey’s $5 billion ISS overrun. Unfortunately, the same X-33, Spaceliner 100, Fastrac crowd (Cook, Davis, etc.) is running the Ares 1 show today.

    Anonymous…you sure got that right. At the very least, Griffin should have put a new team together to manage these activities. From what I’m seeing, Ares I is being run in a manner similar to other past MSFC programs.

  • Edward Wright

    > I was being generous about the Moon being a long term goal. It was more in the spirit of Kennedy, if he had
    > lived I think it would have been different,

    Yes, but not the way you think. Kennedy’s only goal was to land *a* man on the Moon and return him safely to the Earth. Nixon may be reviled by Apollo worshippers, but the truth is, he let the Apollo missions go on longer than Kennedy ever intended.

    On the other hand, if Kennedy had lived, he might have lost to Goldwater (who wasn’t that far behind prior to the assassination). In that case, Goldwater might have cancelled Apollo and restored DynaSoar, in which case we might have cheap access to space and humans on the Moon today.

    > Zubrin is saying that because he wants to go to Mars but if we can’t go to the Moon how are we going to get to Mars.

    Good point, but you don’t take it far enough. If we can’t go to LEO affordably, how can we ever go to the Moon affordably?

    > I don’t know about you, but I don’t like LEO, no challenge.

    LOL. Only about 400 people have flown to LEO. Over 2,000 have climbed Mt. Everest. Do you think there’s no challenge in climbing Everest? Astronautix.com lists every person who has ever flown in LEO. Is your name there?

    > My point is Congress should set a goal and fund it, period.

    Yes, I know that’s your point, and your point makes no sense. There’s no reason why Congress should fund a goal unless the goal makes sense.

    You’re confusing goals with destinations. NASA has had the same goal since Project Mercury: to send astronauts on cool trips. Only the destination has changed. What we need is a new goal, to use space for the economy and security of the nation, not just to send government employees on junkets.

    > Too bad we don’t have any space to take rich people up on the shuttle.

    There was plenty of space on the Shuttle. The payload bay could hold over 70 passengers, if NASA didn’t load it up with lab mice and science fair experiments. NASA could have flown over 7,000 people by now, if they wanted to.

    Or they could have endowed the X-Prize and a series of follow-ons, which would allow millions of people to go.

    They didn’t want to. Human spaceflight was never their goal.

  • Paul Dietz

    restored DynaSoar, in which case we might have cheap access to space and humans on the Moon today.

    How does DynaSoar lead to cheap access to space? It was to be launched on an expendable rocket, and not a cheap one.

  • Edward Wright

    > How does DynaSoar lead to cheap access to space? It was to be launched on an expendable rocket,
    > and not a cheap one.

    DynaSoar was an x-vehicle, not “an American Soyuz” like CEV. An x-vehicle is a beginning, not an end. No one ever thought it wouldn’t evolve or said, “This is the only way Americans will ever go into space for the next 40 years.”

    There were in fact a number of reusable booster concepts for DynaSoar.

  • Paul Dietz

    I still don’t see how DynaSoar would have led to cheap access to space. DynaSoar did nothing to address the things that make launch expensive. As for the reusable booster concepts: there were also reusable booster concepts with capsules on top, yes? The thing you stick on top was not the showstopper.

    No one […] said, “This is the only way Americans will ever go into space for the next 40 years.”

    They would have ended up saying something like that about any effort to make reusable launchers, since one couldn’t have made the economic case close unless the launcher captured all of the reasonably projected market and a great deal of unreasonably extrapolated demand. As it turned out, there wasn’t enough real demand to justify even a single reusable launcher development effort.

  • Anonymous, in general I agree with your analysis here, however,

    But also because they are huge programs with large implications for the bottom lines of the companies those lobbyists work for. The same is not true of Orion or the Ares I upper stage,

    For what it’s worth, a friend of mine who works for Lockheed Martin (and shall remain nameless) told me (after the fact) that it was essential that LM win the Orion contract, because they invested way too much Corporate money in their bid. I have no opinion on the validity of this, except to say that it is possible that Orion is more important to LM than it appears. If so, I hope they fight harder than they seem to be so far. . . .

    Also, keep in mind that Orion is a production contract that could have earning potential decades into the future.

    John: After Challenger Reagan should have stated a replacement for the Shuttle instead of building the Space Station but most everyone was in denial.

    No, NASA should not be in the LEO transportation business, especially now that the Space Station exists as a market. The one thing where I strongly agree with the anti-ESAS folks is that the Ares-1 was a mistake. I said so at the time, but this is even more clear in retrospect. However, the reason Dr. Griffin did that — which nobody here seems to care about — was to tie Mars to the lunar effort, so that the vehicles to get to Mars become part of the core project. While I think it is unwise, I also think he will be very reluctant to give this up. At a minimum, ESAS will live as long as he is at NASA.

    John: Anyway they are talk NEAR objects too which is better than LEO.

    It’s also better than the moon. One of the key advantages of Orion (however it is launched) is that it, with suitable upper stages and storage modules, potentially could do both missions.

    — Donald

  • Edward Wright

    > I still don’t see how DynaSoar would have led to cheap access to space. DynaSoar did nothing to address the things
    > that make launch expensive. As for the reusable booster concepts: there were also reusable booster concepts
    > with capsules on top, yes? The thing you stick on top was not the showstopper.

    I’m not aware of any reusable vehicle concepts that had capsules on top, except for escape purposes (e.g., SASSTO).

    The utility of a reusable booster is severely limited if you have to build a new capsule every time you launch it. In system engineering terms, that would be a “bottleneck.”

    The thing that makes launch expensive is the throw-away hardware. Space hardware is not much more expensive than aviation hardware. What makes it seem so expensive is that it’s only used once. DynaSoar was one of the first programs to (partially) address that.

    > They would have ended up saying something like that about any effort to make reusable launchers, since one
    > couldn’t have made the economic case close unless the launcher captured all of the reasonably projected
    > market and a great deal of unreasonably extrapolated demand. As it turned out, there wasn’t enough real
    > demand to justify even a single reusable launcher development effort.

    There was no real demand because no one ever built one. Just as there was no demand for air travel before the airplane was invented.

  • Paul Dietz

    I’m not aware of any reusable vehicle concepts that had capsules on top, except for escape purposes (e.g., SASSTO).

    There were proposals for Saturn derivatives with reusable stages (perhaps not fully reusable.)

    Were there really proposals for putting DynaSoar on an otherwise fully reusable launcher? I would have thought they’d instead integrate the crew-carrying vehicle and the final stage, rather than sticking a winged reentry vehicle on top.

  • Edward Wright

    > There were proposals for Saturn derivatives with reusable stages (perhaps not fully reusable.)

    Again, the expendable stages would have been a bottleneck, as would the limited number of Saturn-class payloads.

    > Were there really proposals for putting DynaSoar on an otherwise fully reusable launcher?

    ?? Paul, DynaSoar was reusable.

  • anonymous

    “How does DynaSoar lead to cheap access to space? It was to be launched on an expendable rocket, and not a cheap one.”

    Had NASA gone down a DynaSoar-like path, I’d argue it would have been cheaper, more flexible, and maybe even safer than Shuttle, even flying on Titans. And without Shuttle’s cargo bay, it would have forced NASA to pursue a single-launch (or few-launch) space station. All those factors together, we might actually have some real human space exploration underway had DynaSoar or something like it been pursued instead of the Shuttle albatross.

    That doesn’t go to the core of the expendable/reusable cost debate — Shuttle is not really reusable and I’m not speculating that a reusable booster would be developed for Dynasoar. But it’s an interesting point of departure in terms of considering alternate histories and missed opportunities.

    FWIW…

  • anonymous

    “For what it’s worth, a friend of mine who works for Lockheed Martin (and shall remain nameless) told me (after the fact) that it was essential that LM win the Orion contract, because they invested way too much Corporate money in their bid. I have no opinion on the validity of this, except to say that it is possible that Orion is more important to LM than it appears. If so, I hope they fight harder than they seem to be so far. . . .”

    In one sense, that’s good to hear. Even without Ares 1, NASA will need Orion or something like it sooner rather than later to get off Shuttle and eventually service exploration missions. Although I wouldn’t mind seeing Ares 1 go the way of the do-do, it would be nice if LockMart could help keep Orion on a relatively stable track.

    I don’t know, however, that the conversation with your friend really contradicts my argument that LockMart (or any of these big aerospace/military primes) has many other, bigger fish to fry outside NASA when it comes to lobbying on the Hill. I’m sure from the perspective of someone working on or near Orion that it was essential to win the contract after corporate spent a lot of B&P bucks to prepare the proposal. That doesn’t necessarily mean that corporate puts Orion in their top few “must-have” legislative initiatives each year.

    “Also, keep in mind that Orion is a production contract that could have earning potential decades into the future.”

    Absolutely true, but I’d bet dollars to donuts that it’s less money and less profitable (they take no risk with USA) than what they get from Shuttle work (were it extended). I’m not saying that LockMart is lobbying against Orion and for a Shuttle extension — just that they don’t have any particularly powerful incentives to lobby for Orion.

    My 2 cents… FWIW… would be interesting to hear from someone in Bethesda.

  • Edward Wright

    > Had NASA gone down a DynaSoar-like path, I’d argue it would have been cheaper, more flexible, and maybe
    > even safer than Shuttle, even flying on Titans.

    You’re assuming spaceflight would have remained a NASA monopoly.

    My point was that President Goldwater might have reversed the Eisenhower/Kennedy policies. The Air Force might have been allowed to go ahead with manned space programs like DynaSoar, while NASA returned to its pre-Mercury role of doing basic research for the military and industry. Goldwater might also have called on Congress to repeal the Comsat Act, allowing private industry to get back into satellite communications. Goldwater was also a backer of high-speed passenger transportation such as the SST, so it’s likely he would have looked favorably on the development of civilian space transportation as well.

    If the United States had taken the money spent on Project Apollo and put it into a series of research vehicles, starting with the X-20 DynaSoar, space travel might be quite routine by now and establishing a base on the Moon would raise no more eyebrows than building another base in Antartica.

    Instead, we have a space agency run by “remember when” types who think the only problem with Apollo was that we didn’t spend enough money.

  • Paul Dietz

    ?? Paul, DynaSoar was reusable.

    I am refering to the launcher the DynaSoar would have been placed on, not the DynaSoar itself.

  • anonymous

    “You’re assuming spaceflight would have remained a NASA monopoly.”

    Yes, but I think it’s the most reasonable assumption, given that the military had backed away from MOL and the commercial sector was still a ways off.

    “Instead, we have a space agency run by “remember when” types who think the only problem with Apollo was that we didn’t spend enough money.”

    Agreed. Your Goldwater musings are an interesting alternate history.

    FWIW…

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