China’s ASAT test last month was supposed to shake up how the US and other countries perceived the threat posed by such weapons and their reaction to them. So far, though, government officials from China and the US are sticking to the same positions they espoused prior to the January 11 event. A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said that the country would continue to press for a treaty banning such weapons and that the test last month was a “scientific and technical experiment” not targeted at any specific country, and with no plans to repeat it.
The US, meanwhile, is sticking to the position that such a treaty is unnecessary because there is no arms race in space. “Despite the ASAT test, we continue to believe that there is no arms race in space and therefore no problem for arms control to solve,” Christina Rocca, US ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, said in Geneva. Ironically, if you believe the Chinese that this was a one-time test, then the US statement is correct: there is no arms race in space. But do you believe the Chinese?
I don’t think it’s so much a question of whether the US believes the Chinese but if the US believes the Chinese are a threat at this time or in the near future. Otherwise the Pentagon feels we have enough assets to more than counter any ASAT or other threat from the Chinese.
There is, at least to everyone but this administration, a diplomatic and military part of “war” and the Chinese are clearly preparing to wage it.
I really dont see the day in the next fifty years where the US and the PRC tangle…our economies are now to intertwined…but China wants to be and is becoming a regional superpower AND they key to that is being able to control your own battle space in any regional confrontation which might draw in a superpower.
The Chinese have watched the performance of the US military in Iraq and have seen both its strongpoints and its vunerabilities…the ASAT test was to just explain that the PRC has the capability to attack one of the US main force multipliers…
Robert
The asat test was very much a successful global challenge to all countries with a space economy. Having taken the measure of the global reaction and finding it temperate, I think its highly likely the Chinese will conduct future tests of improved systems. With their economic muscle, they can shutdown most countries complaints.
I don’t understand anyone who thinks there will be an emmaculate conception of a regional or global superpower without bloodshed. China’s growth rate, if sustained, will make it an economic peer to the USA in a few decades. Its fantasy to think they will allow the US Navy & Airforce the honored job of protecting Chinese supply lines as they stretch they globe. They will do that job themselves and sooner or later, we’ll see Chinese naval vessels in South America & African waters, even off the America mainland, just as the Soviets did. They will search for foreign bases as well as a means to support their own forces and project power. They are doing that right now in the Indian Ocean right to the mouth of the Persian Gulf.
China is a very aggressive country. Lets not forget the millions of their own killed over ideas during the Great Leap Forward.
Lets not forget their continuing ethnic cleansing of Tibet. They invaded Vietnam in 1979. They continually claim islands from the Philippines to Japan. Of course Taiwan is continually threaten with destruction if they exercise democratic rights. Of course the future isn’t certain, but assuming China will rise to super power status gently, with delicate concern for its global neighbors is a very comforting lullaby.
Richardb: Given that, I hope you are avoiding the purchase of Chinese products. While I think the export controls we’ve put in place are shooting ourselves in the foot, I fully agree with the more narrow position that we should not be purchasing Chinese rockets (or much of anything else). While there are many reasons to think that Chinese dominance of the world is unlikely to happen, it is possible, especially if we continue to export so much of our money to them. While in general I am a strong supporter of “free trade,” it is a double-edged sword, and in China’s case we’ve gone too far.
— Donald
Donald, for years I have gone out of my way to buy products not made in China. Lots of reasons for it, labor conditions being one. I’m sure many store clerks have wondered what that guy is doing opening up cell phones, turning audio/video equipment around as I look at country of origin. But hey, its my money.
I don’t think China is interested in either a space weapons race, global hegemony, or other offensive actions. If you read about Chinese strategic doctrine, China’s thinking is rooted in their experiences from WWII and the Korean War, when their homeland was overrun by foreign forces (Japan) and threatened with nuclear attack (U.S. towards the end of the Korean War). As a result of these experiences, since the 1950s, China has pursued a strategy of minimal reprisal — obtaining and maintaining a small but affordable (for a developing country) nuclear arsenal, on the assumption that the threat posed by even a small nuclear arsenal is enough to deter such invasions and “nuclear blackmail” (their words, not mine) in the future. China’s history since establishing their small nuclear arsenal would reinforce to them that their doctrine is the right one.
Since the first strategic anti-ballistic missile systems were pursued in the 1970s, China has long recognized that even a modest strategic anti-ballistic missile capability could render their small nuclear deterrent impotent, leaving them open once again to invasion or nuclear threats. The Chinese have also long recognized that space-based systems, even just communications and imaging, are critical to these strategic anti-ballistic missile systems. Thus, since the 1970s, China has pursued many diplomatic initiatives and overtures to ban weapons in space as a means of containing the growth of strategic anti-ballistic missile systems that it views as a threat to its small nuclear deterrent.
To date, all of China’s diplomatic attempts to ban weapons in space and contain the growth of strategic missile defense systems have failed. From China’s point-of-view, the situation grew especially worrisome in the 1990s, when the Clinton Administration agreed to Republican demands to pursue an operational strategic ballistic missile defense system. And things have gone from bad to worse from China’s point-of-view in the first decade of the 21st century, as a post-9/11 Bush Administration has elevated the doctrine of “first strike” in its foreign policy and preserved the option of pursuing future space-based weapons in its space policy.
Essentially, China is playing a defensive game, trying to preserve through diplomatic means its small nuclear deterrent in the face of what China perceives to be the offensive capabilities of a U.S. strategic missile defense system, when employed according to our stated “first strike” doctrine. Now that the “carrots” of those diplomatic efforts are at a standstill, China has uncovered its “stick” — an asymmetric weapon that is little more than an decades-old DF-21 medium-range ballistic missile with some updated guidance systems and what is likely a crude kill vehicle adapted to ASAT applications.
China has received some of what it wanted from that “stick” — reassurance from the U.S. that there will be no arms race in space that could further weaken China’s modest nuclear deterrent. But the U.S. is still far from putting such a ban on space weapons in writing, or more importantly to the Chinese, curtailing the growth of strategic missile defense systems that threaten to make China’s small nuclear deterrent impotent and obsolete. It would not be surprising if China’s raises its ASAT “stick” again, depending on what the Bush II Administration does during the remainder of its term or what the next White House does in regards to strategic missile defense and space weapons.
As far as what the U.S. should do, I don’t think the debate should be as polar as it is. Just as China has pursued both diplomatic and military measures to preserve its small nuclear deterrent, the U.S. should use both diplomatic and military tools to achieve its goals. And I think those goals are no more destructive ASAT testing or use in space (something everyone on this forum could probably agree to) and a means to counter an operational ASAT capability, should China (or another nation) ever actually field one.
Although the Bush II Administration does not want to put a ban on space weapons in a treaty, the U.S. could (and should) pursue a ban on space debris from destructive ASAT testing or actual use. With more satellites than any other nation, it is in U.S. interests to contain the space debris threat and maintain the utility of Earth orbit, even if we do not ban all ASAT weapons outright. Moreover, such a ban would immediately render China’s debris-creating DF-21 ASAT “stick” impotent, effectively removing their asymmetric threat from the playing field. With our technological lead, we could simultaneously pursue other, non-destructive and even reversible ASAT weapons, including electronic jammers, lasers, and even parasitic satellites. China’s primitive ASAT capability would be left in the dust (or on the negotiating table), while preserving more advanced and flexible ASAT options for ourselves.
This does not solve the underlying problem of the destabilizing effect of new U.S. strategic missile defense systems on the nuclear balance-of-power around the world and especially on China’s doctrine to preserve that nation’s small nuclear deterrent, which it views as critical to its defense. If China cannot contain strategic missile defense systems through their space assets, the Chinese will probably pursue other diplomatic and asymmetric targets. But the U.S. can take steps now to remove space systems from that playing table.
For further reading, I’d recommend:
— Minimum Means of Reprisal: China’s Search for Security in a Nuclear Age by Dr. Jeffrey Lewis
— Spying on the Bomb by Dr. Jeffrey T. Richelson, especially Chapter 7: Mao’s Explosive Thoughts
— http://www.armscontrolwonk.com
It’s remarkable how consistently wrong a certain kind of arm chair analyst can be when it comes to the intentions of tyrannical regimes. It’s been the same since Hitler started the Nazi arms buildup in the 1930s.
I agree with Jim Oberg that the Chinese are aiming for an arms control treaty which, like many such, they have the option to violate because such a treaty is unverifiable. In any case, a Chinese ASAT weapon is not meant to be defensive (the Chinese know perfectly well that the West is not going to launch an aggressive war on the Chinese homeland.) It is meant to help provide China with a free hand when they decide to commit aggressive war (i.e. against Tawain, to name one target.)
I would say that Chinese defense planning pre 1990 is not relevant to China afterwards. Its wealth is vastly higher, its economic prospects for the future are commensurately higher since the 1980’s economic reforms revitalized a very backward society.
I don’t read Chinese but have read translations of military publications over the years. While the Chinese aren’t forthcoming compared to Western writers, they are thinking offensive and planning the acquisition of precision strike and long range platforms. Look at what they are deploying rather than listen to what they are saying. Its a long list mirroring American offensive systems from AWAC’s to strategic cruise missiles to 4th generation strike fighters to quiet submarines and a home grown GPS system. None particularly defensive in nature.
You’ve hit it exactly right with the Asat being all about missile defense. The US can’t give it up and no Asat prohibition is plausible with a missile defense. China is far from an aggrevied partner on the missile defense problem. After all, it was they who helped Pakistan develope minature nuclear weapons size for ICBMs. It was the A.Q. Khan network that proliferated that technology to countries threatening American interests.
Is it coincidence that close, dependent Chinese allies North Korea and Iran have spent vast sums on long range missiles that might soon be able to threaten Chicago? This all happened, of course, post 1990.
The US can’t verify an Asat ban, especially with a country that is opaque as China. It is feasible to ban explosions in space as you suggested, but that is banning the crudest threat while other technologies are free to be developed and deployed.
Anonymous, while no one can second-guess Chinese thinking (and Westerners probably can’t even understand it beyond a certain point: ancient and independent China is far more alien to our point-of-view than the essentially European Soviet Union ever was), I think your views are a good analysis of the recent past and possibly even the present. I don’t think it’s relevant to the future. It looks to me like China has set on a more-or-less comprehensive challenge to the United States in most every sphere. How else do you explain their low key human space program? Their deliberate efforts (of mixed success) to develop long-range power projection with arial refueling?
I think China has a relatively clear understanding of where they are and where they are going, of what their great limitations are, and of how long it will take them to seriously challenge the United States (a long time). That said, there are clear irrationalities in their efforts (Taiwan; the ASAT test) that probably result from local disorganization and cultural fears, and that make it very dangerous to try to predict what they will do.
China clearly wants to become (and in many ways has become) a regional power, but I do think their long-term goals appear to go beyond that. The apparently deliberate pace is probably driven by an understanding of the limits to their current resources, an apparently unique understanding that sustainable military power must be based on first being an economic power, and the difficulty of what they want to do. Keep in mind that, to this date, there are only two (or maybe now 1.5) countries with truly global (non-ICBM) power projection — the United States and Britain (yes, don’t make Argentina’s mistake!).
China is very aware of that.
— Donald
Mark…
I agree with Brother Oberg that there are some implications for arms control agreements…but I would suggest that those implications are less. Had say John Edwards been President that might have pushed him into something, but they know he isnt (or likely to be) and the PRC is pretty sure, I suspect that the Current Administration wont budge at all from its “course”.
There are bigger implications of the test then just arms control…if the test had any real intended target, in my view it was at the E ring of the five Sided building near Lee’s old mansion.
The Reds have watched both the US military perform and the US political system perform during the “Iraq” thing. My guess is that they have drawn the conclusion from all of this, that while the US military is a formidable force, the US political system and the “will” for any real sustained type of military confrontation is “less” and growing less each day.
There will be (thankfully) a new Administration on Jan 20,2009, but any new administration; even McNasty or Rudy or Gore or any of the people percieved to “tell the truth” would, as a residue of the “why we went to Iraq” debacle would I think have a VERY VERY hard sell trying to get the American public to gen up…for a fight somewhere in China’s kaneck of the deck.
This even more so since the Chinese have enormous economic leverage (our debt a lot of manufactored products, Boeings) over our economy. In the long term a break down of that relationship would I think hurt both of us equally but I suspect that in the short term it would hurt the US a lot more.
I dont think that this administration could sell that there were fleas on dogs anymore…but any new administration would have a really high barrier to convince the American people to well come to the aid of TAiwan, fight for the Spratleys, or stop the Chinese from doing almost “anything” to a third party… This of course begs the question what we would use for land forces to do so..but assuming we had them..
The test was to tell the five sided building…dont count on your force multipliers…we can take them out.
And the political statement that goes with that is…and you wont do anything about it if we do.
The Chinese have already demonstrated that they can engage our airplanes and force them down and we “pause” a whole lot before trying to find a way to back things down.
Having a superb military is all fine and good, but it is a useless force unless there is the will to use it. And sustain its use until such time as “victory” is achieved. I think that will is running out.
Robert
“I agree with Jim Oberg that the Chinese are aiming for an arms control treaty which, like many such, they have the option to violate because such a treaty is unverifiable.”
That’s patently false for destructive ASAT capabilities that create space debris. We wouldn’t know about the breakup of FY-1C otherwise.
For non-destructive ASAT capabilities, I’d suggest reading Chapter 7 from Minimum Means of Reprisal (available on the web). Many of the same space-based systems used to support strategic missile defense can verify ASAT testing or attacks.
“In any case, a Chinese ASAT weapon is not meant to be defensive (the Chinese know perfectly well that the West is not going to launch an aggressive war on the Chinese homeland.)”
They don’t know that, though. We (the U.S.) threatened China’s homeland with nuclear strikes towards the end of the Korean War. At the time, China had no nuclear capability, and to this day, they refer to the episode as “nuclear blackmail”. Although our threat was in response to the troops that they sent across the border, understandably, they do not ever want such a nuclear threat to be levelled against their homeland ever again.
According to China’s strategic doctrine, retaining a small, minimally effective nuclear arsenal is the key to avoiding “nuclear blackmail” in the future. To the extent that future U.S. strategic missile defense systems and associated space-based systems effectively neuter China’s small nuclear arsenal, China wants to contain those systems to the maximum extent practical, whether that’s through their decades-long history of diplomacy on the issue or their pursuit of asymmetric countermeasures in response to developments over the past decade or so.
“It is meant to help provide China with a free hand when they decide to commit aggressive war (i.e. against Tawain, to name one target.)”
It would be foolish for China to use its ASAT capability offensively against U.S. satellites, especially military and intelligence reconnaissance satellites. Such an act is tantamount to a nuclear attack (those systems are critical to U.S. nuclear capabilities) and would invite a response far out of proportion to the benefit gained by China in an invasion of Taiwan. Because an ASAT attack threatens the systems that support nuclear capabilities, an ASAT attack only makes sense if a nation’s strategic nuclear defenses are threatened or as part of a strategic nuclear attack. (That’s why the U.S. and Soviets pursued ASAT capabilities at a couple points during the Cold War.)
Moreover, if China wanted an offensive ASAT capability, they would not have used the systems they did or pursued the test that they did. China only has a few tens of DF-21 missiles and most of those are dedicated to their nuclear arsenal. There are not enough non-nuclear DF-21s to incapacitate (or even seriously threaten) the U.S. satellite fleet, especially when the inevitable misses are taken into account. If the system was offensive in nature, China would want to protect it from attack. The best way to do that would be with one of their landmobile missile systems, but the test was from a static site. Finally, China would not have carried out such a test at all if they wanted to retain the element of surprise for a future offensive. Rather, what we have is a defensive demonstration of a numerically limited and immobile ASAT capability as part of a larger diplomatic and military strategy to contain U.S. strategic missile defense capabilities and preserve China’s small nuclear deterrent.
“It’s remarkable how consistently wrong a certain kind of arm chair analyst can be”
Please, unless you have military or intelligence credentials to share, no ad hominem attacks about armchair analysts when we’re all writing from our armchairs.
“when it comes to the intentions of tyrannical regimes. It’s been the same since Hitler started the Nazi arms buildup in the 1930s.”
To be clear, I’m not trying to be an apologist for China’s domestic policies. If one believes that those domestic policies are enough of a pretext for the U.S. to go to war with China, then one doesn’t really need to discuss whether China’s nascent ASAT capability is offensive or defensive in nature. Just take the moral high ground and start the crusade (probably on another blog dedicated to such issues).
But to the extent that China’s domestic policies are not a pretext for war, then I would argue that it’s important to understand the context of China’s history, strategic doctrine, point-of-view, and likely goals when it comes to the ASAT test. Without that context, the U.S. runs the risk of needless escalation. We’ve done enough of that recently with WMDs in Iraq and (now) Iranian military equipment.
My 2 cents… your mileage may vary… FWIW.
Mark…
Mark…
(sorry for the double post)..
Let me give you an example of how this plays out…I view this as very unllikely because I dont think that the Chinese ASAT is a mature technology…but…
Imagine that this administration gets intel that is 80 percent or so, but not obvious that Iran is about to test a special…and they decide to start swinging against Iran.
Right now unless that evidence was VERY VERY GOOD I bet about 1/2 or more of the American people would be oppossed to this. Most of the world would be completly oppossed to it.
But we start swinging.
The world outcry is very very bad, but we are swinging.
The Chinese decide that they are going to really be against it and take out say the oldest KH…
They stand up and say “we are doing this as a check on US aggression against IRAN that the world does not support”.
What would we do…send Condi over? Nuclear strike? Close down Walmart?
Right now I am not even sure that doing this would get the American people blown about the Chinese…
Robert
“I would say that Chinese defense planning pre 1990 is not relevant to China afterwards. Its wealth is vastly higher, its economic prospects for the future are commensurately higher since the 1980’s economic reforms revitalized a very backward society.”
But until and unless China translates some of that wealth into a larger strategic nuclear arsenal, their relative wealth does not change their strategic doctrine. They still have the smallest nuclear arsenal of any of the original five nuclear powers, and that arsenal is rendered impotent by even a modest strategic missile defense capability. It doesn’t matter that this doctrine is rooted in an experience dating back to the 1950s. It still applies, regardless of economics, as long as China relies on a small number of nukes.
“Look at what they are deploying rather than listen to what they are saying. Its a long list mirroring American offensive systems from AWAC’s to strategic cruise missiles to 4th generation strike fighters to quiet submarines and a home grown GPS system. None particularly defensive in nature.”
You may be right here. But I’d also note that these capabilities are no different than what many European powers are trying to develop as they also play catchup to the U.S. — and we wouldn’t necessarily ascribe offensive intentions to those nations.
“China is far from an aggrevied partner on the missile defense problem. After all, it was they who helped Pakistan develope minature nuclear weapons size for ICBMs. It was the A.Q. Khan network that proliferated that technology to countries threatening American interests.”
That’s a fair statement. It’s a very interesting evolution from nuke proliferation to BMDs to ASATs. Classic prisoner’s dilemma over multiple cycles of weapons development.
“Is it coincidence that close, dependent Chinese allies North Korea… spent vast sums on long range missiles that might soon be able to threaten Chicago?”
I dunno about that statement. Doesn’t square with China’s participation (really, lead) in the six-party talks. Based on China’s cooperation in those talks and the recent breakthrough on North Korean nukes, I think China views North Korea as an even greater regional problem than we view North Korea as a global problem.
Going back to your earlier post:
“Its fantasy to think they will allow the US Navy & Airforce the honored job of protecting Chinese supply lines as they stretch they globe. They will do that job themselves and sooner or later, we’ll see Chinese naval vessels in South America & African waters, even off the America mainland, just as the Soviets did. They will search for foreign bases as well as a means to support their own forces and project power. They are doing that right now in the Indian Ocean right to the mouth of the Persian Gulf.”
That’s an interesting scenario. Time will tell if China develops the kinds of naval and air capabilities necessary to project power so far. I don’t know of anything in their arsenal or under development with that kind of range, but we’ll see — could happen.
“China is a very aggressive country. Lets not forget the millions of their own killed over ideas during the Great Leap Forward. Lets not forget their continuing ethnic cleansing of Tibet. They invaded Vietnam in 1979. They continually claim islands from the Philippines to Japan. Of course Taiwan is continually threaten with destruction if they exercise democratic rights.”
Again, I don’t want to be an apologist for China’s past domestic actions and policies. But from China’s point-of-view, all the oppression, land-grabs, and threats you mentioned relate to their “One China” philosophy –these are all peoples and lands that China (right or wrong) has viewed as part of its undivided nation since time immemorial. I’m not sure we can take the aggression that China has demonstrated on issues that it views as internal politics and assume that they will extend that aggression on a global (or even regional) scale.
I’m not saying it couldn’t happen and I’m not defending what the Chinese government has done. I’m just saying that any Chinese aggression regarding the reintegration of Taiwan (for example) is driven by very different motives and very different levels of risk-taking versus, say, aggressive moves to control oil resources in the South China Sea (for example).
Good discussion… thanks for responding. Should probably get back to the ASAT topic at hand.
Anon, of course knowing your adversary is wise. I doubt we’ll run out of Sinologists over the next few decades….their job prospects look blazingly bright. Still, we’ll need to fight the complacency inherent to a life of studying Chinese political history with a few surprises of our own. I hope our government has the will for it.
> That’s patently false for destructive ASAT capabilities that create space debris. We wouldn’t know about the breakup of FY-1C otherwise.
Okay, a government space agency launches a satellite that collides with another government satellite, creating debris. Is that an ASAT?
(The agency is NASA and the satellite is called DART.)
> For non-destructive ASAT capabilities, I’d suggest reading Chapter 7 from Minimum Means of Reprisal (available
> on the web). Many of the same space-based systems used to support strategic missile defense can verify ASAT
> testing or attacks.
Okay, question 2. A government space agency launches a manned mission to rendezvous with a scientific satellite. It is publicly billed as a repair mission, but the test is secretly observed in mission control by high-ranking military officers. Is that an ASAT test? What space-based systems would answer this question?
(The agency is NASA is NASA, the mission is STS-41C, and the satellite is Solar Max.)
Question 3. A private company, financed by the French government, develops an unmanned system capable of docking with a communications satellite and taking over attitude control or moving it to a new orbit. Is that an ASAT? What space-based systems would answer this question?
Question 4. A government agency develops a ground-based laser that can shave a few atoms off a piece of space debris, altering its course enough that it will reenter the atmosphere after a few orbits. Is that an ASAT? What space-based systems will answer this question?
Question 5. The United States, Russia, China, France, and Great Britain have land- or sea-based missiles with nuclear warheads. Launching one of these warheads on a high trajectory can destroy enemy satellites. Is that an ASAT?
Will your ASAT ban ICBMs? SLBMs? The Space Shuttle? Rendezvous and docking systems? Orbital debris removal systems? What kind of space-based system can verify all these things?
>> “In any case, a Chinese ASAT weapon is not meant to be defensive (the Chinese know perfectly well that
>> the West is not going to launch an aggressive war on the Chinese homeland.)â€
> They don’t know that, though. We (the U.S.) threatened China’s homeland with nuclear strikes towards
> the end of the Korean War. At the time, China had no nuclear capability,
and to this day, they refer to the episode
> as “nuclear blackmailâ€. Although our threat was in response to the troops that they sent across the border,
> understandably, they do not ever want such a nuclear threat to be levelled against their homeland ever again.
A problem that could be avoided if they did not invade other nations again. Or shoot at US soldiers. Sorry, but a threat to use weapons against an enemy in wartime is not the same as “launching an aggressive war.”
> It would be foolish for China to use its ASAT capability offensively against U.S. satellites, especially military
> and intelligence reconnaissance satellites. Such an act is tantamount to a nuclear attack (those systems are critical
> to U.S. nuclear capabilities)
Test question 3: The Chinese force down a US military reconnaissance platform. Does the US President push the button and start World War III?
(The platform is an EP-3, the year is 2001, the President is George W. Bush, and he does not start World War III.)
The idea that the US should have no capability to respond to an incident except by destroying the world unrealistic. (Not to mention frightening.)
> Finally, China would not have carried out such a test at all if they wanted to retain the element of surprise for a future offensive.
There are many types of surprise in military operations. Most do not involve the use of a “secret weapon.” Japan tested torpedo bombers, but that did not prevent them from achieving surprise at Pearl Harbor.
Besides, how can you be sure they don’t have another ASAT weapon that they haven’t tested?
> But to the extent that China’s domestic policies are not a pretext for war, then I would argue that it’s important
> to understand the context of China’s history, strategic doctrine, point-of-view, and likely goals when it comes to
> the ASAT test. Without that context, the U.S. runs the risk of needless escalation. We’ve done enough of that
> recently with WMDs in Iraq and (now) Iranian military equipment.
“Si vis pacem, para bellum.”
“Okay, a government space agency launches a satellite that collides with another government satellite, creating debris. Is that an ASAT?
(The agency is NASA and the satellite is called DART.)”
Fair enough, you got me on that one. My recommendation regarding a ban on destructive ASAT testing should incorporate broader controls on space debris in general.
“Okay, question 2.
Question 3.
Question 4. Is that an ASAT? What space-based systems will answer this question?”
Again, see Minimal Means of Reprisal. You got to do your own imaging and elint homework.
“Will your ASAT ban ICBMs? SLBMs? The Space Shuttle? Rendezvous and docking systems? Orbital debris removal systems?”
No. The recommended ban was on destructive ASATs that create debris. None of those systems do that.
“Sorry, but a threat to use weapons against an enemy in wartime…”
You’re simplifying and generalizing a very specific and important historical case. A threat to employ nukes outside the field of battle and against population centers in country’s homeland carries a lot more weight and much graver consequences than a mere threat to use non-specific weapons in some generic wartime, especially when that nation has no nukes or strategic response with which to protect its homeland.
Again, I don’t want to look like Chinese sympathizer, but we have to able to see this from the other guy’s point-of-view to understand where they’re coming from and how we’ve mutually entered into the situation we’re in, even if in the end we don’t respect the other guy’s viewpoint.
“(The platform is an EP-3, the year is 2001, the President is George W. Bush, and he does not start World War III.)”
A very misleading analogy. There’s a huge difference between a sigint aircraft and an early warning satellite.
“The idea that the US should have no capability to respond to an incident except by destroying the world unrealistic. (Not to mention frightening.)”
Agreed. That’s why I recommended that we pursue non-destructive ASAT capabilities in parallel with a ban on destructive ASATs and space debris.
And although I didn’t write it in the initial post, I’d also recommend more serious efforts to establish responsive space capabilities over the long run (something I’m sure you agree with) so that we could recover more quickly in the event that we do get hoodwinked by a future ASAT attack.
“’Si vis pacem, para bellum.’â€
“War is a cowardly escape from the problems of peace.”
– Thomas Mann
FWIW…
“(The platform is an EP-3, the year is 2001, the President is George W. Bush, and he does not start World War III.)â€
A very misleading analogy. There’s a huge difference between a sigint aircraft and an early warning satellite.
…
yes…people are on the EP-3 and the Chinese came very very close to killing all of them.
Robert
“yes…people are on the EP-3 and the Chinese came very very close to killing all of them.”
I was referring to the fact that an early warning satellite is a critical piece of our strategic nuclear defense system. An attack on an early warning satellite would be viewed as only a little less serious than an attack on a Minuteman silo complex or Trident submarine.
The same does not hold true for a eavesdropping sigint aircraft, or even its crew.
But your point about the human crew is still well-taken.
anonymous wrote @ February 15th, 2007 at 7:59 am
“yes…people are on the EP-3 and the Chinese came very very close to killing all of them.â€
I was referring to the fact that an early warning satellite is a critical piece of our strategic nuclear defense system.
..
Hello
I mentioned a scenario in the thread how I think that the Chinese might use their ASAT.
I dont see them engaging a DSP for a couple of reasons. I dont think that the ASAT has the range to attack a DSP adn second a DSP attack would be viewed correctly as a prelude to a nuclear engagement. Our battle doctrine would with any DSP attack immediatly step up the DEFCON level.
I dont think that an ASAT attack on a national recce means satellite such as KH or Lacrosse or something else would be viewed in that way.
My guess is that an ASAT attack under the scenario I mentioned of say our oldest KH would be viewed and attacked upon precisly how the attack on teh EP-3 was viewed.
The “entertaining” (From a purely doctrine view) would be “would the response of this administration have been different had the EP-3 been lost”. It nearly was. And the lives lost with it?
The sad thing is that my guess is no.
The PRC and the USA have achieved a sort of “MAD” almost as effective as the MAD that existed with the Soviet Union. Our two economies are almost leaning square on each other right now. If we or they pull the plug the other one topples almost as badly. I would argue that theirs is the ecnoomy which is “growing” not ours and that is a long term problem.
But war is goverend within politics. Had the EP-3 crew been lost, were the Chinese to dump a KH were they to do (insert here) I would argue that there is a very high threshold that “here” has to be before we accept the consequences of an economic breakdown.
And they might think that as well.
Attacking a DSP is probably “that high”. It would be interpreted by our battle managers in only one way…
A KH?
Robert
> I was referring to the fact that an early warning satellite is a critical piece of our strategic nuclear defense system.
Yes, but they’re in GEO, and the recent Chinese ASAT is not thought(*) to have more than LEO capability. Optical/IR and radar imaging satellites (8 to 10) of them and defense meteorological satellites are the US LEO targets of interest. Do we love them enough to run the risk of nuclear strikes at CONUS if the PRC starts shooting them and we respond vigorously?
(*) Note that we in the public punditosphere don’t know much at all about the PRC ASAT. We’re guessing that it’s based on the DF-21, but don’t know that. We’re guessing that it was launched from a fixed site, but don’t know that. (The DF-21 is mobile.) We don’t have any particular guesses at all about the nature of the kill vehicle, how it homes, if it can be mounted on other boosters, etc.
Anonymous: “War is a cowardly escape from the problems of peace.â€
– Thomas Mann
Well quoted. Thank you.
— Donald
>> “Will your ASAT ban ICBMs? SLBMs? The Space Shuttle? Rendezvous and docking systems? Orbital debris removal systems?â€
> No. The recommended ban was on destructive ASATs that create debris. None of those systems do that.
Then it’s meaningless. The next time the Chinese want to test an ASAT, all they have to do is claim it’s an autonomous docking system like DART. (Actually, that’s pretty close to what they said this time.)
Imaging and elint can’t tell you whether they hit a satellite because of a malfunction or because they intended to. “Intent” generally comes from human intelligence, which is much harder to get and requires careful analysis. Which often turns out to be wrong anyway.
An ICBM warhead exploded at orbital altitude will create a lot more than debris. A treaty that encourages nations to use nukes instead of kinetic energy warheads is a very bad treaty.
>> “Sorry, but a threat to use weapons against an enemy in wartime…â€
> You’re simplifying and generalizing a very specific and important historical case. A threat to employ nukes
> outside the field of battle and against population centers in country’s homeland carries a lot more weight and
> much graver consequences than a mere threat to use non-specific weapons in some generic wartime, especially
> when that nation has no nukes or strategic response with which to protect its homeland.
I assume you’ve heard of Hiroshima? Nagosaki?
So, you disapprove of threatening to use nuclear weapons (only threatening — *NOT* actually using them) against a nation with three-quarters of a million troops shooting at US soldiers?
But you did propose using nukes in response to an attack on an unmanned satellite???
And as others have pointed out, the most likely targets of an ASAT attack are not ballistic early warning satellites.
> A very misleading analogy. There’s a huge difference between a sigint aircraft and an early warning satellite.
If you place a higher value on a piece of hardware than the lives of US servicemen. I think most Americans would disagree with that.
>> “The idea that the US should have no capability to respond to an incident except by destroying
>> the world unrealistic. (Not to mention frightening.)â€
> Agreed. That’s why I recommended that we pursue non-destructive ASAT capabilities in parallel with a ban
> on destructive ASATs and space debris.
Yes, in a later post. I was responding to your first post which suggested it was possible to have a verifiable ban on such weapons.
> “War is a cowardly escape from the problems of peace.â€
> – Thomas Mann
“The Bible says ‘Blessed are the peacemakers.’ That’s why I’m here with you (the US military) rather than that lot outside.” — Ronald Reagan
It’s interesting that you and Donald quote someone who was a supporter of Kaiser Wilhelm and later a Communist. Perhaps you mean the peace of the grave?
“The next time the Chinese want to test an ASAT, all they have to do is claim it’s an autonomous docking system like DART. ”
I don’t see your point. I’d much rather restrict China to the types of ASATs in which we have the technical lead and that don’t create dangerous space debris. If China wants to sign a ban on destructive, debris-creating ASATs, it would be a win for the U.S. (and other nations) on multiple counts.
“(Actually, that’s pretty close to what they said this time.)”
If you have a source indicating such, please point to it. I, for one, would be interested in reading it.
“So, you disapprove of threatening to use nuclear weapons (only threatening — *NOT* actually using them)”
Where did I say that I, personally, endorse the use of nukes?
“But you did propose using nukes in response to an attack on an unmanned satellite???”
Again, where did I say that I, personally, endorse the use of nukes?
I (and others in this thread) have stated that existing U.S. strategic doctrine places ASAT attacks on certain critical satellites on the same (or nearly the same) footing as attacks on our nuclear arsenal. China surely knows this and is thus less likely to be pursuing their DF-21 ASAT with offensive intent, at least against those targets. They know they’d be opening Pandora’s box if they did so.
We’re just re-stating known doctrine and logically trying to extrapolate China’s thinking in response. That doesn’t me we (I) personally would approve of such a nuclear response. Please separate analysis of existing U.S. military doctrine and likely foreign responses from my personal views on nukes. You, and anyone else on this blog, know nothing about the latter.
“If you place a higher value on a piece of hardware than the lives of US servicemen. I think most Americans would disagree with that.”
Ugh… please don’t question my ethics and views on the value of human life when I’m just stating the obvious likelihood that the U.S. is much more likely to go to DEFCON-4 over an attack on an early warning satellite than over a captured flight crew.
Human life is obviously a precious thing. Capturing a flight crew threatens a few lives. But taking out an early warning satellite could be part of a pre-emptive nuclear strike that threatens millions of lives. Hence the difference in likely U.S. response.
Again, please separate analysis of likely U.S. military responses from my personal ethics.
“Yes, in a later post. I was responding to your first post”
No, not in a later post. Here’s the relevant quote from the original post:
“Although the Bush II Administration does not want to put a ban on space weapons in a treaty, the U.S. could (and should) pursue a ban on space debris from destructive ASAT testing or actual use. With more satellites than any other nation, it is in U.S. interests to contain the space debris threat and maintain the utility of Earth orbit, even if we do not ban all ASAT weapons outright. Moreover, such a ban would immediately render China’s debris-creating DF-21 ASAT “stick†impotent, effectively removing their asymmetric threat from the playing field. With our technological lead, we could simultaneously pursue other, non-destructive and even reversible ASAT weapons, including electronic jammers, lasers, and even parasitic satellites. China’s primitive ASAT capability would be left in the dust (or on the negotiating table), while preserving more advanced and flexible ASAT options for ourselves.”
Very clearly in the third and fourth sentences, I stated that the U.S. should pursue a variety of advanced, non-debris ASATs in tandem with a ban on destructive, debris-creating ASATs.
Please don’t make false accusations about what I have (or have not) written.
“It’s interesting that you and Donald quote someone who was a supporter of Kaiser Wilhelm and later a Communist.”
And there it is. When you feel that you can’t win a debate on logic or evidence or even a quote contest, resort to name-calling. Yes, we’re all war-mongering imperialists and commies here except for you.
In between the name-calling, false accusations, and assaults on personal codes of ethics, I think you might have a good point or two that’s worthy of debate. I share many of your views on the NASA threads, and I think we might have a little common ground on this thread. But it’s practically impossible to get to the content through all the static. Please dial it down. This should be a discussion between adults, not a playground pissing contest.
Why spend all the money to send up an interceptor when you can just use electronic warfare against our space assets? You can use off the shelf componants to jam GPS, or ground based lasers to blind sensors, and neither technology can be banned or inspected with any ease. Sure interceptors look cool on computer generated videos, but in an “Space Pearl Harbor” they will not be the weapon of choice. An ASAT test is a political message, not a military one. We better make darn sure we understand exactly what they are REALLY saying.
>> “The next time the Chinese want to test an ASAT, all they have to do is claim it’s an autonomous docking system like DART. â€
> I don’t see your point. I’d much rather restrict China to the types of ASATs in which we have the technical lead
> and that don’t create dangerous space debris.
My point is that since your treaty would only restrict China from acknowledging ASAT tests, not conducting them.
>> “(Actually, that’s pretty close to what they said this time.)â€
> If you have a source indicating such, please point to it. I, for one, would be interested in reading it.
From Aviation Week: “‘China conducted a scientific and technical experiment,’ Cao said, according to a Kyodo News report”
> We’re just re-stating known doctrine and logically trying to extrapolate China’s thinking in response. That doesn’t
> me we (I) personally would approve of such a nuclear response.
The doctrine you’re restating is unworkable, if not suicidal. I doubt the Chinese are stupid enough to think any US President would do that, just because some paper says he should.
> Human life is obviously a precious thing. Capturing a flight crew threatens a few lives. But taking out an
> early warning satellite could be part of a pre-emptive nuclear strike that threatens millions of lives. Hence
> the difference in likely U.S. response.
As many people have pointed out, early warning satellites are not the only (or most likely) target for an ASAT attack. Why do you keep harping back to that?
“Why spend all the money to send up an interceptor when you can just use electronic warfare against our space assets? You can use off the shelf componants to jam GPS, or ground based lasers to blind sensors, and neither technology can be banned or inspected with any ease. Sure interceptors look cool on computer generated videos, but in an “Space Pearl Harbor†they will not be the weapon of choice.”
Agreed.
“An ASAT test is a political message, not a military one.”
Based on what I’ve read, I think that’s spot on.
“We better make darn sure we understand exactly what they are REALLY saying.”
Amen.
>> “An ASAT test is a political message, not a military one.â€
> Based on what I’ve read, I think that’s spot on.
>> “We better make darn sure we understand exactly what they are REALLY saying.â€
> Amen.
Yes, but human beings are famously incompetent when it comes to reading minds. Frequently we get it wrong even when we’re honestly trying, sometimes disastrously so. Even more often, we come up with interpretations that promote our already determined agendas — the PRC ASAT test is a case in point from both the levo and dextro points of view.
What at some point, maybe during a walk in the woods or over a nice lunch with the right people, the Chinese really need to do is to let the US know in a believable and somewhat convincing way just what message, if any, the test was meant to convey. If it was a mistake, a bit of excessive zeal on the part of the PLA, that could also be conveyed.
Otherwise, the US is probably going to, rightly, regard it as what it appeared to be — a step toward a capability to destroy US satellites in LEO for purely military purposes. (Not, IMO, that such a perception would necessarily be a bad thing. The US has been dealing with the other-country ASAT problem by avoidance and denial for way too long. Again IMO.)
Anon. wrote @ February 16th, 2007 at 11:26 am
. We better make darn sure we understand exactly what they are REALLY saying….
A few points.
First I dont look for a “space Pearl Harbor”…that would almost be impossible. There are, as has been stated here about 10-20 “realistic” ASAT targets and a “time on target” to negate all of them, or even the more important ones all at the same time would be well very very difficult.
Space assets and their battle engagement are not where you do your “Pearl Harbors”…they are where you do both battle management…and you send poltiical messages while in battle with them.
IN the case of the Chinese…they might in some scenarios become the functional equivelent of CONUS targets in various battle scenarios where we start striking targets on the Chinese mainland. I can for instance in some sort of (very unlikely right now) fight over Taiwan see us making strikes (we would almost have to) on Chinese mainland targets. One target I can them engaging in retaliation is our KH and Lacrosse assets. NOt only would they have military significance, but they would have political significance as well.
The GPS satellites are even harder to actually engage and GPS jammers are (as of yet) not that efficient against modern military receivers.
AS for understanding what they are “REALLY SAYING” …that might be next to impossible. It really doesnt matter actually what they are really saying “now” if they continue to develop the capability…because what they are really saying “now” could easily be replaced by new words and actions latter.
It is foolish I think to believe that the Chinese will say with our assymetric space recee capability “we will let you have it while we develop our own”…when that may take sometime. Any prudent battle manager in the PRC would say “until we have it, and even when we do, I need the capability to negate what is now a SINGULAR American advantage in armed conflict”.
Events will in the future I think say a lot about what they are trying to do..as much as the words that they speak.
Robert
Anonymous,
Thanks for the thoughtful analysis of the Chinese mind, and what is behind their actions. It makes sense.
WHITTINGON said: It’s remarkable how consistently wrong a certain kind of arm chair analyst can be when it comes to the intentions of tyrannical regimes. It’s been the same since Hitler started the Nazi arms buildup in the 1930s.
The difference here is that Hitler TOLD us all what he was going to do. It was black & white … he wrote a book saying what he intended to do. The facts were all there to see, we just ignored what the FACTS were saying.
Mr. Whittington, you have made an assertion, and I am willing to consider it, but now it is time to back it up. If you are serious about showing us all the errors in “anonymous” analysis, then you need to provide facts, and a reasoned argument. Show us the “book”!
“Rommel, you magnificent bastard. I read your book.” – Patton (The Movie)
In a debate in which both parties make assertions, but only party provides facts and a reasoned analysis … who do you think is going to win?
BTW, my assertion continues to be that the real threat to the U.S. from China is 1-2 generations away. I am persuaded that their economy will continue to grow at a significantly faster pace than the U.S. economy for perhaps the next Century (following the same trend as other emerging Asian economies) and that they will soon surpass the U.S. GDP and eventually double the U.S. GDP (or more). To prove that I can “walk the walk, and not just “talk the talk”, I provided a reasoned analysis, based on facts, in support of my assertion on April 6, 2006 at 9:14 pm at:
http://www.spacepolitics.com/2006/03/31/waving-the-red-flag-once-again/
The “China strategy” of the U.S. needs to take the “possibility” into account that my assertion is an accurate picture of the future.
I have heard others suggest skepticism of my economic assertion, but nobody has backed up that skepticism with an ounce of reasoned economic theory. Until somebody does, I have to write off the skepticism as “wishful thinking” that China will pull a Brazil (even though all the evidence suggests that China can reproduce the economic results of other successful Asian countries.)
– Al